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Preface
“The solution often turns out more beautiful than the puzzle.” Richard Dawkins
Thinking about where I came from, I cannot help but be extremely grateful 
for how different puzzle pieces fell into places to pave the way for an academic 
path. Where I come from, the best thing that was possible was to only finish high 
school, find a job and spend a lifetime trying (and failing) to get to the other side 
of the wall. In this world, life is solely defined by extreme poverty, violence and 
resignation. And yet, I found solace in reading books, particularly books on his-
torical events and politics. My passion for knowledge was awoken and I started to 
ask questions—sometimes too many and too critical. When my guardian forced 
me to leave high school at the age of 14 and pushed me into working as a waste 
picker in a neighboring dumpsite, this passion for knowledge served as the rock 
of my resistance. She falsely and maliciously denounced me as a drug addict to 
get me expelled, but with the help of my teachers, she was proved to be lying. 
She eventually agreed under the condition that I worked to pay for my school 
expenses, which I was already doing for years. I eventually moved out at 16 to 
pursue my B.A. studies in Philosophy with the help of the Marian Missionaries of 
the Holy Cross and a scholarship grant from the university treasurer, Father Rob-
erto Pinto, O.P., of the University of Santo Thomas in Manila. With unimaginable 
luck, perseverance, and the good intentions of sponsors, scholarship committees, 
and mentors, many years later I wrote this manuscript as a requirement for a pro-
fessorship qualification degree. I am now, finally, where I want to be.
In the last eleven years, I have explored different “training grounds” to collect 
the necessary academic and professional expertise as well as the methodological 
and technical skills to enable me to see different views and versions of the big-
ger picture. My employment (2008–2010) as a researcher and program coordina-
tor of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program, which, during 
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my time, was hosted by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) (now hosted by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) 
in Hamburg), was my first academic training ground. The PIN steering commit-
tee members at that time, Prof. Dr Gunnar Sjöstedt, Prof. Dr I. William Zartman, 
Prof. Dr Oliver Faure, Ambassador Franz Cede, Prof. Dr Rudolf Avenhaus, Prof. 
Dr Rudolf Schüssler, Prof. Dr Mark Anstey, Paul Meerts, Prof. Dr Fen Osler 
Hampson, Prof. Dr Valerie Rosoux, Mordechai Melamud, and Prof. Dr Victor 
Kremenyuk accepted me as one of their own. Working with these bright minds 
was very illuminating and is something I would recommend highly. The projects 
that I coordinated, such as the Caspian Dialogue, the research on climate change 
negotiations, and the large-scale simulation of the point-of-entry negotiations for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization were the first cases of 
negotiations that I became familiar with. Eventually, the negotiation perspective 
and systems analysis as a method of scientific inquiry became the main founda-
tions of my academic profile. I also learned how to develop negotiation games to 
better explain the challenges of multilateral decision-making. I internalized the 
idea that conflicts and differences are not part of the problem, but are opportu-
nities to advance human well-being. Here, my eyes were trained to look at pro-
cesses.
It was also during these first years that I finished my doctoral studies at the 
University of Vienna in Austria and afterwards my second PhD at the Univer-
sity of Cologne in Germany. While the first thesis was on identity-building in the 
Philippines, the second was on facilitating decision-making processes. My super-
visors Prof. Dr. Eva Kreisky and Prof. Dr. Thomas Jäger trained me to ask the 
appropriate questions and seek and find the probable answers to these questions, 
but to still doubt the answers that I found. I learned that when answers become 
self-evident, they cease to be useful.
Afterwards, I was employed as a (post-doc) researcher at the Institute for 
Infrastructure and Resources Management (IIRM) at the University of Leip-
zig (2011–2014). As part of the Faculty of Economics and Business Manage-
ment Science, this training ground made me realize that there are different entry 
points to understanding problems. My main task at IIRM was to support Prof. Dr 
Thomas Bruckner in his function as the coordinating lead author of the chapter 
on energy systems of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the Third Working 
Group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This position 
exposed me to management styles based upon knowledge cooperation. In addi-
tion, I assisted him in his lectures on the integrated assessment of the impacts of 
climate change by preparing obligatory readings, writing the script and the reader 
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for the lecture, standing in for the professor when he was away and conducting 
his lectures, formulating questions for the examinations, evaluating students’ 
outputs (exams, term papers) and supervising eight master’s theses. As I under-
took a course in pedagogy during my master’s studies, I particularly enjoyed 
supporting the faculty’s two master’s degrees: The Joint International Master of 
Sustainable Development and the German-Russian Double Master of Interna-
tional Energy Economics and Business Administration. In my free time, I took 
additional courses and received training in scenario-building and scientific mod-
els such the TIMES-VEDA modeling course offered by the Energy Technology 
Systems Analysis Program (ETSAP), which is part of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). Fortunately, my four-year position as Chapter Scientist (Assistant) 
of the IPCC AR5 chapter on energy systems required me to read thousands of 
articles, books, and reports on the role of energy systems in mitigating climate 
change and reading the work of these and other authors allowed me to synthesize 
everything that is known (and still unknown) about the related issues. In addi-
tion, I was tasked with reading, collecting, evaluating, classifying and even pro-
posing responses to more than 6,000 pieces of feedback and reviews of hundreds 
of experts from all over the world for the different drafts of the chapter. This task 
in particular developed my understanding of the critical aspects behind techni-
cal issues, as well as the policy relevance of technological innovation. After two 
years, I was already confident enough to teach more than 500 students in more 
than 15 seminars and lectures on climate change, energy systems and energy & 
environmental politics not only at the University of Leipzig, but also at other uni-
versities in Spain, Estonia, Mexico, Jamaica and the Philippines, which was made 
possible by EU teaching mobility programs. Connecting my expertise in nego-
tiations and decision-making to my newly found technical expertise in related 
environmental issues and appropriate methods of scientific inquiry, I developed 
innovative simulation games as an experimental approach to revisiting theoretical 
concepts, which were extremely useful in my courses. They were also a great deal 
of fun for the students and for myself. To sum up, this position enabled me to 
explain the relevant issues in the context of complexity and uncertainty.
My employment at the Fraunhofer Institute for International Management 
and Knowledge Economy (Fraunhofer IWM) in Leipzig (2014–2016) was a dif-
ferent training ground. It exposed me to a different research landscape, where 
applied research project acquisition was highlighted. I spent thousands of hours 
writing research grant proposals, building up networks for research consorti-
ums and managing applied research projects. The highlight of this position was 
when I was tasked by GIZ and CARICOM to support the development of the 
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curriculum for the master’s degree in Sustainable Energy and Climate Change at 
the University of Technology in Kingston, Jamaica. For this project, I designed 
and implemented 7 of the 12 modules (sustainable energy systems, energy and 
environmental data management, environmental policies & politics, sustainable 
transport, smart grid management, ocean resource management, and energy man-
agement in buildings and industry). For each module, I wrote a module script 
for lecturers and a workbook for students. For me, it was important to highlight 
the Caribbean and Jamaican context in each of the modules. For this, aside from 
months of literature research, I conducted a series of face-to-face interviews with 
Jamaican policy-makers and local stakeholders. With the help of Prof. Dr Andrew 
Isaacs and Prof. Dr Ruth Potopsingh, I visited and discussed concrete issues with 
decision-makers in several ministries, Jamaican bus companies, the Jamaica 
chamber of commerce, the railway company, industry representatives, NGOs, and 
other local academes. I rented a car and drove through Jamaica visiting energy 
utilities, grid stations, communities dependent on mining companies, and housing 
projects with smart technologies to experience the context. In addition, I was able 
to personally teach the module on Environmental Policies & Politics to 16 Jamai-
can professionals from different sectors. This experience vindicated my approach 
towards highlighting stakeholders’ perspectives when understanding technical 
issues. This training ground allowed me to learn how to understand the prefer-
ences and behavior of actors and use this understanding as an entry point to solu-
tions.
My fellowship at the Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation 
Research (KHK/CGCR) at the University of Duisburg-Essen (2016–2017) gave 
me the space and time to connect all the dots. For a year, I immersed myself 
in academic discussions to better understand the role of cooperation as a frame-
work of decision-making. During the various KHK/CGCR research colloquia, 
I listened and was inspired by the discussions on concrete areas of cooperation 
such as development assistance cooperation, peace-building and migration. I pre-
sented my initial ideas on this book. At first, I found myself struggling to find a 
cohesive storyline when considering the different aspects that I want to connect. 
I simply needed structure. With the guidance of my fellow colleagues Prof. Dr 
Sigrid Quack, Prof. Dr Jon Hovi, Prof. Dr Aridl Underdahl, Dr Katja Freistein, 
Prof. Dr Babacar Kante, Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel, Prof. Dr Larry Crump, Dr 
Xavier Mathieu, Dr Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby, Prof. Dr Detlef Sprinz, 
and Matthias Schuler, among others, the structure of my book slowly emerged. 
During this time, I also presented early drafts of selected parts of this book at dif-
ferent international conferences, such as the 2017 WISC Conference in Taiwan, 
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the 2017 Risk and Asia Conference in Duisburg, and the 2017 Global Studies 
Conference in Singapore, where I received constructive and valuable input from 
peers. In addition, my presentation at the 2017 Research Forum @ UBT Philos-
ophy in Bayreuth, Germany, through the invitation of Prof. Dr Rudolf Schüssler, 
was a welcome reality check, which made me re-evaluate the sense and purpose 
of this book.
The chapter on knowledge diplomacy, the prescriptive part and the conclusion 
of this book was completed during the first six months of my employment at the 
German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
and at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) (2018–2019). 
Through these two positions, I found the solution to my ‘anti-climax’ dilemma. 
How should I end the book in a way that it does not disappoint? These positions 
made me realize that the best way to end is to look at the beginning. My discus-
sions with colleagues, particularly from Managing Global Governance Program 
(Dr Sven Grimm, Dr Wulf Reiners, Dr Tatjana Reiber, Dr Anna Schwachula, Dr 
Johanna Vogel) and SDSN Germany (Adolf Kloke-Lesch, Janina Sturm, Jacque-
line Götze), helped me clarify the remaining issues relating to the sense and pur-
pose in this book. So, what happens now with the knowledge I have developed? 
How can I make my research transformative? How can I encourage people to lis-
ten to what this book has to say? The results of these discussions are the last three 
chapters of this book.
My main confidante for this book was my main supervisor, Prof. Dr Dirk 
Messner. His passion for knowledge surpasses even that of my own. His profes-
sional and personal guidance was more than what a student can usually expect 
from a mentor, especially as this mentor is one of the busiest people of my 
acquaintance. Our discussions were phenomenal, and I one day hope to be able to 
structure my thoughts in the way he does.
Special thanks are to be given to Anni Hellwig, Nora Pierau, and Conny Horn-
schild who supported me in editing the language of this work. I appreciate the 
assistance given to me by the University of Duisburg-Essen, especially the efforts 
made by Prof. Dr. Michael Käding. Thank you also to the funding agencies, such 
as the DLR, GIZ, BMBF, DAAD, EU Mobility, and especially the Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit in Duisburg for the valuable financial grants and assistance that made 
this book possible.
Finally, my incredible journey would not have been possible without my 
friends and family. I found friends and Wegbegleiter such as Gunnar & Eva Licke, 
George Lemon, Astra, Grazie, Christoph, Tita Jojo (and the PGG community 
in Vienna, Austria), Yuni, Tanja, Steffi, Raquel, Tobias, Judith, Fatma, Ferhat, 
xii Preface
Andreas, Jing, Adrian, Teagan, Reto, Philipp, Klaus and Gregor, who stood by 
me through the years. I cherish my former work colleagues such as Tanja Huber, 
Romeo Molina, Amalia Priyatna, Suchitra Subramanian, Maren Rath, Theresa 
Weinsziehr, Hendrik Kondziella, Mart Verhoog, Mario Götz, Angel de la Vega 
Navarro, Urban Kaiser, and Henrik Beerman who inspired me in various ways. 
My family (mother Lagrimas, stepfather Ian Henry, sisters MJ and Gigi and 
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Introduction—That Big Green Elephant 
in the Room
Transformations, transitions and structural changes are not new to human civiliza-
tion. Transitions can be emergent, that is, a subservient response to changes such 
as technological breakthroughs, or purposive, that is, a strategically instigated 
effort to achieve certain goals. Changes are constantly occurring and define identi-
ties, aspirations and how we see our human nature (Menschenbild), how we inter-
act with each other, and how we make sense of the world (Weltbild). Changes can 
also be both fortuitous and expected. It is often during sudden changes that we 
feel disoriented, our identities dismantled, and that our way of life is threatened. 
Changes can cause ambivalence towards the stability of our political, economic 
or social systems. While some changes can be ground-breaking in improving the 
quality of human lives, they can also involve backlashes, which, if not properly 
understood and facilitated, can lead to system ruptures and the collapse of funda-
mental values and social contracts. Very often, transition periods are confronted 
by vacuums that may pave the way to “horrendous events” such as the violent sei-
zure of power by armed groups or the suspension of habeas corpus fraudulently 
justified by the need to restore stability. Unstable systems promote the ‘roman-
ticizing’ of nostalgic memories of the past when ‘everything worked,’ whereas 
other conditions such as a high mortality rate, non-existent welfare system or poor 
living conditions are neglected. Particularly when the imminent change or the 
public call for changes was met by violence by those ‘status quo agents’ in power, 
the caveat against using violence from all sides diminishes as “challenging times” 
can suddenly legitimate excessive use of coercion or the disregard for the rule of 
law. As Ian Bremmer (2018) contends in his book “Us vs. Them: The Failure of 
Globalism,” insecurities behind paradigm-shifting changes such as globalization 
have paved the way to the current emergence of the “era of strongmen.”
Transformations and transitions are often linked to subversion through which 
existing principles and norms are changed, leading to changes in power relations, 
1
© The Author(s) 2021 
A. M. Hernández, Taming the Big Green Elephant, Globale Gesellschaft und 
internationale Beziehungen, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-31821-5_1
2 1 Introduction—That Big Green Elephant in the Room
which mostly motivate those in power to delay or even reject transitions. Individ-
ual societies may react differently to a specific change depending on the ‘Zeit-
geist’ of change. These differences in ‘absorption’ and ‘diffusion’ of change can 
be attributed to existing lock-ins and path dependencies that are deeply rooted 
in socio-political systems. Change also depends on the availability of and trust 
(social capital) in formal and informal channels for change agents who can push 
for change within established provisions. For example, in societies with low social 
capital, changes in power relations can be fatal, especially when the narrative 
“the winner takes it all” defines contestation. Powerful actors can resist change, 
because of the perceived threat to the power. At the same time, weaker actors can 
resist change, because they perceive that changes will only deteriorate their posi-
tions. Because existing structural inequalities, for example, may limit the scope 
and functionality of representation and verification, they might fear being pow-
erless when burdens are disproportionately distributed to them. Hence, it remains 
difficult for academe to grasp the real meaning of change for each actor, often 
because of the lack of precedents. It is also almost impossible to determine the 
‘retrospective’ value of something that has allegedly prevented negative effects.
Because this book intends to address transformation towards sustainability, one 
must inevitably look for other “Great Transformations” to understand and explain 
the dynamics, issues and effects behind such metamorphoses. One example of 
such a Great Transformation is the industrial revolution, which is often seen as 
the event that foreshadowed modernity (see Hobsbawm 1965; Riello & O’Brien 
2009). The industrial revolution was responsible for major shifts in human rela-
tions that resulted not only in positive effects linked with urbanization, the emer-
gence of the middle class, economic growth and changes in the role of women in 
society, but also in negative effects such as air pollution, child labor, and inhu-
mane labor conditions (see Scott & Baltzly 1958; Stearns 1993). In addition, 
industrialization was instrumental in justifying colonialism and imperialism as 
reflected by the narrative of civilizing others as a ‘White Man’s Burden’ and a 
“noble enterprise of civilization” (see Chrisholm 1982; Murphy 2010). A rather 
speculative and yet compelling question is whether these negative effects were 
necessary for development or if they could have been relativized or even pre-
vented if decision-making was inclusive. If the multiple trade-offs were already 
clear and properly understood, and if the weak had credible representation in the 
policy-making process, would economic growth still have been attained? Was 
child labor in factories a necessary evil of the Industrial Revolution?
Centuries later, human civilization is experiencing another kind of revolu-
tion—one that is driven by ‘sustainable low carbon’ developmental goals. Like 
the industrial revolution, this sustainable low carbon development is highly 
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dependent upon technological advancement. However, in contrast to the Indus-
trial Revolution, it was initially motivated by threats to human welfare such as 
climate change, environmental degradation, social inequality and diminishing 
resources, with solutions requiring fundamental changes in structures, paradigms, 
institutions, behavior, and identities. It is therefore purposive, which, unlike 
the Industrial Revolution, was more of an emergent occurrence. Nevertheless, 
this “great ‘green’ revolution” is inhibited by several complex problems, multi-
ple trade-offs and dilemmas such as the public good dilemma, normative traps, 
the prisoner’s dilemma, the not-in-my-backyard dilemma, and the indecisive-
ness dilemma. These dilemmas require proper, additional reconceptualization 
to adequately address the specificities of sustainable low carbon development. 
The absence of a proper understanding of numerous factors and causalities will 
not only lead to missed opportunities but will also empower those who wish to 
discredit the essence of changes. The failure to effectively address the negative 
aspects and fatal synergies linked to sustainable low carbon development has 
supported or even mobilized counter-movements such as anti-intellectualism, 
anti-factualism, anti-establishment, anti-globalization, anti-environmentalism, 
and anti-liberalism that threaten to reverse “hard fought” advancement in climate 
protection and sustainable development.
The parable of the blind men and an elephant can elucidate the complexity 
and uncertainty of sustainable low carbon transformation. The parable is about 
a group of blind men, who have never come across an elephant before and who 
learn and conceptualize what the elephant is like by touching it. Because each 
blind man feels a different and distinct part of the elephant, their individual 
description of the elephant is expected to contrast to those of the others. My entry 
point as one of the “blind men” is the linkage between multiple policy goals 
to achieve sustainable low carbon development. While these policy goals are 
inter-related, they are still addressed separately not only in the international sys-
tem, but also by national governments and local communities. Each one of these 
often has its own socio-political and socio-linguistic context, set of (status quo or 
change) agents and (domestic/endogenous or global) audience.
This book employs a ‘negotiative’ and systems perspective as well as a pro-
cess outlook on sustainable low carbon transformation. As such, I look not 
only at agents, context, audience, sectors and subsystems relevant to transitions 
towards sustainability, but also at processes including functional, institutional, 
and bargaining interactions that define collective, multi-level, and fragmented 
decision-making. The reason for this ‘integrated’ approach is that the success 
of transformations will most likely depend not solely on technical solutions but 
also on how consensus is negotiated and how decisions and actions promoting 
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 sustainability become self-enforcing. In addition, the stability of the transition 
process will depend on its agents, context, and audience, implying the relevance 
of sociotechnical narratives in ensuring legitimacy.
1.1  Research Objectives
1.1.1  Background
Studies of global transformation are often regarded as highly ambitious. The dif-
ficulty of studying (global) transformation starts with the term “transformation” 
and continues with the question of “what transforming actually is”. Synonyms 
of transformation include shift, transition, structural change, conversion, revolu-
tion, transfiguration, transmogrification, switch and metamorphosis. Furthermore, 
related disciplines such as international relations, history, sociology, anthropol-
ogy, and political science are still struggling to fully understand and grasp global 
transformation as a subject of scholarly work. One reason for this is that while 
transformation touches on concepts or categories that transcend disciplinary 
boundaries, fundamental research questions tend to be formulated using “boxes 
of disciplines.” As such, academic debates on global transformation towards sus-
tainability tend to be ‘fragmented’ and therefore limited within each scholarly 
discipline. In addition, the answers provided by these disciplines rather create 
more questions instead of providing useful answers.
Another challenge refers to the process of how notions behind concepts are 
established and reinforced. Current concepts of global transformation may 
include ‘faulty assumptions’ that further blur the understanding of the contem-
porary world. Because analyzing transformation will touch upon human cogni-
tion, such intentions, motivations, preferences, and decisions can also be made 
out of ignorance (“omission”) or out of malicious motives and intentions (“com-
mission”) (see Spranca et al. 1991). For example, referring to global transforma-
tion as merely changes in the global economy may be too simplistic and therefore 
misleading, because it fails to provide understanding of non-monetary values 
such as social trust and cohesion which are necessary to define human well-being.
The difficulty of studying global transformation is further aggravated when 
transformation is linked to sustainability, which is itself a normative concept. This 
particular coupling of transformation and sustainability has increasingly gained 
attention from both academe and policy-makers, because of the distinct ‘body’ that 
emerges. Global transformation towards sustainability is a concert of multiple and 
multi-level linkages. Many universities across the globe are now incorporating the 
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study of transformation/transitions towards sustainability in their curricula, with 
many others starting to branch out into more specialized areas of this emerging dis-
cipline including, for example, climate, environment, energy, water, governance, 
policy, regulations and business. In addition, several governments have created spe-
cial agencies to address this linkage. For example, China’s Third Plenary Session 
of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China initiated the cre-
ation of the task force “National Governance Capacity for Green Transformation” 
and mandated it to propose a comprehensive framework for enhancing governance 
capacity for a successful green transformation through 2030 (CCICED 2015).
1.1.2  Objectives
The primary objective of this book is to provide a comprehensive and integrated 
analytical framework that promotes understanding of multi-level (global, 
national, local and sectoral) transformation towards sustainability. This ana-
lytical framework seeks to contribute and enrich the current discourse on trans-
formation towards sustainability by linking climate protection and sustainable 
development not only to each other, but also with transformation/transition stud-
ies, change management, negotiation and conflict management studies, and with 
decision analysis. This linkage will not only necessitate new methodologies and 
assessment approaches but also new concepts that specifically address issues and 
dynamics that only arise through this linkage. This analytical framework that is 
built upon negotiative and systems perspectives as well as process outlook aims to 
help define, design and facilitate functional, institutional, and bargaining interac-
tions to align collective actions in order to execute the principles of sustainability.
Interestingly, due to the conceptual and methodological challenges of studying 
global transformation towards sustainability, the formulation of concrete objec-
tives of this book has already entailed the justification of arguments as well as the 
clarification of the rationales and logic behind these objectives. These rationales 
and logic will be further elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4. These objectives are:
1. The Sharp-edging of the inter-, multi- and trans-disciplinarity of studying 
global transformation towards sustainability:
a. Understanding and concretization of conceptual and receptive gaps that 
arise through the enforcement of closing or blurring boundaries between 
disciplines
b. Identification and assessment of ‘discriminative contrasts’ that paradoxi-
cally promote learning about transformation towards sustainability
1.1 Research Objectives
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2. Support more strategic and purposive approaches in planning, designing 
and implementing new branches of studies of transformation towards sus-
tainability:
a. The effective design and implementation of new curricula or subdisciplines 
that highlight trade-offs by ‘coupling’ issues such as human rights and cli-
mate change, sustainable development and law, energy systems and gov-
ernance.
b. Identification of new channels or venues for academic discourse, particu-
larly when considering ‘peripheral scholars’ from the Global South who do 
not have access to conventional scholarly channels such as peer-reviewed 
journals and conferences.
3. Promote the adequate combination of incremental (step-by-step), regres-
sive (going back to basics), decremental (backward-sorted) and saltatory 
(leapfrogging, by leaps and bounds) learning in a global transformation 
towards sustainability:
a. The critical assessment of varying paces of development among sectors and 
technologies (e.g., efficient procurement procedures in the energy sector) 
through incremental learning.
b. A pragmatic and yet critical evaluation of ‘best practices’, for example 
among traditional modes of governance, which highlights the advantages of 
regressive and decremental learning (critiques of modernity).
c. The efficient and critical design of innovative concepts that aim to circum-
vent traditional stages of development through saltatory learning.
4. Advance academic and public discourse on transformation towards sus-
tainability by highlighting linkages that uncover new conflict cleavages, 
co-benefits, synergies, fatal synergies, caveats, trade-offs, positive and neg-
ative externalities as well as self-enforcing dynamics resulting from such 
linkages:
a. The identification of novel approaches and methodologies to grasp and 
resolve collaboration and coordination problems, including the prisoner’s 
dilemma, free-riding, and the indecisiveness dilemma.
b. The delegitimization of “counterfactual” claims on global transformation 
towards sustainability.
c. An assessment of the ontological and epistemological baggage of ideas, 
concepts and notions to allow out-of-the-box thinking and to prevent 
the reproduction of ‘cognitive lock-ins’ that frame the understanding of 
 causalities.
d. The evaluation of transition costs, for example, the costs of ‘unlocking’ car-
bon lock-ins.
71.1 Research Objectives
5. Empower decision-makers (policy-makers, policy entrepreneurs) by 
enhancing their capacity to empathize:
a. Resolve challenges in the monolithic architecture and polycentrism of 
multi-level (global, regional, national, local, sectoral) decision-making to 
abrogate existing blurred or competing jurisdictions, inefficient governance 
structures, structural imbalances and inequities, lock-ins in utility and value 
systems and volatile social contracts.
b. Enhance evidence-based decision-making that profits from studies of vari-
ous futures, each of which is defined by context, agents and audience.
c. Strengthening of the value of (knowledge) diplomacy and a critical outlook 
on consensus-building and policy models (e.g., deliberative, democratic, 
authoritarian, post-democratic).
1.1.3  The definition of a Global Transformation Towards 
Sustainability—Clarification
This book defines transformation towards sustainability as:
the shifting from the initially chosen (or taken) pathway to another pathway as 
goals have been revised to enable the system to adapt to changes.
Pathways are sets of critical junctures and lock-ins that have framed decisions 
and collective actions. With this definition, sustainable low carbon transformation 
is then depicted by shifting from one pathway to another by shouldering transition 
costs, that is, the costs of detaching a system for example from existing carbon 
lock-ins. Each transformative pathway is always ‘negotiative’ in nature. The nego-
tiative pathway pursues the convergence of objectives, principles, visions, goals 
and the necessary instruments through collaboration and coordination. However, 
emerging collaboration and coordination problems in various modular sub-systems 
need to be resolved among others by institutions in various modular sub-systems. 
For example, transformation cross-cuts various levels (global, regional, national, 
local, and sectoral). Nevertheless, while relevant vulnerabilities and risks, as well as 
opportunities and benefits, tend to have a global impact, responses are constituted 
and concretized following a local contextualization of vulnerabilities. In addition, 
transformation is dependent upon economies-of-scale. As one country achieves 
benefits and competitive advantages after choosing the sustainable low carbon 
pathway, other countries will follow and when a critical mass’ is reached, this 
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sustainable low carbon pathway will become the ‘new normal.’ However, we have 
a long way to go before we can achieve this new normalcy. Countries need addi-
tional information to identify benefits and assess their capacity to shoulder the 
costs of switching pathways, particularly when (carbon) lock-ins of the current 
non-sustainable high-carbon pathway seem insurmountable.
Figure 1.1 can be helpful in explaining the definition of sustainable low car-
bon transformation. While the figure illustrates the different radiative forces of 
the representative concentration pathways (RCPs), it also demonstrates the 
level of climate protection pursued—the lower the radiative forces, the higher 
the climate mitigation that needs to be done. If the line representing RCP8.5 is 
the pathway with the least emission reduction efforts and the line representing 
RCP2.6/RCP3PD is the pathway with the most mitigation efforts, shifting from 
the RCP8.5 line to the RCP2.6/RCP3PD refers to the ‘transformation’ depicted 
in this book through the dashed arrow. The dashed arrow reflects an example of 
a change of pathway from the initial pathway to the ‘purposive’ pathway, which 






Figure 1.1  Radiative Forcing of the Representative Concentration Pathways. (van Vuuren 
et al. 2011) (modified)
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The success of a facilitation of transformation towards sustainability 
depends on the ‘shifting or transition costs’ of moving from one pathway 
to another. The critical juncture points to the decisive point in defining the 
transition costs, because this represents the point with the lowest transition 
costs. As the transformative pathway unfolds, transition costs also increase. 
As new technologies are developed, or new sustainability-friendly policy 
and market instruments are introduced, a specific pathway, here for example 
the RCP3PD/RCP2.6 line, becomes more beneficial. However, some coun-
tries, while willing to shift pathways, may need additional capacities to be 
able to shift from their current pathway to the more efficient one. Shifting 
will therefore depend on flexibility measures that do not encourage free-rid-
ing, technology transfer that caters to innovation, capacity-building that does 
not reinforce inequalities and even transition cost relief that does not hamper 
autonomy.
In this book, transformation is understood as an ‘umbrella-concept’ that 
encompasses shifts (e.g., a behavioral shift favoring energy-efficient cars), tran-
sition periods (e.g., a ‘grace period’ given to companies to adapt to the new leg-
islation), structural changes (e.g., a government changing its policies following 
the increased importance of the service and information sector), conversion 
(e.g., the monetary value of heritage sites included in the assessment of poli-
cies), evolution (e.g., changing the social mandate of universities following new 
demands from the private sector), revolution (e.g., new business models or new 
technologies as game changing factors), transfiguration (e.g., new technolo-
gies that rearrange the competitive positions of countries), transmogrification 
(e.g., changing the landscape by building a public park on the former elevated 
freight rail line tracks of the “High Line” in New York), switch (e.g., using of 
an alternative IT standard or energy source instead of the conventional stand-
ard or preference) and metamorphosis (e.g., a change in the utility of resources 
such as agricultural waste-to-energy). All these terms connote causalities and 
 associations relevant to changes. This book will make distinctions if deemed 
necessary.
1.2  Research Design and Methodology
Achieving the objectives of this book requires a coherent research design. 
 Figure 1.2 illustrates the research design strategy of this project and describes the 
various stages and processes involved.
1.2 Research Design and Methodology
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Parts B and C of this book refer to the descriptive part that introduces the the-
oretical framework. Chapter 2 synthesizes the literature on transformation and 
introduces clusters of scholarly research on entry points in understanding the 
concept of sustainable development pathways (SDPs). Chapter 3 discusses the 
trade-offs as major drivers of transformation towards sustainability. Chapter 4 
highlights the critical process outlook on decision systems by addressing the ‘par-
adoxical’ assumptions that influence how decisions are made. Chapter 5 concep-
tualizes knowledge diplomacy, how knowledge relevant to sustainable low-carbon 
transformation is generated, and how it reproduces and reinforces asymmetries in 
the international system. Chapter 6 illuminates a systems perspective on transfor-
mations to adequately address problem contexts and policy objectives particularly 
in countries with emerging economies.
Without the intention of relativizing the impact of historical emissions brought 
by now-developed countries, the perspective of developing countries is selected, 
not only because they currently represent the sources of the most growth on GHG 
emissions and are confronted with environmental degradation, but primarily 
because they tend to be confronted with multiple transitions such as political tran-
sitions (e.g., from a military junta to a democratically elected regime) and eco-
nomic transitions (from a planned economy to a market economy), which make 
their transformation towards sustainability more complex and highly contextual. 
This high level of contextuality increases their resistance to the best experiences 
of developed countries.
Chapters 2 to 7 provide some necessary background and parameters for the 
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date the theoretical pillars of the case studies and simulation game and introduce 
the benefits of using scenarios and theoretical models (ideal types) as tools for 
understanding the complexity of transformation under conditions set by pol-
icy models. Chapter 8 introduces the ideal types (theoretical models) of policy 
pathways—democratic, authoritarian, institutional, ‘activistic,’ technocratic and 
post-democratic. These ideal types summarize the assumptions and storylines 
of policy models and identify linkages between policy models and policies on 
sustainable low-carbon transformation. These theoretical models are compared 
with country-specific case studies (to highlight the local context, drivers and path 
dependence of policy-making processes).
Chapters 9 to 12 are country-specific case studies that provide retrospective 
analyses, with the ideal types serving as theoretical models. This part of the pro-
ject demonstrates how ideal type analysis can promote the further development of 
theories by highlighting the historicity of pathways taken by countries.
The theoretical chapters as well as the case studies coherently lead to the 
subsequent chapters: Chapter 13 introduces a conceptual framework of ‘trans-
formative pathways,’ which is inherently derived from the contextualization of 
theoretical models. Through the case studies, this conceptual framework aims 
to provide additional theoretical inputs to better grasp the complexity of shifting 
from the pathway initially chosen (business-as-usual) to other pathways. Chap-
ter 14 highlights the empirical value of this book by creating a check-list that 
comprises reflective questions for stakeholders to develop awareness of the com-
plexities of the transformation process when engaging in various functional, insti-
tutional, and bargaining interactions.
1.2.1  Ideal Types: Theoretical Models and Scenarios 
from the Negotiation Perspective
Like most of the scientific studies on climate mitigation and low carbon trans-
formation, this book orients itself on the use of scenario methods. Because the 
outcomes of present mitigation actions will only be realized after years, if not 
decades, decision-making is inevitably conducted in the context of complex-
ity and uncertainty. Without the support of decision tools, decision-makers can 
be easily overwhelmed by issues, structures and processes, encouraging them to 
either delay or refuse necessary decisions. However, it needs to be highlighted 
that scenarios also have limitations. While scenarios aim to structure complexities 
and uncertainty in a way that helps decision-makers find orientation, they cannot 
be followed blindly.
1.2 Research Design and Methodology
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Scenarios such as decision (analytical) tools can be useful in defining the view 
of the form, contents, and purpose of decisions. While scenarios cannot predict 
or forecast how, and which decisions will be made under specific conditions as 
the transformation process unfolds, they can provide answers to questions such 
as how decisions should be made (normative analysis) and how to ensure their 
compatibility with existing norms and principles. In such cases, theoretical mod-
els such as scenarios can be useful in determining the content and extent of norms 
and principles. However, the use of normative frameworks in evaluation policies 
has its own short-comings, particularly when reflecting upon how and from whom 
such normative frameworks are determined. Here, scenarios can highlight causal-
ities between factors. Finally, and of equal importance, scenarios can demonstrate 
how decision-makers can facilitate multi-dimensional and multi-level negotiation 
processes (negotiation analysis) through a stakeholder perspective approach (see 
Zartman 1988; Young 1991; Sebenius 1992b; Raiffa 2002).
In this book, scenarios (policy models) have been developed that apply ‘ideal 
types’ of analysis to policy-making. Like scenarios, these ideal types express spe-
cific ‘storylines’ that have been defined from the perspective of negotiation stud-
ies. The so-called ‘ideal type analysis’ pertains to ideal types acting as analytical 
instruments by formulating hypotheses that are verifiable through the observation 
of empirical proceedings. The usefulness of ideal types is expressed through com-
paring the ‘storylines’ of each ideal type with empirical case studies. The purpose 
of ideal types is to enable researchers to ask appropriate underlying questions.
1.2.2  Case Studies and Simulations
This book employs a structured and systematic presentation of selected coun-
try-specific cases to verify theoretical models (ideal types). The interactions 
and relations between and the influences on implementing policies that support 
or inhibit transformation towards sustainability will be highlighted. A coherent 
framework for an analysis of cases has been developed for this book to imple-
ment a step-by-step evaluation using different sets of criteria. The implementation 
of these case studies using the framework will also address the significant short-
comings of using (historical) case studies to evaluate transformation processes. 
Through these shortcomings, new conceptual questions can be identified and ret-
rofitted to the locality of the context.
Using case studies as methods of scientific inquiry has its own challenges. 
For example, Audley Genus and Anne-Marie Coles (2008 p. 1441) criticize the 
“flawed use of secondary data sources” as well as any study which “uncritically 
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accepted accounts” and assumptions of the importance of certain events, inten-
tions and actions (or non-actions). To address this, this book intends to re-visit 
and re-evaluate rationales and assumptions (see chapter 4). In addition, case stud-
ies that pertain to the transition or transformation processes of countries are often 
characterized as being rather descriptive or “illustrative” rather than analytical or 
systematic (Geels 2011 p. 36).
Moreover, by using case studies and simulations, this book aims to address 
the broader trade-off that is typical of mainstream social science. As Frank Geels 
(2011) and Peter Abell (2004) contend, this trade-off pertains to the tendency of 
social science to over-emphasize methods (e.g., the procedures for gathering data, 
data analysis, and replication) at the expense of ontology, i.e., a set of concepts 
and categories in a subject area that depicts properties and relations. Similarly, 
process theories tend to have a more complex ontology, but less developed 
methodologies. Studying transformation processes is not only constrained by this 
trade-off, it is also restricted by misleading or absent precedents that undermine 
the usefulness of existing concepts for explaining the various dynamics of trans-
formation towards sustainability. A possible solution is introduced by this book 
by exploring comparative and nested case studies, event-sequence analysis, net-
work analysis, negotiation analysis and decision analysis.
This book primarily depicts the sustainable low-carbon policies of selected 
countries representing selected groups of countries and how these policies are 
implemented in the context of various historical specificities:
OECD United States (case study), Mexico (compara-
tive case study)
High Income and Emerging Economies China (comparative case study), the Philip-
pines (case study)
Middle and Low Income Jamaica (case study & simulation)
Mexico is a democratic country and an OECD member with clear visions on 
where the country should stand in the future. While these visions seek transforma-
tion towards sustainability, legitimacy deficiencies and coordination gaps are found 
to inhibit the achievement of these visions. The deficiencies pertaining for example 
to the formal and material participation of civil societal groups such as indigenous 
communities limit the legitimacy of policies. The lack of genuine deliberation pro-
cesses undermines the realization of sustainable developmental goals.
China is often taken as the ‘best example’ that supports the argument that sta-
ble authoritarian regimes are in a better position to develop and implement more 
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ambitious environmental policies. It is argued in this book that when climate 
protection is “securitized”, it inevitably becomes an indicator of human well-be-
ing. It also modifies the context through new socio-political and socio-linguistic 
narratives, which alter relations between status and change agents, and re-define 
the relevance of audience. In China’s case, the need for authoritarian regimes to 
ensure a high degree of output-legitimacy has promoted climate protection as a 
high-priority policy goal. The case study on China highlights how the securitiza-
tion of climate protection and sustainable development has empowered “change 
agents” that push transformation towards sustainability.
The case study on the Philippines pertains to a transformative pathway 
defined by weak governance and the authoritarian tendencies of a democratic 
regime. The inability of the Philippine State to provide key services or its strat-
egy to franchise the implementation of policies not only limits the sets of possi-
ble actions, but also undermines the effectiveness of policy implementation. The 
change of administration every six years tends to result in a disruptive return to 
“default” policies as the new administration seeks to first discredit its predecessor 
in order to consolidate political capital. While there are cases that illustrate strong 
governance systems, particularly in local levels and civil society participation, 
this strength ironically indicates weak national governance. National governance 
mechanisms are highly dependent on non-state actors or local political dynasties, 
which further strengthen the fragmentation of governance. In addition, one result 
of the state’s low capacity and low autonomy is the diminished caveat against 
politicians abusing the state apparatus to implement policies, which is further 
reinforced by the current, stable culture of impunity.
The case study on the United States of America focuses on how change 
agents have been mobilized under the Trump administration. With the business 
and industry sectors as well as civil society pursuing more ambitious, sustainable 
low-carbon policy goals, it can be argued that under a federal government with 
ambitious sustainability policy goals, civil society and the private sector would 
not have been mobilized in the same way they have been now. The case study 
analyzes how the private sector and civil society can substitute the role of the fed-
eral government in pursuing sustainable developmental goals.
The case study on Jamaica commences with an assessment of the country’s 
transformation process towards sustainability. The assessment identifies the car-
bon lock-ins and path dependencies of Jamaica’s key sectors as well as potential 
entry points to mitigation. In addition, an experiment involving a simulation game 
was conducted to better understand some of the dynamics of decision-making, 
looking in particular at the carbon lock-ins that inhibit decision-making and sup-
port sustainability. Jamaica is a democratic island-state with an insular economy 
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that is isolated and, at the same time, highly dependent on imports from other 
countries. It derives almost 100% of its electricity and other energy supplies from 
oil imports, which implies Jamaica’s vulnerability.
1.3  The Analytical Framework—Negotiation Studies 
as an Entry Point to Transformation Towards 
Sustainability
When reflecting on global, sustainable, low-carbon transformation, understanding 
the concept of transformation will provide decision-makers from all levels and 
sectors (government agencies, business companies, and other societal groups) with 
the capacity to understand and capitalize on information and knowledge in order 
to come up with effective decisions and ‘drive’ the process in a way that is tolera-
ble for all stakeholders. This book intends to come up with ideas to better under-
stand and explain this process. As Wayne Booth and colleagues (1995) argue, “tell 
me something I don’t know so I can understand better what I do know.”
This book introduces negotiation studies as entry point to the analysis of 
sustainable low-carbon transformation. The focus on entry points helps to bet-
ter think through the problem and to guide attention firstly to relevant questions 
and problems in order to come up with the appropriate normative foundation 
and an agenda for collective actions. While the implementation of transforma-
tion towards sustainability covers multi-level and multiple conflict cleavages, the 
value of negotiation studies tends to be underestimated and neglected. The reason 
for this is that negotiation is, as a process, assumed to be self-evident. Negotia-
tion studies address how conflicts can be resolved by focusing on the process 
of collective decision-making.
The current debate on transformation or transition towards sustainability 
with regards to decision- and policy-making tends to evolve around deliberative 
democracy, regime/governance studies and organization studies. For example, 
Teresa Haukkala (2017) highlights the importance of a green-transition advo-
cacy coalition for launching the transition take-off phase for renewable energy in 
Finland. This implies the significance of a robust deliberative democratic model 
which nurtures advocacy. Nevertheless, while a deliberative democratic model 
can promote transformation towards sustainability, it cannot be fully argued 
that countries with alternative models will not be equally capable of achiev-
ing transformation towards sustainability, especially those stable authoritar-
ian states with technocratic elements that can also achieve audience’s approval 
through output performance.
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In addition, Franziska Ehnert et al. (2018) demonstrate how national and 
subnational institutions enable and/or constrain local agency for sustainability 
transition. However, while they identify the linkage between local and national 
agencies for sustainability transition, they do not address the fact that institutions 
are themselves evolving and adapting to changes. This evolution is itself a con-
cert of negotiation outcomes. Furthermore, Brendan Haley (2017) identifies the 
high demand on the capabilities of the state in designing and implementing pol-
icies tailored to technological innovation systems and socio-technical niches and 
regimes. This implies that the state is expected to facilitate innovation through 
“game rules” that will further send useful signals about appropriate behavior. In 
his case study, he demonstrates that an organization’s formal and informal rules 
can make the design principles mutually reinforcing, while a stronger politi-
cal consensus is needed to manage tensions between accountability and stabil-
ity. However, he does not consider that the state itself can be either an agent for 
change or for the status quo. Therefore, the state as an agency cannot be abso-
lutely autonomous in designing formal and informal rules. Conflict of interests 
may arise when the state becomes not only a “rule-setter”, but also a player that 
needs to abide by the rules. This can be problematic when states tend to bend the 
rules to their advantage at the cost of their role as facilitator.
Other authors who focus on the socio-technical dimension of transformation 
towards sustainability tend to highlight technologically optimal solutions as driv-
ers of transformation. For example, Farzin Hossein (1996) suggests the possibil-
ity of the optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock 
externalities. In addition, Hans Werner Sinn (2007) argues for the relevance of 
pareto optimality in determining the appropriate extraction of fossil fuels to sta-
bilize the greenhouse effect. However, as asserted by the IPCC (2007), while 
optimal solutions are often proposed as benchmarks for actual negotiations, these 
optimal solutions tend to be far from the negotiated solution, which causes frus-
tration among technical experts. In addition, as Allard van Mossel et al. (2018) 
argue, the application of solutions will most likely be confronted by resistance. 
Some actors, even indifferent ones, will very likely seek to protect their auton-
omy to enable them to react to varying (local) context conditions. Ronan Bolton 
(2018), for example, identifies the problematic relationship between high-level 
grand visions of an integrated European system and more pragmatic bottom-up 
processes of electricity system development.
Negotiation studies highlight the process of reaching agreements through col-
laboration. Negotiation requires that there is a conflict that needs to be resolved 
(see Hopmann 1996) Moreover, the inability to resolve, a stalemate, is “mutu-
ally hurting” (Zartman 1978, 1988; Young 1991). Negotiated agreements are 
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 necessary, particularly in cases of common vulnerabilities where no single actor 
can effectively resolve the vulnerability (Krasner 1983). This confirms the rel-
evance of negotiations when addressing global environmental concerns such as 
climate change. In addition, particularly when addressing complex (Druckman 
1977; Crump & Zartman 2003) and uncertain issues such as sustainable devel-
opment and climate change, negotiation serves as a tool for adaptive learning and 
for improving social relationships (Kramer & Messick 1995; Cross 1996).
However, the negotiation process is itself not self-enforcing. It requires pur-
posive structure and adaptable organization (Malnes 1995; Lewicki et al. 1999; 
Kremenyuk 2002). Negotiation studies can provide ‘anchors’ or ‘focal points’ of 
transformation from which decisions that promote or inhibit the transformation 
process can depart. Some authors have already initiated the linking of negotia-
tion studies with sustainability, particularly with environmental sustainability. As 
one of the leading figures in negotiation studies on environmental issues, Gunnar 
Sjöstedt (1993; 2013 with Penetrante) highlights the benefits of focusing on nego-
tiation as a process when resolving global environmental issues. Others, such as 
William Moomaw et al. (2003), suggest focusing on innovations in negotiations 
in order to push forward environmental negotiations. This includes effectively 
addressing free-riding problems and the tragedy of the commons. Furthermore, 
studying negotiation is dependent on the analysis of perspectives. Mechanisms 
are needed to enable actors to analyze, reflect, evaluate and modify the perspec-
tive of their peers. Because conflicting parties cannot unilaterally achieve agree-
ments, and the factors hindering particularly weaker parties from committing to 
agreements are regarded as equally the problems of the stronger parties, empa-
thy is enhanced. Adil Najam et al. (2003) and Ariel Penetrante (2010) argue that 
the enhancement of the negotiation capacity of developing countries is inevitably 
linked with any global agreement on climate and environmental issues.
In addition, negotiation studies relativize the influence of power asymmetry 
(Habeeb 1988; William & Rubin 2002; Larson 2003). Because the stronger party 
requires the help of weaker parties, it is in the interest of stronger parties to pre-
vent the use of coercive power. A probable explanation for this is that the out-
come of coerced negotiation will very likely be challenged the moment power has 
shifted. For example, Joseph Nye (2010a) prefers the usage of “smart power” for 
global climate negotiations. For him, the conventional utility of power does not 
have the same meaning in climate negotiations.
Gregory Northcraft et al. (1995) contest the necessity of accommodating the 
non-linear preferences of actors when it comes to the reasons why actors engage 
or leave negotiations. This is particularly the case when there are multiple issues 
under consideration, the parties value the issues differently (Lax & Sebenius 1986) 
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and there are initially no obvious benefits for participating actors. Because the 
transformation process consists of multiple ‘negotiation’ or ‘bargaining games,’ 
transformation towards sustainability is equally non-linear. As such, the relation-
ship between the objective value obtained through the achievement of transfor-
mation goals and the subjective utility experienced by all relevant actors cannot 
be characterized by a straight line (see Northcraft et al. 1995). Because sustaina-
bility transitions are goal-oriented and purposive (see Smith & Tushman 2005), 
attention needs to be given to the preferences not only of the actors, but also of 
the approving or disapproving audience. In addition, because sustainability is an 
ambiguous and contested concept, the directionality of sustainability transitions is 
itself the subject of negotiations or what is referred to in this book as ‘knowledge 
 diplomacy.’
From the negotiation perspective, against the backdrop of multiple possible 
transformative pathways of adapting to changes, ‘status quo agents’ and ‘change 
agents’ can employ various ways of interacting in order to elaborate which prac-
tices and rules need to be maintained to avoid system ruptures. In addition, the 
formalization of interactions (negotiations) between change and status quo agents 
will be guarded by a context that is expressed through narratives. Socio-technical 
and socio-linguistic narratives are the outcomes of multiple, multi-level negoti-
ation or ‘elaboration’ processes. Pathways are the sum of policies, institutions, 
norms and narratives that aim to achieve predetermined goals, whereas path-de-
pendent factors and critical junctures may promote or inhibit the course of the 
paths taken. Shifts from one pathway to another also mean resolving many types 
of conflicts that emerge as (power) relations between actors when hierarchies are 
realigned. Transformation produces new conflict cleavages, as tensions between 
the “old” and the “new” will most likely be projected into many issues, platforms 
and forums. As an implication of the conflicting nature of transformations, vari-
ous types of functional, institutional, and bargaining games emerge. These games 
or interactions can be regarded as the ‘fibers’ of the transformation process, 
because these interactions compel collective actions.
Furthermore, the manner by which the monolithic architecture of global deci-
sion-making promotes or inhibits transformation towards sustainability in a spe-
cific country can be answered by looking at how this architecture determines 
how basic and policy games are pursued (i.e., connected or disconnected). The 
usefulness of the negotiation perspective is also demonstrated when addressing 
gaps between global, regional, national and local policy-making. The two argu-
ments that 1) sustainable low carbon transformation requires global visions, a 
purpose and structural changes in the global sphere; and that 2) decision-mak-
ing at the global level still uses a national lens are already widely accepted. It is 
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necessary to account for many kinds of contextual influences that can stabilize or 
destabilize systems. Connecting these two arguments together will lead to addi-
tional questions that can be adequately formulated and answered by negotiation 
studies.
Negotiation studies calls for a deeper analysis of how decisions can be made, 
for example, to manage the balancing act between the global vision and the 
national reality. The literature on global transformation underestimates the prox-
imity between the merely assumed analytical value of global transformation and 
its actual practical value in individual countries. So, if policy-makers are able 
to fully understand global transformation, will this help them make appropriate 
decisions domestically? In several cases, the disconnect between global visions 
and domestic priorities leads to a refusal to commit to decisions or the so-called 
“indecisiveness dilemma,” that is, the lack of will to make decisions not because 
decision-makers reject the assumed solutions (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Raiffa 
2002), but because they do not fully grasp or make sense of the potential effects 
of these solutions. When the complexity of sustainable low-carbon transformation 
is perceived to be manageable, decision-makers will eventually find resources to 
circumvent the ‘indecisiveness dilemma’ that has effectively inhibited the unfold-
ing of the process.
1.4  Reflexivity and Stakeholder Engagement 
for Transformation Towards Sustainability
This book intends to present a practical approach to strategically facilitating sus-
tainable low-carbon transformation. The recommendations that can be made are 
presented using the Weberian understanding (Verstehen) of various variables and 
dynamics that has been crystalized through this book’s theoretical foundation 
(chapters 2 to 6), methodological tools (chapters 7 and 8), case studies (chapters 9 
to 12), simulation game (part of chapter 12) and theoretical claims through the 
conceptual framework (chapter 13). The theoretical outputs of this research as 
synthesized in chapter 13 can be used by stakeholders as “political models” (poli-
tische Leitbilder) as well as guides for interpretations of various discourses
Chapter 14 provides the empirical value of this book with a reflexivity analy-
sis and a stakeholder engagement plan. Reflexivity is itself a form of intervention 
that allows systems to adapt while preventing ruptures. The analysis of reflexiv-
ity can help better structure institutional, functional, and bargaining interactions 
from the negotiating perspective on context, agencies and the audience of trans-
formation towards sustainability. Reflexivity analysis is a matrix or collection 
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of concrete questions that resonate with the (meta-level) theoretical/con-
ceptual, methodological and practical challenges relevant for each analyti-
cal level (actors, issues, structures, processes and outcomes). In addition to the 
reflexivity analysis, a roadmap or “stakeholder engagement plan” is introduced. 
The roadmap provides a structure that can facilitate interactions by highlighting 
the roles of stakeholders, their power base as well as how they tend to behave at 
various bargaining games (negotiation analysis). The conflict analysis covers how 
stakeholders define conflicts and how they believe the conflict can be resolved. 
Moreover, potential measures of engagement are presented, as well as their possi-
ble entry points to transformation towards sustainability.
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Global Transformation Towards 
Sustainability—Clusters of Current 
Scholarly Discourse
Studying global transformation towards sustainability is a colossal task. The diffi-
culties in determining the scope, boundaries and levels of the analysis have rami-
fications for the conceptual value of attempts to understand global transformation 
towards sustainability. Because of the plurality of possible entry points as well as 
the complexity of various issues involved, providing an overview of the academic 
debate, if one can speak of a single debate on global transformation towards sus-
tainability, is highly challenging. Hence, ensuring the ‘epistemological acuity’ 
of transformation towards sustainability is still in its elementary stage. Linking 
the debate of transformation or transition with the studies of sustainability has 
its own merits, but it also leads to further fragmentation of the debate. Moreover, 
without a clear definition of the normative concept “sustainability” as the goal 
of transformation/transition or the scope of conceptual analysis, designing and 
verifying methodologies becomes equally multifaceted. This blurriness implies 
that gaps will most likely arise during the calibration of theoretical and empiri-
cal models. Furthermore, the plurality of methodologies, for example, will most 
likely lead to many different types of mutually complementing and competing 
evidence.
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When the term “sustainability” entered various policy circles, both on the 
global and national scale, the proliferation of interpretations and responses, 
especially with the absence of verification mechanisms, inevitably call for flex-
ible approaches. In this regard, as the US Natural Science Foundation (2000) 
contends, the term ‘sustainability’ is laden with so many definitions that “it 
risks plunging into meaningless(ness), at best, and becoming a catchphrase 
for demagogy, at worst. It is used to justify and legitimate a myriad of policies 
and practices ranging from communal agrarian utopianism to large-scale capi-
tal-intensive market development.” Therefore, because of the existence of many 
possible definitions (Hopwood et al. 2005b) and divergent interpretations and 
variations applied in practice (Gibson 2005), sustainability has become an “over-
used misunderstood phrase” (Mawhinney 2002). With the intention of providing 
a useful overview of the academic literature, this chapter synthesizes the debates 
on transformation towards sustainability by developing a detailed characteriza-
tion of drivers, actors and barriers to change as well as an overview of potential 
anchors for deliberations. Table 2.1 illustrates the different identified clusters and 
compares them in terms of context (offering a systems perspective by focusing on 
entry points and drivers), agency (addressing power and purpose by highlighting 
anchors for a deliberation process), and audience (in reference to legitimacy and 
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2.1  Cluster 1: Triple Bottom Line (TBL)—The 
Sustainable Development Discourse
The literature categorized in the cluster Triple Bottom Line (TBL) refers to the 
sustainability and developmental discourses that evolve around the Brundtland 
Report in 1987. The literature on sustainable development has achieved a consen-
sus about the three pillars of sustainability—social, environmental and economic 
(see Byrne & Glover 2002; Hopwood et al. 2005b; Elliott 2013). They were 
inherited as these three categories—later labelled as the Triple Bottom Line—and 
have been standardized in most UN agencies addressing sustainability since the 
1980s. The Triple Bottom Line, originally introduced by John Elkington (1994, 
1997) is an accounting framework traditionally used in economics and business 
administration that refers to the society, the environment (ecology), and economy 
(see Willard 2002; Savitz 2006; Slaper, Timothy & Hall 2011).
The TBL has functioned as a catalyst for the sustainability debate, whereas 
social cohesion, environmental integrity and economic affluence are taken as 
goals toward which transformation processes are heading. The usage of TBL as 
a framework was institutionalized by the public sector when it was used as the 
cost accounting standard by the International Council for Local Environmental 
Initiatives (ICLEI), which was founded in September 1990 at the United Nations 
in New York. This international association has more than 1200 cities, towns, 
and regions from 84 countries as members (ICLEI 2018). The private sector has 
followed the TBL accounting standard and used the phrase “people, planet and 
profit” as the goal of sustainability, which later framed the elements of corporate 
social responsibility for companies wishing to embody these three Ps. Subse-
quently, as climate change negotiations have produced the principle of “Equitable 
Access to Sustainable Development” as a major anchor for any acceptable cli-
mate agreement, these TBLs have been incorporated into most discussions about 
transformative pathways.
Because of the functional importance of sustainable development in achiev-
ing climate mitigation, this cluster highlights the perspective of sustainable devel-
opment through transformation. However, from this perspective, environmental 
integrity (i.e. climate mitigation) is only one of three equally important pillars. 
The distinct origin and constitution of the debate on sustainable development lim-
its the capability of this discourse (cluster) to support the overall discussion on 
climate mitigation. The actors participating in the debate on sustainable develop-
ment are diverse, probably too diverse for the climate regime. Furthermore, as 
will be highlighted in this cluster, sustainable development can also be achieved 
without transformation. This is in contrast to the discourse on climate mitigation, 
2.1 Cluster 1: Triple Bottom Line (TBL) …
26 2 Global Transformation Towards Sustainability…
wherein transformation (labelled as ‘transformative pathways’) is inevitable and 
a precondition. Those from the public and business sectors in particular belong to 
the “weak sustainability” group (see Solow 1974; Hartwick 1977; Solow 1986). 
They argue that sustainable development can also be reached without major struc-
tural changes that require insurmountable sacrifices. In contrast, proponents of 
strong sustainability view the natural system as intrinsically valuable and not sub-
stitutable (see Brand 2009; Dedeurwaerdere 2014). Hence, there is a hierarchy of 
norms between the natural/environmental and human system.
Bill Hopwood et al. (2005b) classify debates on sustainability into three 
schools—status quo, reform and transformation, which strongly correspond to 
the categories of weak and strong sustainability. According to them, the “Status 
Quo School” is the dominant view of most governments and business groups. 
Those belonging to the Status Quo School tend to be proponents of weak sustain-
ability who see economic growth as the solution to addressing climate change. 
For example, the Green New Deal Group, through its published report on July 21, 
2008 (Green New Deal Group 2008) calls for a “return to pre-war Keynesianism” 
and an increase in public investment spending and international finance to address 
climate protection (Lynas 2008). Other notable proponents such as Thomas Fried-
man (2007), Mariana Mazzucato (2015), Van Jones (2008), the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation of Germany (French et al. 2009) advocate for fiscal policies that pro-
vide stimulus packages to address both financial crises and environmental issues 
such as climate change.
The combination of fiscal instruments such as investment in the deployment 
of renewable energies and the enhancement of resource efficiency is the solution 
(French et al. 2009). Edward Barbier (2009) published the report “Global Green 
New Deal” which was commissioned by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP). The report calls on governments to allocate a significant share 
of stimulus funding to green sectors order to achieve economic recovery, poverty 
eradication and climate protection through reduced carbon emissions.
Bill Hopwood et al. (2005b) continues with the “Reform School,” which is 
the dominant view of academic communities and mainstream NGOs. The “Lim-
its to Growth” report of Donella Meadows et al. (1972) is often considered to 
have initiated challenges to the idea that growth was the only way to improve 
environmental integrity. Subsequent authors and environmental groups such as 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, WWF and Sierra Club have voiced their con-
cerns about economic growth as the generic solution through political lobbying 
(Hopwood et al. 2005b). Other proponents of the Reform School attribute the 
root of the problem to imbalances and a lack of knowledge and information. For 
example, the Real World Coalition, a group that consists of 25 UK NGOs, sees 
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the necessity of revitalizing democratic governance to empower the government 
and society to address mounting inequality and poverty, environmental degrada-
tion and world instability (Christie & Warburton 2001). This school also suggests 
there is a need for significant shifts in policies and behavior. In their book “Factor 
Five,” Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker et al. (2009) suggest that sustainability can be 
achieved by improving resource productivity for some sectors of the economy, 
while maintaining quality of service and well-being. This argument for using 
technological solutions partly contradicts the Status Quo School by suggesting a 
significant degree of degrowth, particularly in consumption and production.
The Third School, as Bill Hopwood et al. (2005b) elaborate, sees transforma-
tion as fundamentally necessary to avoiding a mounting crisis and even a possible 
system rupture. Linking this cluster to the global transformation towards sustain-
ability debate, it is implied that this cluster sees transformation as only one of 
the options and that sustainability can also be achieved without transformation. 
Authors that tend to represent the “Transformation School” call for “strong sus-
tainability.” This school is the dominant view of grass-root environmental justice 
groups and indigenous environmental movements. For most of these groups, there 
is a need for a new system and a new distribution of power (a shift from center 
to the periphery) (O’Riordan 1989). For the others, there is a need to re-visit the 
dogmatic realization of growth, whereas the logic of growth is considered the 
essence of economicity (Bonaiuti 2014). Because fundamental problems as well 
as imbalances are deeply rooted in society, more efforts and commitments are 
needed to address the conditions that produce and reinforce imbalances.
The Transformation School is also represented by views that are counter-
intuitive or even counterfactual to the goals of global transformation towards 
sustainability. In fact, extreme “transformationists” such as socialists, deep ecol-
ogists, and eco-fascists are not concerned with sustainable development. Other 
proponents belong to what some have called the “School of Post-development,” 
from which the “partisans” of degrowth or “growth objectors” have originated 
(see Bonaiuti 2014). For example, David Foreman (1989), one of the founders 
of Earth First!, justifies the starvation of people in Ethiopia as nature’s way of 
self-preservation (quoted in Bradford 1989; Hopwood et al. 2005b). In addition, 
Arne Naess (1989) observes that in the eight points of the deep ecology platform, 
human needs are sacrificed, and equity concerns ignored.
Nevertheless, this Transformation School also represents “transformation 
with sustainable development.” One example is the Report of the German Advi-
sory Council on Global Change (WBGU) (2011) that argues that transformation 
is a constant development brought about by changes. As new problems emerge, 
societies seek solutions. In most situations, these solutions require systemic or 
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structural changes to alter the obsolete conditions that have caused the problems 
in the first place. For example, after analyzing the tendency of returns on capital 
to exceed the rate of economic growth, leading to extreme inequalities, Thomas 
Picketty (2014) argues that “economic trends are not acts of God.” Hence, polit-
ical actions are needed to design and implement social policies that reduce ine-
quality and do not grow the GDP for its own sake. It is therefore implied that 
transformation is not only emergent, i.e. merely a response to changes, but 
also purposive, i.e. transformation goals are pre-determined. In addition, as the 
WBGU (2011) continues, advancing sustainable development will not only 
require modifications to social contracts as a means of adapting to changes, but 
new social contracts will most likely also challenge existing governance struc-
tures, for instance, because of the transboundary nature of vulnerabilities. More 
arguments from the Transformation School will be introduced in the Cluster on 
the Multi-Level Perspective.
2.2  Cluster 2: Technological Innovation and Change 
Management—The Industrial Revolution 
Discourse
While the discourse that belongs to this cluster uses the triple bottom lines as lev-
els of analysis, its focus also lies in the linkages between them, particularly in the 
analysis of the effects of innovative and technological changes on small organiza-
tions such as industrial and commercial companies (Kristof 2017). Furthermore, 
there is an implied asymmetrical or vertical relationship between them, with the 
economy receiving the primary focus. The common denominator in the literature 
included in this cluster is the use of the Industrial Revolution as a comparative 
model or as precedent that frames the analysis of the scope and processes behind 
the “Great Green Transformation.” For example, Tom Delay (2009) argues that 
the low carbon economy will transform the world much like the first industrial 
revolution did.
The Industrial Revolution from about 1760 to 1820/1840 was driven by tech-
nological innovations, which led to new manufacturing and production processes 
as well as commercial relations between countries (see Hobsbawm 1965; Landes 
1969; Reisman 1998). The unprecedented, sustained economic growth through-
out the Industrial Revolution is claimed to have marked a major turning point in 
history that changed almost every aspect of society (see Feinstein 1998; Lucas 
2002).
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In this cluster, the incorporation of the rationales of the Industrial Revolution 
is evident, hence the entry point to transformation in this cluster is rather tech-
nologically driven. Nikolai Kondratieff’s (1926) theory of the “Long Waves of 
Economic Change,” or the so-called “kondratiev waves or cycles,” is often cited 
as pioneer research work on long cycles theory. Through his studies of indus-
trial behavior using historical facts and economic data, he argued that economic 
growth is not linear, but rather has a sinusoidal form. Kondratieff further argued 
that it was possible to forecast and foster economic growth, because cycles are 
found to consist of growth and decay phases, whereas market economies tend to 
go into the development cycle, where new technological inventions have been 
employed.
Further developing Kondratieff’s theory and putting Kondratieff on the radar 
of international debate is Joseph Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Develop-
ment (1935, 1954), which argues that changes come in the form of significant 
technological innovations. For example, Schumpeter refers to railway construc-
tion as the cause of another wave, because it further enhanced modern the mining 
industry and promoted urban development. He continues that while all economic 
activities are essentially repetitive and follow a familiar, routine course, changes 
need to take place to make the static circular flow a dynamic and discontinuous 
process. According to him, for this to occur, innovation is required: “spontane-
ous and discontinuous change in the channels of flow, disturbance of equilib-
rium which forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing” 
(Schumpeter 1934 p. 64).
Gerhard Mensch (1975) further developed Peter Schumpeter’s Theory of 
Economic Development through his Theory of Innovation. In his 1975 publica-
tion, “Stalemate in Technology”, he attributed economic stagnation to the lack 
of basic innovations. He identified that “basic innovations” (Basisinnovationen), 
as an expression of knowledge development, are the drivers of economic booms 
(Mensch 1971, 1972). According to him, basic innovations create new economic 
sectors following the introduction of new products and production processes, 
leading to new jobs and new sources of income. He differentiated basic innova-
tions from “improvement-innovations” (Verbesserungsinnovation), which further 
develop existing sectors by reducing production costs and increasing productiv-
ity levels. Finally, the so-called “pseudo innovations” (Schein-Innovationen) are 
those that do not possess economic value at all. This refers to those innovations 
that can increase consumer wealth even though these inventions neither move 
demand nor supply side curves. The effects of pseudo innovations such as chang-
ing the color or original form of products to long waves or cycles are too minor, 
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because they do not, for example, significantly increase final consumer satisfac-
tion levels.
As such, the economy, which serves as a “rallying point” for technological 
innovations, is implied as the driving bottom line with the environment and soci-
ety becoming emergent or even subservient. Several authors coming from the 
Great Transformation discourse tend to connect the categories, here labelled as 
the ‘triple bottom line’, in a vertical or asymmetrical manner. Some directly or 
indirectly claim one bottom line “dominating” or “maneuvering” the others. For 
example, Karl Polanyi’s book “The Great Transformation” (published in 1945) 
(2015) pertains to the economy as a driver of the Industrial Revolution and high-
lights the historical evolution of the current dominance of the market economy. 
This book provides an important understanding of global transformation, but it 
only focuses on the market drivers of transformation, such as market logic, as a 
framing factor of the evolution. While it is difficult to imagine a society without a 
market-based economy, Polanyi stressed that markets are not a natural feature of 
human society and that there are also non-market mechanisms to distribute goods 
and services. The dominance of the market has emerged and cemented by certain 
ideologies and principles, which relate to land, labor and the market, in particular 
profit, and which now define the basic fibers of societies.
Others highlight one bottom line as the main driver of global transformation, 
while the two other bottom lines are merely responding as subordinates (or even 
merely as circumstances). For example, Yoshikazu Sakamoto (1994) argues in 
his book “Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System” that while the 
global economy should not be analyzed as an isolated entity, but rather in con-
junction with the political society, economic drivers are both causes and effects 
of global and national societal conditions. In his analysis of how uneven devel-
opment and democratization has led to gaps between capital internationalization 
and political democratization, he focuses on the importance of economic drivers 
to the basic framework of the modern international order. While the book pro-
vides insightful causalities between global economy and the international order, it 
does not provide an understanding of how uneven development affects the pros-
pect of cooperation between actors when forging decisions. Sakamoto focuses 
on global transformation as driven by capital internationalization and political 
 democratization.
Other scholars have a micro-perspective and do not clearly identify technol-
ogies as the catalyst of global transformation towards sustainability, but rather 
as “enablers” of transformation (see Goldemberg 1998; Bibby 2012; Guo et al. 
2015). For example, Manahem Anderman (2007) identifies battery technologies 
for hybrid electric vehicles as an example of such “enablers” of transformation 
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towards sustainability. In addition, Richard Baldwin (2016) provides an analysis 
of how revolutionary changes in information communication technology (ICT) 
has fundamentally changed globalization. Through ICT, economic, political, cul-
tural and military power has shifted in favor of countries with emerging markets, 
whereas the boundaries of competitiveness between countries are increasingly 
controlled by firms who run international production networks. In present times, 
global competitiveness means countries are required to look for new impulses of 
economic development. Low-carbon technologies and innovations can be the new 
“basic innovations” that can create new industrial sectors and jobs. On the other 
hand, Wiebe Bijker’s (1995, 2010) constructivist outlook on technologies claims 
that technologies can be “treated” or “created” differently depending on various 
social factors such as changing gender relationships. He calls for the establish-
ment of a basis for science, technology, and social change that addresses the 
social roots of technology (Bijker 1995).
Most of the literature classified to this cluster do not clearly address social, 
cultural and political processes of change as being of a technological nature or 
determined by technology. Some authors, such as Marko Hekkert et al. (2007), 
are critical of the fact that while technological innovation systems are multidimen-
sional, they do not fully address structural change and how emerging innovations 
struggle against existing systems (and vice-versa). They propose a method for 
systematically mapping processes taking place in innovation systems and result-
ing in technological change. In addition, Clayton Christensen et al. (2006) argue 
that innovations and technologies can also be disruptive. Some innovations and 
technologies do not bring better products to existing markets, but rather disrupt 
and redefine trajectories, and that increased attention needs to be given to interac-
tions between new entrants and incumbents. As Richard Baldwin (2016) argues, 
an outcome of a transformation process changes the role of distance and policies. 
New conflict fronts are established, particularly as declining sectors and skill 
groups fall into disfavor, are mobilized, and struggle for their relevance. Further-
more, some challenges that currently inhibit transformation towards sustainability 
transcend technologies, such as changing lifestyles and preferences (see Jackson 
2008; Roy et al. 2012). For example, with the ability of transportation technolo-
gies to address traffic congestion, some governments prefer “basic technologies” 
such as bicycles rather than expensive and less environmentally-friendly technol-
ogies. The introduction of new technologies often means the increased consump-
tion of exhaustible natural resources, which is counterintuitive to sustainability. 
New voices have emerged claiming that sustainability also means less technolo-
gies or less dependence on technologies, because as new innovations are intro-
duced, consumption increases.
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2.3  Cluster 3: Systems Approaches (SA)—
Transformation Management and Socio-
Technical Discourse
The next cluster pertains to transformation management theories (that trace their 
origin to the Netherlands) as well as the socio-technical transition theories. The 
transformation management theories highlight the goal of effectively managing 
transformation by taking into account complexities and the multi-tiered nature 
and non-concurrency of transformation processes (see Loorbach 2010; Schäpke & 
Rauschmayer 2011). In the words of Rainer Grießhammer et al. (2015), this goal 
is motivated by the assumption that transformation processes can only unfold when 
the focus is not limited to technical innovations, but also includes social and insti-
tutional innovations. In addition, René Kemp et al. (1998) assert that managing 
transition is not only a useful option for many policy instruments, but “it may be 
the only feasible way to transform environmentally unsustainable regimes” (1998 
p. 191).
The backdrop of this discourse is that transitions are multi-level in terms 
of governance. They cut across the local, national, regional and international. A 
significant consequence of this cross-cutting element is the emergence of several 
conflict cleavages, particularly when asymmetries, for example those in power, 
are re-aligned and relations need to be revisited. It needs to be highlighted that 
asymmetries are reproduced across levels. As such, the boundaries between the 
global, the national and the local become diffuse because of the emergence of 
new interdependencies. For example, the “local” assumes a “global touch” when 
communities, villages, towns and municipalities become recipients of technology 
transfer to support local sustainability projects. Best practices from these local 
projects will most likely be collected, inductively assessed, re-conceptualized and 
applied in projects in communities from other countries. An example is the use of 
the Talanoa Dialogue, a concept that originates from Fiji, in global negotiations 
pertaining to climate change (see UNFCCC 2016). In addition, the introduced 
technologies are expected to assume economic, social, cultural and institutional 
connotations (Bijker et al. 1987; Bijker 1995, 2010). New business models are 
sought to adequately capture the opportunities of new global-local settings. These 
interdependencies between levels are therefore multifaceted, non-linear and even 
fragmented.
The socio-technical theories emphasize the relevance and complexity of tech-
nologies and the inclusion of social relations in the analyses of technological con-
figurations (Rip & Kemp 1998; Geels 2005; Geels & Schot 2007b; Geels & Schot 
2009). The inclusion of human agency as reflected by the interests, behavior, and 
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preferences of humans and organizations in the analyses of technologies sets the 
stage for the multi-level analysis. John Grin et al. (2010) identify three initially 
independent action levels: megatrends, sociotechnical regimes and niche level, 
which allow the consideration of path dependencies along which lie processes 
with distinct self-contained dynamics and actors’ preferences. Through these three 
action levels, the scope of action for change agents can be explored. Similarly, 
Arie Rip and René Kemp (1998) suggest three analytical levels that host non-lin-
ear processes that result from the interplay of multiple developments. The niches 
(1) serve as the locus for radical innovations. Sociotechnical regimes (2) pertain 
to the locus of established practices and associated rules that stabilize existing 
systems. Finally, the exogenous sociotechnical landscape (3) refers to background 
variables such as the material infrastructure, political culture and coalitions, social 
values and the natural environment.
Relevant to the linking of transition research to sustainable development 
is the work of John Grin et al. (2011), who argue that transformation does not 
only foresee new societal practices, but also changes in the structures in which 
these practices are embedded. They further contend that new practices need to 
co-evolve with earlier practices (“the regime”). Frank Geels (2011 p. 26) claims 
that the regime needs to be given the primary focus, because transitions are 
defined as shifts from one regime to another. He classifies the niche and land-
scape levels as “derived concepts,” because “they are only defined in relation to 
the regime, namely as practices or technologies that deviate substantially from the 
existing regime” (Geels 2011 p. 26).
One major strand of socio-technical theories is the multi-level perspective 
(MPL), which conceptualizes overall dynamic patterns in socio-technical tran-
sitions (Geels 2011). The multi-level perspective uses a combination of evolu-
tionary theory and the sociology of technology in explaining that transitions are 
shifts from one stable socio-technical regime to another. Transitions occur when 
regimes are destabilized through pressures (Rip & Kemp 1998; Markard & 
Truffer 2008a). Frank Geels (2005; 2011) summarizes that MPL is an analytical 
framework that combines concepts from evolutionary economies (trajectories, 
regimes, niches, speciation, path dependence and routines), science and technol-
ogy studies (sense making, social networks and innovation), structuration the-
ory and neo-institutional theory (rules and institutions as “deep structures” from 
which knowledgeable actors draw their actions).
The multi-level perspective can provide relevant insights into helping develop-
ing countries, especially those countries with emerging economies such as China, 
India, Mexico, Brazil and Indonesia, to manage their transformation towards 
 sustainability. By assessing the historical phases of economic, technological, 
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 cultural, and political changes, this multi-level perspective can help distinguish 
other transition patterns which destabilize the system as the transformation pro-
cess unfolds. In addition, the analysis of multiple processes of “changing prac-
tices” and structural change during the course of transformation can be better 
aligned parallel to each other to produce non-incremental changes in practices 
and structures (Grin et al. 2010). Because these countries are often confronted 
by multiple transition processes (e.g. political, economic, post-colonial), causal-
ities and related challenges can be better understood and resolved. For example, 
through this understanding, corrective measures can accompany technology trans-
fer mechanisms to effectively target “deficient” regimes in these countries.
Through the application of the MLP, it can be inferred that sustainable, 
low-carbon development, as sociotechnical transition, will most likely involve 
alterations of various sectors such as transport, energy, and agriculture, which 
would entail technology policy, markets, cultural meaning and scientific knowl-
edge. However, as Fernand Braudel (1958) argues, each of these sectors or sub-
systems may vary in pace and follow different historical timescales. Therefore, 
it is detrimental to managing transformation that the stage of transition for each 
sector be assessed. In addition, there are existing path dependencies that may 
inhibit a specific sector to support sustainable, low-carbon development. Hence, 
more rapid and widespread reforms are necessary to pave over path dependencies 
and restructure asymmetries.
New revisions of the MPL are emerging. Some of the literature is now looking 
at transition or transformation as a process, with various possible pathways (plu-
rality of pathways towards one outcome) depending on different configurations 
and multi-level interactions (Smith 2005; Patwardhan et al. 2012). This is par-
ticularly interesting when assessing the relevance of policy models (democratic, 
authoritarian, hybrid) to the achievement of sustainability goals. While the MPL 
as an evolutionary approach on transformation entails a pre-determined “future” 
for a system, it also argues that changes merely reorient existing development 
trajectories. The regime adopts certain niche innovations into the system which 
leads to a gradual reconfiguration of the basic architecture including guiding prin-
ciples, beliefs and practices (Smith 2005; Geels & Schot 2007a).
Although the multi-level perspective is largely confined to emerging technolo-
gies, it can shed light on how the motivation to accept change is created. As trans-
formation follows a specific evolutionary continuum, it is understood as an initial 
one-pathway, whereas challenges to the incumbent and dominant socio-tech-
nical practice (regime) will eventually emerge as the transition process unfolds. 
As time passes, the actors that are profiting from change will be more  powerful 
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than those resisting change. As more jobs are created, for example through the 
expansion of the renewable sector, the renewable sector will possess more 
resources and the confidence to pursue more effective advocacy. This is some-
thing that is being anticipated, leading to a more difficult transition process as 
resistance becomes a question of survival for some.
2.4  Cluster 4: Systems Approaches (SA)—Global 
Shifts and Globalization Discourse
Another cluster of how (global) transformation towards sustainability is 
addressed pertains to the focus on boundaries between the global and the 
national/local. This cluster revolves around questions about processes that support 
transitions and the interlocking and permeability of various domains such as state 
boundaries, cultures, societies, national identities and citizenship. Transforma-
tion towards sustainability is inherent to globalization, because sustainability as 
a concept has emerged in the context of intertwined vulnerabilities that transcend 
state boundaries. These intertwined vulnerabilities confront the monolithic archi-
tecture of the global system, leading to debates not only on how diplomacy can 
achieve solutions, but also on how the convergence of standards and identities can 
be facilitated to support transformation towards sustainability.
Peter Dicken (2015) points out that global shifts are mainly attributed to 
empirical changes in the configuration of the global economy and to changing 
interpretations of, and attitudes towards, ‘globalization’. Barry Eichengreen 
(2011) attributes Great Britain’s control of fully a quarter of the world’s popu-
lation and land mass by the end of the 19th century to the industrial revolution, 
which marked a global shift. He depicts another shift in economic power from 
Britain to other continental countries in Europe such as Germany and France as 
the pretext for World War I. In the same manner, Charles Kindleberger (1973) 
argues that the Great Depression of the 1930s was a ramification of the global 
shift of power from Europe to the United States.
This shows that global shifts are to be explained in the context of power, 
which is manifested by how structural as well as technological changes have 
altered relations between countries. Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2015) 
highlight the impact of global transformation on international relations. They 
argue that the uneven distribution of economic development brought by a com-
plex configuration of industrialization, rational state-building and ideologies of 
progress defines the uneven distribution of power in the international  system. 
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In addition, this inequity further determines the configuration of undergoing 
wide-ranging political, economic and cultural transformations. These global 
power shifts changed the basic modes of power, stimulating the emergence of 
global modernity.
While Joseph Nye (2010b) makes claim to the relative decline of the power of 
the United States, as Barry Eichengreen et al. (2008) also argue, he claims that 
the ongoing global shift of economic power from the United States to the East 
Asian region has a potentially far-reaching impact not only on markets and envi-
ronmental policies, but also on reshaping relations in the current multilateral sys-
tem. Several authors see a new era marked by accelerated globalization, where 
new decisive elements are available to maintain a leading global position (see 
Bardhan 2010; Kappel 2011; Shambaugh 2013; Kappel 2014). With China as the 
main proponent of this current global shift, the authors have pondered the emer-
gence of new impulses for transformation towards sustainability (see Fücks 2011; 
Volz 2015; CCICED 2015). China’s “change of tune” in climate policies is the 
result of the securitization of climate change (see chapter 8). This change reflects 
China’s current, more cooperative posture in international climate policy-making 
as motivated by its new sociotechnical and sociolinguistic narratives.
2.5  Cluster 5: Process Approaches (SA)—The Center-
Periphery and the Global South Discourse
Transition and transformation studies are no longer confined to European uni-
versities. Research institutions and universities in Asia and the Americas have 
recognized the need to establish or modify their mandates and visions and 
re-align their positions to be able to participate in shaping the discourse on sus-
tainability. For example, initial contributions to leading practices in sustainabil-
ity in higher education in the Asia-Pacific region have explored the trajectories 
of key initiatives across the region through the contextualization of sustaina-
bility innovation in higher education. Alexandra Ryan et al. (2010) attribute a 
wider understanding of the learning dimensions of sustainability in the region 
to several creative initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region that have helped har-
ness national policy, develop further local and regional initiatives towards 
more profound change in curriculum development, and establish collaboration 
with external communities and stakeholders. As many Asian and North/South 
American universities and post-graduate institutes join their counterparts in 
Europe in establishing new, dynamic programs that integrate sustainability into 
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most aspects of their curriculum including business and management, “change 
agents” of transformation towards sustainability are now equipped not only with 
concepts or ideas, but also with the technical expertise to address the emerging 
challenges of transformation.
The increased participation of non-European universities and research insti-
tutes in sustainability discourse will most likely lead to challenges to existing 
well-established Euro- or West-centric assumptions about sustainability. Old 
evidence paired with old approaches will most likely be revisited and new ways 
of linking will emerge, particularly because of the inter- and trans-disciplinarity 
of sustainability studies. For example, trajectories of sustainable development 
tend to “favor” democratic or deliberative (consensus-building) policy models 
(see Baber & Bartlett 2005; Arias-Maldonado 2007; Purdy 2010). Nevertheless, 
selected case studies in the book, particularly the case studies on Mexico, China 
and the Philippines offer new ways of re-linking ‘modern’ policy models with 
sustainability.
Some questions arise as to whether alternative perspectives such as the ‘Indig-
enous’ Modernity (see Pratt 2002; Ravindran 2015), the ‘Asian Way’ (Dupont 
1996; see Chesterman & Mahbubani 2010) and Bienestar (see Collier & Collier 
1991; Feinberg et al. 2006; Etcheverry 2011) could be equally useful for stud-
ies of transformation towards sustainability. For example, Simon Chesterman 
and Kishore Mahbubani (2010) argue that while there is no coherent or system-
atic Asian approach to meeting global challenges, Asian policy-making tends to 
respond pragmatically to challenges and is less ideology-driven. This includes 
how Asian countries such as Japan, with its “reluctant realism” towards China 
(Green & Self 1996), address changes in the region.
Another strand of this cluster refers to linking the study sustainability trans-
formation to the development of the welfare state, which has been made prom-
inent in Latin American literature through the concept, “estado del bienestar” 
(state-of-well-being) (see André 2008; Seligman 2014). This strand is a propo-
nent of the ideas of Abraham Maslow (1943), who suggested the pyramid of basic 
needs. In addition, this strand calls for political actors to pursue the enhancement 
of four areas of health: physical, mental, emotional and social (see Smith et al. 
2012; Abers & Tatagiba 2014). The “wellness” concept may open more channels 
for discourse on transformation towards sustainability, because most societies, 
particularly in developing countries, have had a long-standing debate on welfare 
policies such as Zakat (charity) in Islamic Law and Dharma (path) in India that 
could be used to further promote sustainability policies (see Shadi 2003; Crone 
2005).
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As the understanding of transformation or transition towards sustainability 
is widely contextualized, it has become apparent that differences in approaches 
and Weltbilder (world views) exist that require the re-visitation of existing con-
cepts. As some developing countries that demonstrate advancement in their 
transformation towards sustainability deviate from the ideal type of democratic 
policy models as the “formula” for successful transformation (see Baber & Bart-
lett 2005; Arias-Maldonado 2007), there is a need to revisit, among others, the 
‘purposive rationality’ (Zweckrationalität) of sustainability. As proposed by Max 
Weber (2005), expectations are developed as a means for a particular actor to 
attain rationally-pursued and calculated ends. In this sense, while transformation 
is driven by “social actions” serving a particular end, preferences around policy 
models can be diverse. Following the ‘value-free’ argument of global transforma-
tion in their book “Global Transformation and the Third World,” Robert Slater, 
et al. (1993) suggest that while the major element of global transformation per-
tains to democratization (the wave of political liberalization), the ‘Third World’ 
perspective may highlight military rule as the major alternative to democracy in 
most ‘Third World’ countries where military regimes can be, equally, both ‘cred-
ible’ as well as effective and efficient administrators. Therefore, when reflecting 
on sustainable, low-carbon transformation, a ‘value-free’ perspective on assessing 
sustainability pathways seems to be viable. This suggests that processes that are 
not built on consensus-building can also be practically used to achieve sustaina-
bility priorities.
2.6  Cluster 6: Process Approach—The Climate 
Negotiations Discourse
Another cluster can be identified, one that evolves around the discourse framed 
by or for climate negotiations, where major conflict cleavages, as reflected by the 
numerous bilateral and multilateral climate negotiations, are related to the per-
ceived economic burdens of climate mitigation and adaptation as major pillars of 
addressing climate change (see Cullet 1998; Heyward 2007; Penetrante 2010). 
The demand from developing countries for exemptions or delays in their mitiga-
tion commitments due to their right to develop (see Ott et al. 2004; Kanitkar et al. 
2010; Najam 2010; Penetrante 2010) collides with the demands of developed 
countries that developing countries make comparable commitments to mitigation 
(see Winkler et al. 2009a; Penetrante 2010, 2013). As such, the academic debate 
has focused its attention on the nexus economy and the environment as well as on 
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the nexus society and the environment when addressing climate mitigation and 
adaptation.
Some authors have observed that the global transformation towards sustaina-
bility is currently framed by global negotiations, particularly the climate change 
negotiations (see Sjöstedt 1993; Sjöstedt & Penetrante 2013) and the multilateral 
process towards sustainable development (see Kalhauge et al. 2005). As climate 
negotiations proceed, problems come to light, agendas are defined and procedures 
of generating solutions emerge as outcomes of these negotiations. The tendency 
within debate has now moved forward towards the ‘decoupling’ of the three bot-
tom lines (see Steinberger & Roberts 2010), as doing so is perceived to create the 
political will to commit to climate protection. In this regard, a number of studies 
now support the notion that a climate-compatible global economy is technologi-
cally possible (see McKinsey 2009; GEA 2012). For example, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) (2016b) reported that global CO2 emissions from ener-
gy-related activities have not risen since 2013 in spite of global economic growth, 
suggesting that the decoupling of emissions and economic activity is possible. 
The stabilization of emissions was attributed to the registered 1.5 percent decline 
in emissions in the United States and China.
A major obstacle to climate protection, and therefore also for low-carbon 
development, is primarily the ‘undoing’ of narratives and the perception of addi-
tional constraints, for example to food security and living space, particularly for 
countries already struggling to meet their needs. Because the discourse on cli-
mate mitigation in most countries is dominated by narratives of climate protec-
tion, for example exacerbating food insecurity, policy-makers focus on trade-offs 
rather than co-benefits. Some scholars question these narratives and argue that, 
with efficient structural changes including the promotion of inclusive participa-
tion (see Winslow 2005), food insecurity does not need to be an issue. For exam-
ple, Julia Steinberger and J. Timmons Roberts (2010) highlight the possibility 
of decoupling of energy and carbon from human needs such as food and shelter. 
If the academic discourse on the decoupling of the three bottom lines is able to 
find a consensus that there are co-benefits to pursuing climate protection policy 
goals for the two other bottom lines (economy and society), negative externali-
ties can be reduced or even prevented. Nevertheless, decoupling requires a more 
integrated understanding of causalities and process-tracing. For this, new methods 
of assessment and verification are needed to be developed and to mature, which 
requires more time and testing.
For scholars working on path dependencies, decoupling means identifying car-
bon lock-ins, particularly in the economy, which hinder the sets of viable  solutions 
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that support sustainability, including climate protection. New approaches are 
needed to recalculate economies of scale, revisit coordination and collaboration 
problems and redefine the impacts of policies (or the lack of them). As Claus Leg-
gewie and Dirk Messner (2012 p. 10) maintain, the successful implementation of 
transitions towards sustainability will be highly dependent on cognitive models, 
concepts and narratives that foresee how “change agents” acquire power to rea-
lign the economy and society. There is still, however, the need to move one step 
‘sideways’ and link this newly acquired power with a debate about justice 
and fairness. Existing formal and informal rules as well as norms will need to be 
improved to adequately address this newly acquired power. Transformation needs 
to be legitimized by the society, but this legitimization needs to be preceded by a 
“tolerable window” (see Bruckner et al. 1998; Bruckner et al. 1998; Petschel-Held 
et al. 1999). In addition, the temporal dimension of decoupling, for example, cli-
mate protection from the economic burdens of mitigation, necessitates the careful 
planning of stages and complementary mechanisms to absorb and make sense of 
the incremental learning process.
2.7  Interim Conclusion
This chapter contributes to this book’s theoretical framework by identifying 
parameters for the knowledge tools (ideal types and case studies/simulation). The 
rationale behind the introduction of the six different clusters is to rethink bound-
aries, even between relevant debates surrounding transformation towards sus-
tainability, in order to effectively establish frameworks. The six different clusters 
allow a clear comparison in terms of context (a systems perspective, by focus-
ing on entry points and drivers), agency (the power and purpose, by highlighting 
anchors for the deliberation process) and audience (in reference to legitimacy and 
the social contract vis-à-vis the transformation process).
Interestingly, the differences between these clusters of debates are themselves 
results of the contextuality of the process of academic debate. While looking at 
these differences, it can be argued that some difficulties in designing and imple-
menting sustainability policies can be attributed to the continuous development 
of a specific debate. For example, while the debate surrounding climate change 
negotiations problematizes the coupling of climate protection goals with devel-
opmental goals (emission reduction can be achieved with increased economic 
development), the debate surrounding sustainable development calls for a much 
closer coupling of climate protection and developmental policies. For many 
developed countries, climate mitigation assistance to developing countries should 
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be counted as official development assistance. For most developing countries, cli-
mate mitigation assistance from developed countries should be counted ‘in addi-
tion’ to official development assistance. Furthermore, because the audience of 
climate protection policies does not always correspond to the audience of sustain-
able development policies, some gaps between policy outcomes arise. There are 
different types of resistance within a specific debate that might later limit the use-
fulness of concepts to policy-making. This ‘anti-climax’ following intense debate 
can lead to frustration and resignation.
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Trade-Offs and Turnstiles as the Main 
Drivers of the Transformation Process 
Towards Sustainability
This chapter is a major pillar of the theoretical framework and reiterates how this 
book understands the intricacies of decision-making in the context of transfor-
mation towards sustainability. It looks at how power, identities, path dependence, 
emotions, norms, institutions and paradigms can promote or inhibit effective 
decision-making. This understanding aims not only to achieve the ‘deconstruc-
tion’ of paradigmatically ‘given’ terms, which are widespread within and across 
disciplines, but, equally importantly, to also develop and/or refine decision tools 
to address complexity and uncertainty. This understanding also provides bench-
marks and indicators to help ease the justification, verification and monitoring of 
decisions, paving the way for the effective ‘management’ of complexity. Because 
‘decision science’ is still in its infancy (see Skorepa 2011), there is still a need to 
clarify the definitions, terminologies and concepts of decision-making processes 
that are relevant for this book. In addition, because of the complexity of relevant 
issues, a ‘salad bowl’ of perspectives, approaches and methodologies should be 
expected.
Moreover, as this chapter highlights, the contextuality of decisions and the 
conceptualization of the processes of achieving these decisions require a dif-
ferent stance on normativity. What is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ can no longer be easily 
determined, because of the lack of clear boundaries between perspectives. This 
complexity of issues, which implies the diversity of perspectives, prevents a 
‘black-and-white’ distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ As context is reproduced 
and reinforced by narratives, there will be no single version of reality, or of the 
future. For example, while democratic principles, such as formal and material 
participation, are generally considered ‘good,’ such principles may also lead to 
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‘bad’ conditions, such as inefficient environmental protection measures, thinned 
out to accommodate the interests of the stakeholders. Trade-offs between pov-
erty alleviation and emission reduction will very likely motivate policy-makers 
to prioritize poverty alleviation policy goals. In the same manner, purportedly 
‘bad’ principles typical of authoritarian regimes that do not have ‘respect’ for 
human rights may actually be more effective in protecting the environment. In 
such cases, for example, a military junta leader that grabbed power from corrupt 
but democratically elected leaders through a violent coup may turn out to be an 
adamant ‘protector’ of the rule of law, including the protection of ethnic minori-
ties, which may not have been practically respected by previously democratically 
elected administrations. Nevertheless, it is not being argued by this book that the 
value of human rights and democracy are to be diminished or disregarded. In this 
sense, the analyses of decision-making processes need to be aware of ‘norma-
tive biases’ in order to maintain proximity to Eurocentric worldviews and to 
accommodate ‘indigenous’ ideas on modernity. Analyses of decision-making 
processes need to be able to evaluate ‘alternative paths’ (e.g., the Chinese way, 
the Asian way, the Russian model, etc.), isolate ‘best practices’ and come up with 
‘adapted versions’ of these practices.
Contextualizing decision-making to achieve sustainability is a situated and 
interactive activity. The contextualization of decision-making employs descrip-
tive, analytical and prescriptive approaches. It also requires the re-visitation of 
dominant theories and assumptions that are often taken for granted or presup-
posed. In addition, because the world system is in a transitional stage, collec-
tive decision-making is also in transition or transformation, as the number of 
issues, actors, and complexities increase along with the scope (see Kremenyuk 
2002). The monolithic architecture of the global system is complemented by frag-
mented decision-making that often leads to gaps that are still being conceptual-
ized and understood.
The analysis of decisions and the processes needed to achieve them involves 
multiple disciplines and methodologies. Multiple disciplines are used by this 
book to come up with qualitative and quantitative as well as ‘systemic’ bench-
marks and indicators: decision analysis, behavioral science, game theory, sociol-
ogy, logic, negotiation analysis, etc. Furthermore, the systems approach identifies 
the different units of analysis to enable an understanding of the processes within 
such units, their interactions with other units, the dynamics defining their inter-
connectivity, and the resulting positive and ‘fatal’ synergies. These units of analy-
sis are: actors, issues, structures, processes and outcomes.
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In terms of context, as will be demonstrated through the case studies in this 
book, important main drivers of transformation towards sustainability are iden-
tified and evaluated. In this evaluation, the functional, institutional and bargain-
ing interactions are highlighted. This structural analysis is key to understanding 
how transformation towards sustainability can be facilitated. For example, the 
case studies present potential entry points to transformation towards sustainabil-
ity for the selected countries. These entry points may involve resolving current 
path-dependent impasses such as carbon lock-ins or identifying opportunities that 
have been so far overlooked. In addition, the case studies analyze how the con-
text defines the agency and audience by, for example, pinpointing how bargaining 
interactions create more values that further promote sustainability. Nevertheless, 
there is a need to take one or two steps back and define the main drivers of trans-
formation towards sustainability through trade-offs and turnstiles.
The main drivers are evident, and latent factors behind decisions can be 
external or internal. Their effects can be regarded as subjective, as the effects of 
these drivers can only be ‘substantiated’ when they relate to the actors’ dispo-
sitions. As Andrea Trianni et al. (2016) suggest, these drivers can be economic 
(internal costs, opportunity costs, market barriers, demand, supply, etc.), regula-
tory (tariffs, taxes, public financing, fiscal subsidies, market instruments, etc.), 
informative (quantification methods leading to the consideration of additional or 
co-benefits), and educative (learning curves, technological maturity, etc.).
While these drivers ensure that similar decisions will be made as agents are 
eventually recalled and replaced, they are often highly contextualized, as these 
drivers may also occur only once or only as results of the uniquely constituted 
positive and ‘fatal’ synergies of various factors. For example, in a given devel-
oping country, the combination of a deficient element of governance, the unique 
effect of the global financial crisis due to the country’s high dependence on for-
eign remittances and foreign direct investment, low social capital following dec-
ades of colonization, a recent natural disaster, and an on-going constitutional 
crisis, can only occur once. In addition, a triggering event may initiate a tipping 
point as this event may cross the boundary of what actors can accept, or this event 
may initiate a ‘domino effect’ which further blurs causalities between exogenous 
and endogenous factors. This event can either be a major game-changing occur-
rence, such as the natural death of the country’s president, or a relatively unim-
portant event such as a successful, unexpected take-over bid of a company, which 
can push the last ‘domino tile’, leading to other events such as the mobilization of 
labor unions.
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Analyzing these drivers, including the related dynamics, synergies, 
triggers, and tipping points through process-tracing, is a highly complex 
endeavor. It requires not only a comprehensive and integrated understanding 
of historical events, not to mention access to confidential decisions made dur-
ing closed-door meetings, but also the identification and usage of adequate 
methodologies for content analysis, the definition of units of analysis (com-
ponents, sequences, or complete models) and for data interpretation, both in 
terms of theories and in terms of its practical meaning and usability. Never-
theless, a shared understanding of the drivers behind one’s own decisions and 
the decisions made by others is beneficial, especially when different actors 
can align their key goals, paving the way for a more mutually acceptable joint 
agreement.
The case study analyzed in chapters 8 to 12 of this book will highlight the 
main drivers of various transformation processes.
3.1  Trade-Offs
Trade-offs are paradoxes that inhibit, delay or prevent decision-making. They 
highlight the ‘human factor’ in decision-making, particularly in transformation 
processes, where ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ are expected to emerge. Without ade-
quate decision tools to understand the complexity and uncertainty of the issues 
involved and of the potential ramifications of their decisions, decision-makers 
will mostly refuse to commit to any purportedly ‘game changing’ decisions, par-
ticularly when they will be eventually held accountable or responsible for these 
decisions.
Transformation processes towards sustainability will most likely touch upon 
various policy goals. In some cases, the achievement of one policy goal will 
diminish the possibility of reaching another goal or it may increase the monetary 
and non-monetary costs of achieving a later goal. Without proper coordination 
and facilitation when managing these trade-offs, new conflict cleavages will most 
likely emerge, which may be ‘too much to handle’ and lead to system ruptures. To 
address this, cluster 3 (transformation management and socio-technical discourse) 
in the previous chapter has provided impulses.
Table 3.1 enumerates the selected nexus that reflect trade-offs in transforma-
tion processes towards sustainability.
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3.1.1  Global vs. Domestic/Local
The global and the domestic/local can be regarded as two sides of a continuum. 
While they are, to a significant degree, interconnected with the national spheres 
and serve as sub-systems, the two can also be defined as two separate systems. 
Each system has its distinct processes and dynamics and although it will be dif-
ficult to ‘think’ of the global without the local (and vice versa), this is theoreti-
cally possible from an analytical point of view. Nevertheless, the uncooperative 
game theory characterization of a system where actors are rational, strategic, and 
opportunistic and that no outside actor will step in to enforce agreements can 
be generally applied to both domestic (national/local) and international politics 
(Martin & Simmons 2010 p. 43). Furthermore, as Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons 
(2010 p. 43) suggest, with a similar assumption about the nature of actors and 
their environment, the potential for learning offered by this level of analysis could 
be enormous.
At first glance, the trade-offs between the global and the domestic/local 
includes the need to give up a specific degree of sovereignty, that is, of control 
(see Biersteker & Weber 1996; Aspinall 2002). This means, on the one hand, 
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‘outsourcing’ some aspects of national decision-making processes to mechanisms 
outside of state governance and to non-state actors in a franchise-like system (see 
Hernandez 2014a). This is not only limited to government agencies seeking pri-
vate providers of outsourced civil services to increase efficiency, but also to the 
substitution of tedious domestic constituency through mechanisms of various 
international institutions, where governments can play the “sovereignty” card to 
block decisions that are against their political agenda. This was, for example, the 
case when former US President Obama deliberately sidestepped the Congress and 
formally entered the United States into an international climate change agreement 
(Davenport & Prusak 2000; see DeMint 2016).
On the other hand, giving up a specific degree of sovereignty can also mean 
accepting a specific degree of dependence on international governance structures 
when forging national policies over lower-prioritized issues (see Cede 2012). 
National governments may, for example, accept the jurisdiction of international 
arbitration bodies in specific issues, particularly when disputes involve non-cit-
izens (see Cede 2009). In addition, national governments allow themselves to 
be the subjects of external verification and sanction mechanisms which form a 
type of hierarchy, either because of rewards and sanctions (see Birnie & Boyle 
1992; Boyle 1999), or because non-compliance will merely empower domestic 
pro-compliance constituencies to monitor and enforce national compliance (Dai 
2007).
Another trade-off refers to identity-building and its meaning when accessing 
resources. When focusing on the above-mentioned distinct processes and dynam-
ics related to transformation towards sustainability, opening the ‘local’ up to 
the ‘global’ may also promote disengagement among the locals. As the ‘global’ 
instils new and unfamiliar ‘dominant’ values and norms (often defined by histor-
ical experiences of the Global North) leading to the establishment of paradigms, 
the locals of countries belonging both to the Global North and the Global South 
are confronted by differences and conflicts between their homes (local) and the 
new romanticized ‘society-at-large’ (global). For example, in the Philippines, 
due to its colonial past and as enhanced by globalization, the use of the English 
language has been used as the defining factor for employment and status quo, 
whereas the ability to speak English with an American accent (‘elitist English’) 
promises more job prospects and social prestige. This ability is taken as an indi-
cator of an individual’s access to quality education or even of intellectual capa-
bility and therefore offers opportunities that are unreachable to others. Filipinos 
that speak English (or even Tagalog) with a clear ‘provincial accent’ are ridiculed 
as backward and uneducated (see Montalvan, III 2010; Hernandez 2014a). Many 
locals are then confronted with a clear disconnect between their ‘primordial’ 
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identity and the social identity, as the language used at home (one of more than 
100 local languages) and the English language they need to speak with an Amer-
ican accent to acquire better employment, for example, in the high-paying call 
center industry, imply two different incompatible identities. This apparent dis-
connect implies that their relationships, activities and roles are restrained.
3.1.2  The Unit vs. Collectivity
Trade-offs can also be observed when decisions are made by individuals or by 
a collectivity. Policies that need to be forged by individual actors in the name of 
the collectivity will need to address distinct challenges (see Olson 1965; Sandler 
2004). In many cases, while unitary decision-making is considered to be effi-
cient because decisions can be goal-oriented and made quickly, it is thought to 
circumvent proper representation and is therefore regarded as undemocratic and 
unwarranted. The connection between unitary decision-makers and the collectiv-
ity is contextually subjected to existing governance structures, which reflect the 
political mandate given to decision-makers (see Walker et al. 1988). This political 
mandate or legitimacy can be derived through electoral processes, for example 
in democratic countries, and in authoritarian countries through ‘performance out-
puts’ (see Easton 1975). In some cases, the effectiveness or integrity of decisions 
can be undermined by a failure to adequately consider the perspectives of all 
members of the collectivity. Nevertheless, the need to achieve consensus can also 
delay decisions and delays can incur additional costs or missed opportunities. In 
the same manner, when a unitary entity has made the necessary decisions alone 
without any form of consultation, it will most likely lead to the mobilization of 
opposition, disconnecting basic games from policy games.
Depending on the context, affected stakeholders that were not embedded in the 
process or did not agree to the decisions made by the majority may resort to legal 
or paralegal channels that could further increase the costs of decision-making (see 
Faysse 2006; Cheyns 2011). Furthermore, ‘spoilers’, or those actors that are not 
open to persuasion or bargaining are further empowered and vindicated and are 
provided with more arguments against the decisions made (see Mitchell et al. 
1997; Pinkse & Kolk 2012). Nevertheless, while collective decisions resulting 
from consensus-building processes will most likely have fewer difficulties when 
being implemented, the integrity of these decisions can be doubted, as they can 
be significantly ‘watered-down’ as a result of compromises (see Ostrom 1990; 
Sandler 2004). A major trade-off refers to risks of disidentification and disen-
chantment, where decisions made by the few promote the removal of the signs 
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of identities of the many such as roles, titles and statuses as well as creating new 
‘worlds’ that are not ‘real’ for many locals (see Adger et al. 2011). For example, 
the signing of the Paris Climate Agreement by their national government may 
mean distress for coal-dependent communities that have already assumed dis-
tinct identities. This agreement may also mean that in the medium and long term, 
they will need to ‘unlearn’ their perspectives in order to survive, which horrifies 
many. This distress is, for example, considered to be responsible for the loss of 
the Democrats in Wisconsin and Michigan during the US Presidential Elections 
in 2016.
3.1.3  Cooperation vs. Sovereignty
While engaging in international cooperation has its distinct advantages, it also 
often means giving up some elements of sovereignty, whereas sovereignty and 
its indicators are regarded as matters of perception (see Biersteker & Weber 
1996). In addition, trade-offs between international cooperation and sovereignty 
are often analyzed in the context of power asymmetry. For example, Johannes 
Urpelainen (2011) argues that under power asymmetry and in the context of 
cooperation, powerful states are willing to accept constraints on the use of power, 
as opposed to simply maximizing the supply of the collective enforcement power. 
Therefore, for weaker countries, engaging in cooperation with powerful states 
allows them to maintain their sovereignty, because cooperation also limits the 
motivation and capacity of powerful states to violate the sovereignty of weaker 
states.
International cooperation may also mean tolerating interference in domestic 
affairs, and this exclusion from the benefits of cooperation can be used as politi-
cal leverage (see Axelrod 1984; Bunker & Rubin 1995). As international coopera-
tion may also mean that sensitive information needs to be shared with the others, 
some countries may engage in ‘tactical’ cooperation to collect information. This 
means that cooperation could also limit one’s competitive advantage (see Oye 
2011; Urpelainen 2011).
In addition, international cooperation can be used by the government to define 
the paradigm of self-legitimization, particularly when there is a domestic legiti-
macy crisis. Nevertheless, because international cooperation is highly dependent 
on the kinds of issues involved, limitations to cooperation due to the demands of 
sovereignty are rather self-serving. When a government refuses to cooperate on 
issue A due to sovereignty concerns, and it cooperates on issues B and C, how 
can this government decide that cooperation on issues B and C do not undermine 
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sovereignty? When such decisions are arbitrary, how can reciprocity, which is a 
major driver of cooperation, be built?
Limitations to cooperation often lead to questions about which issues should 
be dealt and to which degree sovereignty should be lost. For example, while it is 
evident that international cooperation on security will be confronted by different 
sets of political obstacles, and the national government will more likely prefer 
to limit the participation of social actors, what compels a government to reject 
environmental cooperation by claiming that it undermines national security? On 
the other hand, cooperation on trade and industry, such as free trade that requires 
involvement in the private sector, will more likely bear witness to a national gov-
ernment seeking the participation of business and industry actors. Why is sover-
eignty, then, defined by issues? Sovereignty is understood as independence from 
external influences and is a constitutive principle of ‘legitimacy’ vis-à-vis the 
audience, that is, one is sovereign not only in the eyes of the international com-
munity but also, and more importantly, in the eyes of the constituents.
3.1.4  Optimization/Efficiency vs. Consensus/Participation
Analyzing trade-offs between the efficiency of policy goals and promoting par-
ticipation in forging and implementing these policies is tricky (see Walker et al. 
1988; Cadman 2013). Although efficiency and participation can be regarded as 
the two sides of legitimacy, with participation serving as a category of ‘input’ and 
efficiency of ‘output’ legitimacy, they can be seen as competing in the eyes of 
policy-makers. Efficiency enhances the probability that the implementation of the 
measures and provisions of the decisions will lead to the achievement of the goals 
(see Barr 2012). Efficiency is often connoted in terms of the concept “Pareto Effi-
ciency.” Pareto efficiency, which has its origins in social welfare optimization, 
is the state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate 
to improve one’s own status without making at least one counterpart worse off 
(Krasner 1991; see Sinn 2007).
Meanwhile, participation means ‘tailoring’ and ‘ownership’ of the decision- 
making process. It also constitutes the ‘acceptability’ of these provisions in the 
eyes of the affected audience. In addition, it refers to the probability that the neg-
ative consequences of these decisions will be ‘tolerated’ and remain unchallenged 
by those affected, knowing that the ‘pain’ of indecision is worse than the expected 
consequences (see Luce & Raiffa 1957; Raiffa 1968). When the status quo ante 
or the ‘alternative’ to the ‘business-as-usual’ option is better off than the status 
under these (new) decisions, then legitimacy can be undermined, because of the 
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high probability that the implementation will be rejected (see Tversky & Kahne-
mann 1986; Toth et al. 2001). Hence, efficiency can also be regarded as a cate-
gory of legitimacy, as deficient decisions will also most likely lead to resistance.
The choice between efficiency and participation becomes challenging when 
there are trade-offs between them. In ideal cases, efficiency can be achieved 
without sacrificing a degree of participation. Nevertheless, particularly in cli-
mate protection, ‘effective’ measures and ‘optimization formulas’ will involve a 
degree of restriction on the part of the population or constraints to specific actors. 
Therefore, legitimizing channels need to be found to ensure the acceptability of 
such ‘optimal solutions’, particularly in front of a domestic audience. Because 
addressing trade-offs in (transformative) decision-making can be best understood, 
defined and conducted in the context of negotiations (see Winham 1977; Zartman 
1994a; Watkins & Passow 1996), efficiency calculations and indicators need to 
adequately address negotiation pay-offs.
3.1.5  Choice vs. Control
Decisions are ‘purposive,’ because they are framed by goals. To enable deci-
sion-makers to evaluate the current status of decisions in terms of how the goals 
are expected to be achieved, there is a need to come up with indicators and 
benchmarks as the basis of verification or of performance control (see Freistein 
2016; Boavida 2017). Nuno Boavida (2017) suggests that studies about the way 
indicators are used in technological innovation are significantly rare, despite the 
centrality of decisions. In addition, Greg Marsden and Carolyn Snell (2009) are 
critical of the fact that indicators can distort decision-making processes because 
of poor internal planning processes or unnecessary external constraints.
Indicators are needed to measure the progress of achieving predetermined 
goals. As discussed in the introduction, the transformation process towards sus-
tainability is purposive due to the centrality of predetermined goals. For exam-
ple, Greg Marsden and Carolyn Snell (2009) see indicators as crucial to transport 
planning processes as they can be used for decision-support in all aspects of pol-
icy development and assessment, from option generation, through to policy test-
ing and appraisal, to monitoring and feedback. Moreover, indicators can provide 
insights into whether additional intervention or changes are needed to correct 
unwanted occurrences. Nevertheless, as indicators are often quantitative, focusing 
only on indicators may cause decision-makers to miss out on other signs of pro-
gress that cannot be measured numerically. For example, while climate protection 
goals can be measured through the amount of emission savings, specific co-ben-
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efits of these goals such as the prevention of destruction of historically important 
buildings and monuments or the improvement of health are often missed or inad-
equately included in assessing the benefits of such goals. Therefore, as Marsden 
and Snell (2009) suggest, an indicator framework needs to be an essential part 
of effective planning processes for internal management and decision support, as 
well as for external communication.
Trade-offs arise when decisions involving several actors are given more 
‘choices’ as to how to fulfill their responsibilities and ‘shopping’ for indi-
cators become a usual practice. In this situation, indicators are designed and 
developed to serve the vested interests of the actors. These self-serving indica-
tors become useless in assessing various stages of transformation. Zachary Kar-
abell (2014) argues that the twenty-first century is proving more challenging to 
measure. He continues that statistics cannot capture the multifaceted and complex 
national and global economic systems.
Another trade-off refers to choices available during collective decision-mak-
ing. Choices, particularly long-term ones under certainty, are often linked to 
flexibility (see Fawcett et al. 2012). As a provision in an agreement, flexibility 
means one unit less of possible control. For example, the implementation of 
new policies is often combined with flexibility measures to enable affected actors 
to manage transition in an acceptable way. In addition to compensatory meas-
ures, flexibility may also include ‘grace periods’ or ‘exemptions’ until a given 
time. For example, Wigley et al (1996) found that the global time flexibility in 
GHG emission reduction given to developing countries can be justified to some 
extent. Particularly after the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, developed countries 
have expressed their position that they will only commit if developing countries 
will agree to comparable commitments (Bodansky 2010; Penetrante 2010, 2011). 
Nevertheless, as Taishi Sugiyama and Liu Deshun (2004) argue, it does not nec-
essarily serve as a rationale to delay the emission reduction commitments and 
efforts of developed countries.
In a similar way to flexibility, ambiguity in collective decisions increases 
the set of possible choices while limiting control. Trade-offs are evident in 
 decision-making under uncertainty when policy-makers look for a ‘way out’ from 
the commitments before signing any agreement. From the negotiation perspec-
tive, while reaching an agreement is hard, honoring one may be even more dif-
ficulty. Martin Weber (1987) identified methods which are particularly suitable 
for handling decision situations with incomplete information. The decision-maker 
is unable to define a precisely defined and stable preference structure because 
probability distributions vis-à-vis the consequences are not known completely. 
Ambiguity in some provisions of the agreement would allow decision-makers 
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flexibility, particularly in determining the “how”-provisions of agreements. How-
ever, difficulties arise when there are so many flexibility measures, or the goals 
are too ambiguous that verification (control) becomes useless. Ambiguity may 
also encourage ‘bad faith negotiators’ (see Churchman 1995) and ‘spoilers’ (see 
Stedman 1997), who have other vested interests when engaging in negotiations 
(e.g., to gather information about competitors) and who had no intention to com-
mit from the start. Nevertheless, ambiguity is inevitable as agreements will not 
cover all possible aspects of interactions. In addition, ambiguity (and flexibility 
measures in general) encourages participation in bargaining processes. Ambigu-
ity motivates actors to not leave the negotiation table, and should ambiguity and 
flexibility measures be inefficient, they can be re-negotiated. In these cases, there 
would be no need to start from square one of collective decision-making.
3.1.6  Prototypes vs. Generics
Decisions as solutions to new emerging problems may be either prototypes or 
generics. As new and previously unknown problems emerge, decision-makers 
can look for early samples or models as the basis for a decision. Prototypes 
intend to test various parameters relevant to the problem and to enhance future 
 decision-making through replication and learning. As such, it follows the prin-
ciple of ‘trial-and-error’, which implies that unknown negative aspects or 
unwanted side-effects are expected and will be useful in reconfiguring decisions. 
Prototypes undergo ‘learning-by-doing’, defining their ‘maturity process’ as prob-
lems to be adequately addressed. Uncertainties about these negative side-effects 
will most likely be used by opposing actors to demand the recanting of previous-
ly-made decisions. Depending on how the opposition can mobilize popular sup-
port to form a counter-movement to reverse changes, the whole transformation 
process can be jeopardized. Therefore, decision-makers are highly dependent on 
verification measures to act as quickly as possible to address these side-effects.
Another approach that can be used by decision-makers when formulating deci-
sions on emerging problems is to seek, or, if not available, to constitute ‘gener-
ics’. There is often a ‘general formula’ to address such issues regardless of the 
unique specificities of these problems. Such ‘standard operating procedures’ 
(SOPs) are most likely general in scope and cannot address the specificities of 
these emerging problems. For example, Carlo Guipponi and Alessandra Sgobbi 
(2013) illustrate a generic decision/policy-making process with its main steps and 
the areas of influence of participatory planning, simulation planning and decision 
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analysis: (0) political and normative triggering factors (e.g., water management 
plan); (1) problem exploration and framing (gaps, needs, potentials, constraints); 
(2) the actor’s involvement and participatory process (stakeholder’s dialogues, 
focus groups); (3) problem analysis (organization of information and knowledge, 
mental models); (4) data-processing, modeling and evaluation (simulation mod-
els, scenario analysis); (5) the analysis of response options (e.g., multi-criteria or 
cost-benefit analysis); (6) action-taking and monitoring (implementation plans, 
investment).
Decision-makers may, on one hand, see the need to look at each problem as it 
comes, that is, case-by-case. In these instances, decision-makers will start from 
a ‘default’ position, analyze the problems, investigate the factors responsible for 
cause-and-effect relationships and then come up with a solution for this spe-
cific case. On the other hand, decision-makers may prioritize a ‘rapid response’ 
to emerging problems and prefer to come up with ‘generics,’ where they have 
anticipated the problems and have already worked on protocols and SOPs. As a 
problem emerges, decision-makers will adhere to SOPs and will be less likely to 
tolerate deviations from presumed procedures.
Trade-offs are for example made between the effectiveness (in the context 
of usefulness) of the solutions and the speed of reaching decisions. Particularly 
when dealing with pressing issues while confronted by incomplete or soon-
to-be obsolete information, decision-makers must absorb learning and establish 
adequate institutional memory or “stored knowledge within the organization” 
(Gibbons 2007). In addition, Jack Corbertt et al. (2018) contend that institu-
tional memory is central to the pragmatic task of policy-making. They continue 
that memory can be “static,” i.e. memory is singular and held in document form, 
or “dynamic,” i.e. memory is dispersed across an array of actors that make up 
the differentiated polity. However, decision-makers in policy circles, particu-
larly those at higher levels, often do not stay long in their positions. Therefore, 
because they do not especially have dynamic institutional memory, they may tend 
to prefer prototype decisions (based on static memory), while those at middle and 
lower levels tend to prefer generic decisions.
3.1.7  Linearity vs. Non-linearity
While the process outlook on decisions implies a ‘holistic’ or ‘systems’ approach, 
the negotiation perspective provides insights into the importance of different 
types of preference (utility) functions in collective decision-making, which can be 
linear or non-linear. An actor with a linear preference function will have strictly 
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monotonous preferences through which larger quantities of a single good will 
be chosen (higher utility). Furthermore, the actor with a linear preference func-
tion will have ‘weakly convex, but not strictly convex’ preferences in which the 
mixture of two equivalent bundles is equivalent to the combined original bundles 
(see Gale 1976; Candeal-Haro & Induráin-Eraso 1995). In contrast, actors with 
non-linear preference functions will be confronted by differences between the 
‘objective’ value of a negotiated outcome and the subjective utility attributed to 
the same outcome. In other words, non-linear preference functions highlight 
the relevance of ‘experience’, which prevents a constant, subjective utility func-
tion. A non-linear preference can encompass both the decreasing and increasing 
marginally subjective utility of negotiation outcomes on a single issue (see North-
craft et al. 1995 p. 298).
The prevalence of non-linear preference functions is not only to be found in 
economics, but also in negotiation studies. Gregory Northcraft et al. (1998) have 
compared the effects of both linear and non-linear preferences on negotiated 
settlements. They claim that while non-linear preference functions dramatically 
alter the dynamics of negotiation exchanges by creating more value, called ‘log-
rolling’ (see Pruitt & Rubin 1986), they also promote ‘concession cross-over’ 
(see Northcraft et al. 1995). The paradox of concession cross-over occurs when 
an issue originally less valued by a negotiator becomes subjectively more valu-
able, merely because concessions were already made in the past. In addition, 
non-linearity implies that set-backs can also contribute to the achievement of the 
envisaged outcome, particularly when set-backs are understood as ‘materials’ or 
‘lessons’ for future decisions. This ‘non-linearity’ of the decision-making process 
allows a more pragmatic stance on decision-making. Nevertheless, policy-makers 
often assume linearity of processes, as implied by their dependence on indicators 
and benchmarks to legitimize their decisions. The understanding of non-linearity 
allows a problem-solving outlook on process-related challenges that inhibit deci-
sion-making.
Nevertheless, non-linearity not only fails to consider more interconnected con-
flict cleavages that need to be addressed simultaneously, it also implies challenges 
on legitimizing policies, as policy-makers require indicators and benchmarks to 
assess the effectiveness of their decisions in terms of the value of concessions. 
While preference utilities can be non-linear, decisions cannot fully make use of 
these, especially when multiple issues are involved; therefore, they tend to use 
assessment tools that assume the linearity of preference utilities over issues and 
over the process in general. As Max Bazerman et al. (1985) as well as Marga-
ret Neale & Gregory Northcraft (1986) claim, because actors can also have lin-
ear subjective utility (preference) functions, their preferences will most likely not 
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change as their endowment, or holding, of other resources increases or decreases. 
For example, in negotiating monetary compensation for relocation due to the 
construction of dams for hydrogen power, a person might already have a spe-
cific minimum amount that he or she considers to be acceptable. The ‘reservation 
value’ or the ‘walk away’ (Raiffa 1982), or in this case, the minimum level of 
compensation that a person can accept, although subjective, is most likely linear. 
The person will most likely refuse relocation if not given any comparable values 
such as housing allowance, which can be ‘converted’ to monetary compensation.
Therefore, because concessions cannot always acknowledge or incorporate the 
diversity and complexity of possible subjective utility functions (see Northcraft 
et al. 1995), decision-makers will most likely be confronted by trade-offs between 
objective and subjective utilities. For example, to implement the low carbon tran-
sition of energy systems, the government plans to build two wind mills in the 
first year and another mill in each following year. Although the monetary value 
of this project increases every time a wind mill is installed, the utility function of 
the households living in the area may not increase to the same level or may even 
decrease after a specific threshold has been passed. Hence, trade-offs between lin-
ear and non-linear utilities or preferences need to be effectively addressed when 
facilitating transformation processes.
3.1.8  Incremental vs. Leap-Frogging
Transformation processes are dependent on technological innovation that sup-
ports the implementation of policy goals (see Carraro & Siniscalco 1994; Mark-
ard & Truffer 2008b). In some cases, innovation can initiate the transformation 
process, as societies find solutions to problems that have long existed. Step by 
step, as the transformation process unfolds, minor changes are made to achieve 
predetermined policy goals. Therefore, transformation processes are driven by 
incremental knowledge. Nevertheless, the maturity of technologies is often a 
result of constant exchanges with societal actors. During such exchanges, tech-
nology providers can adapt technologies according to the demand or to antici-
pated demand. While not all technological innovations are embraced by the 
population, those that have garnered attention will be further developed. Syner-
gies are made as other products are developed that complement the initial tech-
nology (e.g., batteries and storage for new transportation modes).
In addition, synergies between technological and social innovation may 
improve transformation as shifted paradigms lead to new institutions and even 
new forms of governance. New information technologies will most likely lead to 
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changes in modes of accountability and transparency. For example, a government 
prioritizing the elimination of corruption can further advance this policy goal by 
digitalizing various services provided by the government. Another example is that 
as it becomes evident that new green technologies can create new job opportuni-
ties, governments will have, ideally, started developing or adjusting existing polit-
ical and market instruments. Nevertheless, because political actions depend on 
the incremental character of knowledge generation and technological innovation, 
the government and other state agencies might need to ‘adjust’ their mandate as 
well as some provisions in the ‘social contract.’ Digitalization might, for example, 
require new public debate and consensus related to data protection and freedom 
of speech.
Being incremental also means that a learning process is inevitable. However, 
in the national or global academic and political climate debate, there is a narra-
tive that is gaining ground: that it is better for developing countries with emerg-
ing economies to omit this tedious, emission-rich and expensive learning process 
and accelerate transformation towards sustainability by bypassing certain stages 
of development. In current climate change negotiations, many governments and 
experts call for developing countries to ‘leapfrog’ (see Goldemberg 1998; Zerriffi & 
Wilson 2010; Correa d’Almeida & Poon 2015).
The concept of leap-frogging argues that it is possible for a country to change 
to a higher level of development without going through the intermediate stages. 
In other words, it means that developing countries should not follow the ‘dirty’ 
economic development path made by developed countries, and should accelerate 
development by skipping inferior, less efficient, more expensive or more pollut-
ing technologies and industries and move directly to more advanced ones (see 
Goldemberg 1998; Steckel et al. 2013; Jakob et al. 2014). When technologies as 
well as financing models are already available, why should developing countries 
not avoid the environmentally and socially harmful stages of development? In a 
highly globalized world, technology transfer can allow developing countries to 
‘assume’ high technological development without the being country that has pro-
duced this technology.
Technological development needs to be complemented and guided by social 
change, which is highly context dependent. For example, as Victor Berrueta et al. 
(2015) conclude from their case study of Mexico’s Patsari improved cook stove 
project, while a new low-carbon cooking technology can be easily distributed to 
poor households in developing countries, there is no guarantee that this technology 
will ‘sink in’ and be used, especially when cultural aspects have been disregarded. 
Moreover, new technologies may also lead to the reproduction or reinforcement 
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of existing social fragmentation, as access to these technologies may further 
strengthen the hierarchy between urban (core) and rural (periphery) areas (see 
Jonas 1984; Meadowcroft 2005; Stirling 2008). Therefore, not only can too ambi-
tious and rapid technology-driven social change disenfranchise a huge portion of 
the population and promote social division, it can also limit the potential benefits 
of technological innovation, as the society is not able to fully ‘absorb’ and ‘repli-
cate’ innovation, which may lead to further frictions (e.g., legitimacy gaps).
3.1.9  Adaptation vs. Latency
Talcott Parsons (1951) highlighted in his AGIL-functions the systematic depic-
tion of certain societal functions, which every social system needs to maintain 
stability. He argued that the stability of a social system depends on various func-
tional prerequisites: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latency. Adap-
tation refers to the capacity of the system to interact with its environment. Goal 
attainment pertains to the system’s capacity to set goals for the future and for-
mulate provisions and strategies to attain these goals. Integration points to the 
harmonization of the system through values and norms that are solid and suffi-
ciently convergent. Latency, also referred to as latent pattern maintenance, refers 
to the capacity of the system to maintain integrative elements to ‘mediate’ or 
facilitate cohesion between different generations and actors within the system.
In the context of transformation processes towards sustainability, the trade-off 
or conflict cleavage that is often the subject of public discourse is between the 
‘old’ and the ‘new,’ that is, between adaptation and latency. Some proponents of 
the ‘old system’ argue that there is no need to change something that has proven 
to have worked. One argument is that the system is constantly changing, and it 
needs to adapt to these changes if it wants to survive. Transformation can also be 
regarded as a self-preserving mechanism. With the ability to adapt to occurring 
changes, the system is able to avert perceived system ruptures. For Nietzsche, 
transformation is a matter of survival and well-being. In his work “Also sprach 
Zarathustra” (1883), he highlighted the necessity of allowing the three major epi-
sodes of the metamorphoses of the “human spirit” as a process of self- discovery. 
The camel, which is able to collect “burdens, conquests and scars,” needs to 
transform into a lion over time to prevent the “risk of being poisoned by bitter-
ness, despair and the spirit of despair.” This “destructive” lion however needs to 
turn into a child, who represents a “new beginning” where the original “inno-
cence” is revived.
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Transformation is one of the most intuitive responses to a changing environ-
ment. Change management in organizations including business companies is an 
integral part of strategies in which their survival is highly dependent upon their 
capacity to adapt to changes and identify and utilize competitive advantages 
before their competitors do. For many major business companies, adaptation 
means seeing a different future for the company and being unafraid of making 
large scale changes (Simpson 2011). Now known as one of the world’s largest 
chemical companies, DuPont (NYSE: DD) started as a gunpowder supplier. As 
new opportunities were identified, DuPont pioneered new plastics and synthetics, 
fertilizers and new healthcare and nutrition products.
Another argument is that the system needs to maintain its basic fiber. 
Latency does not resist changes in the system per se but focuses on maintaining 
basic structures or elements that mediate or facilitate between conflicting actors 
or elements within the system. Latency can be understood in terms of the gov-
ernance theory introduced by Renate Mayntz (2009). Her definition of govern-
ance is functional and refers to how political facilitation (politische Steuerung) 
determines the agency or the capacity to act in vertically differentiated govern-
ance structures. For example, this definition can be referred to as channels of 
finding solutions to problems, realization of specific values such as climate pro-
tection and human rights, as well as the improvement of specific services such 
as energy supply security. For example, institutions such as the constitution can 
mediate belief systems and values between generations, ensuring social cohesion 
and therefore stability of the system. The literature has argued that transition or 
transformation is a process with various possible pathways that include low, mod-
erate and extreme changes, depending on different configurations and multi-level 
interactions (Smith 2005; Patwardhan et al. 2012). As such, transition does not 
need to lead to ruptures, as it merely reorients existing development trajectories. 
Latency therefore means that the regime adopts certain niche innovations into the 
system which leads to a gradual reconfiguration of the basic architecture, includ-
ing guiding principles, beliefs and practices (Smith 2005; Geels & Schot 2007a).
Trade-offs between latency and adaptation become relevant when deci-
sion-makers are compelled to maintain some elements of the system for it not 
to lose its identity, which binds differences between constituents while allowing 
some changes to adapt to the new environment, either globally or locally. María 
Eugenia Sánchez (2010) attributes a loss of identity to the process of creating a 
de-territorialized or multi-local world productive system, which is more informa-
tional than industrial and more speculative than productive. She argues further 
that the breakdown and disarticulation of institutional and symbolic mediations 
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of the past have had a strong impact on identities. In addition, while some insti-
tutions can facilitate the identification of common ground, these institutions are 
themselves also subject to changes they need to adapt to. It remains a question 
of how much change these institutions can undergo before they lose their credi-
bility as facilitators. For example, Patricia Gumport (2000) problematizes some 
changes in the academic landscape of public higher education in the United 
States over the past 25 years. She identifies a macro-trend whereby the mandate 
of public higher education has shifted from being a social institution to an indus-
try. She explains that this pattern of academic restructuring that reflects multiple 
institutional pressures may lead to a loss of legitimacy, as universities move away 
from their historical character, functions, and accumulated heritage as educational 
institutions.
3.1.10  Causal Determinism vs. Self-Efficacy/Free Will
The assessment of possible decisions is often based on causal determinism, also 
referred to as cause-and-effect. Causal determinism is “the idea that every event 
is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of 
nature” (Hoefer 2008). In other words, all events have causes and identical causes 
will lead to same effects. While determinism can be less problematic in certain 
technical issues, attributing deterministic principles to collective decision-making 
can be challenging. Determinism in decision-making implies predictability. 
However, such determinants can also include human choices and actions that do 
not occur as a first cause but rather as responses. As events are perceived to be 
bound by causality, it makes sense to investigate how agents absorb information 
and constitute responses. Nevertheless, determinism is often considered to discard 
self-efficacy or ‘free will’, because determinism connotes predictability in human 
behavior (see Franklin 1968).
Furthermore, determinism seems to ignore self-driving and self-enforcing 
dynamics, where factor A leads to the occurrence of factor B, but only when fac-
tor C is near A, or where factor A leads to the occurrence of factor B, but the 
next occurrence of B is no longer dependent on factor A, because factor B is now 
able to reproduce itself. In these two examples, causality has ceased to be rele-
vant, because of the lack of attribution. For example, the German government’s 
“Energiewende” (energy transition) to the new German energy and climate poli-
cies (factor B) was primarily caused by the decision to phase out nuclear energy 
(factor A). It is often argued that the Fukushima incident (factor C) has influenced 
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the decision to phase out nuclear energy (Hennicke & Welfens 2012; see Wille 
2017). Regarding this matter, Dominik Smyrgala (2017) presents a statistical 
analysis of the impact of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident on the Energie-
wende. He argues that the decision of the German government to phase out Ger-
many’s nuclear plants triggered this “irrational” behavior. Nevertheless, for the 
proponents of determinism, irrationality is non-existent. There was a causality 
and this causality occurred. Furthermore, it can be argued that while the Fuku-
shima incident motivated Energiewende, it merely provided the pretext for the 
decision and no direct causality between the Fukushima incident (factor C) and 
Energiewende (factor A) can be established, because if that was case, then other 
countries should have done the same as the German federal government
In evaluating transformation processes, it can be useful to analyze not only 
how a specific decision has come into being and how this decision will elicit fur-
ther decisions and actions, but also why other (national) systems failed to reach 
similar decisions as well as how comparable decisions failed to elicit further deci-
sions and actions. Nevertheless, the complexity and uncertainty of various issues 
will bring challenges, particularly when human accountability comes into the 
picture. For example, after low-carbon system transition costs are calculated, the 
next step is to find a formula to distribute these costs among actors, both per-
petuators and recipients (victims) as well as both suppliers and consumers. The 
costs can, for example, be distributed according to the anticipated benefits, where 
actors expecting more benefits should pay more. In addition, costs can also be 
distributed according to their accountability.
The trade-off between determinism and free will can be particularly evident 
when mechanisms of rewards and sanctions are to be established as part of an 
international and national verification regime. Determinism foresees a clear attri-
bution of negative externalities, while self-efficacy entails the responsibilities 
behind these decisions. Using the common understanding of fairness, equity and 
justice, those who have inflicted costs upon others (recipients) ‘with intent’ will 
need to be held accountable and responsible for the negative effects inflicted upon 
the others. Those perpetuators that did not, with free will, inflict the costs, are 
also held accountable according to their degree of guilt, but with lower sanctions 
after considering mitigating conditions. Therefore, the level of accountability 
(and the costs/sanctions linked with it) must also take into consideration causal 
determinism and free-will. However, this can be difficult, as there are no clear 
indicators that could objectively separate and measure factors that attest to causal 
determinism or free will.
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3.1.11  Quantitative vs. Qualitative Valuation
Outcomes of a collective decision-making process are intended to reflect the 
goals and targets set by the actors prior to the process. This juxtaposition between 
the purported goals/targets and the negotiated outcomes is assessed through cor-
responding indicators. International organizations such as the World Bank and the 
IMF have developed ‘measurement regimes’ that have led to various paradigm 
shifts (see Freistein 2016), not only at the global but also at the domestic/local 
level. The development of these indicators is, however, also the subject of pub-
lic debate, as ‘control’ over the development of these indicators can ‘dictate’ the 
paths of future policies (see Lyytimäki et al. 2013; Tokimatsu et al. 2013). Jari 
Lyytimäki et al. (2013) note that following the criteria for a good indicator does 
not guarantee that the indicator will be used, nor does it guarantee its use will 
produce the desired effects. For example, the scientists and experts drafting the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC have used the World Bank indicators to 
classify countries according to their level of income. This was a significant para-
digm shift, because it was perceived to mean moving away from the UNFCCC’s 
own categorization of countries through its Annex List. During the IPCC 
Approval Session of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Third Working Group in 
April 2014 in Berlin, developing countries, particularly the Gulf countries, pro-
tested against the use of the World Bank country labels (e.g., high, middle, low 
income countries), as this implied a different political understanding of historical 
responsibilities.
The functionality of indicators can also ‘concretize’ political mandates, 
because indicators are expected to enforce the unambiguity and applicability of 
provisions stipulated by the outcomes (see Underdahl 2002; Wilson & Wu 2016). 
Indicators can either lead to the success of implementation or can hinder imple-
mentation, particularly when the numbers reflected by indicators cannot be trans-
lated into realities. For example, Sarah Fredericks (2012) identifies definitions 
of justice used in sustainability discourse and evaluates how these concepts are 
aligned with different sustainability indicators and indexes, including the 2010 
Environmental Performance Index and Eurostat’s Sustainable Development Indi-
cators. She concludes that while these indicators cover various aspects of jus-
tice, they are still confronted by limitations such as the availability of data and 
the  inability of monitoring inequities between subpopulations. Finding appropri-
ate indicators is a challenging task, as they not only need to fulfil several crite-
ria such as the availability of data, their capacity of being monitored and their 
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 general suitability (see WRI 2009; World Databank 2011; Cobham 2014), but 
also because of the legitimacy impact of such indicators.
Particularly in the context of sustainable, low-carbon transformation, where 
quantitative and qualitative indicators are both used to monitor and verify compli-
ance and progress, academic research on negotiations has been mostly qualitative 
and has depended on case studies to come up with insights useful for conducting 
negotiations (see Hopmann 2002). This is usually the case, because quantitative 
methods are not often seen as useful in negotiation studies. In addition, as Andy 
Scerri and Paul James (2010) explain, because achieving sustainability is often 
undertaken as a technical task, some methodological issues arise when setting out 
to develop and implement qualitative indicators of sustainability that incorporate 
quantitative metrics.
Additional challenges arise when quantitative indicators are bestowed with 
qualitative value to legitimize decisions and actions. A major concern refers 
to doubts about the universality of the results of quantitative measurements 
using merely a small fraction of the total population. In addition, it is not clear 
how quantitative indicators can make use of random and context-dependent 
occurrences. While quantitative indicators use average or median values, these 
can either ‘water down’ or exaggerate in a way that becomes useless for deci-
sion-making in a local context. Therefore, trade-offs between quantitative and 
qualitative valuation involves on one hand policy-makers who must be aware of 
the need of ‘contextualizing’ numbers, and on the other hand, the need to base 
their decisions on something ‘objective’ and ‘representative’.
3.2  Interim Conclusion
Structural analysis is key to understanding functional, institutional and bargain-
ing interactions in the context of the transformation towards sustainability. This 
chapter highlighted trade-offs and turnstiles as the main drivers of transforma-
tion, which define the contextualization of transformation. By clarifying which 
stumbling blocks (trade-offs) and opportunities (turnstiles) inhibit or promote 
transformation, the “ripeness” of decisions conducive to transformation can be 
strategically instigated.
These trade-offs and turnstiles are the “lever” that require proper management. 
They allow a degree of predictability in reproducing decisions. The trade-offs 
and turnstiles summarize the conceptual and methodological challenges of stud-
ying and managing multi-level transformation towards sustainability. Through 
the understanding of these challenges, policy goals can be more strategic and 
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 target-oriented. These trade-offs and turnstiles cut across scholarly disciplines 
and political jurisdictions. They uncover the dilemmas that might distort effective 
decision-making.
Referring back to the research design of this project, this chapter sets the stage 
for data assessment by providing parameters for process-tracing and congruence 
methods. By attributing distortions of decision-making to trade-offs, scholars and 
decision-makers can reflect more purposively and can strategize actions more 
effectively.
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A Critical Outlook on Assumptions—
Decision Systems in Transformation 
Towards Sustainability
Some assumptions about decision systems in the context of transformation 
towards sustainability will be presented in this chapter. These assumptions are 
backed by rationales, which highlight the utility preferences of agents and audi-
ence. In addition, trade-offs reflect the selection of the most important caveats 
that decision-makers are confronted with. These trade-offs were comprehensively 
discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, turnstiles are enumerated that 
demonstrate possible ‘silver-linings’ and potential opportunities that may arise to 
strategically facilitate transformation processes. These turnstiles will be substan-
tially re-examined in a later stage (prescriptive) of this book. The critical assess-
ment of assumptions relevant to the studies of transformation processes towards 
sustainability needs to be part of any analytical framework. A critical outlook 
on transformation processes towards sustainability implies a systems analytical 
approach where the understanding of the parts of human thinking, or elements of 
reasoning, is given adequate attention. As Richard Paul and Linda Eder (2002) 
note, an understanding of elements such purpose, question, information, infer-
ence, assumption, point of view, concepts, and implications is a prerequisite of 
any critical thinking. Ignoring unquestioned and blindly accepted assumptions 
can lead to different types of bias that may have significant impacts, for example, 
on the relationships between the stakeholders of transformation towards sustain-
ability.
As explained in Chapter 1, the negotiation perspective that defines the analyt-
ical framework of this book highlights the justifiability of decisions through the 
recognition of a diversity of viewpoints. Because most human thinking is inferen-
tial in nature (Paul & Eder 2002), there is a need to uncover, question, clarify and 
“reconcile” relevant assumptions that guide decisions and reasoning pertaining to 
dealing with complexity. ‘Assumptions’ refer to a collection of both justified and 
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unjustified beliefs or accurate and inaccurate inferences drawn from experiences, 
which are then used to interpret the world. Assumptions are those that are taken 
for granted or presupposed, because they are no longer questioned. Nevertheless, 
the diversity of inferences is inevitable, because individuals will tend to have dif-
ferent viewpoints or terms of reference on the same situations, which constitute 
experience and meaning. In other words, because different assumptions can be 
made about the same situation as reference object, and because assumptions are 
the basic foundation of decisions and reasoning, the importance of re-visiting 
assumptions in book needs to be highlighted.
4.1  Actors
Assumption 1: Power is to be understood through its ‘relative’ value.
Rationale: Excluding some actors to gain access to at least one source of power 
is impossible, as different types of structural changes unfold, but as different 
actors express different types of power, there is uncertainty as to which type of 
power is useful in a specific context or issue. It is important to accept that col-
lective decision-making is a power game that motivates preparations as well as 
the formulation of short and long-term roadmaps, strategies and contingency 
plans to facilitate the achievement of goals (see Zartman & Rubin 2000; Hernan-
dez 2014b). This preparation includes not only the ‘calculations’ of the ‘relative’ 
value of expected outcomes to the status quo to define the legitimacy behind such 
values, but also the relative value of one’s preferred outcome to that of their com-
petitors (Zartman 1994; Dupont & Faure 2002). In addition, these calculations 
will usually involve the examination of different types of leverages most likely to 
be available to oneself and to the others that will define subsequent interactions.
While changing sources of power as well as varying meanings and implica-
tions of power asymmetry can mean (old and new) opportunities, this can also 
be a source of anxieties and insecurities especially under high uncertainty (see 
Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Carraro & Sgobbi 2008). Therefore, it is highly 
important to assess how sources of power such as access to knowledge, military 
strength, moral power, and financial capacity can purportedly be converted into 
political actions by the others. An assessment of power needs must be performed 
to accommodate the complexity of specific issues. What are the advantages of a 
country’s military strength in achieving climate protection goals?
In addition, the ‘relative’ value of power can be understood in terms of 
power asymmetry, whereas the unequal distribution of resources has led to more 
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 leverage for those with more (see Brooks 2006). It can be assumed that the dif-
ferent pools of actors within the global and national spheres will have different 
sources and uses of leverage. Nevertheless, having more power can also mean 
getting less, especially for the one actor with the most power. As power may also 
mean additional responsibilities and constraints, where the powerful actors are 
morally obliged to adhere to the rules that they themselves have established. The 
marginal benefit of one unit of power from the superpower is less than that of 
a weaker country, particularly because of legitimacy bias. For example, Gilbert 
Winham and Elizabeth DeBoer-Ashworth (2000) highlight that in the Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement between 1985–1987, the more powerful United States was 
confronted by more urgent issues and so sent less experienced negotiators, while 
Canada sent its most experienced ones, leading to the best outcome Canada could 
achieve. Therefore, the concept of rational choice (see Simon 1955; Tversky & 
Kahnemann 1986) that assumes ‘consistency’ among goals and objectives rela-
tive to a particular action does not foresee that power asymmetry can mean both 
advantages and disadvantages. As such, power asymmetry is assumed to prevent 
many types of consistencies among goals relative to actions. Thomas Hobbes’ 
notion of consistent, value-maximizing reckoning or adaptation within specific 
constraints (see Friedrich 1963; Gauthier 1969) need to be revisited as actors can-
not be consistent with their decisions, as they are compelled to ‘compare’ values 
and strategize decisions.
Turnstiles:
– While the relative valuation of power is captured by its loss-aversion value 
function, the origins of loss aversion itself can be more effectively identified 
(and resolved) by framing power within the status quo.
– Power becomes a subject of analysis especially when linked with either main-
tenance or challenge of the status quo.
– Empathy towards the interests and perspectives of others can become more 
pronounced after the careful evaluation of relative values.
– Determining relative values can provide more appreciation, as useful insights 
emerge that can frame debate on values that cannot be measured, such as the 
value of world heritage sites for humanity.
– Focusing on the relative value of power will most likely allows changes 
in the distribution of power that may further promote ‘decentralization’ or 
 ‘poly- centralization’ of the world order, with more regional powers assuming 
leadership.
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– The emergence of ‘new leaders’ or new major players can promote finding 
‘fresh’ ideas and develop innovative leadership styles.
– More deliberative negotiations can be more conducive to robust decisions 
compared with purely power-driven negotiations, whereas outcomes of delib-
erative negotiations are more resilient to changes as they are more capable of 
absorbing shifts in power.
Assumption 2: Power is not only an instrument for achieving goals, it is also 
a category of identities.
Rationale: As the analysis of power and power asymmetry motivates a more con-
scious articulation of the relative advantages and disadvantages (see Assumption 1), 
it can be assumed that behavior reflects purpose or intention. One’s purpose or inten-
tion is in turn framed by one’s expectation of the probability of actually realizing 
this purpose, which presupposes a calculation of one’s power. Furthermore, as the 
connection between behavior and purpose becomes evident, it can be assumed that 
decisions (and actions) are framed by a ‘value system’ as rewards or sanctions are 
formalized. When an actor follows a value system in its decisions and actions, it is 
inevitably assuming an ‘identity.’
Any form of representation, whether ‘formalistic’ (see Warren & Castiglione 
2004; Grant & Keohane 2005) (that is, institutional arrangements that precede 
and initiate representation), or ‘descriptive’ (see Pitkin 1967; Young 1986) (that 
is, the close proximity of the interests between the representative and the repre-
sented, or ‘symbolic’ representation (see Pitkin 1967), presupposes the ability of 
the representative to project the interests of the represented to the others, as well 
as a degree of identity-building (see Hernandez 2014a).
In addition, as game theory would suggest, because actor A’s choice depends 
on B’s choice (and vice versa) it can also be assumed that the identity of A 
depends on the identity of B (and vice versa). This mutual causality implies that 
by making an adjustment to one’s decision, an actor can already influence the 
decisions of the others. This understanding, which conceptualizes the connectiv-
ity of decisions, will more likely promote empathy among actors, particularly in 
the context of power asymmetry.
Turnstiles:
– As a state or a collectivity assumes an identity, its behavior can become ‘pre-
dictable’ and therefore manageable. Predictability of behavior decreases 
uncertainty in decision-making processes.
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– Reciprocity can make it easier to forge collaboration and to execute coordi-
nation. As parties are able to ‘estimate’ and ‘calculate’ the behavior of other 
actors, they can look for similarities and assess differences. Motivations to 
agree on concessions increase, because reciprocity enables the creation of 
additional value.
– Identity-building can promote trust among negotiating actors, primarily 
because the counterparts are able to identify reference points which allow the 
others to come up with concrete strategies to respond to or develop a contin-
gency plan to address power asymmetry.
Assumption 3: Rationality is to be decoupled from transitivity.
Rationale: Decisions are to a significant degree normative and will not 
always follow transitivity, as rational choice theory assumes. Actors can arbi-
trarily violate transitivity (A > B > C; but C > A) as they assess options (e.g., A, 
B or C) using their own context-based value systems. Actors may be willing 
to tolerate the negative aspects of C, although C’s pay-offs are worse than 
those of A. Tolerance is a matter of perception, and emotions can amplify the 
importance of one or more elements behind an issue while underestimating 
the others. The consideration of emotions in decision analysis amplifies the 
human factor and needs to be included in any decision optimization effort 
(see Moore 1996).
Modern decision theory highlights rational choice in decision-making. Particu-
larly because, in the selection among a set of given options (whose consequences 
are preferred in terms of the agent’s utility function), each set of consequences 
is ranked according to the order of preference (see Raiffa 2002: 11). However, 
as suggested by game theory, rational choice can illuminate oversimplifications 
within the symmetrical normative orientation of actors. In addition, the compul-
sion to achieve equilibrium frames the set of actions, which highlight the impor-
tance of targets (see Raiffa 2002 p. 11). Transitivity is therefore the implication of 
such oversimplification leading to the failure to grasp complexity.
Turnstiles:
– By highlighting the ‘human factor’ (emotions), decision-makers can not only 
avail themselves of important qualitative impacts, they can also assume a more 
pragmatic outlook when seeking joint decisions.
– Decoupling transitivity from rationality can allow the development of more 
useful decision tools that are more effective in managing complexity.
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Assumption 4: Decisions are changed following the adaptation of behaviors 
through the modification of expected outcomes.
Rationale: Decisions of actors in a joint decision-making process are made to 
achieve goals. As goals are converted to outcomes at a later stage, there is a need 
to conceptualize this ‘conversion.’ The first step of such a conceptualization is the 
examination of the ‘trigger’ that has caused the motivation to formulate goals (see 
Raiffa 2002 p. 16). The second step involves the format of realizing these goals. 
Is this format already evident or is there a need to constitute a new one? In cases 
of problems that can only be solved through cooperation with other actors, there 
is a need to evaluate how this format can scale up values from interpersonal to 
larger scales. Assuming the cooperative disposition of human-beings (Messner 
et al. 2013), it is inevitable that possible motivations for non-cooperation be high-
lighted. Is this format resulting from group identity formation or is this format an 
antecedent of such an identity formation? If the latter is the case, there is a need 
to have a closer look at their existing value system and how their value system 
dictates specific actions. The next step pertains to the analysis of the meso-level, 
where persons who represent groups in negotiations affect the course of negotia-
tions, either by promoting or inhibiting the achievement of the goals.
As differences between actors are expected and will be reflected in their 
behavior when negotiating, the more urgent question is how behavior can be 
changed while acknowledging these differences. ‘Manipulating’ behavior refers 
to altering peoples’ choices which will be most likely chosen under business-as-
usual conditions. Michal Skorepa (2011) suggests that behavior can be manip-
ulated by changing the outcomes of decisions or merely the perceptions about 
these outcomes. By modifying the volume or context of outcomes, new value is 
created, paving way for updates in perspectives and behavior. Such a manipu-
lation can be conducted through educational campaigns, where pay-offs can be 
highlighted or differentiated. Other types of manipulation involve focusing on 
negative perspectives and on disadvantages (see Ganzach & Karsahi 1995).
Turnstiles:
– Modifying outcomes to accommodate changing goals can be done by chang-
ing the format of the decision-making process (e.g., from vertical to horizon-
tal)
– Knowing the effectiveness of ‘negative framing’ in manipulating decisions, 
decision-makers can assess different types of manipulation, compare these to 
their own utility functions and ‘convert’ the negative frame.
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Assumption 5: The compatibility and convertibility of perceptions of justice, 
fairness and equity define the resilience of decision systems.
Rationale: Sustainable low-carbon transformation encompasses different public 
goods that are indicated by different connotations and methodologies. As differ-
ent public good problems (see Snidal 2010) are manifested through the plurality 
of connotations as well as the relevance of these public goods, several types of 
strategies emerge. When connotations compete for relevance, decision-making 
will need to touch on broader principles (environmental protection, civil liberties) 
and attempt to reconcile those principles in competition.
The existence of differences between actors intending to achieve collec-
tive decisions also encompasses differences in perceptions of justice, fairness 
and equity. The resilience of decision systems is contingent on mechanisms that 
facilitate the compatibility and convertibility of these differences. While exist-
ing orders will most likely reflect an asymmetrical distribution of privileges 
and (positive and negative) entitlements, the resilience of decision systems, that 
is, the capacity of these to survive internal and external shocks, will depend on 
how this asymmetry is reproduced or reinforced by the outcomes. Nevertheless, 
to understand how the asymmetrical distribution of privileges and entitlements is 
reproduced or reinforced in outcomes, it is first required to find the typologies of 
justice, fairness and equity.
Turnstiles:
– The typologies of justice, fairness and equity as well as the conceptualization 
of the facilitation of compatibility and convertibility of justice, fairness and 
equity can be helpful in re-framing conflict cleavages such as the North-South 
divide, the core-periphery dichotomy, and the urban-rural divide.
Assumption 6: The tolerance (and the acceptability) of biases which are inev-
itable in the decision-making processes that involve multiple perspectives is 
highly contingent on mechanisms of persuasion and the possibility of updat-
ing perspectives.
Rationale: Often regarded as an ‘anomaly,’ bias is inevitable for any person with 
a value system. As Johann Galtung (1990) claims, only ‘dead people’ are free of 
any form of bias. Human beings, either acting as a person or as a representative 
of a collectivity, cannot be free from every value system. Such a value system is 
a collection of life experiences, and although it can be updated, certain elements 
will remain and will define one’s preconception or prejudice. Nevertheless, bias 
4.1 Actors
74 4 A Critical Outlook on Assumptions—Decision Systems …
does not always need to inhibit decision-making. For example, neutrality or lack 
of bias is often regarded as a necessary requirement for mediators or chairs in 
negotiations. However, William Zartman (1988) claims that bias does not disqual-
ify mediators per se, because this bias can be circumvented when mediators who 
are presumed to be biased are still able to deliver the ‘message’ from one actor to 
another. Assuming this logic, bias in collective decision-making processes should 
be defined as a stumbling block and assessed on how it can inhibit, delay or pre-
vent the realization of presumed goals.
Decision biases are the tendencies to make decisions in certain ways that 
are systematic deviations from ‘rational’ or optimal judgment. Psychology and 
behavioral economics assess these deviations and look for explanations. Biases 
are often linked to ‘heuristics’ or ‘mental short-cuts’ that are cognitively produced 
to guide decisions. One prominent example of heuristics refers to ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecies’ where expectations dictate behavior and positive expectations call for 
appropriate behavior leading to the realization of goals. On the other hand, nega-
tive expectations lead to less motivation and less appropriate behavior, inhibiting 
the realization of goals. Another example of decision bias pertains to the valua-
tion of ‘sunk costs,’ also referred to as ‘loss aversion.’ The pressure of sunk costs, 
which cause the overvaluing of past investments and the strong determinant of an 
irrational escalation of commitment (see Staw 1976; Bazerman & Shonk 2005), 
may eventually lead to decisions no longer honored, as escalated commitments 
are simply too expensive. When the disutility of giving up an object is greater 
than the utility associated with acquiring it (see Kahneman et al. 1991), costs can 
no longer be legitimized by their objective utility.
Other biases include ambiguity effect or the tendency to avoid options for 
which missing information makes the probability of an occurrence seem to be 
unknown (see Baron 1994); anchoring or focalism, that is, the tendency to rely 
too heavily on one piece of information, usually the first piece of information 
acquired, when making decisions (see Zhang et al. 2007); availability heuristics 
or the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater availability 
in memory (see Schwarz et al. 1991); the backfire effect, or the reaction to discon-
firming evidence by strengthening one's previous beliefs (see Sanna et al. 2002); 
the bandwagon effect, or the tendency of one’s action to occur when many other 
people are doing the same (see Colman 2003); the bias blind spot, or the ten-
dency to see oneself as less biased than other people or to be able to identify more 
biases in others than in oneself (see Pronin & Kugler 2007); the contrast effect, 
or the enhancement or reduction of a certain perception's stimuli when com-
pared with a recently observed, contrasting object (see Plous 1993); hyperbolic 
discounting, that is, the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for 
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more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs (see Laibson 1997); and reac-
tive devaluation, or devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated 
from an adversary.
Turnstiles:
– As decision biases are often inevitable, it can be useful to engage a more prag-
matic outlook on evaluating biases. One possible step is to make such biases 
transparent to enable a case-by-case evaluation of their relevance to the reali-
zation of goals. As these biases will most likely lead to inconsistent decisions 
over time, decision-makers will require some mechanisms to document such 
inconsistent decisions. In addition, what needs to be analyzed is how perspec-
tives can still be updated in spite of the occurrence of biases.
– Personal biases can provide insights into how issues and potential provisions 
of outcomes are prioritized, thus creating additional contingencies for possible 
agreements.
– Recognizing bias can allow the justification of compensatory measures, thus 
the internalization of bias.
Assumption 7: While emotions vindicate the importance of decisions, emo-
tions define the unpredictability of decision-making processes.
Rationale: As the ‘human factor’ enters the picture, decision-makers are startled 
by the choices and decisions made by others. Interestingly, human emotions are 
often linked with irrationality, as emotions hinder humans from achieving the 
ideal type of homo economicus, which refers to a creature that takes into account 
all aspects of a situation to maximize its own utility (see Dubreuil 2010). In addi-
tion, there is the huge question of how poorly humans are able to relate to the 
negative emotions of the others, such as anger or fear. Without a sense of empa-
thy, this perplexity leads to frustration. For example, when the lead negotiator 
of the Philippines delegation broke down in public and wept during the full ple-
nary session of the COP18 climate talks and later staged a hunger strike to force 
a substantial outcome from the COP meeting, he was celebrated by the media 
and civil society groups. However, he was also later strongly reprimanded by the 
Philippine government and was reminded that the COP meeting is not a proper 
place for such emotional outbursts, as policy-makers need to “show a picture of 
strength to calm fears” (Cabacungan 2013).
Furthermore, as current developments prove, the rise of social media and 
other informational and communication technologies have led to the increased 
claim of ‘opinions’ as equal to facts and evidence. As such, the transitivity of 
4.1 Actors
76 4 A Critical Outlook on Assumptions—Decision Systems …
decision-making becomes more difficult, as opinions often refer to an emotional 
basis. As everyone is deemed to have the right to his or her own opinion, and 
when policy-making needs to be justified by public opinion, it becomes a ques-
tion of whether this justification through public opinion another source of unpre-
dictability is, as opinions can quickly change or even be easily manipulated.
The failure to adequately address the gaps between (evidence-based) knowl-
edge systems and self-perceived ‘marginalized’ individuals has often been 
addressed by ‘correcting the facts.’ Nevertheless, as these individuals have crys-
tallized their own identity, stressing the factuality of decisions to ‘correct’ pre-
conceived and emotion-based ideas and opinions is now counterproductive. In 
addition, such efforts are resisted as the knowledge system has also been placed 
into doubt and anti-intellectualism is now equated with ‘anti-elitism’ or ‘anti-es-
tablishment’ (see Tan 2017).
Turnstiles:
– New impulses can be found to stress a “we-identity,” which can help solve 
other social cohesion problems.
– The social dimension of policies can gain more attention from policymakers 
and other stakeholders.
– As knowledge systems are re-visited as a reaction to anti-intellectualism, both 
methodologies and data assessment systems can be improved and matured.
4.2  Issues
Assumption 8: Understanding the domestic (local) in the context of the 
global and the global in the context of the domestic (local) will provide addi-
tional perspectives on the replication of best practices.
Rationale: While states and government agencies have the essential role of con-
flating global with domestic/local issues, non-government actors have been effec-
tive in both ‘scaling up’ and ‘scaling down’ good practices. Nevertheless, the 
replication of best practices, both upwards and downwards, will depend highly on 
the inclusiveness of decision-making. Increased participation and the enhanced 
role of particularly marginalized actors need to be dependent not only on the 
knowledge of what these actors will do, but also on what they could do. Inclu-
siveness promotes framing and controllability. While multiple perspectives allow 
issues to be framed differently, they also lead to trade-offs in goals, which highly 
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depend on ‘costing out’ (see Raiffa 2002 p. 19), that is, converting different val-
ues to make them relevant, quantifiable, and comparable to other goals.
Inclusiveness also promotes the controllability of the decision-making pro-
cess, making it more predictable and manageable. A common approach to ensur-
ing inclusiveness is to support NGOs and other social movement organizations, 
which can serve as bridges between citizens and policy-makers (Princen & Finger 
1994; see Andresen & Gulbrandsen 2003; Dong Wei 2010). For example, while 
social movements have developed ‘champions’ among target groups, they are 
lobbying for data-driven policies, monitoring and verifying the progress of gov-
ernment policies, seeking partnership or competing with other groups and local 
communities to advance their goals, and in some cases performing roles tradition-
ally played by governments. Nevertheless, the relationship between governments 
and social movements is ambivalent and may reflect different developments 
depending on the local context. While in some countries NGOs have comple-
mented governments in designing and implementing policies, others are viewed 
as being in ‘opposition to the state’ particularly when the activities of these NGOs 
focus on governance issues. In other cases, governments may ‘tolerate’ NGOs 
depending on the issues. While the diffusion of power is empowering states 
against their population, NGOs are also empowered against both their local state 
and transnationally, against other states, other NGOs and the international soci-
ety. However, while NGO actions are informed by (liberal) normative concerns, 
NGOs also pay close attention to instrumental concerns that bear upon organiza-
tional survival and growth (Prakash & Gugerty 2010). Therefore, NGOs and other 
social movement organizations cannot be exempted from the analysis of power 
relations.
With the globalization of their means of communication as well as the glo-
balization of their sources of funding, social movements have gained more lever-
age against government actors. In various cases, social movements have assumed 
deterrence and balancing strategies, have often been successful in containing state 
power. As NGOs seek to widen their range of goals and actions in order for them 
to stay relevant, governments have found ways to embed these groups into the 
political framework.
Turnstiles:
– The changing distribution of power between states and NGOs can expand the 
‘core,’ lower barriers for peripheral states to enter the core, and make legiti-
macy more culturally pluralistic
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Assumption 9: The negative synergies resulting from the interconnectivity of 
issues will most likely result in an assortment problem.
Rationale: As a ‘portion’ or a ‘segment’ of a (decision) policy is altered to 
address unacceptable trade-offs or negative externalities to other (decision) pol-
icy goals, the overall quality of this initial policy may significantly diminish and/
or may no longer satisfy demand. Therefore, the ‘removed’ portion or segment 
needs to be substituted by an adequate component set to avoid ‘adaptation loss,’ 
‘linear substitution costs’ and ‘standardization gaps’ (see Sadowski 1959; Pentico 
2008). Assortment problems arise when it is difficult to decide which portions or 
segments of a policy can be altered or even taken out without undermining the 
overall effectiveness of the policy.
For example, the interconnectivity of promoting renewable energy, local com-
munity development, and innovation & entrepreneurship may result in negative 
synergies such as the loss of biodiversity which will motivate policy-makers to 
make changes to their overall sustainable, low-carbon policy to prevent or cir-
cumvent the loss of diversity. However, as policy-makers introduce new provi-
sions, identify and implement substitute provisions, or alter existing ones, the 
effectiveness of the policy may lead to deficiencies.
Turnstiles:
– The effective management of negative synergies resulting from the intercon-
nectivity of issues can be promoted by a clear understanding of relevant values 
and pay-offs (what does it bring to the table to address these issues, either only 
in terms of principles or only their practical meaning).
4.3  Structures
Assumption 10: The gaps between individual and collective rationality can 
be the results of varying levels of decision-making.
Rationale: While unitary decision entities are monolithic and ignore internal con-
flicts (see Raiffa 2002: 4), collective decisions emphasize the interactions and 
dynamics between multiple unitary decision entities. Expanding this idea and 
adopting the process outlook, these interactions and dynamics can be scaled up 
to various levels or structures. Each scale reflects specific principles, narratives 
and paradigms. Nevertheless, because these various levels are interconnected, 
contradiction of principles will only be evident at one point, which will require 
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integrated management. In addition, as a joint process is dependent on various 
factors, both fragmentation and convergence of these levels or structures will 
most likely be observed, which practically defines institutional complexity.
The implementation of the outcomes of decision-making processes is highly 
dependent on the connectivity between ‘policy’ and ‘basic games.’
Turnstiles:
– As different levels of decision-making are highlighted, it can be easier for 
decision-makers to distribute ‘ownership’ among them and at the same time 
forge a shared identity.
– An integrated approach in assessing the various levels (as separate entities) 
can increase the proximity between policy goals and local conditions leading 
to enhanced legitimacy and effectiveness.
– The proper analysis of level-dependent rationalities can help develop new 
tools of evidence-based measurement, data interpretation, monitoring, and 
assessment.
– Hierarchies place ‘anchors’ at various stages of decision-making, thus defin-
ing expectations and limiting sets of possible outcomes of decision-making 
 processes.
Assumption 11: Decisions cannot be ‘freed’ from normativity, particularly in 
the context of transformation processes that involve paradigm shifts.
Rationale: While the normativity of decisions is well accepted among 
 policy-makers, particularly in the context of climate change mitigation, there 
has been louder calls for policy-makers to come up with decisions that meet the 
expectations of the various scientific communities. While these scientific com-
munities, including the IPCC, argue that what they contribute are merely ‘policy 
relevant,’ but not ‘policy prescriptive,’ and when scientific knowledge defines the 
so-called ‘decision maxim,’ it inevitably becomes normative, that is, it assumes 
a prescriptive role. The ‘detesting’ of the normativity of scientific knowledge 
follows the self-definition of most scientists of their roles. In order to maintain 
independence as well as objectivity, scientists need to refrain from any type of 
normative actions. When politicians, business actors, social groups, etc., are able 
to dictate the subjects, methods and results of scientific studies, then science loses 
its integrity.
Nevertheless, particularly when scientific studies define a ‘decision maxim,’ 
new discussions are needed on how to address the normative character of these 
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studies. A decision maxim is a general maxim (composed of principles and 
rules), designed such that decision-making may adhere to or violate it (Skorepa 
2011: 40). For example, the scientific results synthesized by the various IPCC 
reports constitute the principles (e.g., 2 ℃ threshold) and rules (e.g., life cycle 
assessment methods) of the decision maxim framing political decisions. Never-
theless, as the next chapter of this book claims, the generation of this knowledge 
is subject to various norms. Furthermore, should there be consensus about the 
‘absolute’ non-normativity of this scientific knowledge, the ‘aesthetic argument,’ 
that according to Michal Skorepa (2011 p. 42) proves the normativity of a deci-
sion maxim, shows that the principles and rules also encompass ‘aesthetic’ ele-
ments such as consistency, coherence, stability, symmetry, analogy, balance and 
simplicity. Scientific knowledge that employs one or more or all of these ‘aes-
thetic’ elements is normative per se.
Turnstiles:
– The acceptance of the normativity of scientific knowledge will most likely 
require new concepts and methods of accountability and transparency that 
reveal conflicts of interest.
– The normative outlook on scientific knowledge can be helpful in identifying 
and ‘controlling’ various types of decision biases.
4.4  Processes
Assumption 12: Global convergence has amplified the ‘competition among 
concepts of modernity’ leading to more embedded consolidation of national 
identities.
Rationale: The increased competition among states implies changes and shifts 
in the World Order. Nevertheless, the emerging ‘Post-Western’ World Order will 
most likely not see the immediate removal of these mechanisms of privilege and 
vulnerability, but rather maintain them, as these mechanisms are often ‘coupled’ 
with rewards and incentives. While some privileges have lost their meaning in 
terms of ‘Realpolitik,’ some types of vulnerabilities are either too difficult to 
eliminate or provide additional political leverage. When this new ‘meaning’ of 
vulnerabilities has defined the prospects of alliances, they require a new assess-
ment in terms of international politics. As Barry Buzan and George Lawson 
(2015) observe, the current World Order is shifting. They claim that the great, 
old, advanced industrial powers are “exhausted and weakened both materially 
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and in terms of ideational legitimacy”, debarring them from credibly fulfilling 
their roles as leaders and giving the impression that the World Order is now 
defined by the so-called ‘G-zero,’ which is a World Order where no country can 
step in to replace the United States. With these powerful countries voluntarily or 
involuntarily relinquishing their ‘exclusive’ dominance, more opportunities are 
given to developing countries with emerging economies to replace these devel-
oped countries and set the pace of global decision-making. Nevertheless, these 
new ‘major players’ are not always interested to the ‘new privileges’ linked 
with global leadership. While some of them have already started establishing 
and maintaining their ‘spheres of influence’ (e.g., China in Africa or Southeast 
Asia), they are resorting to strategies that fall short of global leadership and still 
demand more responsibilities from the ‘old powers’, against whom they bring 
their grievances. The changes and shifts in the World Order have produced a 
new consciousness and ‘naturalness’ (Selbstverständlichkeit) that still await 
 conceptualization.
In addition, while the occurring global convergence, as further induced by 
information technologies, has moved countries closer to each other in terms of 
economic development, pop culture, Western science (e.g., medicine), democrati-
zation, industrialization, and secularization, new waves of ‘indigenous modernity’ 
emerge, where various societies recognize that as global convergence unfolds, 
their national or local identities should be ‘empowered.’ Various societies that are 
unable to adapt to new realities without losing their identities are confronted with 
‘counter-processes’ that aim to ‘bring back the old glory.’ What follows is the 
‘paradox of modernity’, where the struggle between ‘competing modernities’ (see 
Mauch & Patel 2010) has led to more diversity in the definition of modernity. As 
it is clear that there can be no consensus as to how modernity should be defined, 
many countries, particularly developing countries, have come up with their own 
‘indigenous modernity,’ which is often seen as challenging, freezing, stagnating 
or even eroding the world’s multilateral system.
Turnstiles:
– The conflation of global and local cultures will most likely promote 
 co-authorship between the ‘old’ powers and the ‘new’ powers in terms of rea-
ligning intermediary global and regional institutions, leading to ‘global deci-
sions’ with more expanded scope and significance.
– A more embedded and consolidated national or local identity will more likely 
increase the legitimacy of global decisions as it closes the distance between 
individuals and global decision-makers.
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Assumption 13: Global convergence does not foresee the creation of ‘melting 
pots,’ but rather of ‘salad bowls’.
Rationale: The global convergence of standards, norms, governance structures, 
economic transactions, (popular) culture, consumption, political identities and 
communication is not contingent upon the creation of ‘melting pots,’ where dif-
ferences among actors are ‘melted together’ to create a homogenous identity. 
Melting pots address conflict cleavages by eliminating them, whereas alienation 
among individuals becomes cumulative. Therefore, global convergence needs to 
be understood as ‘salad bowls’ where differences mix but still remain in some 
cases, without causing system ruptures. For example, a melting pot definition of 
global convergence would see norms spill over to countries which are not always 
tailored to the local conditions. Melting pots will most likely ignore the relevance 
of addressing local conditions. In contrast, a salad bowl understanding will see 
new forms of ‘glocalized’ decision-making that enjoys more support from local 
stakeholders (Princen & Finger 1994; see Roudometof 2015).
Nevertheless, melting pots will exist, but will maintain a rather regional scope, 
where countries of a specific region benefit from already existing regional cooper-
ation regimes. Regional melting pots will define the thresholds of conflict cleav-
ages, as global transformation will take place not in the global system, but rather 
in regions. Regional demarcations of knowledge production and representation of 
the world have defined transfers and synergies within regions. As Barry Buzan 
and George Lawson (2015) argue, global transformation will be a conglomerate 
of various (interlinked) transformation processes in various regions, issues and 
areas.
Turnstiles:
– New forms of glocalized decision-making will most likely increase the legiti-
macy of decisions
– Understanding that while problems can be global, their solutions can only be 
local, will most likely increase ownership of the processes and the solutions, 
leading to better and more sustainable implementation of goals.
Assumption 14: As decisions relevant to transformation are collective deci-
sions, the achievement of global and domestic/local decisions will depend on 
how collective and individual ‘pay-offs’ can be bridged.
Rationale: Negotiations as joint decision-making procedures presuppose that 
 parties voluntarily come together, as the expected ‘pay-offs’ of individual or 
 unilateral decision-making is ‘worse’ than those of non-negotiation.  Expanding 
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upon this, parties will need to ‘convert’ collective pay-offs in terms of how 
much these will increase or decrease ones’ competitive advantage. This creates 
the ‘negotiation dilemma’, where parties are reluctant to commit to negotiated 
agreements when there is uncertainty about the implications of these agreements 
in terms of their future negotiation leverage. Therefore, bridging collective and 
individual pay-offs will also require ‘coupling’ the costs of non-agreement or 
non-participation to ‘individual loss.’ For this to occur, the focus should be shifted 
from separate interactive actions to group actions, effectively dissolving game 
theory’s ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (see Raiffa 2002). While parties make separate 
decisions, these decisions will need to make sense only when they interact with 
the decisions of others, leading to the production of joint pay-offs.
Nevertheless, joint pay-offs can only be useful when there is full information 
about individual pay-offs. This will require a specific level of mutual trust, which 
itself is a subject of learning processes. Joint pay-offs will also depend on rec-
iprocity. On occasions where pay-offs cannot be divided equally, joint pay-offs 
will be distributed. What follows are exchanges of other resources to ‘level up’ 
distribution. Reciprocity plays a role in defining the level of possible trust.
Turnstiles:
– New methods on analyzing and understanding processes may lead to insights 
into methods and possibilities of ‘coupling’ as well as ‘decoupling’, leading to 
new values useful for joint pay-offs.
– Bridging collective and individual pay-offs may dissolve free-riding and social 
traps.
4.5  Outcomes
Assumption 15: The efficacy of outcomes of joint decision-making is con-
tingent upon ambiguity that allows constituting exit-strategies from path 
dependence.
Rationale: While ambiguity may reduce the practical value of outcomes through 
multiple interpretations of outcomes, it expands the quantity and quality of par-
ticipation in the decision-making process. Uncertainty around the implementa-
tion of outcomes can be relativized when decision pathways, defined as critical 
junctures, and locked-in sets of decisions, are accompanied by contingencies 
that allow revisions of path trajectories without forcing a system default or rup-
ture. Decision-making processes that involve more than one actor are particularly 
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dependent on provisions that allow flexibility, as there is most likely an asym-
metry of departing points. In addition, uncertainty can be managed when deci-
sion-making guarantees the repetition of interactions between actors in order to 
collect experiences and information about the viability of reciprocities. Moreover, 
because participation in negotiations mutually ‘reveals’ the identities of partici-
pating parties, useful mechanisms of communication can be developed that could, 
among others, adequately address existing asymmetries.
In the context of negotiations on emission reduction to mitigate climate 
change, while one actor can easily commit to this mechanism, others will need 
more time or more capacities, and if not, these actors will not agree on any agree-
ment in the first place. In this situation, flexibility measures entice them to be part 
of the ‘system,’ take advantage of the various learning processes and have access 
to incremental knowledge not only in terms of the technical content of the issues, 
but also the strength of reciprocities among actors. As such, ambiguity can be 
regarded as a principle that can initiate (but not guarantee) trust among actors.
From the path dependence perspective (see Arthur 1988; David 1988; Arthur 
1994; Sydow et al. 2009), flexibility measures can decrease the ‘magnetic’ influ-
ence of critical junctures and lock-ins. Nevertheless, flexibility measures can be 
easily ‘abused’ in order to free-ride. Therefore, the provisions of ambiguity need 
to be transparent, context-dependent and focused on allowing exit strategies from 
path dependence. In addition, ambiguity provisions should be limited by comple-
menting them with both quantitative and qualitative indicators of defined targets 
to promote the predictability of the resulting consequences of ‘ambiguous’ provi-
sions. Furthermore, the definition of risk profiles (see Raiffa 2002 p. 20) should 
be clearly communicated. Moreover, the ambiguity of provisions does not always 
mean uncertainty, as uncertainty pertains to the likelihood of the implementation 
of the outcome, and ambiguity refers to scalable values such as ordinal ranking, 
monetary value, desirability value and utility value (see Raiffa 2002: 22).
Turnstiles:
– Ambiguity provisions for outcomes of joint decision-making can expand par-
ticipation and deter or even ‘convert’ spoilers.
– Ambiguity can provide incremental knowledge both in terms of trust and the 
technical content of relevant issues.
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Assumption 16: Because joint decision-making cannot expect complete infor-
mation, the implementation of the outcomes of decision-making need to be 
open to permanent change through learning.
Rationale: In a ‘perfect’ world, decision-makers will be given a set of 
alternatives, a set of objectives (or attributes), and a known probability 
 distribution of outcomes and the decision-maker will have a stable utility or 
preference function (Weber 1987 p. 44). Based on these, an optimal or satis-
fying solution can be found, whereas the decision-maker is required to pro-
vide all information. The decision-maker needs to provide his or her set of 
objectives to predict his or her behavior. In addition, methods such as con-
joint analysis are needed to ‘translate’ holistic statements into preferences 
(see Weber 1987). Nevertheless, the ‘real world’ will be completely different. 
Not only can all relevant information be known but providing all informa-
tion that one has can also be practical, particularly in a joint decision-mak-
ing process involving negotiations. As a bargaining game, negotiators need 
to calculate how the information he or she gives can lessen his or her lev-
erage. In addition, any prediction about the behavior of an actor based on 
a set of information can only ever be a model, because humans have both 
stable and unstable preference structures. Moreover, an incomplete prefer-
ence structure itself can be the reason for incomplete information, as humans 
often do not always know what they want (Weber 1987 p. 51). Preferences 
can also change with or without new information. Therefore, joint decision- 
making should lower its requirement or expectation about the completeness 
of  information.
Turnstiles:
– Acknowledging the limitations of information can motivate actors to think 
probabilistically and focus on what they could do and not on what they want 
to do. In doing so, expectations can be more consistent with the objectives of 
the decision-making process.
– Although decision-making under incomplete information can promote 
risk-aversion and increase intractability when achieving outcomes, provisions 
of permanent change (e.g., conflict management, review and monitoring, etc.) 
can further induce the learning process.
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4.6  Interim Conclusion
This chapter is another important pillar of the theoretical framework. It identi-
fied theoretical and conceptual issues in decision systems that tend to be taken as 
self-evident and therefore ignored, both in theory and in practice. As self-evident 
assumptions, these issues in decision processes and dynamics tend to be taken 
for granted. Because of this, the evaluation and the management of these issues 
are often skipped or circumvented in most functional, institutional and bargaining 
interactions. They are no longer questioned and therefore they represent missed 
opportunities. However, they do represent conceptual and practical lock-ins that 
prevent out-of-the-box or without-a-box thinking that is needed when addressing 
complex issues of transformation towards sustainability. They can cause further 
distortions in decision-making. But when they are adequate questions, they might 
provide additional impulses for strategies and solutions. These issues in decision 
systems can be understood by exposing them and inviting scholarly discourse on 
how they can relate to the transformation process towards sustainability.
In this chapter, the exposure of these issues was conducted by explicating 
them as assumptions and by explaining where these assumptions come from 
and how these can inhibit or promote transformation towards sustainability. The 
rationales behind these assumptions intend to shed some light on the utility pref-
erences of agents and audiences. Finally, turnstiles were identified that represent 
addition opportunities for facilitating the transformation process.
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Knowledge Diplomacy as Facilitator 
of Transformation Towards 
Sustainability—The “New Diplomacy” 
and Consensual Knowledge
Negotiations over the best way to address climate change and sustainable devel-
opment are heavily dependent on input from scientific and expert communities. 
While policy-makers seek to rationalize and thereby legitimate their decisions 
through evidence-based decisions frameworks, this unprecedented reliance on 
scientific knowledge has inadvertently led to a perceived erosion of state author-
ity and a weakening of democracy. It has been strongly suggested that the use 
of scientific knowledge in policy-making is reducing the demand or need for 
concordant consensus-building, or distorting deliberation processes through the 
emergence of new forms of dependency (see Barett & Chambers 1998; Bijker 
et al. 2009). In addition, Wiebe Bijker et al. (2009) dispute that the more urgently 
scientific advice is solicited, the more vigorously scientific authority is questioned 
by policy-makers, stakeholders and citizens, who themselves have become reliant 
on scientific inputs.
Knowledge is becoming a powerful means of effectively asserting interests. 
This gives rise to new demands, related to accountability, for a critical assessment 
of how knowledge is generated, applied and monitored. Does the knowledge 
produced by scientific communities really facilitate or even justify interventions 
by policy-makers? Concerns have been expressed that the use of knowledge in 
policy-making is replicating existing structural imbalances and therefore rein-
forcing or even reproducing inequities (see Crouch 2008). With power estab-
lished through knowledge, equitable access to knowledge resources requires 
additional discourse to prevent knowledge from reinforcing structural inequities. 
Furthermore, it is increasingly proposed that scientists and research institutions 
have assumed a “corporate identity” following the increased market logic being 
applied to the awarding of research grants and the emphasis on attracting paying 
students. Through this corporate identity, scientists and research institutions may 
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have ceased to reflect the image of “disinterested, rationalized” powerbrokers (see 
Crouch 2008; Rohde 2017). They have simply become another interest group 
seeking funding for growth and survival. Scientific knowledge, as Tora Skodvin 
(2000) suggests, no longer exists as an agency of transformation towards sustain-
ability, but as a calculating policy entrepreneur.
This chapter introduces the concept of knowledge diplomacy as an instrument 
or “agency” of collective decision-making. After a brief synthesis of how knowl-
edge diplomacy is understood by the academic literature, this chapter introduces 
typologies of knowledge diplomacy to structure the analysis of how knowledge 
can strategically facilitate the transformation process. The typologies reflect the 
two, complementary, negotiation perspectives on knowledge: power-base and 
systems perspective. To put knowledge diplomacy into context, it will be exam-
ined by analyzing the IPCC process of knowledge generation for policy-making. 
In addition, this chapter re-visits the concept of “new diplomacy”, which was 
previously introduced by Bo Kjéllen (2007). This “new diplomacy” can be use-
ful for analytical purposes, whereby the centrality of knowledge/information in 
framing functional, institutional and bargaining interactions can be highlighted. 
The concept can also help to distinguish the current collective (negotiative) deci-
sion-making on transformation towards sustainability from the traditional terms 
of diplomacy. Finally, the critical assessment of knowledge diplomacy offers an 
understanding of the perils and challenges brought by this “new diplomacy” as 
well as recommendations to address them.
Scientific knowledge and decision tools (as provided by scientific communi-
ties) that support climate protection are often the subject of political scrutiny. The 
complexity and uncertainty of climate change issues, the limitations of method-
ologies and the frequent ambiguity of scientific findings have led to allegations 
of manipulation, and the assertion that scientific results are divorced from the 
real world. It is necessary to analyze where these anti-intellectualist sentiments 
are coming from. This chapter discusses, through the analysis of the IPCC pro-
cess, how current knowledge management practices are reinforcing structural 
imbalances. For example, the “sensation-seeking” media and the uncontrolled 
social media have provided platforms for condemning the so-called “climate con-
spiracy”, a view that has gained significant public support, in particular after a 
few factual errors and inaccuracies were discovered in the WGII Contribution to 
the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) and were used to cast doubt on climate science in its entirety (see 
Cogley et al. 2010). In addition, several political actors have managed to incrimi-
nate science by “shopping” for scientific studies, in which they choose only those 
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that support their political agenda, while at the same time defaming studies that 
are opposed to it. Instigated by the political narratives of populist groups, for 
example on climate conspiracy, a significant portion of society now sees climate 
science as based on false and manipulated data that merely aims to suppress dis-
sent (BBC News 2016; see Robertson 2016).
A current trend indicates that although governments have become knowl-
edgeable about the importance of addressing climate change and sustainable 
development, these issues are still not the top priorities of national governments. 
A discussion is therefore needed as to whether the power of knowledge in set-
ting the policy agenda is misleading, if not overstated. For example, the 2017 
Report Card on International Cooperation of the Council of Councils (2018), 
a survey of global think tank leaders on which global issues were prioritized 
by world leaders in 2017, climate change and development are ranked merely 
5th and 8th respectively. Preventing nuclear proliferation and preventing and 
responding to violent conflict between states have taken the top two positions 
in the ranking. In addition, the survey included an assessment of global issues in 
terms of how they are effectively addressed through international cooperation. 
Mitigation and adaptation to climate change was given a grade of C+ in 2017 
compared to B in 2016 (with A+ as highest grade). This low grade (and deteri-
oration) is attributed to the United States’ climate policies, the end of US fund-
ing for the Green Climate Fund, and its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. 
Moreover, development as a global issue also witnessed a decline, from B– in 
2016 to C+ in 2017. This decline is attributed to the failure of 22 members of 
the OECD to meet their development assistance target of 0.7% of gross national 
income. In addition, aid to least-developed countries fell by 3.9% in real terms 
from 2015.
Knowledge diplomacy in the post-factual era needs to revisit the social man-
date of knowledge. Emerging narratives that couple knowledge with elitism 
are supported by arguments that target legitimacy deficits on how knowledge is 
generated, distributed and used to justify political decisions. Knowledge diplo-
macy is a multi-level (e.g., global and national) process of joint decision- making, 
using the art and science of negotiations, whereas knowledge serves as a facil-
itating agency to structure complexity and uncertainty. In addition, scientific 
communities need to take an active role in defining these narratives and to break 
the increasing monopoly of “anti-intellectualist” groups that abuse know ledge 
to serve their own political agenda. But for this to happen, an extensive multi- 
disciplinary academic discourse is inevitable. The following sections aim to 
 identify issues that can be the subject of such a discourse.
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5.1  Knowledge Diplomacy and Consensual 
Knowledge
Knowledge diplomacy on climate change is evident in various forms and 
stages. The most intuitive type of knowledge diplomacy refers to negotiators (or 
 decision-makers in a collective setting) consulting scientific knowledge experts as 
the basis for agenda-setting and the resolution of issues through agreements. The 
context pertains to sociotechnical narrative that the objectivity of knowledge can 
be trusted to ensure efficiency and legitimacy of decisions. Knowledge serves as 
agency or facilitator by providing a framework for complexity and uncer-
tainty. For example, the RAINS model introduced by the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) was used in the complex negotiations on 
long-range air pollution in Europe to address acid rain problems (Anstey et al. 
2009). The approval of the audience is deemed evident, because decisions based 
on objective indicators are perceived to be less arbitrary. At the national level, 
most governments appoint technical experts in Scientific Advisory Committees to 
help government departments and agencies as well as other executive public bod-
ies to access, interpret and understand the full range of relevant scientific infor-
mation, and to make judgements about the relevance, potential and application of 
policy instruments (UK GOS 2011).
Looking at the process level, knowledge diplomacy can also refer to the efforts 
to collect appropriate consensual knowledge to prepare for upcoming negotia-
tions. This type of knowledge diplomacy also focuses on the utility of consensual 
knowledge, including standards and norms. With clear consensual knowledge 
(e.g., the 2 °C threshold), future joint decision-making can save resources on pro-
cedures and concentrate on concrete solutions. One example is the IPCC process 
involving numerous assessment reports and special reports (see Schulte-Uebbing 
et al. 2015). The IPCC’s Summary for Policymakers undergoes an approval ses-
sion at the IPCC, with country negotiators directly verifying each word and sen-
tence of the text of the Summary for Policymakers (SPM) in close collaboration 
with IPCC scientists. The SPM, as will be discussed later, becomes the departing 
point of upcoming UNFCCC negotiations.
One example of knowledge diplomacy refers to consultations through regional 
forums, which may not be directly connected to the UNFCCC. Prior to UNFCCC 
COP meetings, regional forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU are 
used as preparatory spaces for upcoming COP meetings, where initial direction 
of consensual knowledge on several topics is harmonized and determined. For 
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 example, prior to the COP15 negotiations in Copenhagen, members of APEC 
used its November 2009 Summit to come up with a common agenda for COP15. 
Serving as a “political barometer”, the APEC Summit did not produce any sub-
stantial agreement and this failure motivated the UNFCCC and the COP15 chair 
to lower their expectation, which may have motivated them to take a more prag-
matic approach to reduce potential frustration (Penetrante 2010). Regional forums 
also include formal and informal coalitions such as the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS).
Another type of knowledge diplomacy refers to epistemic communities, 
including think tanks, NGOs, universities, research institutions and even the 
private sector, which actively seek to influence policy-makers (e.g., selection 
of policy objectives). In contrast to the IPCC, where scientists merely present 
 policy-relevant knowledge without seeking to direct policy-making, there are cer-
tain epistemic communities that actively participate in forging policies through 
various formal channels available. For example, the Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network (SDSN) Germany, which is the local response to the global 
initiative for the United Nations, was formally launched in 2014 to promote the 
sustainable development of Germany as well as German efforts for sustainable 
development worldwide (SDSN 2018). This network aims to serve as a catalyst or 
accelerator of cooperation between research institutions working on sustainable 
development. The group involves leading think tanks, research institutions, foun-
dations and networks, and maintains close partnership with government agencies 
and private sector stakeholders.
SDSN Germany can also be taken as an example of another type of knowledge 
diplomacy, in which scientists and experts cooperate with each other to produce 
evidence-based consensual knowledge. In this type of knowledge diplomacy, a 
process of consensus building occurs between different subgroups coming from 
different fields and disciplines. For example, social scientists have but a shal-
low knowledge of the natural scientific issues that are addressed by policy-mak-
ers. Therefore, the assistance of natural scientists is recommended to improve 
their capacity as issue experts. Similarly, natural scientists need to reach out for 
social-scientific knowledge in order to increase the actual operational usability 
of scientific knowledge (Anstey et al. 2009). Natural scientists strive to structure 
uncertainty by means of probability estimates, whereas policymakers tend to pre-
fer unstructured certainty. In their capacity as process experts, negotiation ana-
lysts are, for example, in a position to help natural scientists to develop methods 
to cope with obstacles impeding their communication with the critical actors in 
an international organization (Anstey et al. 2009).
5.1 Knowledge Diplomacy and Consensual Knowledge
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Other types of knowledge diplomacy are latent. For example, in the global 
level, achieving consensual knowledge for sustainable development is a pro-
cess that involves convergence of norms, standards and practices that can also 
be achieved through knowledge or technological spill-overs through cooperation 
mechanisms such as the International Development Assistance (ODA) (see Car-
raro et al. 2006; Easterly 2007). A type of knowledge diplomacy can be observed 
in technological cooperation projects as well as technology-transfer activities. On 
the one hand, countries providing technologies can learn from recipient countries, 
allowing the further development and maturation of technologies involved. On 
the other hand, recipient countries can acquire the necessary human capital and 
technical expertise to initiate further technological development that is more tai-
lored to local parameters. This is, however, highly dependent on how the transfer 
of ownership is envisaged.
5.2  Negotiation Perspectives on Consensual 
Knowledge
“Knowledge diplomats” or “knowledge entrepreneurs” are scientists and profes-
sional experts, often referred to as members of “epistemic communities”, who 
have become central pillars of both international and national policy-making 
(see Adler & Haas 1992; Haas 1992; Sebenius 1992a; Haas 2010). Knowledge 
diplomacy is not a fully new concept in international diplomacy, but its increased 
importance in achieving global agreements related to climate change and sustain-
able development is leading to changes in how bargaining between countries is 
strategized or how individual bargaining games relate to specific policy games. 
For example, the profile of diplomats participating in climate negotiations has 
shifted from traditional diplomats sent by Foreign Ministries to delegation mem-
bers recruited from a wide range of ministries who do not necessarily have the 
diplomatic training but do have the technical expertise on the core issues that 
are important to them. Interestingly, smaller countries tend to concentrate on 
selected specific issues, as reflected by the expertise of the members of their del-
egations. For example, during the COP23 meeting in Bonn, Germany, among the 
nine members of the Azerbaijan delegation, three represented the oil sector of the 
country. In the same meeting, as distinct from most countries, which have delega-
tions led by their Environmental Ministry, Sri Lanka’s delegation was led by rep-
resentatives from the Ministry of Science, Technology and Research, reflecting 
the country’s different outlook on addressing climate change. In addition, some 
countries have found a hybrid type of diplomats. For example, during the COP23 
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meeting, among Australia’s delegation was H.E. Mr. Patrick Suckling, the coun-
try’s “Ambassador for the Environment” (UNFCCC 2017).
Consensual knowledge establishes the parameters within which deci-
sions can be made. Hence, it assumes a facilitating function in the multi-level 
 transformation towards sustainability, because many issues addressed in various 
multilateral talks related to climate change and sustainable development need to 
be assessed in scientific terms to structure complexity and contingencies. This 
structuring is a requirement before these issues can be objects of functional, insti-
tutional and bargaining interactions that lead to collective decisions (see Zartman 
1994b; Sjöstedt 2009). Consensual knowledge’s acquisition of a facilitator role 
enables a negotiation outlook on consensual knowledge as an agency of transfor-
mation towards sustainability. To provide a comprehensive overview of knowl-
edge diplomacy, Gunnar Sjöstedt (2009) initially suggested that two negotiation 
perspectives on knowledge diplomacy can be identified: power-base and systems 
perspective. The next sub-section synthesizes and further expands the previous 
collaboration between Gunnar Sjöstedt and the author of this book by elaborating 
these two perspectives and by defining how (consensual) knowledge facilitates 
the achievement of collective decisions through bargaining.
5.2.1  Power-Based Perspective on Consensual 
Knowledge
Knowledge can be seen as a critical component of the power base of individual 
actors involved in a game of diplomacy. After calculating the utility of engaging 
in negotiations, the next step is the estimation of one’s power relative to that of 
one’s counterparts. Although power is a merely a perception (see Dahl 1957), it 
still influences the behavior of actors. Even though the outcome of negotiations 
tends to benefit those actors with more power (see Habeeb 1988), as argued by 
I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (2000), the clarification of power asym-
metry motivates negotiating parties to know their roles and correspondingly 
prepare strategies to achieve their intended appropriate benefits. Furthermore, 
Zartman and Rubin contend that conflicts can be resolved more efficiently with 
clarified power asymmetry, because parties will avoid wasting time sending sig-
nals about their power.
In addition, the definition of power as an act designed to cause the other party 
to move in a desired direction allows a more detailed analysis to be made of pref-
erences. Through a definition of power that separates power as a concept from its 
source and its effects, strategies can be forged to “equalize” power in a way that 
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ensures that negotiation pay-offs justify the efforts made. For example, connecting 
different issues together allows one actor to have a bigger pool of possible conces-
sions for bargaining. By focusing on co-benefits and synergies, negotiators can be 
more willing to accept concessions on one issue, when they anticipate pay-offs in 
other issues. However, this can only work if reciprocity has already been estab-
lished and formalized. Another example of possible strategies to address more pow-
erful actors is to build coalitions and alliances to balance the more powerful actor 
(see Dupont 1994). Such coalitions and alliances can share individual capabilities 
and the expertise of members, allowing them to improve their overall leverage.
Gunnar Sjöstedt (2009) identifies the international negotiations leading to 
the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution in the 1970s as well 
as to the achievement of its eight protocols that concretize commitments as an 
example of where the power-equalizing characteristic of knowledge was demon-
strated. The Convention, which was composed of a series of multi-lateral treaties, 
is witness to how 49 Parties were able to cooperate in developing scientific under-
standing of the problems related to long-range transboundary air pollution (Slig-
gers & Kakebeeke 2004). The negotiations involved many scientists representing 
different issues, whose contributions were used as a foundation on which poli-
cy-makers have based their negotiations on emission-reduction commitments. For 
example, the elaboration of the effects-based or critical loads approach, as well as 
the extensive use of integrated assessment models as the basis for policy-making, 
provided negotiators with objective indicators that addressed existing caveats due 
to uncertainty.
Negotiations on the Convention were known to be “arduous” (Sliggers & 
Kakebeeke 2004 p. 20). “Hard negotiations” were expected against the backdrop 
of the Cold War, where the lack of antecedent negotiation frameworks and experi-
ences on a similar scale was aggravated by mistrust, particularly when procedures 
were being established. In addition, politicians and environmental experts were 
far from unanimous, which can be attributed to the lack of experience of coop-
eration and gaps in professional cultures (see Sjöstedt 2003; Penetrante 2014). 
Nevertheless, the negotiations also demonstrated different dynamics in the power 
game among the countries that participated (Sjöstedt 2009), which, although 
smaller in scale, can be compared to the climate change negotiations. In the acid 
rain negotiations, access to scientific and expert knowledge was linked to power, 
with smaller and weaker countries able to circumvent traditional power logics and 
assume leadership or to adopt an assertive negotiating style due to their technical 
expertise on certain issues. Another possible enabling factor was that the lead-
ership of neither Norway nor Sweden was perceived as a threat by the United 
States and the USSR. The Convention was eventually signed by 34 governments 
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of European countries, Canada and the United States, as well as by the European 
Economic Community (EEC).
The knowledge-based “convening power” of Norway and Sweden was sup-
ported by antecedents. Because Scandinavian countries were the first ones to 
experience the negative effects of acidification due to air pollution, these coun-
tries had large stakes in the negotiations. Therefore, Norway and Sweden were 
not only keen to participate, but they have indeed actively sought and demon-
strated clear leadership. This tactical leadership was not only skillful in terms of 
diplomacy, but it also effectively addressed the critical power-base component of 
negotiations through access to expert knowledge on relevant issues related to the 
acidification problem and its international causes. This expert knowledge of Nor-
way and Sweden was the outcome of interested and concerned individuals, organ-
izations, and agencies in Norway and Sweden that analyzed and assessed the 
issue of acid rain earlier than other countries (Sjöstedt 2009). With expert knowl-
edge, these two countries were successful in linking policy games with simple 
bargaining games, which further facilitated the negotiation process. In addition, 
with expert knowledge, Norway and Sweden were able to compete with more 
powerful countries and take the initiative in determining the negotiation agenda 
and the solution formula as reflected by their proposals for the agreements.
Similar dynamics can be observed with both the climate negotiations and the 
international talks on sustainable development. During the COP15 meeting in 
Copenhagen, in particular, Scandinavian countries demonstrated leadership not 
only because of Denmark’s chairmanship but also through the technical expertise 
they had built through their experiences of previous environmental negotiations. 
However, it became evident that this expertise was not yet enough to achieve a 
comprehensive emission reduction agreement. Nevertheless, the COP15 meeting 
produced important consensual knowledge, such as the 2 °C threshold that set the 
stage and empowered “change agents” in achieving the Paris Climate Agreement.
5.2.2  Systems Perspective on Consensual Knowledge
The negotiation outlook also evinces the systems perspective on collective 
 decision-making. The establishment, for example, of the climate regime is not only 
reliant on consensual knowledge but also runs parallel to the establishment of con-
sensual knowledge on individual issues, which, in concert, “fuel” the phases of nego-
tiation. For example, the Paris Agreement was preceded by numerous formal and 
informal agreements on roadmaps and procedures that specifically required proce-
dural knowledge. In addition, when relevant issues are particularly complex, such as 
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is the case with climate change, consensual knowledge scientific knowledge assumes 
a relatively high degree of authority and acceptance. Consensual knowledge not only 
legitimizes the outcomes of decision-making, but also the process that unfolds to 
achieve such outcomes. Gunnar Sjöstedt (2009) identifies the GATT/WTO regime 
as an example of how the neo-classical trade theory has provided direction to multi-
lateral trade negotiations in the last 50 years. This theory, which argues, for instance, 
that all obstacles to the free exchange of goods and services on the world markets are 
to be eliminated, is acknowledged by brief references inserted into the treaty texts.
Another example is Provision 20 of the Johannes Declaration on Sustainable 
Development. The provision declares the commitment to ensure that women’s 
empowerment, emancipation and gender equality are integrated in all the activities 
encompassed within Agenda 21, the Millennium Development Goals and the Plan 
of Implementation of the Summit. It can be argued that this provision has benefit-
ted from the public discourse that was initiated by the suffrage movement at the 
end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century. Serving as an antecedent, 
the consensual knowledge on women’s empowerment as a necessity for sustainable 
development has successfully debarred counter-arguments against Provision 20.
In this regard, several negotiation frameworks are dependent on their capabil-
ity to “borrow” or “absorb” theoretical concepts and empirical models to build 
consensual knowledge that will accordingly give direction to the negotiation pro-
cess. Consensual knowledge represents the common but specific understanding 
that parties have of the issues, and it subsequently defines the “tolerable  window” 
for present and future decisions as well as the agenda and formula for  functional, 
institutional, and bargaining interactions. Therefore, it can be argued that nego-
tiation frameworks are built on a system of multiple consensual  knowledge, 
which further highlight the strategic importance of the ability to influence the 
generation and systemic distribution of consensual knowledge. Serving as 
anchors, “negotiation lock-ins” can be established, which may increase the power 
of those who installed these anchors and at the same time impede the power of 
the others (e.g., market barriers established by “first movers”).
5.3  Case Study: The IPCC and the Generation 
of Consensual Knowledge for Climate 
Negotiations
Negotiators and decision-makers on climate change issues are aware of their 
heavy reliance on science and research. This reliance opens new demands for 
accountability, as the lack of adequate knowledge management can distort exist-
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ing social contracts. This section analyzes the IPCC process of generating con-
sensual knowledge for climate negotiations. It highlights the power-based and 
systems perspective on consensual knowledge. Some of the analyses made in this 
section is based on the author’s anecdotal experience as a chapter scientist, con-
tributing author and informal reviewer of the Fifth and Sixth Assessment Reports. 
The IPCC was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2007 (shared with Albert Arnold “Al” 
Gore) “for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about 
man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are 
needed to counteract such change” (Nobel Media AB 2014). The Nobel Prize 
Committee based its assessment on the scientific reports published by the IPCC 
over the preceding years, which had created an “ever-broader informed consen-
sus about the connection between human activities and global warming” (Nobel 
Media AB 2014). While the prize confirmed the mandate not only of the IPCC, 
but also of scientific bodies providing policy relevant knowledge, it also placed 
them under more intense public scrutiny.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several scientific communities expressed 
concern about the potential severity of the increased CO2 emission. The issue 
garnered political attention when the 1978 Carter administration sought to use 
domestic coal to solve the energy crisis, prompting the early forms of “knowledge 
diplomacy”, in which evidence-based decisions are preferred, leading to various 
consultations with scientific communities. Increased public awareness following 
prominent environmental problems, such as the smog problem in London, the 
Minamata-sickness in Japan and the Waldsterben (death of forests) in Germany 
have further motivated national governments to listen to the scientific communi-
ties, as restrictive actions require a new basis of legitimacy.
The establishment of the IPCC by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 
was a direct response to the increasing number of climate-change-related studies 
as well as to the increasing demand for the knowledge needed for policy-making. 
The IPCC is designed to provide necessary assessments of findings within fields 
and disciplines relevant to climate change, and to elucidate multiple  linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes (Haas 2010 p. 186). As 
Evan Schofer (1997) as well as Gili Drori et al.  (2006) referred to in relation 
to international organizations, the IPCC’s aim includes the broad development of 
societies that promote the rationalization of decision-making.
The IPCC produces assessment and special reports by engaging thousands of 
scientists and experts worldwide, with recognized expertise and competence, who 
have been nominated by their national governments, appointed by the IPCC sec-
retariat after it considers geographical balance, and have committed themselves to 
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participate in the assessment-writing process without any form of financial remu-
neration. This voluntary participation of scientists reflects the shared set of nor-
mative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social 
action of community members (Haas 2010 p. 186). The IPCC does not conduct 
its own studies, and its reports are constituted to reflect the international standard 
of scientific knowledge within a given time period.
While a mandate was given to the IPCC to provide reliable and policy-rele-
vant scientific inputs through its various reports, national governments are able 
to influence the types and scope of scientific knowledge codified in the “Sum-
mary for Policy-makers” (SPM) during the IPCC approval session. Because 
this SPM is formally used as the basis of subsequent climate negotiations, most 
countries are keen to block certain technical information in the SPM that opposes 
their political interests or that can limit their future leverage. For example, Bra-
zil, as a major bioenergy producer, is usually highly “vigilant” when wordings on 
bioenergy in the SPM are at stake, as are the United States, France and Austria 
regarding wording on nuclear energy. In the approval session of the Third Work-
ing Group of the IPCC in April 2014, several countries, for example China, India, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, South Africa, Ecuador and Bolivia, were “unhappy” with 
some chapters that used country classification based on income in the context 
of climate mitigation. These countries argued that the presumed political conse-
quences of this reference include the “thinning out” of the “historical responsibil-
ity” of developed countries, because mitigation actions will no longer be defined 
by past emissions, but by the current country income.
Most importantly, due to the reliance on science and research when under-
standing the consequences of climate decisions, most climate negotiators are 
required to be experts on climate science. In various cases, IPCC lead authors 
are often later (or were earlier) invited to be members of country delegation in 
UNFCCC negotiations. Negotiators need to understand the scientific evidence as 
well as the methodologies used to come up with certain policy scenarios. The dis-
parity among regions is further reinforced by the fact that most developing coun-
tries from Asia and Africa, without an extensive pool of scientific experts in their 
countries, are unable to send “experts” as negotiators. While some developing 
countries often hire Europeans or Americans as consultants or expert-members of 
their delegation, others are dependent on their diaspora, which is usually based in 
developed countries, while some have opted to tap “patronage countries” from the 
“North” to gain access to scientific knowledge.
When providing a synthesis of available literature, the IPCC assessment reports 
concentrate on peer-reviewed materials. Peer-review is one of the mechanisms to 
guarantee the reliability of the scientific literature (see Brembs et al. 2013). How-
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ever, non-peer-reviewed materials, such as reports and data from international 
organizations, national governments and their agencies, and international non-state 
organizations—also called “grey literature”—are included in IPCC reports if these 
materials are deemed to meet the high standards of quality demanded by the lead 
authors of the reports. Nevertheless, the existing inequalities among regions are 
also reflected in the scientific literature, with scientists and experts from Africa, 
Latin America and Asia heavily relying on non-peer-reviewed materials, due to 
their lack of access to journals, which mostly require subscription fees. In addi-
tion, scientists and experts from developing countries have less opportunity to 
publish their works in peer-reviewed journals due to language barriers and the ten-
dency of journal editors to reject papers that mostly cite grey literature.
At first glance, the analysis of the IPCC working process suggests that while 
there is political motivation to engage scientific experts from, for instance, Africa 
and Asia, most climate knowledge is generated in North America, Europe and 
Oceania. Among the 830 coordinating lead authors, lead authors and review 
editors of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), 301 (36%) are from developing 
countries (including countries labelled as economy-in-transition, such as Russia, 
Poland and other EU members from Eastern Europe). The regional distribution of 
all AR5 author teams further support this claim: Africa (8%), Asia (16%), South 
America (6%), North America, Central America and Caribbean (28%), South 
West Pacific (7%), and Europe (34%) (see IPCC 2017).
On a practical level, more than 69% of the authors and expert reviewers of 
the AR5 are from the “Global North”. This implies that members of epistemic 
communities from the “North” have more opportunities to influence international 
and domestic climate policies. As they are able to “illuminate the salient dimen-
sion of issues from which the decision-makers may then deduce their interests” 
(Haas 2010 p. 187), they increase the likelihood of convergent behavior of states 
that “listen” to experts who are mostly from the Global North. This condition 
is structurally driven and path dependent, and the question is whether “better” 
alternatives are available. The scientific works assessed in the Fifth Assessment 
Reports of the three Working Groups were, with few exceptions, peer-reviewed as 
a requirement for them to fulfil the necessary scientific quality standard.
In addition, because the three IPCC Working Groups mainly consider 
peer-reviewed journal articles published in English, there is a rather high pro-
portion of cited articles published in Anglo-Saxon countries. While some lead 
authors are willing to cite non-English sources, it is difficult for reviewers to 
assess the quality of the content cited, because only abstracts of non-English 
studies are provided in English. Therefore, the content will most likely not garner 
support from other lead authors and expert reviewers in the multiple draft-writing 
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(e.g., zero, first, second order drafts) and review stages, and will be unlikely to 
be included in later versions of the report. As radical constructivists contend, the 
use of English language in IPCC outputs implies a socially constructed “material 
reality” that corresponds to the social circumstances under which descriptions, 
terminologies and concepts of English-speaking nations were inherited, which 
further alienates the applicability of concepts and models to peripheral countries 
(see Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay 1983; Woolgar 1988).
Moreover, the bias against journals not published in English is among others 
already institutionalized as defined by the current journal ranking system. The 
quality of academic journals is claimed to be determined by its impact factor, 
which serves as proxy to reflect the place of a specific journal within its field. The 
impact factor suggests the level of prestige of being able to publish one’s article 
in that specific journal. It reflects the average number of citations to articles pub-
lished in science and social science journals. Because of this, some journals adopt 
editorial policies to maximize their impact factors, including the “by invitation 
only” policy under which senior scientists, who tend to come from, or work in, 
developed countries, are invited to publish “citable” papers to increase the journal 
impact factor (see Moustafa 2015).
Because publication in peer-reviewed journals has become the major crite-
rion of research evaluation in Anglo-Saxon countries and most of Europe (which 
determines one’s competitiveness in attracting funding or employment), addi-
tional grants and resources such as language editing are provided by universities 
and research institutions to boost their publication performance, not to mention 
the professional grant application writers and consultants usually hired to improve 
the success rate of grant applications (e. g., the Euro 80 billion worth EU Research 
and Innovation Program called Horizon 2020). Journal articles often become both 
outputs of successful grants and inputs, simultaneously indicating a scholar’s or 
research institution’s ability to attract grants. In comparison, most researchers from 
developing countries, who are usually employed in universities, tend to spend most 
of their time teaching and fulfilling administrative tasks. For example, according 
to numerous interviews, Filipino scholars in Philippine universities are confronted 
by their heavy teaching load (an estimated 80% of their time, not including admin-
istrative tasks) as well as the lack of research grants (and experience in preparing 
for grant applications) which prevent them from doing substantial and internation-
ally competitive research. Furthermore, most of the research done by local schol-
ars is limited to local topics, which further limits the attractiveness of their research 
for international journals. In addition, there are usually fewer financial and struc-
tural resources available to support scholars in most developing countries to write 
peer-reviewed journal articles published in a language other than their own native 
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language, not to mention their lack of access to expensive journals, which should be 
cited for their paper submissions to be accepted.
Moreover, journals published outside Europe and the Anglo-Saxon region 
and which are published in English are most likely to publish articles written by 
English native speakers or Europeans with excellent language skills or who can 
afford language-editing services. Furthermore, many of these journals have edi-
tors originating from Europe or the United States to save the cost of the neces-
sary English-language editing (see Belcher 2009). In many cases, peer-reviewed 
journals do not offer language-editing services and the acceptance of submitted 
journal articles is therefore significantly dependent on the quality of English lan-
guage. In cases where language-editing services are offered, researchers will need 
to bear these costs, adding further barriers to publication for non-English speak-
ing researchers from Asia, Latin America and Africa. In addition, most journals 
often cater for certain methodologies and theoretical approaches when accept-
ing submitted articles. Expertise on specific methodologies, such as modelling, 
or specific “theoretical schools” (e.g., Chicago school, Copenhagen school) is 
often established over a long period of time and is usually concentrated in a few 
research institutions and universities in Europe and the United States, promoting 
the tendency that articles written by scholars affiliated with these few institutions 
are preferred.
In the various AR5 meetings of the different IPCC working groups, this issue 
has often been raised not only by scientists from developing countries, but also 
by the IPCC secretariat. Efforts were made, for example, to ensure North–South 
balance by nominating and appointing Coordinating Lead Authors (CLA) of the 
different chapters, with one CLA coming from a developing country. Neverthe-
less, this CLA from a developing country needs to be equally qualified and there 
were often some shortcomings in this regard. In addition, the appointment of the 
CLAs, lead authors and chapter reviewers also took into consideration geograph-
ical balance. However, some CLAs and lead authors during the AR5 writing pro-
cess expressed the view that some appointed authors from developing countries 
who provided no input in the writing process, nor participated in sessions for var-
ious reasons, were nevertheless included in the list of authors. The geographical 
representation reflected on paper is not always effectively translated into the pro-
cess of building consensual knowledge.
The experiences from the IPCC AR5 writing process conceptualize a type of 
knowledge diplomacy demonstrated when synthesizing knowledge on climate 
change. It allows the convergence of shared notions of validity: intersubjective, 
internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain 
of expertise (Haas 2010 p. 186). In addressing various shortcomings, the IPCC 
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requested the InterAcademy Council (IAC) to perform an independent review of 
its processes and procedures, after which the IPCC adopted various changes to 
its processes and procedures. However, this resulted in even higher workloads 
for those involved in preparing the assessments and further becoming dependent 
on developed countries, which provided “chapter assistants” to CLAs from their 
countries (Schulte-Uebbing et al. 2015). As such, it becomes apparent that gen-
erating knowledge on climate change can also be a question of analyzing power 
relations and power asymmetries.
Because the IPCC experiences suggest that acceptable scientific quality stand-
ards for IPCC reports are dependent on what is currently “best” available, the 
IPCC process unintentionally reproduces or even reinforces structural imbalances 
and unequal inputs from regions in the generation of knowledge. While the trans-
boundary character of climate change demands a global response, as codified 
through a global agreement, for example, solutions are dependent on regional and 
local actions, and decisions need to be coordinated and best practices exchanged 
between actors coming from various regions. Therefore, a transregional perspec-
tive towards knowledge generation and deployment and towards power relations 
in climate change negotiations can be helpful in understanding how knowledge 
becomes a subject of climate diplomacy.
5.4  Interim Conclusion: Convergence of Knowledge 
Frameworks as Opportunities and Risks—The 
Preceding Step Towards Global Convergence
While effective knowledge diplomacy is generally contingent on balance of 
power in terms of generating and applying knowledge, the critical assessment of 
the IPCC process as a type of knowledge diplomacy to address climate change 
has demonstrated that additional mechanisms are still needed to address certain 
legitimacy gaps of knowledge diplomacy. Such legitimacy gaps include the unin-
tended reproduction of structural inequities due to structural imbalances that are 
systemic in nature and are therefore difficult to correct. While there are intentions 
to resolve these gaps, additional efforts are inevitable to “compensate” disadvan-
tages. However, the ontological baggage of the concept of “compensation” aggra-
vates these legitimacy gaps, because compensation connotes the admittance of 
guilt, which complicates any reform process.
Solutions need to be found and there are already conceptual impulses that can 
be further explored. For example, while the generation of knowledge relevant for 
climate negotiations is still concentrated in the “Global North,” peripheral regions 
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can still circumvent knowledge gaps by focusing on sub-frameworks of climate 
negotiations that address specific topics relevant to climate change. Furthermore, 
with regards to the norms, rules and practices institutionalized by the SDGs, 
developing countries are increasingly discovering regional bodies and forums 
through which to gain access to needed technical knowledge. Therefore, a further 
examination of regional knowledge generation and the way it promotes transfor-
mation towards sustainability in the global level would be beneficial.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, 
sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you 
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Crea-
tive Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to 
obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
5.4 Interim Conclusion: Convergence of Knowledge Frameworks …
105
The Systems Perspective on the 
Transformation Towards Sustainability
From the systems perspective, the ultimate ‘Angst’ of societies is the occurrence 
of ‘dystopian’ system rupture, which can be the outcome not only of unexpected 
events leading to the elimination of principles that bind actors together (e.g., 
identity), but also by purported solutions that create further ‘horrendous’ events. 
System ruptures are not only linked with natural hazards such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, floods, and pandemics (such as the Ebola outbreak), but also with col-
lapsing national governments and regimes, for example following the outbreak of 
a popular revolt after a state-sanctioned escalation of violence (e.g., Mubarak’s 
Egypt and Ghadafi’s Libya) or an outside intervention (e.g., Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq following the US intervention).
Assuming that transformation can be either a response to a collapsed system 
or a preventive effort to avert collapse, this chapter starts by looking at the cog-
nitive aspects of transformation in terms of experiences. In addition, this chapter 
discusses how energy security reifies transformation, which highlights a major 
context of the transformation process towards sustainability. Moreover, a spe-
cial focus on countries with emerging economies will be presented. This selec-
tion is set against the backdrop of these countries experiencing multiple parallel 
transitions that are, to a significant extent, mutually competing. The contextual 
predicaments (problem contexts) of these countries will be used to understand 
how impulses for change are both a threat and an opportunity, whereas the differ-
ence between a threat and an opportunity is inherently defined by how the states 
choose to respond and manage changes. Finally, this chapter will suggest pol-
icy objectives when addressing, for example, contextual predicaments related to 
energy security.
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Much of the debate about system ruptures and disruptions is about the impor-
tance of an actor (e.g., a country) or an entity (e.g., a bank) to a constructed 
social system. More illuminating questions emerge as new issues tend to mod-
ify  existing contexts, agencies, and audiences both in positive and negative terms. 
What will most likely happen to the system if an actor or entity fails to fulfil its 
function? Is the cost of helping this actor or entity to get back on track smaller or 
more tolerable than the expected cost of system ruptures? How do decision-mak-
ers assess both the monetary and non-monetary costs of actions and non-action? 
How will the system ‘reboot’?
Moreover, other questions pertain to how changing power configura-
tions allow individual actors and entities to gain preference when reshaping 
the existing order. Is the stability of the global system and order threatened 
by China as an emerging superpower? Or is China the necessary agent of 
change by assuming global leadership that can bring motion (and growth) to 
a global system that has stagnated and has become fragmented? How will Chi-
na’s ambitious development campaign, the Belt and Road Initiative, which is 
backed by 40 billion US dollars from the New Silk Road Fund, 900 billion US 
dollars from China’s Development Bank, and 100 billion US dollars from the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (see Menon 2017; Philipps 2017) define 
international relations, particularly after the withdrawal of the United States 
from the TPP and the Paris Climate Agreement? How will sustainable low car-
bon transformation be embedded in China’s long-term policy objectives? Or is 
sustainable development the long-sought-after principle that can bring China to 
the next level?
In addition, linking the discourse on system ruptures to transformation 
processes remains a huge challenge. While it is widely accepted that changes 
are imminent if not necessary for growth or even survival, it is a huge con-
ceptual and methodological challenge to decide whether an impulse (or a trig-
ger) is part of this imminent system change that ensures the relevance and 
functionality of the system, or if it is already the first step in a system rup-
ture. Furthermore, there is a diversity of meanings and ramifications of such an 
impulse. For example, the massive decrease in coal prices could be an impulse 
to enhance the expansion of renewable energy. But for some coal-dependent 
countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic or other regions within a 
country such as Kentucky, West Virginia and Ohio in the United States, this 
impulse is not only a significant threat, but it mobilizes radical agents who 
have now found new channels to reverse other advancements such as in welfare 
and human rights.
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6.1  System Transformation and Human  
Cognition—Power and Identities
The conceptualization of system transformation needs to begin by looking at the 
cognitive and behavioral aspects of changes (see Brewer & Stern 2005; Messner 
et al. 2013). Collectivities that represent people respond to changes by transform-
ing themselves. While some experts, such as Anthony Robbins (2006), equate 
change with growth, others highlight ‘distress’ when addressing transformations 
(see France 2013; Benson et al. 2014). For example, Karl Polanyi (2015) reiter-
ates that a “great transformation” is the result of a collapse of the system. Further-
more, as this chapter argues, a transformation process is likely initiated when 
(at least) one of the three streams (policies, polities and politics) experiences 
at least one of the following symptoms of cognitive vulnerability: disengage-
ment, dismantling, disidentification, disenchantment and disorientation.
Disengagement pertains to the loss of connection to the specific environment, 
whereas ‘connection’ means a sense of purpose and personal growth. For exam-
ple, when the decline of profitability of coal technology had led to a significant 
loss of employment, private households may have experienced disengagement as 
they were forced to seek employment in other places or in other sectors, lead-
ing to the loss of their routines and comfort zones. Arguments that the renewable 
energy sector means new jobs do not mean anything concrete for those previously 
employed in coal mining industries, not only because of differences in qualifica-
tions, but also because of how they have built their identities.
Dismantling refers to vulnerability during transitions, where temporary struc-
tures are not able or are no longer able to provide the perception of stability and 
security. Vulnerability connotes the loss of control and autonomy. For example, 
the transition period that foresees a shift in the dominant use of fossil fuels to 
renewables may produce ‘disturbing’ vacuums due to a lack of experience around 
how challenges caused by transition can be effectively addressed. For example, 
the Energiewende in Germany led to a significant increase in electricity bill prices 
for private households leading to a perception of inequity, as most industrial and 
business entities were exempted from newly introduced levies to support the 
renewable energy sector.
Disidentification occurs when roles and status are no longer able to provide the 
same purpose (such as stability and security) that they have provided in the past, 
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leading to a loss in the meaning of identities. The sense of belonging defines 
identity and its loss brings distress. Addressing a loss of identity requires an 
understanding of the ‘stories’ and narratives behind such representations. Through 
this, a more adequate understanding of how identities can be open or resistant 
to changes can be achieved. For example, when owning gasoline-intensive SUVs 
is no longer seen as a status symbol, individuals will have the chance to see the 
impractical aspects of owning such vehicles. This requires, however, the decou-
pling of status from emission rich cars by producing luxurious cars with less 
emissions.
Disorientation is the absence of perspectives or direction. A sense of purpose 
is translated into actions, leading to the achievement of goals. Actions, how-
ever, require a plan or a (road)map that serves as personal leverage for beliefs 
and behavior. Without a map, a sense of less certainty of actions will more likely 
arise. Disorientation reinforces insecurity, because caveats such as norms and 
values that have served as orientation for social relations often lose their mean-
ings. For example, local communities affected by massive job loss may witness 
increased level of antipathy towards policy-makers, who are unable to effectively 
address the causes of job loss. Discredited policy-makers can become the targets 
of various forms of violence.
Depending on how inclusive (collaborative or positive-sum) or divisive (com-
petitive or negative-sum) the decision-making processes are, some actors may, for 
example, use ‘dogmatic’ arguments to assert their interests, appealing to issues of 
higher political priority. For example, in 2010, vindicating the dominance of the 
market logic in German policy-making, five German car companies, supported 
by the then German Federal Minister of Economy Michael Glos, argued that low-
ering the threshold value for CO2 emissions from cars to 120 grams per kilom-
eter by 2012 will lead to elimination of jobs in Germany (Schulte von Drach & 
Schätzl 2010). In this case, ‘change agents’, such as environmental NGOs and 
social groups, are deprived of effective arguments, because as non-economic enti-
ties, they are unable to provide compelling arguments using market logic. Resist-
ance to changes that are compelling is not constructive, especially when the 
‘success’ of this resistance is merely defined by the perception of power. 
Depending on how effective groups protecting the interests of conventional 
energy are, implementing energy policies conducive to climate protection goals 
requires a broader consensus-building framework where consensus will not 
be merely dependent on the inability of dissenting actors to organize resist-
ance, but rather on the notion that cooperation provides more gains (compared to 
non-cooperation).
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Nevertheless, when considering the power resources available to societal 
groups, the successful transformation of systems needs to find ways to integrate 
the interests of societal groups irrespective of their power resources. In addi-
tion, identities may exist that do not correspond to that of the system. Often, it 
is assumed that a given system reflects one identity and that changing systems 
imply equally changing identities, which is misleading. For example, coal mining 
is deeply embedded in the social identity of many local communities. While the 
majority of the communities are enthusiastic in welcoming new job opportunities 
that are created through renewable energies, climate policies that aim to reduce 
emissions by closing coal mining pits are then perceived as targeting their com-
munities, hence, their identities.
Therefore, energy policies promoting non-conventional energy also need to 
address the narratives behind these identities, which will require more time and 
different types of interventions or incentives. There is co-evolution within and 
between levels, processes at multiple dimensions and levels unfolding simulta-
neously (Hughes 2009), and these levels often have different paces of transfor-
mation (Braudel 1958). These processes may compete or reinforce each other, 
making decision-making more complicated and requiring a well-orchestrated 
integrated approach. As Frank Geels and Johan Schot (2009: 22) argue, transi-
tions come about when processes link up and reinforce each other. This focus on 
the linkages of processes deviates from technology-push approaches, which can 
be found in punctuated equilibrium frameworks.
6.2  System Transformation—‘Grasping’ the Context 
of Sustainable, Low-Carbon Transformation
The historicity of the transformation process needs to put the focus of analysis 
on the meaning of collected decisions or actions for the system. From the  system 
perspective, historicity can define and provide an understanding of self-driving 
dynamics as well as ‘fatal synergies.’ Various subsystems such as governance, 
institutions, and civil society may have deficiencies which, when analyzed sep-
arately and individually, can be tolerated by the system in specific contexts (and 
not in others). However, when these deficiencies are combined over the course of 
the transformation process towards sustainability, they produce additional obsta-
cles that pose additional conceptual and methodological challenges. For exam-
ple, the lack of channels to formally and materially integrate political opposition 
into government, combined with structural inequalities in society and the high 
upfront costs of renewable energies, may increase the need for the security of 
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 sophisticated facilities and high-tech equipment (further increasing the costs of 
maintenance), as the lack of political integration into a specific context may have 
created and reinforced the use of paralegal means, wherein attacking expensive 
facilities becomes an effective means of leverage.
System transformation, as a non-linear process, is not self-evident and not 
self-enforcing. When changes remain unmanaged, shocks may lead to partial or 
total collapse of the system, thus, producing vacuums and uncertainty. Its man-
agement requires quantifiable indicators that could serve as ‘benchmarks’ to even-
tually decide on adjustments in priority areas. Quantification, in turn, necessitates 
appropriate procedures of data collection and content analysis as well as a clear 
definition of the units of analysis (components, sequences or complete models), 
encoding categories and the interpretation of data to determine patterns. Nev-
ertheless, quantitative methods, which aim to eliminate coincidences, are con-
fronted by the historicity of the transformation process leading to conflicts.
The difficulties in analyzing sustainable low carbon transformation processes 
are similar to the difficulties in analyzing historical events, with the distinct 
purpose of deriving lessons for other cases. Often, the comparison of different 
country cases with the intention of learning from the ‘successful’ (often devel-
oped country) in order to ‘help’ the less successful (often developing country) 
is trapped in the ‘center-periphery’ dichotomy, limiting the acceptance and even 
applicability of these lessons. Mainly following ‘the center is capable, the periph-
ery is not’ evolutionary narrative is frequently misleading, at least in its method-
ological function. As natural sciences may suggest, the individuality of historical 
events often undermines the scientific validity of historical analyses due to lim-
itations in the generalizability and applicability of results. In addition, compar-
ing the low carbon transformation of countries is often rejected due to claims of 
Eurocentric perspectives (see Fisher & Green 2004; Najam 2010).
Furthermore, when ‘green technology’ becomes the dominant agenda of a 
country’s foreign policy, green technology is inevitably geo-politicized as it indi-
rectly changes existing power relations between relevant countries, making it pre-
dominantly a mere subject of power games. For example, applying lessons from 
the “successful” German Energiewende (energy system transition) to developing 
countries is often regarded by critics as “a new form of imperialism.” The Ger-
man Energiewende was officially introduced after the Fukushima reactor incident 
in 2011 and was vindicated by challenges brought about by the Russian-Ukrain-
ian conflict. It defines changes in Germany’s policies and initiated the trans-
formation of the country’s energy system to a system with the increased use of 
renewable energies and energy efficiency technologies (see Ciuta & Klinke 2010; 
Die Bundesregierung 2016). Because the Energiewende is regarded as a result 
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of the geopolitical and energy security discourse in the country, its application 
to other (mainly developing) countries which did not undergo the same discur-
sive process implies latent coercion. As such, as claimed by Felix Ciuta and Ian 
Klinke (2010), the Energiewende has increasingly dominated and framed the 
debate on the domestic and external policies of Germany and has eventually 
defined the German geopolitical narratives. Germany has become a major pro-
ponent of renewable energies and energy efficiency technologies in various inter-
national forums, whereas, countries with a high dependence on conventional 
energies are pushed to the ‘periphery’ through these forums. In addition, Germa-
ny’s international aid support, both from government agencies as well as from 
German NGOs, has increasingly become related to the promotion of renewable 
energies in developing countries, while the narrative “climate protection is sus-
tainable development policy” has increasingly defined foreign and developmental 
policies (BMZ 2015).
6.3  Transition, Transformation and Leapfrogging—
Sustainable Low Carbon Policy Priorities 
in Countries with Emerging Economies
Academic and political discourses about the transitions, changes and transforma-
tions of energy systems have been revived in the assessment of measures to mit-
igate climate change. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Third Working Group, 
in summarizing their results, claim that stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) con-
centrations will require large-scale transformations in human societies, from the 
way energy is produced and consumed to how the land surface is used (Clarke 
et al. 2014). Furthermore, Thomas Bruckner et al. (2014) raise the issue that the 
energy infrastructure in most developing countries is still undeveloped and not 
diversified. Therefore, energy system transformation will involve incremental 
costs. Nevertheless, while this may be the case, especially in the Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDCs), other developing countries such as Brazil, China, Turkey, 
India, Mexico, Indonesia and the Philippines do have the technical and financial 
capacity to deploy renewable energy technologies (La Viña 1997; van Asselt & 
Gupta 2009; Rong 2010). In fact, not only is China currently the biggest investor 
in renewable energy, the deployment of renewable energy technologies is also a 
top policy priority of the government (Feng Wang & Haitao Yin 2010; Mathews 
& Hao 2013).
There is a consensus that the any mitigation regime will need to address 
the requirements of energy systems, particularly of developing countries with 
6.3 Transition, Transformation and Leapfrogging …
112 6 The Systems Perspective on the Transformation …
 emerging economies. As the UNFCCC (1992) identifies, preventing dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change will only be feasible with substantial emission 
reductions below the business-as-usual case in developing countries (Jakob & 
Steckel 2013; Jakob et al. 2014). While this consensus also recognizes that the 
sustainable low carbon transformation of energy systems of developing coun-
tries should not hamper economic development, the international community 
is fragmented when it comes to how economic development should define the 
emission reduction goals of developing countries (Najam et al. 2003; Winkler 
et al. 2009b). Some governments argue that developing countries have the right 
to emit all necessary emissions for the sake of economic development (Zhang & 
Cheng 2009; Lotfalipour et al. 2010; Ozturk & Acaravci 2010). Others argue that 
although developing countries should be given the right to emit emissions, the 
level of emissions should not surpass the average level that was reached by devel-
oped countries. Michael Jakob et al. (2014) suggest that reducing emissions in 
developing countries will require a fundamental break in the historical correlation 
between economic growth and GHG emissions.
The prospect of decoupling economic development from GHG emissions 
has become a popular notion. As Fred Pearce (2016) points out in an article in 
The Guardian, the International Energy Agency of the OECD has reported that 
global CO2 emissions from energy-related activities have not risen since 2013, 
staying at 32.1 billion tons even as the global economy grew. As Pearce suggests, 
this implies the possibility of decoupling emissions from economic activity. This 
decline was led by China and the United States, which are the two largest emitters 
and which both registered declines in emissions of about 1.5 percent. Moreover, 
the decoupling is mainly attributed to the higher pace of increased deployment of 
renewable energies. The Frankfurt School of Finance and Management confirms 
that in 2015, more than twice as much money was invested into new capacities 
for renewables than into new power stations using fossil fuels. In addition, for the 
first time, the majority of this investment was in developing countries, with China 
responsible for 36 percent of the total global investment (Pearce 2016). Decou-
pling is therefore already on its way and has reached a stage in which renewable 
energy deployment has become self-enforcing.
6.3.1  Leapfrogging of the Developing Countries—A Way 
Forward?
An argument was presented by several governments in developed countries and 
by epistemic communities that developing countries should not follow the “dirty” 
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economic development path made by developed countries. Instead, these devel-
oping countries should take advantage of ‘leapfrogging’, which is both more 
economical and lower in carbon. Technologies and financing models are already 
available to enable leapfrogging. However, while this is the case in theory, such a 
transformation of the global energy system would impose considerable  additional 
costs on developing countries (Jakob et al. 2014). If developed countries decided 
to shoulder the costs of energy system transformation, a further question would 
be raised about the channels used to transfer the money. The first notion that usu-
ally comes into the picture is that this transfer is a development aid. There is a 
separate debate about developmental aids and how providing aid to developing 
countries is often defined by self-serving interests rather than the wish to sup-
port development (see Tandon 2008), not to mention the so-called “climate rent 
curse” through which financial inflows negatively affect the recipient’s long-term 
economic performance (Jakob et al. 2014). Yash Tandon (2008) further argues 
that the conceptual understanding of developmental aid is dominated by the 
notion that the donors own the process. This notion would lead to additional con-
flict cleavages in any energy system transformation process where, unlike in the 
donor-recipient dichotomy, developing countries expect to own the process.
The concept of leapfrogging was originally developed in the field of indus-
trial organization and economic growth. The main idea behind the concept is that 
small and incremental innovations are the responsibility of a business company 
wanting to dominate the market. As of more recently, the concept of leapfrogging 
is used in the context of sustainable development and energy system transforma-
tion, particularly for developing countries, as a theory of development which may 
accelerate progress by skipping inferior, less efficient, more expensive or more 
polluting technologies and industries and move directly to more advance ones. 
As José Goldemberg (1998) argues, by avoiding the mistakes made by developed 
countries, developing countries can circumvent environmental and socially harm-
ful stages of development and do not need to follow the polluting development 
trajectory taken by industrialized countries.
Major challenges for the leapfrogging of developing countries to attain a sus-
tainable and low-carbon energy system include the issues of knowledge/technol-
ogy transfer and capacity-building, that is, how to help developing countries to 
build up new infrastructure, acquire knowledge and technological expertise, and 
formulate relevant policies in line with sustainable development and climate pro-
tection. Furthermore, the leapfrogging country needs to build an ‘enabling envi-
ronment’ that includes good governance and the availability of local technical 
expertise that fosters innovation from within (see Zerriffi & Wilson 2010). Inno-
vation should also be supported by an innovative culture, whereas innovation is 
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the ultimate mantra of local entrepreneurship (Carraro & Siniscalco 1994; Lun-
dvall et al. 2011). Innovation should also serve as the major driver of production 
and consumption that cuts across various sectors of the economy.
Another major challenge for leapfrogging to attain sustainable and low- carbon 
energy is how social inequalities can be reduced. Susan Cozzens and Raphael 
Kaplinsky (2009) note that innovation and inequality co-evolve, with innovation 
sometimes reflecting and reinforcing inequalities and sometimes undermining 
them. Innovation is only seldom seen as a potential driver of social and economic 
justice. Mitigation measures, including deploying renewable energies, could con-
tribute to further deficits in public acceptance because of adverse distributional 
impacts. However, leapfrogging to attain sustainable and low-carbon energy, 
when managed properly, can also pose opportunities for reducing inequality. For 
example, individuals with lower incomes tend to be more dependent on public 
transportation than individuals with higher incomes. While leapfrogging is pos-
sible and feasible, both technologically and financially, why is it that some coun-
tries still opt to follow the “dirty” path? This book argues that the technological 
and financial feasibility of leapfrogging is not enough to entice the shift-
ing of energy systems. There is a need to address transformation as a process 
of  decision-making. Which requirements should be fulfilled, from the decision- 
making perspective, to enable the switch?
6.4  Problem Context: Energy System Transformation 
in Developing Countries with Emerging 
Economies
What makes the energy system transformation of countries with emerging econ-
omies different to those of developed countries and other groups of developing 
countries? Why is it worth analyzing? What is the value of learning the specifi-
cities of energy system transformation in developing countries? If no substantial 
emission reduction schemes will be relevant, developing countries are expected 
to follow China’s carbon-intensive economic growth pattern and this will make 
any drastic emission reduction in developed countries unable to achieve the 2 °C 
target agreed by the international community (IEA 2011). As Michael Jakob et al. 
(2013) observe, households from selected developing countries with an income of 
the average European household exhibit a carbon footprint similar to that of the 
average European. In addition, richer households, for example from India, Indo-
nesia and the Philippines, have considerably higher carbon footprints than poorer 
ones (Jakob & Steckel 2013; Seriño 2014) which suggests that income is the most 
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important driver of variations of emissions over time and between households 
(Jakob et al. 2014). As such, the demand of developed countries that develop-
ing countries substantially limit their emissions, implies limiting the increase of 
income.
Moreover, putting pressure or even blaming the developing countries to the 
failure to reach the 2 °C target is not only unfair (La Viña 1997; Beyerlin 2006; 
Penetrante 2010), it is also counterproductive. For once, developing countries 
will not accept any emission reduction scheme which limits income growth. As 
carbon-intensive energies have traditionally met energy demand, there is a close 
 correlation between human development and GHG emissions (Costa et al. 2011). 
No developed country has managed to achieve high levels of economic develop-
ment without having crossed a threshold in final energy consumption of approx-
imately 40 GJ per capita (Steinberger & Roberts 2010; Steckel et al. 2013). 
Expecting or even forcing developing countries to refrain from following the 
same path under business as usual conditions is not only inequitable, it is also not 
feasible (Najam et al. 2003; Winkler et al. 2009b).
Nevertheless, as already highlighted in this book, it is possible to decouple 
emissions from economic development. Leapfrogging can be viable in develop-
ing countries, particularly for those with emerging economies, if they are not left 
alone with the issues related to the transition processes. As Michael Jakob et al. 
(2014) argue, in a similar way to developed countries, per capita emissions in 
developing and emerging countries will only stabilize or decline at comparatively 
high income levels. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked is how devel-
oping and emerging countries can transform their energy systems before reach-
ing high income levels. Leapfrogging will require substantial financial support to 
cover the incremental costs.
Developing countries with emerging economies will need to simultaneously 
manage various transitions in a shorter time frame than the developmental tra-
jectory taken by developed countries. As increased income will call for social, 
cultural, and other types of changes that are beyond the economic sphere and 
developing countries with emerging economies will need to employ a holistic 
approach in policy-making. For example, these countries tend to experience more 
intense changes in demography, such as massive urbanization as job opportuni-
ties become more concentrated in bigger cities, internal migration and displace-
ment as new infrastructures will require the relocation of communities, and some 
qualifications becoming obsolete as new types of expertise are demanded, among 
others.
In addition, developing countries with emerging economies tend to act as 
experimental grounds for new technologies that require maturation. As new 
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 technologies are deployed in non-OECD countries, new conflict cleavages arise 
as these technologies clash with existing cultural and societal conditions. Tech-
nological development is often driven by a specific societal need and deploying 
this technology to a different society will require significant adaptation. With 
no prior practical experience available, the current state of progress of deploy-
ing new technologies in these countries remains bleak, a “black-box” dilemma. 
Public acceptance of technologies is a process that can take time and forcing 
the deployment of these technologies without substantial public acceptance will 
not only make the deployment costlier, the deployment will remain uncertain as 
minor problems can easily be transformed into reasons to cancel deployment.
6.5  A Systems Perspective on Energy Transitions—
Energy Policy Objectives for Countries 
with Emerging Economies
For any given energy policy objective, decision analysis is useful when analyzing 
the multiplicity of policy options and of policy evaluative criteria and can help 
policy-makers assess the trade-offs and synergies associated with one or a com-
bination of policies. Countries with emerging economies will need an integrated 
outlook on policy objectives. This section analyzes the challenges of energy 
 policy-making in countries with emerging economies. It also provides recommen-
dations for how these challenges can be resolved.
6.5.1  Policy Objective 1: Increase Energy Access 
and Energy Efficiency by Reducing Income Gaps 
Between Urban and Rural Areas
One major barrier for many developing countries in ensuring universality of 
energy access is the gap between urban and rural incomes. A common trend in 
these countries is rapid urbanization, where opportunities are concentrated in 
 cities (Kusno 2000; Grubler et al. 2012). Providing energy, such as electricity 
and the required infrastructures in rural areas, is often not cost-effective due to 
the lack of possibility of economies of scale. Under current conditions, private 
investment in energy projects in rural areas will be in most cases limited, because 
these projects are not expected to yield profits. Therefore, providing energy 
in rural areas will most likely involve certain amounts of subsidies. With many 
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low-income households living in rural areas, government subsidies will be needed 
to avoid high energy costs being forwarded on to low income households. While 
subsidies are often seen as not sustainable and inhibiting innovation, rural com-
munities will continue to require government assistance to ensure that rural areas 
will have access to a similar quality of living as in urban areas.
From the estimated 1.2 billion people (17% of the global population) who did 
not have access to electricity in 2013, more than 95% of this 1.7 billion lived in 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and developing Asia. In China, 1 million people 
are without electricity. In India, 237 million people (19% of the total population, 
26% of the rural population) do not have access to electricity (IEA 2015). The 
Philippines (21 million), Indonesia (49 million), Bangladesh (60 million), Viet-
nam (3 million), and Pakistan (50 million) are the other countries identified as 
EAGLE or N-11 countries with emerging economies (IEA 2015) with a huge 
portion of their population still without access to electricity. Providing access to 
these people will most likely lead to an increase in the national level of emissions 
but will at the same time promote the achievement of certain sustainable develop-
ment goals (e.g. gender equality, affordable and clean energy).
In addition, the massive inflow of new residents into megacities will often 
require upgrades in energy infrastructures in urban areas to catch up with the 
increasing energy demand. The trend towards urbanization, now standing at 
3.7 billion people, is expected to accelerate and double by 2050. Furthermore, 
96% of all urbanization by 2030 will occur in developing countries (Runde 2015). 
This shift will create additional challenges to providing food, water and energy. 
Policies that aim to ensure a reliable energy supply will cut across other priorities. 
Paradoxically, in many developing countries, there is often the sentiment that cit-
ies tend to be major recipients of government spending, successfully competing 
for funds that could have been spent in the peripheries. In many developing coun-
tries, this sentiment fuels separatist movements, right and left-wing extremism, 
and further exacerbates social distrust.
Moreover, as cities become more congested, the more difficult and 
cost-intensive it will be to expand existing infrastructures. It becomes more diffi-
cult for governments to prioritize other policies than those that support, for exam-
ple, energy efficiency. For example, in a highly populous city with a very high 
housing demand, governments will most likely prioritize providing affordable 
housing rather than low-carbon housing. Energy efficiency programs offered by 
governments such as tax cuts for solar panels on roofs will most likely experi-
ence resistance from the society as such programs are seen to favor high-income 
households and real estate property owners. In addition, with a very high demand 
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for rental housing, property owners will have low or no motivation to refurbish 
in order to meet energy efficiency goals, as they will not personally benefit from 
such investments. Low-efficiency rental houses and apartments will easily find 
tenants in highly populated urban areas.
Governments in emerging countries need to identify a scenario that addresses 
the dilemma of policies that aim to increase energy efficiency and policies that 
aim to expand energy access. Incentives and other types of market instruments 
are available to avoid policies promoting energy efficiency from obstructing the 
state’s ability to effectively provide other welfare services. Furthermore, pol-
icies should focus on co-benefits and synergies as promoting energy efficiency 
can lead to additional benefits such as job creation, health improvement, pollution 
control, entrepreneurship and local community development.
6.5.2  Policy Objective 2: Capacity Building for Energy 
Transitions
It is widely accepted that there is no one-size-fits-all strategy for capacity devel-
opment. Efforts need to be tailored to the specific attributes of a given continent, 
region, country, and even sub-national region (Armitage 2005; Mytelka et al. 
2012). The energy system transition of developing countries in the context of cli-
mate mitigation usually implies the need to build local capacity through techno-
logical, knowledge-based and financial transfer. Such a transfer intends to help 
developing countries in building local expertise and financial capacity to deploy 
necessary technologies for low-carbon development (see WBGU 2009). Michael 
Jakob et al. (2012) estimate these financial transfers will reach almost 400 bil-
lion US dollars by 2020. They further claim that this amount is comparable with 
many developing countries, raw material exports. In this regard, many experts 
argue that the rationales behind raw material export might be assumed in finan-
cial transfers leading to similar negative effects related to the so-called ‘resource 
curse’ or ‘Dutch disease’ (van der Ploeg 2011; Kornek et al. 2013). In addition, 
Ulrike Kornek et al. (2013) observe that countries that receive the highest trans-
fers are generally confronted with low institutional quality as indicated by defi-
cits in the rule of law and the control of corruption. Therefore, policies related to 
capacity building in the context of energy transition should adequately address 
their negative effects on local state-building processes.
Furthermore, to ensure the contextual relevance of their strategies, the own-
ership of capacity building as a process needs to be taken up by the recipients. 
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Capacity building often involves technology or knowledge transfer which implies 
the existence of the dichotomy of “donor” and “recipient”, where the donor 
tends to be developed countries and the recipient developing ones. There is a 
need to find a concept for the capacity building of developing countries which 
is not based on the current OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
vocabulary and their definitions of aid, which have also been adopted by the 
United Nations (see Tandon 2008). Furthermore, the new concept of technolog-
ical, knowledge-based and financial transfer in climate mitigation should not be 
an extension of the 0.7 percent Official Development Assistance (ODA) model, 
which was adopted by the United Nations in October 1970. Public discourse 
about the responsibilities of developed countries towards developing countries 
has used this ODA model as a yardstick for measuring developed countries’ com-
mitment to the advancement of developing countries (Tandon 2008). The new 
concept of capacity building in the context of climate mitigation and low-carbon 
energy system development needs to be based on equal partnerships and cooper-
ation.
Thus, technology transfer to build the capacities of developing countries to 
achieve successful energy transformation needs to have the perspective of an 
asymmetrical cooperation, where interdependence between the donor and the 
recipient defines the “mutual” relationship of the donor and recipient. The differ-
ing and often non-comparable commitments of developed and developing coun-
tries do not need to hinder cooperation. Only when the donor is dependent on 
the success of realizing the objective of the transfer can the recipient occupy 
an equal rank and therefore co-own the process. In addition, when the receiv-
ing country can reciprocate the transfer, the transfer ceases to involve the recip-
ient as an object of generosity or charity. The benefits of energy transformation 
in developing and emerging countries should be clearly documented in order for 
developed countries to recognize that their efforts benefit them as well, and not, 
as many experts see it, that the capacity building of developing countries with 
financial commitments to developed countries is unfair to future generations of 
developed countries (Schelling 1995).
Reciprocity is therefore a key element that policies need to adequately 
address. This means that any international program that aims to support energy 
transformation in developing and emerging economies should also encompass 
provisions for reciprocating technology or knowledge transfer from the develop-
ing country to the developed country. For example, technology transfer projects 
tend to involve experts from developed countries coming to developing countries 
to build capacities. Reciprocity should promote experts from developing countries 
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coming to developed countries not only for training purposes, but also to allow 
them to build capacities, for example, in developed countries with aging infra-
structures. This would allow experts from developing countries to gain experience 
as well as international recognition. When the direction of technology transfer is 
two-way, additional benefits can be gained. Energy policies should therefore build 
on partnership and cooperation that aims to achieve mutual gains rather than mere 
developmental aid, which is often driven by vested interests and donor owner-
ship of the process. Developing countries should also seek cooperation with other 
developing countries through South-South partnerships.
6.5.3  Policy Objective 3: Reduce the Environmental 
and Human Health Impacts of Energy System 
Transformation
A critical outlook on energy system transformation in countries with emerging 
economies includes a critical analysis of measures that are considered solutions. 
Renewable energies, such as biomass, may undermine food security and/or biodi-
versity. Wind mills may, for example, negatively affect ecosystems including bird 
migration routes (see GWEC 2010; Wiser et al. 2011). The necessity of expand-
ing smart grid systems enormously may pose health problems to the population 
living near the high-voltage grids (see IRENA 2013). In addition to mitigation 
costs and potentials, the deployment of energy-related mitigation measures will 
depend on a variety of other factors that relate to broader economic, social and 
environmental objectives, driving policy choices and decisions in the relevant 
sectors. The implementation of energy-related mitigation measures can have pos-
itive or negative effects on these other objectives. To the extent that these side-ef-
fects are positive, they can be deemed as co-benefits. But if these side-effects are 
adverse and uncertain, they imply risks. Co-benefits and the adverse side-effects 
of mitigation measures, the associated technical risks and uncertainties, as well 
as their public perception and technological spill-overs can significantly affect 
investment decisions, individual behavior, and policy-maker priorities.
Developing and emerging countries’ energy policies need to look at the tech-
nical, social, economic, and environmental risks of relevant measures, such as 
the deployment of renewable energies, the expansion of smart grid networks, 
etc. Particularly in liberalized energy markets, governments have to ensure 
that standards are met and that companies will take responsibilities when risks 
materialize.
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6.5.4  Policy Objective 4: Accelerate the Rate of  
Energy-Related Technological Change
Innovative policy plays a central role in accelerating the rate of energy trans-
formation (see Markard & Truffer 2008b; Mission Innovation 2015). It is fun-
damental in stimulating and managing the processes of knowledge generation, 
application, dissemination, and feedback that are involved as the transformation 
process unfolds. Policies supporting the supply of innovations or the development 
of technologies include investments in R&D, intellectual property protection, lab-
oratory and testing infrastructure, training and skills, university-industry collab-
orations, formal and informal mechanisms of knowledge exchange, technology 
roadmaps to guide the direction of innovation, and financial incentives such as tax 
credits for private investment.
A major challenge to coming up with effective innovation policy is that it cuts 
across various jurisdictions. Policy instruments promoting investments in R&D 
are often addressed by the ministries responsible for research, technology, educa-
tion or trade & industry. Intellectual property protection is addressed by the min-
istry responsible for justice, peace and order; training and skills by the ministry 
for education. Financial incentives are most likely provided by the ministry for 
finance or the ministry for economy and trade. In addition, in most developing 
countries, universities and other centers of higher learning tend to be run by pri-
vate institutions and enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, as such establish-
ing collaborations between universities is difficult if not unwanted, because of the 
highly competitive environment. Cooperation frameworks between universities 
and industries are also often not yet evident in developing countries, especially 
when local industries tend to cater to foreign markets.
Energy system transformation must be complemented by integrated policies 
that seek to promote innovation to effectively absorb the contingencies of tech-
nological change. Energy system transformation also needs to be complemented 
by expanding the domestic market, as innovation is a direct result of solving local 
problems. When a country’s industrial sector is raw material export-oriented, 
which is typical of most developing countries, the required impulses that trigger 
innovation tend to be far-fetched.
Furthermore, policies should address cultural elements of technological 
change. Innovation is often the result of technological development responding to 
concrete societal needs. When innovation is exogenous, it might clash with local 
culture. For example, Ilse Ruiz-Mercado et al. (2011) note that the adoption of 
improved biomass cook stoves, which will not only improve the health conditions 
6.5 A Systems Perspective on Energy Transitions …
122 6 The Systems Perspective on the Transformation …
of households but also reduce emissions from developing countries, will depend 
on public acceptance. For many indigenous communities in Mexico, fire is an 
important symbol, and cooking practices that limit seeing the fire will tend not 
to be used. Therefore, policies that aim to promote technological change need to 
assess the level of public acceptance of the deployment of various technologies. 
Technological change requires an ‘innovative culture’ where the society is recep-
tive to innovation.
6.5.5  Policy Objective 5: Coordinate and Implement 
International and National Energy-Related Policies
Globalization poses both risks and opportunities to a country’s energy system 
transformation. A major instrument to promote energy transformation is direct, 
foreign investment in the energy sectors in developing countries. However, 
because imminent issues in many developing countries revolve around providing 
access to electricity in rural areas, foreign direct investment remains unattractive 
for foreign investors as these fields do not promise significant returns. Further-
more, foreign direct investment may also pose risks to the country’s energy secu-
rity goals.
Furthermore, as a vast array of agencies and structures are responsible for var-
ious aspects of energy sector governance, the national government requires a high 
level of institutional capacity to coordinate and facilitate interactions between the 
government agencies responsible for various elements of the energy sector. Many 
developing countries are confronted with political fragmentation in which gov-
ernment positions have been allocated based on the political interests of political 
parties and groups and not on technical expertise. This leads to crucial govern-
ment agencies having other interests beyond their formal mandate. In addition, 
government agencies often compete for limited public resources.
Moreover, due to their wide-ranging and often cross-sectoral responsibilities, 
many government officials lack detailed knowledge of sustainable energy tech-
nologies, their economics and financial requirements, and alternative mechanisms 
for their effective support (see Ochs et al. 2015). There is also often the lack of a 
significant capacity dedicated exclusively to energy issues, often making it dif-
ficult to coordinate with other government officials and to provide the updated 
information necessary for renewable energy planning. Finally, the transformation 
of energy systems requires clarity in final decisions in the energy sector and that 
this final decision will be continued by subsequent governments or administra-
tions. Thus, a broad general political consensus is inevitable.
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6.6  Interim Conclusion—So What? Where Do We Go 
from Here?
This chapter highlighted the historicity of transformation processes, it focused on 
the cognitive aspects of transformation towards sustainability and explained how 
these aspects frame the set of possible actions. In addition, this chapter explained 
the systemic contextuality of policy-making by focusing on countries with emerg-
ing economies as well as on energy security as a major policy goal. The contex-
tual predicaments (problem contexts) of these countries were used to understand 
how impulses for change are both a threat and an opportunity, whereas the differ-
ence between a threat and an opportunity is inherently defined by how the states 
choose to respond and manage changes. The chapter ended by recommending 
policy objectives when addressing, for example, contextual predicaments related 
to energy security.
From a systems analytical perspective, there are many reasons why developing 
countries, particularly those with emerging economies, find it difficult to commit 
to a low-carbon and sustainable energy system. As highlighted in this chapter, 
these reasons include the lack of a holistic and integrated perspective due to a 
failure of re-visiting existing assumptions, which was highlighted in chapter 4. In 
addition, after chapter 3 provided the understanding of how structural imbalances 
are unintentionally reproduced due to existing critical junctures, this chapter fur-
ther explored the specificities of these imbalances by analyzing how human cog-
nition reinforces such imbalances.
Finally, this chapter problematized the failure to consider co-benefits in cal-
culating the costs and benefits of low carbon energy policies. As argued in this 
chapter, the possibility of decoupling emissions from economic development 
and some of the trade-offs between energy security and climate protection could 
be resolved, both of which are integral aspects of sustainable development. The 
policy objectives presented in this chapter use the premise of such decoupling to 
advance transformation towards sustainability.
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Theoretical Models, Case Studies 
and Simulation Games as Knowledge 
and Decision Tools
The methodological challenges identified by this book reflect the limitations of 
or the constraints on the ontological conceptualization of transformation towards 
sustainability due to complexity and uncertainty. This complexity is exacerbated 
by the inevitable contextualization of sustainable, low-carbon transformation, 
where there is the need to find ways to assess and understand the political, eco-
nomic, cultural, technological and environmental context from many analyt-
ical and governance levels, degrees and scales of causalities as well as making 
use of insights from these contexts to draw up lessons for others. The context, 
as reflected by socio-technical and socio-linguistic narratives, not only defines 
power relations between agents (e.g., between change agents and status quo 
agents), but also constitutes the audience as codified by social contracts.
The historicity challenge of sustainable low carbon development is driven by 
the inherent connection of the past to the present and future. Because historical 
events are usually analyzed in retrospect and as ‘finished products,’ the empirical 
value of historical analyses is defined by what has already happened. For exam-
ple, the life-course analysis focuses on the overlaps between individual experi-
ences and those coincident in history within specific structural, social and social 
contexts (e.g., changes in government policy) (see Elder et al. 2003; White & 
Klein 2007; Mayer 2009). As such, questions that are formulated in historical 
analyses tend to depict closed processes.
As the theory of path dependence implies, decisions made in the past limit 
the set of possible present and future decisions (see David 1988; Arthur 1994). 
Therefore, analyzing the historical components of current and future policies, 
governance structures and human behavior can only be useful for the analysis of 
transformation processes when the relevance of these historical components to 
the present and the future can be established and understood. However, as it will 
7
© The Author(s) 2021 
A. M. Hernández, Taming the Big Green Elephant, Globale Gesellschaft und 
internationale Beziehungen, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-31821-5_7
126 7 Theoretical Models, Case Studies and Simulation Games …
be evident in the case study chapters in this book, arguments of historical inevi-
tability based on formulating examples of historical contingency of how differ-
ent choices could have led to different consequences may be misleading, because 
of the inability to test the occurrence of ‘alternative paths’. The comparison of a 
‘real’ development with its version in an ‘alternate universe’ has limited empiri-
cal value due to its highly speculative character. Therefore, due to the historicity 
of case studies, interpretations of cause-and-effect relations can only be tentative, 
and they need to be regularly revisited and corrected.
While ‘learning from history’ is intuitively accepted, there are limitations 
to the significance of history for studying the present and the ‘futures,’ primar-
ily because the ‘formalization’ of historical analyses constantly needs further 
development. Charles Tilly (1987) identifies deficits in formalization in histori-
cal analysis as important factors in understanding the limitations of the value of 
historical analyses. Formalization requires the conceptualization, measurement, 
modelling, and estimation of historical events. However, as Charles Tilly (1987 
p. 20) further claims, formalizing historians have devoted little of their ingenuity 
to the statement of an historical question as a problem susceptible to a formal 
statement (conceptualization), to the organization of evidence in a standard, com-
parable form (measurement), to the formal statement of an argument concerning 
the expected pattern of a phenomenon (modelling), and to matching models to 
evidence in order to see how the model fits (estimation).
Scholars working on sustainable, low-carbon transformation will need to 
ensure such formalization, which will very likely require multi- and interdisci-
plinary approaches and expertise. For example, conceptualization is likely to be 
conducted by social scientists with comprehensive and integrated knowledge that 
would allow the establishment and validation of concepts, labels, terminologies, 
and notions. Conceptualization needs to identify and justify the boundaries and 
scopes of the subjects of the analyses. It will also need to accommodate com-
peting historical narratives. In addition, measurement and modelling will require 
scholars with expertise to identify and filter relevant data and information. These 
scholars should be able to simplify a complex system without losing empiri-
cal relevance. Additional scholars are needed to calibrate models and connect 
them to empirical reality to make them useful for decision-making. The assess-
ment of the value of these models is often defined by how they can help provide 
policy-makers with the capacity to justify decisions.
Also relevant to the methodological challenge brought by path dependent 
historicity is the plurality of historical explanations due to limitations on access-
ing all relevant information. As many of the decisions were made in closed-door 
meetings, the assessment (process-tracing) of these historical events is confronted 
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by a plurality of possible explanations. These explanations can be regarded as 
storylines that are composed of arguments supporting cause-and-effect relation-
ships. This plurality is likely to be reproduced when establishing narratives and 
enduring issues.
In addition, analyzing the ‘Gestaltungsmacht’ (shaping power) of historical 
events vis-à-vis the future is a contentious endeavor, particularly because of the 
need to clearly identify and trace the cause-and-effect relationships between fac-
tors and monitor the long-term developments that transcend spatial and tempo-
ral boundaries. Moreover, not only are there many ways of ‘packing’ a concert 
of historical events, there are also latent self-driving processes that can only be 
identified in retrospect, thus limiting the ability to predict the future. Another 
concern is that, particularly in sustainable, low-carbon transformations, there is 
not only one future caused by various possible concerts of historical events, but 
many futures that can be possibly caused by one or more concerts of historical 
events. Inserting the value of perspectives in the analysis brings the challenge that 
one future, say the sustainable, low-carbon transformation, cannot, under current 
conditions, be optimal for several actors, because they are confronted with other 
points of departure. As there can be more than one optimal future scenario, col-
laboration and coordination problems need to be resolved as forethoughts.
7.1  Scenarios as Methods of Analysis of Futures
The scientific literature on climate mitigation and low-carbon transformation 
relies heavily on the use of scenario methods. The complexity as well the tempo-
ral dimension of relevant processes and outcomes require decision-makers to use 
decision tools to structure decision-making. For example, the reduction of emis-
sions will require years if not decades before substantial effects will be signifi-
cant. As such, present decision-makers and their constituents will most likely not 
personally experience the outcomes of their decisions. Similarly, some positive 
effects might take place in other areas leading to these effects becoming intangi-
ble for those who would need to accept present burdens of actions. Nevertheless, 
as it is assumed that delaying decisions or even avoiding making decisions will 
lead to more ‘painful’ and, therefore, unacceptable costs, decisions are still to be 
made. Because decision outcomes can be theoretical at best, while actions are 
practical, tools are needed to bridge the gaps between these two analytical lev-
els. Inevitably, decision-makers are required to formulate visions or goals that 
would frame decisions, or even set or change paradigms. Goals have a tempo-
ral dimension as they imply achieving a specific status in the future. Therefore, 
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 formulating policy goals will require tools that address the need to ‘prepare’ for 
the future.
Scenarios are constructed to investigate alternative future developments under 
a set of assumed or controlled conditions. Scenarios are instruments to help 
 decision-makers cope with problem cases that are complex and uncertain. As 
Nick Hughes (2009) observes, recent years have seen a proliferation in the use of 
scenario methods to define low-carbon futures. ‘Energy in a Finite World’ of the 
International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis is one of the first global stud-
ies that have used scenarios as a tool to assess future CO2 emissions in the late 
1970s (Häfele et al. 1981). The IPCC has used emissions and climate scenarios 
as a central component of its work as an institution that assesses climate change 
research. Working with authors and modelers, it has developed emission scenar-
ios to be used for driving global circulation models to develop climate scenarios. 
The SA90 scenarios were introduced by Working Group 1 of the IPCC in 1990 
(IPCC 1990).
Some questions that a scenario developer needs to address include how sce-
narios can provide insights not only into the integrated scope or description of the 
system being studied, but also how the system may have evolved into its current 
state and more importantly, how the system might continue to evolve, taking into 
consideration changing motivations and functionalities. What are the possible sys-
temic effects of changes in the motivation and behavior of actors? This will most 
likely invoke the re-evaluation of various elements of the scenario, asking whether 
and how the actors could have decided to resolve these changes in a different man-
ner. Asking these questions implies that scenarios have a normative undertone.
There are limitations on decisions based on scenarios. Scenarios often do not 
envisage changes in an actor’s preferences, as well as in relations between actors. 
Therefore, scenarios are often limited to providing insights on behavioral change 
and paradigm shifts that are highly valuable in any analysis of transformation 
processes. Because choices will depend on temporal and spatial circumstances, 
humans can change their decisions when circumstances change. As Michel Godet 
(2000) argues, humans can be both rational and driven by the emotional faculties. 
While scenarios are often not able to capture these changes, they are also often 
designed assuming the rationality of decisions and actions. In addition, as cir-
cumstances change, human interactions also change. Iterative actor interactions 
imply changing coalitions, behavior and identities. Scenarios, therefore, need to 
be complemented by tools that support the anticipation of changes in an actor’s 
preferences and relationships.
Furthermore, scenarios are often not able to properly address the dynamics 
of social, technological, and economic change. As social, technological, and 
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economic changes unfold, new issues may arise, or old issues may gain a differ-
ent meaning and significance, prompting the need to revise previous decisions. 
For example, the dynamics of change may imply a new importance on certain 
conflict cleavages that will touch on differences between actors in terms of their 
values and even ideologies. Because of this, the agreements and other outcomes 
of previously conducted bargaining games will require renegotiation and re-elab-
oration. In some cases, renegotiations will need to start by default. In other cases, 
particularly when the procedures of renegotiations were included in previous 
agreements, bargaining over new issues will be met by amendments or additional 
protocols to existing agreements.
One scenario is a collection of conditions and factors that jointly express 
a specific storyline. The storyline is heuristic in the sense that it employs an 
approach to problem-solving that does not guarantee or pursue ‘optimality.’ A 
scenario is an analytical instrument through which assumptions or ‘stories’ are 
made about the system under the conditions of limited knowledge and informa-
tion. Therefore, a scenario inevitably pertains to a deviation from the ‘optimal 
solution’, as optimality presumes complete information. Nevertheless, it is not the 
objective of scenarios to present the optimal solution or the ‘perfect story’, but 
rather to look for a simple set of conditions sufficient to achieve immediate goals. 
This storyline serves as the structure in decision-making, limiting the number of 
possible decisions, thus, reducing indecisiveness. For example, the storyline of 
a scenario may highlight the necessity to adhere to human rights in present and 
future actions. It encourages decisions and actions by providing the scope of nec-
essary actions and eliminating possible decisions and actions that do not corre-
spond with the storyline. Nevertheless, the storyline, which is often a result of 
consensus-building processes, needs, as a normative approach, to be inclusive and 
should support the orchestration of various negotiation processes.
7.2  Theoretical Models and the ‘Ideal Type’—A New-
Old Method of Analysis
An ideal type can be regarded as a distinct type of model or scenario. One major 
difference between an ideal type and a model or scenario lies in its methodologi-
cal implication. When a model or scenario depicts a historical or trajectory-based 
process, as is the case with the low-carbon transformation of energy systems, 
an understanding of purposes and the related causal interdependencies becomes 
necessary. Can properly identified indicators be adequately measured and inter-
preted? Are the benchmarks being fulfilled in order to achieve the predetermined 
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purposes as the process unfolds? Is there room for tolerance and the adjustment 
of targets? Are there relevant self-driving dynamics that need to be addressed? 
The usage of ideal types allows researchers to focus on the individuality of actors, 
structures, issues, processes, and outcomes, without undermining the scientific 
validity of the results of analyses. It allows the ‘systematic’ management of indi-
cators and benchmarks.
The ‘ideal type’ is a typological term most closely associated with the sociol-
ogist Max Weber (1864–1920), in which Weber claimed a better understanding 
(Verstehen) of historical development through ideal types (Weber 1976, 1985). 
Georg Simmel (1858 to 1918), a contemporary of Weber’s, has adapted Weber’s 
line of thought and developed a similar term called “categories,” which are ideal 
types that not only serve as principles for constructing terms and concepts but as 
sources of theoretical knowledge (see Simmel 1908).
Similar to scenarios, ideal types can be identified as analytical instruments 
designed to strategically facilitate decision-making. Ideal types formulate hypoth-
eses that are verifiable through the observation of empirical proceedings, provid-
ing resources for understanding patterns of actions, world views (Weltbilder), 
structural order and lines of development or trajectories. Ideal types are com-
posed of basic concepts that define a “constructed world of ideas” or “idea con-
structs” (Gedankenbilder), with a distinct analytical functionality—to compare. 
Later, ideal types compel researchers to conduct a comparison between the con-
structed ideal type and the ‘historical case.’
The ideal type is a normative and heuristic model or scenario that does not 
need to emerge from the experiences of a successful case (e.g., developed coun-
tries). It does not need to include optimally technical solutions, because it can 
also refer to a case where conditions are merely tolerated for pragmatic reasons. 
As George Jellinek (1900) suggests, ideal types can only be manifested as incom-
plete as they disregard one or more parts of reality, limiting the complex charac-
teristics of the case. The divergence between the ideal type and the historical case 
serves as leverage point for formulating questions and constituting explanations.
The primary value of ideal types is to enable the formulation of relevant 
research questions that do not claim the ability to reproduce reality or to predict 
the future. An ideal type is not the ‘perfect situation’ or the utopia. While some 
critics argue that the ideal type tends to focus on extreme phenomena and over-
look the connections between them, the ideal type developer can be flexible in 
designing the ideal type. In this book, the ideal type of the transformation pro-
cess has been aligned to the stages of the negotiation process and assumes the 
perspectives of collective decision-making. Nevertheless, ideal types should 
also allow the construction of simple concepts and fictional conceptual extremes 
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 (Grenzbegriff), which, however, can still occur in reality. Therefore, ideal types 
can contribute substantially when conceptualizing complex phenomena.
Ideal types are frequently also regarded as merely applying lessons from suc-
cessful cases to less successful ones. European forms of democracy, governance, 
welfare systems and even climate protection schemes are frequently regarded 
as the end of the evolutionary process (Najam 2005; see Beyerlin 2006; Najam 
2010), and this optimal stage is nothing else but the ideal type. This is, how-
ever, not how Max Weber and Georg Simmel define ideal types or categories. It 
is merely a methodological instrument of constructing ideas, a Gedankenexperi-
ment. Moreover, as Alexis de Tocqueville (1856) stressed, although institutions or 
systems may be similar in some details, they cannot be reproduced as each sys-
tem is unique. Therefore, borrowing lessons from one case to another, for exam-
ple from a developed country to a developing country, will most likely involve 
incomplete information. Although there is still merit in looking at the evolution-
ary dimension of the development of developed countries, this is not the primary 
value of ideal types as depicted in this book.
7.3  Case Studies as Historical Analyses—The Value 
of Context
As a method of scientific inquiry and research, case studies have long assumed 
a well-established and prominent status in many academic disciplines (see 
McKeown 1999; Maiden 2004; George & Bennett 2007). While it is often thought 
that Frederic Le Play first introduced the case-study method into social science in 
1829 (see Healy 1947), similar forms of case-study methods can be traced to ear-
lier historical times, even to as early as Ancient Greece (see Lloyd 1992). Case 
study analysis involves a method that uses the up-close, in-depth, and detailed 
examination of an object of study (the case) in a specific spatial, temporal, cultural, 
social, political, and economic context. The usage of case studies in social science 
has often been chosen, particularly because of its descriptive value in explaining 
the outcomes or effects of variables. Nevertheless, the systematic further develop-
ment of case study methods for the cumulative building of theories from various 
disciplines of social science is often neglected (see George & Bennett 2007).
A major point of debate on the viability or scientific validity of case study 
analyses as methods of scientific inquiry is the capability of formulating gener-
alizations from single cases and applying these generalizations to other cases. 
Karl Popper (1959) has suggested the use of falsification or falsifiability, which 
forms part of critical reflexivity, as a test to determine the generalizability of 
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the outcomes of case studies. He claimed that falsifiability defines the boundary 
between the scientific and unscientific, whereas that which is unfalsifiable is clas-
sified as unscientific. Based on this definition, the possibility that the outcomes of 
a case study are not applicable to other cases makes case study methods scientific.
7.3.1  Grasping Historicity and Plurality Through Case 
Studies—The Value of Perspectives in Knowledge 
Generation
What makes case studies interesting for this book is that it highlights the value of 
perspectives in generating, testing, re-testing, validating, rejecting and accepting 
knowledge. The use of perspectives in scientific inquiry ensures the acceptance 
of the pluralism of ideas, actions, normative systems and even of the concepts or 
understandings of fairness and justice. Such perspectives automatically provide a 
foundation for revisiting and the eventual modification of ontological concepts. 
While case study methods reiterate the uniqueness of each case, they are still able 
to identify and conceptualize patterns, as overlaps, cross-cuts and deviations con-
tribute additional resources for further theory development.
Case studies of transformation processes highlight the relevance of historic-
ity and plurality in understanding the process. Because each transformation pro-
cess is unique, historicity can only be understood through the perspectives of 
actors, issues, and structures. Some scholars may even argue that when looking 
at the perspective of power (power-centric), interactions between actors can be 
explained and predicted. Perspectives can even define the sources and value of 
power. The case study approach takes a snapshot of a historical episode, assesses 
the interactions of various variables and comes up with historical explanations 
that can be used to explain other events, which could have happened in the past or 
the future as well as in other geographical areas.
As discussed in the introduction of this book, time is a central pillar in any 
transformation process. Case studies attempt to provide an account of rele-
vant turning points, lock-ins, set-backs and leapfrogging moments that have 
occurred. A case study can only grasp one set of these events. Therefore, case 
studies are based on the presumption that there is a plurality of turning points, 
lock-ins,  set-backs and leapfrogging moments, which are particularly dependent 
on perspectives. In order words, case studies most likely come from a specific 
perspective, depending on the preferences and purposes of the chosen actors and 
frameworks.
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7.3.2  Procedures and the Design of Case Studies—The 
Role of Theoretical Models in Case Studies
The value of comparing case studies among themselves and comparing these case 
studies with theoretical models, here presented as ideal types, is measured by how 
these case studies and theoretical models complement each other and how differ-
ences can be understood and explained. In addition, the value of comparing case 
studies and ideal types can be measured by how complex contingent generaliza-
tions can be formulated to support decision-making.
In this book, looking for the evident complementarity of case studies and the 
ideal types will require the following assumptions:
– Ideal types serving as formal models and scenarios have storylines and con-
cepts that can be tested using the case studies.
– Case studies examine how and why these cases overlap and/or devi-
ate, while identifying the new variables or new interdependencies that are 
responsible for the deviance. As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett 
(2007) suggest, deviant or outlier cases may be particularly useful for heu-
ristic purposes, as by definition their outcomes are not what traditional 
theories would anticipate. In addition, the ability to explain this deviance 
enriches theories, as they suggest new terrains that need to be further under-
stood and explained.
– Case studies evaluate the causal mechanisms behind the correlations or pat-
terns between variables that have been assumed by current theories. Case 
studies provide a controlling mechanism to check whether correlations are 
spurious or potentially causal, adding insights into how causal mechanisms 
can be newly understood as well as how new variables or the refinement of 
concepts can be specified and operated.
To ensure coherence in the chapters on case studies, the following design and 
procedures will be implemented:
7.3.2.1  Problem and Objectives
Each case study of this book aims to introduce a selection of the most impor-
tant subjects and objects of analysis that will be used to examine the specificities 
of the transformation process. While the subject of the case study refers to the 
promotion or obstruction of the low-carbon transformation process, the following 
will be taken as objects of the case study analysis:
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– Recent developments, particularly how the country refers to the Paris agree-
ment and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
– The multiple entry points to SD, particularly climate mitigation  and energy 
security
– The multiple goal-setting of policies through different scales and levels
– Challenges, barriers, trade-offs, caveats, gaps and risks
– Opportunities, synergies, and co-benefits
– System transition and/or transformation (multiple transitions) including 
socio-economic, cultural, technological, political, and demographic drivers 
and trends of change (e.g., GDP, population, migration, R&D)
– Path dependence and lock-ins: infrastructure, governance, behavioral aspects
– Enabling or hindering frameworks for behavioral and lifestyle change: policy 
instruments, non-mitigation policies, non-SD policies, state partnerships with 
private sector and civil society
– International cooperation and institutions
– Legitimacy: transparency, accountability and social inclusion in decision-making
– Innovation and technology development, diffusion and transfer
The analysis of these subjects will allow the inductive identification of new var-
iables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms and causal paths that are needed to be 
understood in order to correct the paths or benchmarks of low-carbon transforma-
tion. In addition, the discovery of potential causal relationships may initiate new 
methods of quantitative and qualitative measurement.
7.3.2.2  The Execution of the Case Studies
The execution of the case studies as methods of scientific inquiry will be con-
ducted through the following steps:
1. The formulation of the chronological ‘narrative’ that defines each chapter
2. The identification and assessment of causal mechanisms through congruence 
methods and process-tracing
3. A deviation analysis between the empirical case studies and the ideal types
4. A Comparative analysis of two selected (country) case studies (where 
 applicable)
For each chapter, accessible primary literature, secondary literature and interview 
data will be used to construct a chronological ‘narrative’ that will structure his-
torical inquiry. Such an inquiry aims to establish the values of independent and 
dependent variables.
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In addition, the case studies aim to highlight the causal mechanisms that are 
substantial in promoting or obstructing low-carbon transformation. Looking at 
particular cases, it is argued that such causal mechanisms can operate only under 
certain conditions and that their effects are highly contingent upon interactions 
between factors. As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2007) claim, a 
causal mechanism may be necessary, but is not sufficient, in an explanation. In 
other words, effects or occurrences are brought about by a set or bundle of fac-
tors and configurations of mechanisms, through which the behavior of actors is 
defined. Nevertheless, the same bundle may constitute other effects or even coun-
teract the effects when transferred to another country or even region within the 
same country. Therefore, one causal mechanism will be compared with another 
case study in the chapter as well as compared with the theoretical model (ideal 
type) to analyze how a causal mechanism offsets other causalities in some con-
texts and complements them in others (see George & Bennett 2007).
7.3.2.3  Congruence Methods—The Role of Process Tracing
The relevant theories are summarized through the ideal types. Linking these 
theoretical models to the case studies is an attempt to assess the ability of these 
theories to explain or predict the occurrence of events or factors. As Alexander 
George and George Bennett (2007) suggest, if the outcome of the case studies is 
consistent with the predictions of the theories, then there is the possibility that a 
causal relationship exists. Overlaps and cross-cuts can explain the applicability of 
theories to realities. In cases of deviations, explanations will be sought for these 
deviations, and hypotheses will be formulated about how these deviations will 
need to expand the existing theories. In cases of both congruence and deviation, 
factors and theoretical reasons will be taken into consideration to address how the 
hypothesized causes may be amplified, diminished, delayed or sped up (e.g., the 
self-fulfilling prophecy).
The next step pertains to the assessment of the possible causal significance of 
congruity (see George & Bennett 2007), where two questions will be asked:
– Is the consistency spurious or of possible causal significance?
– Is the independent variable a necessary condition for the outcome of the 
dependent variable and how much explanatory or predictive power does it 
have?
As suggested by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2007), spuriousness 
occurs when the observed congruence of the cause C and effect E is artificial 
because both C and E are caused by some third factor Z. 
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Alternatively, the putative cause C lacks causal priority if C is necessary for E, 
but C is itself only an intervening variable wholly or largely caused by a neces-
sary prior variable Z. In this instance, both Z and C are necessary for E, but C has 
no independent explanatory value. The comparability of these country cases will 
be supported by the general questions formulated that link these subjects of anal-
ysis (see above) to the low carbon transformation process. The outcomes of the 
case studies will be explained by referring to the theoretical models (ideal types). 
Deviations will then be highlighted while providing theoretical and empirical 
explanations for these deviations. In many cases, the theoretical framework pro-
vided by the ideal types will need to be broadened to capture the major aspects of 
the historical elements. This broadening defines the analytical value of these case 
studies by allowing typological theorization.
To summarize, process tracing is a method that motivates one to take equifi-
nality into account. This refers to an openness to the possible feasibility of alter-
native paths through which the outcome could have occurred. In addition, process 
tracing supports the possibility of mapping out one or more potential causal paths 
that are consistent with the outcome. As other cases are identified and tested, new 
typologies can be developed, leading to the further development of existing theo-
ries.
7.3.3  Theory Testing and the Implications of Case 
Findings for Theory and Practice
An analysis through case studies pertains to the testing of deductive theories. 
Theory-testing aims to strengthen or reduce support for a theory, narrow or 
extend the scope conditions or parameters of a theory, or determine which of two 
or more theories can best explain a case, type or general phenomenon (George & 
Bennett 2007 p. 112). As theories are tested using the data and information from 
the case studies, this testing may lead to an assessment that existing theories are 
not able to provide the necessary framework of understanding. Therefore, case 





An analysis of deviations from theoretical models (ideal types) can link the 
gaps between deductive and inductive processes. As case studies uncover new or 
omitted variables, self-driving dynamics, hypotheses, causal paths, causal mech-
anisms, types of interaction, and network effects, the historical explanation that 
has been supported by existing theories can be improved upon (see George & 
Bennett 2007). This improvement highlights previously overlooked variables. 
In some cases, some of these new factors can be a highly significant factor that 
delays or obstructs the transformation process.
Developing or expanding upon existing theories through the analysis of 
case studies is an inductive process. Single case studies can produce observa-
tions that can initiate further questions, detect patterns (which can be supported 
by additional case studies as well as by other forms of scientific inquiry such as 
experiments), and hypothesize on tentative explanations of these observations. 
Hypothesizing can include distinguishing the subclasses or subtypes of existing 
typologies. In addition, ‘concatenated’ theories can be developed by dividing 
complex causal processes into specific component theories, or sequential stages, 
phases or episodes, as well by as focusing on the perspectives of identified actors 
(see George & Bennett 2007). For example, by focusing on actors’ behavior and 
how it changes as the process unfolds will provide important insights into sequen-
tial stages and typical interactions and dynamics within a specific stage or epi-
sode.
As the deviance between the theoretical model and the case studies becomes 
clear and eventually leads to the specification of a new theory, generalizations can 
be achieved as to how the newly identified mechanism may play out in differ-
ent contexts and how this new mechanism can be relevant in managing processes 
(George & Bennett 2007 p. 112).
7.4  Role-Play Simulation
Simulation as a method of scientific inquiry gained popularity in the 1990s as 
computer simulations were used to simplify and mimic complex systems. Consid-
ered the third pillar of empirical research, along with experiment and theory (see 
Drösser 1994), simulations are recognized as allowing the manipulation of com-
plex systems that would be impossible, too costly or unethical to do so in natural 
systems (Peck 2004). Simulation can add to theory development and testing, can 
assist in formulating hypotheses and can limit the scope of which data are most 
important to gather (see Peck 2004; Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005).
7.4 Role-Play Simulation
138 7 Theoretical Models, Case Studies and Simulation Games …
This book does not intend to do computer simulations, but rather a so-called 
‘role-play’ simulation. Particularly because this book highlights the aspects per-
taining to functional, institutional, and bargaining interactions, a simulation 
was conducted using the role-pay format, where the participants were brought 
together to mimic interactions under conditions and parameters set by the game 
designer. For simplicity, when referring to simulations in this book, role-play sim-
ulations will be meant. In this book, more than 15 postgraduate students from the 
University of Technology in Kingston, Jamaica, participated in a role-play simu-
lation. While the main goal of the simulation was educational, the role-play sim-
ulation was also designed to provide useful empirical insights into the analysis of 
sustainable, low-carbon transformation.
7.4.1  The Scientific Value of Role-Play Simulations
While the pedagogical value of role-play simulations in the classroom is less 
contentious, the value of the results from these games to scholarly research may 
require further discussion, if not further convincing of their scientific value. The 
engagement students as subject groups or ‘human guinea pigs’ may be perceived 
as self-serving and drawing empirical evidence from these games may be limited. 
Furthermore, most of the simulation games used in classes of international rela-
tions and political sciences depict complex cases such as climate change negotia-
tions, where negotiators are required to have extensive institutional memory and 
technical expertise. While role-play simulations will mostly run for mere hours, 
these real-life negotiations occur for a longer period of time, with several prepara-
tory meetings and consultations.
Nevertheless, the limitations of the empirical value of role-play simulations 
are not limitations per se, because there are distinct expectations and none of 
these expectations is to reproduce reality. Like computer simulations and mod-
els, role-play simulations aim to look at specific aspects of negotiations. Varia-
bles and parameters are adjusted to look at how processes are affected by such 
changes. In addition, particularly for this book, role-play simulations are used to 
identify interesting impulses that will then become subjects of further scientific 
inquiries. Moreover, some events in the role-play simulations are compared to the 
real-world and some theories and empirical statistics are drawn to explain differ-
ences. These explanations will inevitably test the relevance of existing theories 
and suggest improvement or even encourage the development of new hypotheses 
for further research. Therefore, in any case, role-play simulations can in actuality 
promote further theory development.
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The purpose of conducting simulations as a method of scientific inquiry is 
to introduce the possibility of a new way of thinking about social processes that 
is difficult to understand through text books (Penetrante 2012). Based on ideas 
about the emergence of the complex mechanisms of interactions between actors, 
a holistic and meta-level analysis is made possible. Because simulation is akin to 
an experimental methodology, simulation can be executed many times to draw 
conclusions through analogies (Müller 1998). The variation of conditions through 
the researcher allows the exploration of the several effects of different parameters 
(Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005 p. 14).
7.4.2  The Procedures and Design of the Role-Play 
Simulation
This book puts forward the procedures and design of role-play simulations that 
highlight the process and negotiation outlooks on a complex system. As men-
tioned earlier, in role-play simulations, such as those conducted in this book, the 
dynamics of functional, institutional, persuasive and bargaining interactions ini-
tially depend on the parameters preconditioned by the researcher, who will define 
the initial point of behavior, based on assumptions made prior to the game. These 
assumptions are to be clearly communicated to allow the participants to under-
stand the scope of the issues that are relevant to the game.
These assumptions can be formulated through the following steps:
First, the role-play designer chooses an aspect of a complex system. For 
example, in chapter 12, a cabinet meeting of the Jamaican national government 
on budget-planning under the conditions set by the International Monetary Fund.
Second, the role-play designer identifies the problems and challenges he 
or she wants to be understood through the game. The problems and chal-
lenges will define the agenda of the role-play game and will limit the scope of 
parameters. A game can be limited to a single problem. In chapter 12, the diffi-
culty of consensus-building in achieving the budget plan will be presented as the 
over-arching problem. In this game, the agenda becomes clear, which helps struc-
ture the discussions of the participants. In addition, a game can also highlight sev-
eral problems and challenges. Here, more than one problem was introduced, and 
these need to be resolved in parallel, in conjunction or in a specific order by the 
participants. In addition, each interacting participant has a different set of prob-
lems and challenges, where resolving them requires cooperation with other par-
ticipants who may not have the same set of problems.
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Third, questions need to be formulated that will identify the parameters 
that will be manipulated. For example, in chapter 12, one question refers to 
the effects of gender. In one group, all the members were females, in another all 
male, and in the other mixed. In addition, the parameters can be addressed by 
introducing control and experimental groups to allow direct comparisons.
Fourth, the profiles of participants need to be prepared and distributed 
among the participants before the games. These profiles need to include brief 
background information about the positions and interests of the country. These 
positions and interests are to be concretized in specific numbers (e.g., 20 mil-
lion US dollars as compensation; or maximum 10 percent in GHG emissions by 
2030). Each profile also needs to clarify the limitations of the negotiators. For 
example, a ‘toxic’ issue can be identified, where negotiators would need to walk 
away if this issue is involved. The profiles also include some instructions or rec-
ommendations as to how they should behave at the bargaining table: competitive, 
collaborative, avoidant, cooperative, emotional, arrogant, etc. to highlight the 
human factor at negotiations.
Fifth, the role-play designer needs to plan the departure point of the 
game. It may include requiring all participants to give a brief (ministerial) 
statement in a plenary session or to instruct each participant which bilateral or 
mini-lateral meeting he or she needs to prioritize first. These brief ministerial 
statements allow the participants to have an overview of potential partners and 
adversaries. This ‘departure point’ also serves as an ‘ice-breaker’, as participants 
will eventually ‘warm up’ during the game.
Sixth, some flexibility and creativity should be encouraged in the game to 
allow the participants to come up with innovative and out-of-the-box solu-
tions. Furthermore, some provisions should be made leading to changes, for 
example, in the power or interests of one or more participants. In addition, while 
the simulation is running, the participants may choose to follow instructions 
and adapt to these parameters and frameworks, basing their decisions on certain 
rationalities and criteria. With the researcher intentionally changing the param-
eters and frameworks as the game unfolds, the effects of such changes should 
be observed, documented and discussed during debriefings. These observations 
would generate (simulated) data, which can be later compared to the data pro-
duced by other methodologies outside of the simulation (Penetrante 2012).
Seventh, the results of the role-play should be clear and concrete, such as 
forging an agreement with one or more counterparts, or ‘sabotaging’ and ‘stall-
ing’ the negotiations. This allows closure in the game. Furthermore, the role-play 
designer needs to carefully plan the evaluation discussion and debriefing to encour-
age the participants to reflect on what they have experienced. The participants 
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should also be asked about their feelings during the game, whether their expecta-
tions are met, whether they would like to change something about how they nego-
tiated were they given the chance, or what struck them most during the game. Also, 
technical and logistical questions about the game should be encouraged. Are there 
some shortcomings in the game and whether there are things they would like to 
change about how the game was designed and conducted?
Eighth (and finally), participants should be given a questionnaire or a writ-
ten task that they need to do in few days after the experience has sunk in. 
It should be submitted no longer than a week after the game. This questionnaire 
with both open and closed questions could include questions that can be useful 
for the researcher when assessing the empirical value of the results.
7.5  Interim Conclusion: Bridging Gaps Between 
Theory and Practice Through Knowledge 
and Decision Tools
The knowledge and decisions tools introduced in this chapter can be particularly 
helpful in identifying and assessing obvious and latent stumbling blocks to effec-
tive collective decision-making. These tools can also provide impulses for how 
these stumbling blocks can be addressed to allow actors to cope with them. Major 
challenges and barriers to low-carbon system transformation are diverse. The first 
step of bridging the gaps between theory and practice is to ensure the fluidity of 
the relationship between the two. Theory generation should be dynamic, as reality 
becomes more complex with the emergence of new issues that require multi- and 
interdisciplinary as well as an integrated outlook to grasp their essence and mean-
ing. As challenges and barriers are identified by policy-makers (covered here by 
the case studies) and academes (covered by the theoretical models), their perspec-
tives combine, and new insights can be found that can allow more effective meas-
ures to facilitate the transformation process.
It is the aim of this book that the theoretical models (ideal types), case stud-
ies and the role-play simulations will contribute to an understanding of how gaps 
between theory and practice can be bridged. The case studies and role-play simu-
lations will be conducted to understand how low-carbon transformation processes 
can be facilitated. What kind of theoretical and practical knowledge is needed by 
decision-makers for dealing with challenges, risks, caveats and barriers related to 
sustainable, low-carbon transformation? How can these case studies and role-play 
simulations contribute to the establishment of general, conceptual models that can 
be helpful in designing and implementing policy instruments?
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sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you 
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Crea-
tive Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to 
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Ideal Types—Theoretical Models 
as Agent of Transformation Towards 
Sustainability
This chapter introduces the ideal types of a transformative policy pathway as the 
agencies of transformation: democratic, authoritarian, institutional, activistic, 
technocratic or bureaucratic, and post-democratic. Functioning as ‘corridors’ 
where transformation is facilitated, each of these ideal types of policy models 
may have distinct preferences regarding procedures of collective decision-mak-
ing. These procedures are, for example, highly dependent upon existing path 
dependencies defined by how each ideal type tends to draw legitimacy in front of 
its audience.
A major purpose of this chapter is to ‘unmask’ the normative judgment of 
 policy models, whereas the academic literature on transformation for example tends 
to link environmentalism with democratic governance (see Humphrey 2007). While 
democratic and authoritarian ideal types of policy pathways reflect the types of 
regime, institutional, activistic, technocratic and post-democratic ideal types of 
policy pathways can be considered as deviations, because they can be found in 
both democratic and authoritarian regimes. The separate analysis of these ‘sub-
types’, or deviations, are significant as they suggest different dynamics in the 
transformation process, which will be illustrated through the integrated streams of 
transformation.
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8.1  An Ideal Type of Transformation—The 
Democratic Policy Pathway
The ideal type of a democratic policy pathway pertains to a ‘corridor’ or a ‘trans-
formation roadmap’ that identifies the multiple underlying stages, paces, episodes 
or parts of orchestrated transformation and the various conflict cleavages within a 
specific stage or episode. As figure 8.1 suggests, this integrated stream illustration 
identifies the relevant stakeholders for each stage and episode, whose interactions 
produce a collection of outcomes (both agreements and non-agreements). These 
interactions lead to the concretization and elaboration of the relevant issues and 
interests involved, allowing the integrated understanding of barriers into the trans-
formation and eventually establishing possible procedures of resolution (Fig. 8.1).
Each box of the diagram represents a sub-system where various types of nego-
tiations occur. Each of these subsystems have distinct actors, issues/agendas, 
processes, structures, and outcomes. Furthermore, the relationship between these 
inter-related subsystems may be complementary or competing. The different 
phases of negotiation—the opening of the process, agenda setting, the clarifica-
tion of interests, generating solutions and ending the process—are reflected in the 
diagram (see Zartman 1978; Young 1991; Sebenius 1992b), suggesting the incre-
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8.1.1  Context: Actors and Issues
Because the competitive advantage of political actors in democratic countries is 
defined by how they manage to align their political interests with public opin-
ion or how they shape public opinion, bargaining interactions are important sub-
jects of analysis in democratic pathways. In many cases, public opinion is not 
defined by a ‘collective logic,’ but by how arguments are made, communicated 
and exchanged. Moreover, public opinion is often heterogeneous and, in some 
cases, fragmented, as many societal groups with complementing and competing 
interests seek to claim representation of what ‘society wants.’ In some countries, 
universities and other academic institutions play a significant role in providing a 
‘public space’ where various societal groups can meet and exchange perspectives.
The diagram highlights the role of drivers and brakes in either promoting or 
delaying the various negotiation processes. These drivers and brakes are frequently 
path-dependent, which can be properly addressed when transition costs are com-
prehensively identified and accommodated. Context, for example, is an important 
factor that needs to be discussed. It explains the occurrence of a decision in one 
setting while being unimaginable in a different setting. The Fukushima incident 
has, for example, led to policy shifts in Germany, yet not in other countries.
This illustration summarizes the different channels where a transformation 
process can be initiated: policy, polity and politics streams. Like in the first phase 
of negotiation, the left side of the diagram pertains to how transformation is ini-
tiated by the emergence of a specific challenge, which can only be addressed 
when changes occur. The policy stream refers to government agenda as signifi-
cantly defined by the ideological preferences of the political party in power, the 
technological options available to implement policies, viable alternatives and the 
related costs of pursuing these alternative opportunities, and the locked-in pol-
icies that were made in the past. For example, a government may initiate new 
policies to implement electoral promises. However, the fulfilment of electoral 
promises may be dependent on how much change the constitution allows (e.g., 
Rückwirkungsverbot, or the principle of non-retroactivity in Germany).
In addition, a government may revise existing policies, for example, to adhere 
to international or regional agreements pertaining to climate mitigation meas-
ures. Although international agreements may contrast with a government’s formal 
position, for example, in terms of climate mitigation, because expected gains will 
serve other, highly-prioritized political goals, the country opts for cooperation. 
For example, Poland and the Czech Republic, countries that are highly  dependent 
upon coal energy and are staunch opponents of ambitious mitigation meas-
ures that relate to coal energy, have agreed to commit to more stringent climate 
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 protection policies to fulfil the agreements they have agreed to upon their ascen-
sion to the European Union (Darby 2014). Moreover, a reversal of past policies 
may be a product of crises and even of natural disasters.
The polity stream pertains to the national institutions in place. It includes 
the institutions responsible for monitoring, evaluating and verifying govern-
ment actions. The politics stream is dynamic and is defined by the power rela-
tions between actors, as well as how existing polities serve as formal and material 
frameworks that allows weaker parties to cope with asymmetrical relations. The 
polities will then review if new policies are in accordance with the existing rules 
of the game while evaluating the resilience of the system. In most countries, new 
government policies most likely result in legal challenges from various sectors of 
the society. This possibility of check-and-balance promotes social trust; as weaker 
actors are assured that they have access to formal channels of decision-making.
Politics is the stream that refers to how public discourse will unfold and the 
various complementing and competing perspectives regarding concrete mat-
ters are mobilized and communicated. This stream also involves the expres-
sion of power games, as the societal actor that has most of the relevant effective 
resources will tend to dominate the discourse. Power resources do not only refer 
to money, but also to information, including how information is disseminated. For 
example, an environmental group with fewer financial resources could find more 
public support if it could present a more compelling argument based on scientific 
facts or at least the impression of serious evidence.
8.1.2  Agencies: Structures and Processes
The alignment of the three streams is a significant part of the transformation pro-
cess, because it represents the critical juncture that determines subsequent steps. 
For example, as the policy stream identifies energy security as a political priority 
and agenda, the politics stream may agree on the importance of resolving threats 
to energy security especially when these threats to energy supply are causing 
higher energy prices. At this point, the polity stream may not have major reser-
vations except when huge interventions are to be made by the state in the energy 
market that could reach the tipping point. In the streams-alignment stage, all the 
issues behind energy security will be collected and translated into the respective 
language of the different streams.
After the agreement on the agenda, the streams-alignment is followed by the 
identification of a mixture of approaches through which various interests are pro-
cessed and evaluated. The process unfolds, leading to the combination of three 
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possible approaches, where one approach can be more dominant than the others, 
depending on the importance of the issues involved. The policy approach involves 
the normative setting provided by past and present policies. While the govern-
ment may set the limits of what is politically acceptable, for example, the same 
national government needs to adhere to these limits. It may define that changes in 
the country’s energy system should not undermine the global competitiveness of 
the country. This normative setting may subsequently limit the financial burdens 
of transitions and legitimize financial incentives or tax exemptions to business 
and industrial companies affected by transition.
From the policy-approach perspective, the resolution of an issue needs to be 
within the boundaries set by pre-defined guard-rails that exclude the intolerable 
impacts of an emerging problem as well as any unacceptable measures used to 
address and resolve these problems. These guard-rails will eventually define and 
frame institutional interactions, in which certain policy principles need to be con-
sidered, no matter what policy area is involved. Such guard-rails can be directly 
defined by polities (e.g., the constitution) or be directly negotiated ad hoc by 
relevant actors determining principles that frame subsequent actions. For exam-
ple, the “tolerable window” may include provisions for the protection of human 
rights, especially for indigenous communities.
8.1.3  Audience: Outcomes
The three approaches—the policy approach, knowledge diplomacy and the public 
consensus approach—interact in various forms by complementing, substituting or 
competing. The three approaches will eventually define the new social contract. 
In cases of stalemate, new agendas may be introduced, paving the way for new 
rounds of negotiations. Subsequently, decisions are achieved by following the 
conclusions of ‘follow-up’ negotiations. When decisions are then implemented, 
they call for the institutionalization of practices. Eventually, institutionalization 
will lead to new status quo and transformation that has followed a democratic 
policy pathway will have been completed.
8.2  An Ideal Type of Transformation—The 
Authoritarian Policy Pathway
Academic debate around environmentalism, particularly when addressing cli-
mate change, is increasingly focusing on the significance of the types of govern-
ance or regimes as agents of transformation towards sustainability (see Newig 
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& Fritsch 2009; Young 2009; Zelli 2011). For example, Derk Loorbach (2010) 
introduces transition management as a new governance approach for sustainable 
development. He highlights the impact of the long-term outlook on network and 
decision-making processes. While the definition of authoritarianism has become 
less contested in the last few decades (see Avritzer 1995; Altemeyer 2006), there 
is an emerging debate as to how authoritarianism relates to environmental pol-
icies. Mark Beeson (2010) argues that the intensification of a range of environ-
mental problems reinforces authoritarian regimes, particularly in East Asia and 
Southeast Asia. To understand this presumed linkage between environmentalism 
and authoritarianism, the value of this policy model as an agent for sustainable, 
low-carbon development needs to be determined. Following Juan Linz’s (2007; 
2009) three major indicators of authoritarianism (the de-politicization of society, 
limited pluralism and a connection to a traditional mentality), this section focuses 
on how (environmental) policy-making in authoritarian regimes facilitates trans-
formation towards sustainability.
In light of the various challenges that hinder effective and efficient climate 
policy formulation and implementation, arguments have been raised about the 
incapacity of democratic regimes to effectively respond to climate problems. A 
growing literature on ‘authoritarian environmentalism’ or ‘ecological authori-
tarianism’ has emerged, proposing a non-participatory approach to public pol-
icy-making and implementation to address environmental challenges such as 
climate change (see Doyle & Simpson 2006; Beeson 2010; Gilley 2012). On 
the one hand, how democratic countries can isolate environmental policies from 
other policy areas and purposely ‘suspend’ or ‘limit’ civil rights and liberties 
for climate protection is discussed (see Heilbroner 1974; Beeson 2010). On the 
other hand, several experts have focused on how stable authoritarian regimes 
can effectively respond to environmental challenges (Sowers 2007; Schreurs 
2011). For example, the Chinese case study of Bruce Gilley (2012) provides a 
comprehensive analysis of how authoritarian environmentalism is practiced in 
China.
8.2.1  Challenges to Developing an Ideal Type of an 
Authoritarian Policy Pathway
In conceptualizing an ideal type of an authoritarian policy pathway, there are 
 several challenges that need to be clarified. One significant challenge refers 
to the current diversity of existing authoritarian regimes. This diversity com-
plicates the potential representativeness of this ideal type. There are different 
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types of  authoritarian regimes and these types can become even more complex 
and intangible when local cultural aspects enter the spectrum of analysis. For 
example, after differentiating authoritarianism from democracy as well as from 
totalitarianism, Juan Linz (2007; 2009) differentiates seven subtypes of authori-
tarian regimes: (1) bureaucratic-military; (2) corporatist; (3) mobilizing regimes 
in post-democratic states; (4) post-colonial; (5) racial and ethnic ‘democracies’; 
(6) incomplete totalitarian and pre-totalitarian; and (7) post-totalitarian. Other 
authors have also introduced different subtypes of authoritarian regimes. While 
Wolfgang Merkel (1999) bases his subtypes on the holder of power (Herrschaft-
sträger), Armin Pfahl-Traughber (2004) defines the subtypes according to the 
legitimacy of authority. This book introduces an ideal type of an authoritarian 
(environmental) policy pathway that focuses on interactions between actors 
and institutions as results of the interplay between agents, agencies and audi-
ence.
Another challenge refers to the lack of a clear separation between authori-
tarian and democratic regimes. While there is common knowledge about how 
authoritarian regimes are to be distinguished from democratic regimes, certain 
democratic elements can still be observed in authoritarian regimes in the same 
manner as authoritarian tendencies can be identified even in the purportedly most 
democratic regimes. Because of this, it is difficult to clearly attribute environ-
mentalism either to the democratic elements of an authoritarian regime or to the 
authoritarian elements of a democratic regime. Furthermore, democratic regimes 
may prefer authoritarian procedures when addressing specific issues, especially 
issues that can stir social division. In addition, constitutions of most democratic 
countries have provisions allowing limitations to political pluralism such as the 
implementation of martial law and the suspension of habeas corpus under spe-
cific conditions that can be easily ‘abused’ for other political reasons. Facing 
increased political opposition and the loss of political power, political leaders can 
“stage” different types of crises. Minor crises can be projected out of  proportion 
for political gains. Moreover, as Bob Altemeyer (2006), a leading scholar on 
authoritarianism argues, a simple but significant majority can be mobilized to 
democratically elect a charismatic leader. He suggests that as time passes, the 
drive for authoritarianism may become stronger as this leader may see the need 
to suppress opposition to fulfil electoral promises. With the majority’s support 
or with the passiveness (or ignorance) of the silent majority, democratic regimes 
can feel authoritarian, given their mandate to limit political liberties, for example 
those of minorities, and to suppress political opponents who can be easily cast as 
risks and threats to the stability of the system.
151
8.2.2  Advocacy, Social Movements and Authoritarian 
Environmentalism
A growing number of researchers are analyzing the role of social movements 
including NGOs in authoritarian states and many of them see environmental 
advocacy as a type often tolerated by these states (Sowers 2007; Mertha 2009). 
Especially because environmental groups tend to pursue interests that coincide 
with state policies of restricting rights and liberties of other actors such as busi-
ness and industry, authoritarian regimes see their benefits when seeking inhibi-
tions to the rule of law that will exclude corporate and business actors as well 
as other groups from participation in policy processes on the basis that they are 
mostly opposed to environmental action or that their existence is leading to envi-
ronmental degradation (see Shearman & Smith 2007; Wells 2007; Gilley 2012). For 
example, while public policy processes in China are non-participatory, public poli-
cies involving environmental issues including air pollution or climate change have 
indeed engaged in an advanced level of societal participation (Gilley 2012). Never-
theless, broader public participation in environment-related public policies in China 
is limited to cooperation with state authorities (see Teng & Gu 2007; Lei 2009).
In response to the existing difficulties in forging agreements to effectively 
address the environmental challenges brought about by climate change, there is a 
growing literature calling for alternative public policy models. This growing liter-
ature often refers to the effectiveness of authoritarian policy models in confront-
ing environmental problems. As the case study on the Philippines demonstrates, 
because the successful implementation of measures that would ensure environ-
mental integrity implies restrictions, and because of civil society activism around 
environmental issues, there is an increasing preference towards authoritarian 
structures within democratic states (see Sowers 2007; Beeson 2010; Geronimo 
2016; Pora 2017).
Most of the academic studies on authoritarian environmentalism address this 
policy model in comparison with democratic environmentalism. Many scholars 
argue that authoritarian environmentalism is more effective than democratic envi-
ronmentalism in addressing the specific characteristics of environmental issues, 
including public ignorance, public irrationality, free-riding, the need for imme-
diate action, the lack of resources to motivate social action and multi-stakeholder 
veto players (see Diehl & Gltsch 2001; Barrett 2003; Posner 2004; Arias-Mal-
donado 2007; Stone 2009; Beeson 2010; Gilley 2012). Authoritarian environ-
mentalism refers to the concentration of state authority in executive institutions, 
which facilitates a rapid formulation and implementation of environmental 
8.2 An Ideal Type of Transformation—The Authoritarian Policy Pathway
152 8 Ideal Types—Theoretical Models as Agent of Transformation …
 policies through limitations on individual freedoms and the partial or total exclu-
sion of social actors or their representatives (see Shearman & Smith 2007; Sowers 
2007; Beeson 2010).
In comparison, democratic environmentalism pertains to a public policy model 
that spreads authority across several levels and agencies of government and 
where direct public participation from various groups of society is encouraged, 
if not guaranteed (see Holden 2002; Humphrey 2007; Gilley 2012). Participation 
takes place from the upstream stage (research and knowledge formation, prob-
lem identification, measurement and assessment, policy options identification 
and assessment) to the midstream stage (policy selection and formulation) to 
the downstream stage (policy implementation, leadership, monitoring, report-
ing, assessment and revision) (Birkeland 2005). In addition, participation occurs 
at different levels: low level (being targets of state propaganda, reporting public 
violations and attending informational meetings) and high level (legally-binding 
and deliberative forums, outright citizen autonomy, legislative sovereignty) (see 
Arnstein 1969; Plummer & Taylor 2004; Gilley 2012).
While authoritarian environmentalism is able to produce a rapid and central-
ized response to environmental threats and mobilize much needed public support, 
the society will most likely not always benefit from the outcomes of such poli-
cies, because of other emerging problems caused by the exclusion of key stake-
holders in policy-making. Especially in many developing countries with weak 
governance and a highly fragmented society, the benefits of authoritarian envi-
ronmentalism will more likely not contribute to sustainable development due to 
the authoritarian system’s proneness to favoritism towards technocratic elites 
(see Shearman & Smith 2007). Looking at China, which is regarded as a pos-
itive example of the effectiveness of authoritarian environmentalism, opponents 
argue that the authoritarian model is causing poor policy formulation and poor 
policy implementation (Gilley 2012). Before summarizing the parameters of this 
ideal type, there is a need to clarify that this ideal type presupposes an authoritar-
ian regime with continual stability and robustness, that is, an authoritarian regime 
that is deeply embedded in the society and in the culture of that specific country. 
The cultural integration of authoritarian rule is expressed through narratives and 
a psychological disposition of the constituents which are enforced by social insti-
tutions (see Adorno et al. 1950). Furthermore, there is a significant amount of the 
(formal) rule of law in such a regime that allows a degree of predictability of poli-
cies and political actions.
Figure 8.2 is the illustration of an authoritarian policy pathway that summa-




















































8.2 An Ideal Type of Transformation—The Authoritarian Policy Pathway
154 8 Ideal Types—Theoretical Models as Agent of Transformation …
8.2.3  Context: Actors and Issues
In an authoritarian policy pathway, (political) elites such as agents from the pol-
icy and polity streams historically dominate policy-making. This dominance is 
guided by socio-technical and socio-linguistic narratives that legitimate the con-
trol of state institutions. The recruitment of new members of the elite is structured 
and to a certain degree eidetic. Depending on the subtype of the authoritarian 
regimes, who will be in the next generation of leaders is most likely predictable. 
While from a normative perspective, the recruitment process is unjust and ineq-
uitable, this predictability of recruitment can ensure long-term stability as power 
is passed from one generation to another. For example, because a military regime 
will most likely involve military personnel in higher political positions, citizens 
who aim to hold political offices will need to enter the military and pursue a mil-
itary career. In racial and ethnic ‘democracies’ (e.g., Apartheid South Africa), 
belonging to the ruling racial or ethnic group ensures access to political offices.
Nevertheless, the participation of the politics stream (civic society groups and 
those groups excluded from the political elite) is still possible or in some cases 
even encouraged. Compared to democracies, the consensus approach involves a 
different process in authoritarian regimes. Social movements are not dormant in 
this ideal type of authoritarian policy pathway, but rather stratified. Participation in 
social movements is limited to certain domains or issues and is ‘tolerated’ as long 
as it does not pose an opposition to certain state policies and to the political system 
in general. A social group can achieve ‘non-threat’ status when it has, for example, 
existing, informal connections with members of the political elites or when social 
networks are seen as beneficial to the legitimacy of the regime. Such informal 
connections often imply the personal guarantees of members of the ruling elite. 
In various cases, authoritarian regimes are keen to work with social movements as 
these can serve as pools of new recruits. Furthermore, the interaction between pol-
icy-makers and scientific communities often involves scientific and technocratic 
elites with long-standing relationships with the state. Knowledge diplomacy takes 
place in a rather controlled manner. In ‘stable’ authoritarian states, state universi-
ties and other research institutions are directly or indirectly managed or funded by 
government agencies. Therefore, scientific knowledge can easily be ‘institutional-
ized’ and interpreted in a way that supports government policies.
In stable authoritarian regimes like China and the United Arab Emirates, cli-
mate protection measures are most likely decoupled from political opposition. 
This is done by framing climate protection as an integral part of social poli-
cies that are concerned with human well-being. Embedded in existing social 
 policies, climate protection becomes an indicator of output legitimacy through 
 performance. Therefore, the regime will most likely allow more ambitious  targets. 
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Authoritarian regimes that are able to achieve higher indicators of welfare are 
more likely to receive adulation from the audience as compared with democratic 
states. In addition, because a failure to achieve ambitious targets will not face 
drastic criticism domestically as communication channels are controlled by the 
regime, authoritarian regimes are most likely willing to set ambitious targets. Fur-
thermore, modernization is framed as an indicator of performance that legitimizes 
the authoritarian system of governance. Aware of the risks of modernization to the 
system, stable authoritarian regimes have found ways to expand the benefits of 
modernization to a larger part of the population, thus, promoting social cohesion. 
This ‘guided’ modernization proves to be more effective than the use of violence.
8.2.4  Agency: Structures and Processes
Because the stable authoritarian regime derives its (output) legitimacy primarily 
from its performance in achieving indicators of modernization, bureaucracies of 
authoritarian regimes will most likely play a very significant role in planning. 
Stream alignment is rather simple, because state authority is concentrated in 
executive institutions. Decisions are expected to be swifter and policies tend to 
be predictable, as historically dominant policies will significantly influence the 
approach that policy-makers will take when addressing new areas. The charac-
teristics of historical policies will be most likely reproduced in new policies. For 
example, in a country where an authoritarian regime has historically used gener-
ous welfare policies (e.g., United Arab Emirates) to uplift the well-being of its 
citizens to ensure its legitimacy, the regime will most likely apply similar princi-
ples to addressing other policy areas such as climate protection.
Although modernization is often argued as a threat to authoritarian rule, as 
modernization tends to ‘balance’ power among societal actors, it can also be used 
to legitimize authoritarian rule, particularly in highly paternalistic societies (see 
Kreisky 1979; 2008). Because of the authoritarian regimes’ control of communi-
cation systems (e.g., censorship, state media), ‘authoritarian culture’ is enforced. 
When the authoritarian regime can effectively ‘frame’ the minds of citizens in 
terms of the meaning of (‘guided’) modernization, legitimacy is ensured.
Processes refer to various means of interactions that allow the achievement of 
decisions that advance the transformation process. As discussed above, although 
authoritarian countries are governed center-to-periphery and top-down, there is 
this predictability of institutional interactions (implying stability), as the char-
acter of historically dominant policies will define the policies adopted in new 
areas. Jurisdictions and hierarchies are well defined, implying a certain degree of 
accountability.
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In addition, authoritarian structures define functional interaction, where actual 
or potential interaction between policies can be emphasized. Policy approach 
will most likely be highly functional, as fewer stakeholders will be involved. The 
tolerable window approach is defined by historical policies and will most likely 
not be subjected and open to intense bargaining with non-state actors. Moreover, 
bargaining interactions in authoritarian countries are framed and managed by 
the authoritarian regime. While the regime will allow the significant information 
participation of social elites and mid-level social movements and activists, the 
boundaries are well clarified, and violations are heavily sanctioned. In addition, 
bargaining interactions between elites and other social actors in authoritarian pol-
icy pathways tend to occur through informal and non-public channels.
8.2.5  Audience: Outcomes
It is assumed in this ideal type that while policy outputs are more easily achieved, 
these outputs are highly contingent on system stability. Because all governance 
structures of authoritarian states are construed to ensure system stability with low 
or no tolerance to challenges to the system, not to mention state control of com-
munication channels, it is most likely difficult to anticipate when a rupture will 
occur. Therefore, system ruptures in authoritarian states will most likely ‘catch 
everyone in surprise.’ However, in case there is a rupture and the authoritarian 
system collapses, system default will most likely occur, and the transformation 
process will most likely need to start from zero, which implies a high degree of 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, a system rupture occurring in a democratic state may 
also lead to previous policies being disregarded, but it is assumed that dispersed 
decision-making as a result of factional politics following the separation and 
distribution of powers among various levels will mostly likely allow these ‘dis-
persed’ policies to be maintained.
The learning process is very important for authoritarian regimes. It is assumed 
that stable authoritarian regimes can adapt quickly to new challenges as deci-
sion-making does not need to undergo a rigid political debate among various 
political groups. The government can adapt faster to new conditions. In addition, 
because authoritarian regimes will most likely influence all aspects of the trans-
formation process, outcomes will then require cooperation with state authorities 
from various levels. In addition, outcomes will be more embedded in existing his-
torical policies. Persuasion interactions in authoritarian regimes will most likely 
be framed already by historical policies as these policies will identify the logic of 
the authoritarian regime.
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8.3  An Ideal Type of Transformation—Policy 
Pathways Driven by Institutional Activism
In reality, democratic policy systems are often confronted with deviations. On the 
one hand, these deviations can be significant, but they cannot constitute another 
ideal type because of integral differences. On the other hand, these deviations still 
need to be ‘isolated’ to identify what is different in this scenario compared to an 
‘ideal’ democratic system, and to analyze how deviations lead to changes in the 
structures and outcomes of decision-making processes. This section addresses a 
scenario that constitutes a subtype of the democratic policy ideal type—the insti-
tutional activist-driven policy model.
8.3.1  Literature on Institutional Activism—When 
Activists Hold Power
As Rebecca Abers and Luciana Tatagiba (2014) assert, most of the North Ameri-
can and European literature on social movements ignore the possibility that activ-
ists might work from inside government bureaucracy. The literature on new social 
movements highlights the need for civil society groups to maintain distance from 
the state, not only to ensure their credibility, but also their independence. Civil 
society groups, often formalized as non-government organizations, are expected 
to exert a significant degree of “self-limitation” (Cohen & Arato 1992), especially 
because proximity between bureaucracy and civil society would limit the latter’s 
democratizing and transformative potential (Abers & Tatagiba 2014).
This theory is far from reality. While the majority of the academic literature 
looks at civil society groups as the consultants, contractors or partners of gov-
ernment agencies when implementing policies, it is not rare that governments 
hire activists due to their technical expertise and on-the-ground knowledge. 
 However, as Federico Rossi and Marisa von Bülow (2015) suggest, the tasks of 
these activists are often limited to small-scale projects and they usually have to 
content themselves with making incremental changes while trying to maximize 
the effects of small actions such as a well-placed word in a decree or a training 
manual. Nevertheless, there are several cases of mobilized social movements 
which have successfully influenced or even dictated policy-making. For example, 
a whole generation in Germany were mobilized in the 1960s and 70s following a 
contentious public debate on nuclear energy leading to the establishment of the 
Green party.
8.3 An Ideal Type of Transformation—Policy Pathways …
158 8 Ideal Types—Theoretical Models as Agent of Transformation …
8.3.1.1  Environmental Activism and Democracy
Environmental activism is considered to be a significant force behind deci-
sion-making concerning environment-related issues (see Wapner 1996; Sutton 
2000; Chasek 2006). In general, the academic literature on democracy sees activ-
ism as a major pillar of deliberative or discursive democracy, in which deliber-
ation and consensus is central to decision-making (see Bessette 1980; Gutmann 
& Thompson 2002; Dryzek 2010). In contrast to traditional democracy, delibera-
tive democracy sees authentic deliberation and not merely voting as the primary 
source of the legitimacy of the system. The function of activism is to expand the 
base of public support as it goes beyond partisan politics (Goldberg 2013). Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2002) highlight the importance of the pro-
cess, which not only guarantees fair terms of cooperation for all parties, but also 
the possibility of defection should the outcome of participation be proven to be 
non-reasonable.
The relation between state and civil society is traditionally adversary (see Tilly 
1978, 1985), particularly when civil society groups emerge because of deficien-
cies in and failures of state instruments. Civil society groups are usually engaged 
in “collective challenges” to the political system (see Tarrow 1994). When the 
existing governance proves not to be receptive to the demands of civil society 
groups, these groups tend to resort to coercive means. In deliberative democra-
cies, civil society groups act as participants in the consensus-building process, 
often identifying agendas and providing the technical expertise needed for the 
identification and implementation of solutions.
Environmental activism is regarded as the main driver of the inclusion of 
environmental issues in the political agenda (see Princen & Finger 1994; Wap-
ner 1996; Andresen & Gulbrandsen 2003; Epstein 2005; Dong 2010). For exam-
ple, Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger (1994) suggest that environmental 
NGOs challenge the traditional structure of politics, especially when states are 
reactive to various environmental crises, behaving both as independent negotia-
tors and as agents of social learning. They continue that environmental activism 
identifies the political agenda by linking biophysical conditions to the political 
realm. However, environmental activism is to be differentiated from activism that 
pushes for other issues such as political liberties or gender equality. Civil society 
groups pushing for environmental integrity often enjoy more leeway, especially 
when their demands are in accordance with government policies and when these 
demands do not question governance structures (see Doyle & Simpson A. 2006; 
Sowers 2007; Beeson 2010; Schreurs 2011; Gilley 2012).
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8.3.1.2  Relations Between Activism and Climate Protection—
The Scientific Community as Norm Entrepreneurs?
Environmental activism is key to politicizing environmental issues and to bringing 
them to the political sphere not only at a national but also at a global level. Paul 
Wapner (1996) acknowledges that transnational groups such as Greenpeace, the 
World Wildlife Fund and Friends of the Earth use transnational social, economic 
and cultural networks to politicize environmental issues and mobilize the global 
civic society, aiming not only to alter norms and practices leading to the shifting 
of standards coinciding with the ideals of these groups, but also to define political 
agendas and determine the design of decision-making processes. Pamela Chasek 
(2001) documents how civic society groups have shaped the course of various 
negotiations directly or indirectly when dealing with environmental issues.
Environmental activists have regularly used science to convince policy-makers 
of the need for policies to address the increasing problems posed by environmen-
tal threats (see Eyerman & Jameson 1989; Fogel 2002; Epstein 2005). Environ-
mental activists have identified the increase of public awareness as their main 
strategy to attract the attention of policy-makers (see Chasek 2006; Dong 2010). 
For example, activists have used the results of scientific studies, leading to their 
success in achieving the collective 1982 declaration of an international ban on 
commercial whaling (Aron 2001), ozone depletion (Litfin 1994), transboundary 
movements of hazardous wastes (Kempel 1993), and climate change (Andresen 
& Gulbrandsen 2003). Currently, it seems unimaginable to exclude NGOs and 
other environmental groups from climate change negotiations, given the high 
degree of public interest in and concern for the issues involved (Depledge 2005).
Expanding environmental activism to other issues such as sustainable devel-
opment and energy security is regarded as inevitable, due to the interlinkages of 
these three policy priorities (Mawhinney 2002; Hopwood et al. 2005a; Kalhauge 
et al. 2005; Jabareen 2006). Nevertheless, environmental activism needs to 
expand its existing networks to include those groups whose interests complement 
their own. New alliances may be formalized with “sustainable activism” (see 
Goldin & Winters 1995; Fisher & Green 2004; Berrueta et al. 2015) and “green 
energy activism” (see Fitzpatrick 2014; Mission Innovation 2015), which will 
require prior evaluation of new conflict cleavages among these groups.
When activists are able to hold positions in one of these cooperating agen-
cies, they will be confronted with the need to learn to consider procedures to be 
equally as important as results. The hierarchies, management and bureaucracy of 
different agencies are often diverse as they are defined by institutional memories, 
where the “due process” as coordination requirements may take longer and will 
eventually increase the frustration of activists, paving the way for more motiva-
tion to circumvent these procedures. Fig. 8.3 depicts the transformation process 
with activists predominantly in the driver seat.
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The ideal type of institutional activism in decision-making is summarized as 
follows:
8.3.2  Context: Actors and Issues
The ideal type of institutional activism involves activists who are either elected or 
appointed to government posts, and who are mandated to define and implement 
policy goals. Activists hired in management positions can also be considered to 
be “institutional activists” if they are able to “shift” government policies in the 
direction coinciding with the activists’ advocacies by introducing game-changing 
measures or strategies.
The previous figure (Fig. 8.3) illustrates the union between the “policy” and the 
“politics stream.” In the two first phases of negotiative transformation, the open-
ing of the process and agenda-setting for the negotiation process are dominated by 
institutional activists. In this ideal type, polities such as legal frameworks and other 
bureaucracies can be perceived as adversarial to the policy and politics stream. Stream 
alignment is often implemented with less participation from other institutions.
The union of the policy and politics streams dominates the identification of 
relevant issues. Because specific issues are non-negotiable for institutional activ-
ists, these issues are less receptive to compromise and are often based on ideol-
ogies or normative belief systems. The union between the policy and consensus 
approaches, as a direct consequence of the union between the policies and pol-
itics stream, leads to definition of the role of knowledge as a subordinate posi-
tion. Science ceases to become a partner and becomes arbitrary and merely an 
instrument for legitimacy purposes. While issues are often backed with scientific 
studies, when scientific studies are unable to support arguments or when these 
are adversarial to the activists’ arguments, other sources of legitimacy or methods 
of discrediting policy-makers are sought, such as mass demonstrations or public 
naming, blaming and shaming.
8.3.3  Agency: Structures and Processes
Institutional activists, prior to their government position, often complained 
about the biased structures of decision-making, where powerful actors such as 
 corporations and business groups are able to dominate the process because of the 
resources at their disposal. Policy spheres (e.g., mining policy) are often estab-
lished by dominant actors. Because of the lack of formal channels to effectively 
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express opposition within this “policy sphere”, activists tend to rely on social 
networks to mobilize popular support as leverage. However, now that they are in 
power, institutional activists are ironically taking advantage of the lack of effec-
tive formal channels to express opposition to their own advantage. As such, for-
merly powerful actors now look for other frameworks outside the distinct policy 
sphere to oppose decisions, such as courts or even social networks.
The transformation process in this deviating policy regime tends to circumvent 
existing bureaucracies and procedures for the sake of efficiency and effective-
ness. The transformation process is less likely to be consensus-based. Therefore, 
the system will witness the emergence of new conflicting and highly competitive 
processes. The rhetoric will most likely be aggressive in blaming opposing coun-
terparts, and the possible outcomes will also most likely be perceived as nega-
tive-sum. Instead of looking at potential synergies between the interests of actors, 
strategies will revolve around how the other actors can be disenfranchised, dis-
credited and excluded. Furthermore, the transformation process is understood as 
“linear”, as short-term “set-backs” for the sake of long-term strategies are most 
likely unacceptable.
8.3.4  Audience: Outcomes
Results tend to be the only things that matter for institutional activism. The out-
comes are most likely short-term, as there will most likely be challenges after 
the activists leave office. New elections tend to be perceived as disruptive, as 
they will most likely bring uncertainties and instability. When opposing parties 
win elections, emerging vacuums will most likely define the relations between 
actors. In addition, because the results achieved through institutional activism are 
often reached by ignoring existing procedures, they will be confronted by legal 
and other types of challenges. A high proportion of the resources of institutional 
activists will be needed to address opposition, which may effectively “wear out” 
activists, prompting them to seek more drastic measures. Therefore, the imple-
mentation of these results will be the major hurdles for the institutional activ-
ist. The lack of broader support for policies produced by institutional activists 
increases the costs of transformation. In addition, the outcomes concentrate more 
on issues, rather than changes in the “social contract” or the mechanisms and 
procedures of decision-making. Therefore, the outcomes will most likely fail to 
address existing, biased structures and will therefore produce or reinforce existing 
power asymmetries and inequalities, because the activists need these biased struc-
tures to produce the results they want.
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In this regard, while it is still possible for institutional activism to achieve 
transformation, it is a question of at which cost and at the expense of which actor. 
In addition, renegotiations of isolated terms or provisions are less likely, because 
of the highly competitive nature of the negotiation strategies used to achieve 
the results. New negotiation rounds, if they occur, will most likely encompass a 
default. Because of the high cost of renegotiations of terms, stalemates are most 
likely to occur, which may further delay important decisions to resolve problems.
8.4  An Ideal Type of Transformation—The 
Technocratic/Bureaucratic Policy Pathway
In policy-making in areas related to climate protection, sustainable development 
and energy security in particular, technocratic elements have become integral parts 
of decision-making structures and processes. While there is no concrete claim of 
being a purely ‘technocratic’ regime, current governments of both developed and 
developing countries as well as both democratic and authoritarian regimes have 
recognized the effectiveness of technocrats within their ranks (see McDonnell & 
Valbruzzi 2014; Shelton & Clark 2016; Rohde 2017). This section introduces an 
ideal type of a technocratic policy pathway. In addition, this section assumes that 
technocracy is reflected in the increasing importance of bureaucracies, where on the 
one hand, political decision-making is ‘franchised’ to technical experts and on the 
other hand, working groups such as scientific advisory councils have been tapped to 
assess problematic issues and to come up with solutions, and where politicians will 
most likely follow the ‘recommendations’ made by these ‘expert committees.’
8.4.1  Technocracy and Governance
The academic debate about technocratic types of governance is becoming 
increasingly loud, particularly in policy discussions revolving around  climate 
protection, sustainable development and energy security. The debate has 
evolved from its beginning and is now no longer concerned with technocracy in 
a  classical or utopian sense  where experts directly assume political power for 
the ‘greater good.’ The Platonic idea of philosopher-kings is often regarded as an 
early  version of technocracy, in which the state is governed by those with expert 
knowledge of the ‘good.’ The ‘technocratic narrative’ has elevated the rule of the 
technocrats as one that has some problem-solving capacity and one that is linked 
with modernity (Shelton & Clark 2016).
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Some academic scholars have coupled ‘technocratic’ qualification with profes-
sion or occupation. For example, the qualified minister of health is often regarded 
as someone who should have a medical background. There is then the question of 
how the evolution of a technocrat to a politician and vice-versa can be analyzed. 
When a medical doctor assumes the office of health minister, he or she needs to 
learn the challenges of bargaining interactions.
Technocracy can be found both in democratic and authoritarian regimes. As 
The Economist (2011) suggests, autocracy and technocracy are ‘bedfellows’, as 
authoritarian regimes prefer technocrats to run political offices. The Soviet Union 
is often classified as the first technocratic government. For instance, presidents 
of the Soviet Union often had a technical background in education. In addition, 
in 1986, 89 percent of Politburo members were engineers (Graham 1993 p. 74). 
As industrialization was promoted in the 1930 s, engineers were rapidly promoted 
within the Communist Party. A similar development can also be observed in 
China. Similarly, military regimes often appoint civilian technocrats in govern-
ment positions. Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Hong Kong, are often labelled 
as the ‘best advertisement’ for technocracy, where political and expert compo-
nents of governance have merged completely, particularly through information 
technology (see The Economist 2011).
Several European democratic countries have seen the rise of technocrats as 
leaders, particularly in times of economic crisis. During political crises, techno-
crats are often the preferred ‘compromise’ candidate between competing political 
parties. Technocrats have, for example, assumed leadership during the financial 
crisis in Greece and Italy (see Grundle & Parker 2012), as they were seen as able 
to rise “above the paralyzing political rancor” (Blair 2011). Two bureaucrats—
Mario Monti, an economist, and Lucas Papademos, the former vice-president of 
the European Central Bank—were seen as the ‘saviors’ of these two countries. 
Technocrats are often preferred by markets and international partners over ‘inde-
cisive’ Berufspolitiker (career politicians) as they are able to provide concerted 
answers that political figures are unable to give (see Blair 2011).
While technocratic principles have their own merits, unelected technocrats 
holding political positions are required to ‘evolve’ into politicians as time passes 
by. Jürgen Habermas (2013) in his book ‘Im Sog der Technokratie’ sees democ-
racies with increased technocratic tendencies as weak democracies, as the elite is 
able to identify the quickest means to achieve their interests under the banner of 
efficiency. He continues to argue that technocratic governance structures are less 
receptive to persuasion and bargaining interactions. The European financial cri-
sis has enforced technocratic principles and institutions in solving the crisis that 
many scholars argue was caused or at least promoted by technocrats, who failed 
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to supervise financial institutions. In addition, Jürgen Habermas links the current 
‘political crises’ of the European Union, including Brexit and the emergence of 
alt-right movements, to its technocratic tendencies.
Nevertheless, other academic scholars have argued that technocrats are pri-
marily driven by their cognitive ‘problem-solution mind-sets’ (see Njalsson 
2005), where relevant ideas and decisions are forged not or less by political ide-
ologies, but by how information is assessed and interpreted. As such, technocrats 
are often regarded as being independent of lobbying. However, the absence of 
lobbying can also be ‘undemocratic’, as lobbying does not always need to refer 
to powerful business and industry groups influencing policy-making but can also 
refer to social movements and grass-root organizations aiming to persuade poli-
cy-makers.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, there is a need to clarify the idea that tech-
nocratic features can be observed in both democratic and authoritarian govern-
ments. While technocratic principles can be seen as undermining accountability 
in democratic countries, as these experts may not be elected through a popular 
vote, technical expertise can be a significant legitimizing factor in democracies, 
especially those experiencing a crisis. For example, the constitutional protection 
bestowed upon Central Banks and the judiciary to guarantee independence from 
political interference is an example of the technocratic characteristics of demo-
cratic political systems. Furthermore, in authoritarian states, technocratic prin-
ciples can also be prevalent. With the practical absence of a popular election, 
technical expertise becomes a major criterion for recruitment to political offices 
(see The Economist 2011).
8.4.2  An Ideal Type of Transformation—The Technocratic/
Bureaucratic Policy Pathway
The following illustration (Fig. 8.4) summarizes the various processes of a 
 technocratic policy pathway in the context of transformation. Decision-making is 
initiated solely or predominantly by expert committees, forming the union of the 
policy and polity streams. Other societal actors belonging to the politics stream 
have limited channels to influence decision-making, and in many cases their 
involvement is tolerated only in agenda-setting. Stream alignment is, as expected, 
rather simple and the agendas are not subject to external contestation. Solutions 
are reached through closed-door expert committee meetings and there is the 
 connotation that whatever solutions are produced, these are for the sake of the 
common good (Fig. 8.4).
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8.4.3  Context: Actors and Issues
An elected or appointed politician (e.g., president, prime minister, minister) is 
defined as a technocrat if he or she has, prior to his/her (first) appointment or 
election, never held public office under the banner of a political party or is not 
a formal member of any political party. A technocrat can also be someone who 
is elected through an electoral campaign that emphasized non-political, techni-
cal expertise (e.g., a businessperson, scientist, teacher or athlete). He or she can 
also be appointed upon recognition of non-political expertise that is directly rel-
evant to the role occupied in government (e.g., a military general as minister for 
defense, a doctor as minister of health, or a lawyer as minister for justice) (see 
McDonnell & Valbruzzi 2014).
A significant portion of the population is ‘apolitical’ if not defined by polit-
ically apathy. On the one hand, a technocracy can be the result of this increas-
ing political apathy in the population. On the other hand, political apathy is 
reinforced by technocratic practices, with the public losing channels to influ-
ence policy-making. In addition, social movements that seek to influence the 
policy-making process will most likely employ ‘technocrats’ to represent them. 
Speaking the same language, NGOs that are able to manifest the same technical 
expertise will mostly likely be embedded in the decision-making process.
Relevant issues will most likely be identified, chosen for the agenda, and 
addressed by technocrats both from the policy and polity streams. The politics 
stream assumes a merely ‘responding’ or ‘recipient’ role. The assessment of the 
issues will very likely be conducted using presumed technical methodologies that 
are systematic and perceived to be representative. Conflicts evolving from these 
issues are seen as a matter of differences in methodologies and in the calibration 
of models and projections. Furthermore, issues tend to be de-politicized and are 
often not subjected to political debate, at least not the methodologies. There is an 
understanding that isolating these issues from the political sphere serves the inter-
est of the public, particularly in times of crises.
8.4.4  Agency: Structures and Processes
Technocratic characteristics of decision-making are reflected in the structural 
design of governance. At first glance, the technocratic policy pathway will be 
highly dependent on institutions. The ‘proliferation’ of institutions will most 
likely imply a huge bureaucratic system. Institutions are most likely independent 
from each other, implying dispersed decision-making. Nevertheless, because of 
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the highly formalized nature of governance, institutions will most likely be skep-
tical of engagement in new policy areas. Because interactions between institutions 
are also highly formalized, bargaining interactions are shifted towards back-chan-
nel communications. In addition, bargaining interactions with non-expert social 
groups are limited. In addition, the intersections or cross-cutting features of policy 
areas will require additional institutional mechanisms. Paradoxically, while tech-
nocrats can find quick answers to problems in the short term, in the long-term 
technocrats will most likely accumulate the control over procedures and structures 
to promote the efficiency of the system leading to a ‘fat’ bureaucracy.
A technocratic policy pathway will most likely imply a high level of social 
capital in the short term, as the public will tend to tolerate a lack of inclusiveness 
and transparency for the sake of technical effectiveness. Nevertheless, additional 
legitimizing actions will be needed as this tolerance tends to be short-term and 
challenges will be voiced in the long-run as the ramifications of policies move 
from the collective to the personal level. Without such additional legitimacy, the 
public will ‘feel’ the distance between decisions and society. The technocratic 
‘establishment’ will then be highly criticized as ‘undemocratic.’ Institutional 
interactions are highly formally defined, with clear jurisdictions and mandates of 
government agencies. Unlike the situation in many democratic regimes, there is 
no or very low competition between government agencies.
Communication channels tend to be one-way with the technocratic regime 
merely informing the public about the benefits of decisions that it has made. Per-
suasion and bargaining interactions tend to be highly formalized. Technocratic 
policy pathways are also characterized by ‘dispersed decision-making’ as a result 
of the dynamics of factional politics (see Gilley 2012), as decisions are most likely 
‘bundled’ according to the ‘expert committees’ formed. For example, as health 
issues will be addressed by health experts, there is a tendency that experts on 
energy will not be invited to the health committee. As such, additional processes 
are needed to structure functional interactions between ‘policy issue groups.’
There is limited or low interaction with other societal actors in terms of assess-
ing the ramifications of the solutions proposed. Knowledge diplomacy occurs 
solely within expert committees. At one point, these solutions will be imple-
mented and institutionalized, leading to the new status quo and thus complet-
ing the transformation process. Due to the exclusion of some stakeholders who 
will be affected by such decisions, the regime will need additional resources to 
ensure that these solutions will not be challenged. For some regimes, additional 
 legitimacy will be derived through output legitimacy (performance) or through 
international recognition of their ‘efficient’ structures. For others, the  legitimacy 
of unelected technocrats is achieved through plebiscites or active informa-
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tion campaigns to gain popular support. Other governments resort to ‘quiet’ 
approaches, where solutions are not ‘loudly’ announced through the media.
8.4.5  Audience: Outcomes
The results of expert committee decisions are ‘dispersed’ and highly ‘factional.’ 
Therefore, outcomes of committee deliberations in a technocratic policy path-
way will tend not to be integrative. As there is most likely no competition among 
government institutions and agencies with clear jurisdictions and mandates, addi-
tional measures are most likely needed to make sure that the ‘technical’ deci-
sions made are cohesive. The proximity of decisions made by technocrats to the 
‘sentiments’ of certain members of the society will most likely lead to the rise of 
anti-intellectualism.
8.5  An Ideal Type of Transformation—The Post-
Democratic Policy Pathway
As an ideal type, a post-democratic policy pathway is not a ‘continuation’ or a 
later version of a democratic pathway. Rather, it is a policy pathway that is dem-
ocratic in nature but has some features that are typical of pre-democratic political 
systems (see Crouch 2008). In this ideal type, the role of the finance, business 
and industry sectors refers not only to the involvement of the representatives from 
these sectors in the policy-making processes either as direct appointees or elected 
officials, but also to the installment of market-based principles and a logic in the 
narratives that legitimizes political actions. The emphasis on money and economic 
values in the political goals of policy-makers is a significant deviation from a 
democratic policy pathway, where social, political, cultural, economic and envi-
ronmental interests are of the same rank. As a deviation, there is a need to con-
ceptualize how post-democratic characteristics shift institutional, functional, and 
bargaining interactions in the context of a transformation towards sustainability.
Although there are similarities, post-democratic policy a pathway is differen-
tiated from a technocratic pathway. While a technocratic policy pathway pertains 
to an emphasis on knowledge-based decision-making through technical experts, 
which may also include financial experts, a post-democratic policy pathway 
solely or dominantly employs experts from the financial, business and industry 
sectors. These ‘money’ experts are directly or indirectly mandated to make deci-
sions relevant to non-economic issues.
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8.5.1  Post-Democracy and Institutional Interactions
Post-democracy is a concept that has emerged from protest movements. As the 
European financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 unfolded, there was criti-
cism of how current democratic systems have shifted away from the ‘ideals’ of 
democracy. Post-democracy is labelled as ‘unhealthy’ democracy, where indi-
cators of pre-democratic eras can be recognized without moving back to these 
times. Colin Crouch (2008 p. 13) argues that while democratic institutions are 
still formally unimpaired, political procedures and governments increasingly 
manifest structures typical of pre-democratic times. One of these developments 
refers to the retraction of democratic participatory requirements and the 
replacement of these requirements with outputs and performance. The dis-
crepancy between the formal democratic legitimacy models of governance and 
the political actions increasingly legitimized through efficiency distorts demo-
cratic procedures.
The 2008–2010, the economic and financial crisis in Europe led to new dis-
cussions about institutional deficits in the European economic and financial 
system (see Sell, Friedrich, L. & Sauer 2011; Ullbrich & Lipponer 2011). Most 
authors see the economic and financial crisis in ‘small boxes’, and often ignore 
the ‘spill-overs’ between different policy domains. The analysis of institutional 
interactions occurring between political actors (such as ministers, members of the 
parliament and bureaucrats) and banks as well as the financial service sector has 
led to insights into how democratic principles have been changed or re-defined. 
Particularly because the state is regarded as the guarantor of economic stability, 
deriving its output legitimacy through the level of its economic welfare, the ques-
tion arises as to whether the same state can act as ‘referee’ in the society, where 
social welfare or even climate protection can be undermined by the primacy of 
economic welfare.
Post-democracy is a political science concept that aims to explain how certain 
societal actors are extruded through the dominance of economic actors that leads 
to the establishment of state structures that favor money interests and focus on 
economic values. For example, the erosion of state monitoring and verification 
mechanisms in a post-democratic state is a consequence of the typical devolu-
tion of state functions to private actors, particularly because ‘privatization’ tends 
to be equated with rationalization and efficiency. This development is regarded as 
being a feature of post-democracy, which often leads to a legitimacy crisis. Armin 
Schäfer (2008) argues that trust in the capability of the state decreases, particu-
larly because the privileges given to these economic actors are often translated 
into a decrease of social welfare.
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The following illustration summarizes the interactions of the different 
streams as well as the processes leading to the achievement of the transformation 
(Fig. 8.5).
8.5.2  Context: Actors and Issues
In this ideal type of policy pathway, representatives or proponents of the finance, 
business and industry sectors have been able to establish themselves in the policy 
stream. As various financial actors such as the ‘rating agency’ Moody’s are able 
to use the threats of lowering the solvency ratings of countries to compel political 
actions, governments are most likely to assume the socio-technical and socio-lin-
guistic narratives of these agencies when legitimizing unpopular austerity meas-
ures and other market instruments such as cuts to subsidies to the coal energy 
sector. Particularly in a post-democratic state, governments have become highly 
dependent on loans and investment from the private sector. With a negative rating, 
governments will find it difficult to access loans with acceptable terms. Moreover, 
particularly in times of economic hardships involving deficit-tainted governments 
forced to bail out financial institutions and business or industry companies that 
are too big to fail, austerity measures are expected to be implemented to prevent 
Figure 8.5  The post-democratic policy pathway—an Ideal Type (own representation)
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further negative ratings. These austerity measures tend to limit expenses relating 
to social welfare, further vindicating the dominance of economic actors.
A further characteristic of a post-democratic ideal type refers the state ceasing 
to be the sole holder of monopoly of authority and welfare services, as it has pri-
vatized most of its functions. The state will most likely be concentrating on the 
bureaucracy (polity stream). As the state has privatized most of its functions, pol-
icies are now in the hands of the ‘private sector.’ As ‘bidding’ for the state func-
tions were conducted in an ‘auction’ like process, economic actors would have 
eventually won the biddings. Through the dominance of ‘money actors’ in pol-
icy-making, the state will most likely assume ‘money logic’ in constituting the 
‘rules of the game’ in the bargaining space. As a consequence of privatization, the 
state will be de facto substituted by the private sector, similar to how the Medi-
cis controlled politics in Florence in the 15th century. As dominated by the pri-
vate sector, the state ceases to be the genuine regulator, becoming a player itself 
and leading to further legitimacy crises due to the bias favoring the interests of 
‘money actors.’
A major characteristic of a post-democratic policy pathway is the reduction 
of the functionality of the State to being merely a ‘security instrument’ through 
diverse waves of privatization. Indeed, in some countries, even security services 
have been outsourced to private security companies. As such, a further reduction 
of the quality of democracy is implied, as diminished transparency and unclear 
accountability are to be expected (see Crouch 2008). Nevertheless, not all sec-
tors of social life can be privatized. The state will need to take over sectors that 
cannot yield profits and which no business company is willing to take. This will 
most likely lead to a further erosion of the quality of government services as the 
‘poor’, without a political voice, will be the only remaining direct ‘dependents’ of 
the state (see Hirschmann 1974; Crouch 2008). Following ‘market logic,’ govern-
ment expenses for the poor—who are considered the ‘others’—will be eventually 
reduced over time as these will most likely not yield profits.
Due to the perceived bias of the state, other societal actors (politics stream) 
will most likely be motivated to seek alternative channels outside state mecha-
nisms. While a significant portion of the population will resort to resignation and 
political apathy, others will mostly likely be motivated to use paralegal instru-
ments. As such, societal actors will most likely be perceived and will understand 
themselves as part of ‘protest movements’, stirring further political apathy in the 
population. Issues and agendas for policy-making will be primarily determined 
through economic lobbyism. Because of the access of economic elites to political 
power, political authority lies de facto on the table of the CEOs and directors of 
financial and economic institutions and actors. The lobbyism of economic actors 
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in post-democratic policy pathways is highly effective, because economic elites 
can threaten governments with the idea that policies limiting the activities of eco-
nomic actors will lead to a reduction of employment. In addition, most economic 
actors see lobbyism as an investment, which promises revenues in the future. This 
is part of the logic that investment should only be done in areas where profits can 
be expected, and no longer in areas that serve common good.
Issues will most likely entail ‘horror scenarios’ should governments fail to 
effectively address emerging issues. The importance of actors that are special-
ized in developing such horror scenarios, such as rating agencies and, to a lesser 
degree, industry associations, will most likely be reinforced in post-democratic 
policy pathways. Non-economic issues such as animal protection and human 
rights protection will often be secondary in government decisions. Economic 
sanctions on countries that regularly and systematically violate human rights will 
be harder to legitimize and implement. As such, proponents of these non-eco-
nomic issues will need to find ways to couple these issues with existing economic 
interests. They will need to speak the language of ‘money actors,’ and employ 
the same methodologies, further reinforcing the dominance of market logic in the 
society.
8.5.3  Agency: Structures and Processes
Decision-making in post-democratic pathways are highly dependent on structures 
such as institutions and bureaucracies. The polity stream complements the pol-
icy stream in framing the agenda for further interactions. Nevertheless, in contrast 
to technocratic pathways, jurisdictions and mandates of individual institutions 
are not fully clear and there is a market logic preventing the clear separation of 
powers. As the market logic implies the necessity of ‘healthy’ competition among 
state institutions, institutional interactions will be limited. Due to the privatiza-
tion of most of the public services of the state, the state will most likely have 
low autonomy and low capacity. As it is merely functioning as a regulatory body, 
should the government initiate and pursue more ambitious targets it would need 
more assistance and collaboration from other actors such as the finance, business, 
and industry sectors. The success of government-led programs will be highly 
dependent on how the economic actors will think they will profit from these pro-
grams.
Streams alignment will be more likely structured using practices typically 
used in the finance, business and industry sector. For example, issues that prom-
ise the most economic value will be prioritized over the others that are merely of 
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‘symbolic’ importance. In addition, the methodologies that will be used to assess 
the feasibility of political actions will most likely use monetary, cost-benefit anal-
yses. The tolerable window approach will be de-politicized and commercialized. 
What is acceptable is what brings economic value compared to costs. Maximizing 
benefits with the lowest possible costs will frame political actions. Structures that 
regulate the actions of all stakeholders will be stable, primarily because adhering 
to these rules and regulations will bring more value and not because of equity 
concerns. Cost-benefit calculations will define the effectiveness of structures in 
managing functional interactions. In addition, serving as a basis or criteria for 
rationality, cost-benefit analytical methods will further reinforce the privatization 
or commercialization of public services and welfare. At some point, cost-bene-
fit thinking will define equity as it penetrates all sectors of social life. Bargain-
ing interactions in a post-democratic policy pathway follow the market-driven 
and market-defined frameworks for assessing the feasibility of policies. Consen-
sus-building is exclusive to only the economic value of decisions. Knowledge 
plays a significant role merely in providing inputs on costs and benefits as well as 
risks and opportunities.
Policy-makers in a post-democratic policy pathway will most likely follow the 
approach of ‘system relevance’ or ‘too big to fail.’ Government bail-out programs 
using tax-payers’ money to the finance, business and industry actors will depend 
on how their failure to do so would have fatal consequences for the stability of 
the financial system and the economy. As such, post-democratic pathways will 
most likely require additional legitimizing mechanisms, particularly when profits 
are privatized while risks and losses are socialized. Furthermore, the ‘system rel-
evance’ approach will most likely distort  bargaining interactions, because actors 
such as labor unions and welfare associations, which do not enjoy the status of 
system relevance, will be confronted with an unfair bargaining sphere.
Of equally importance is how the concentration of power within the inner 
ellipsis in the context of a ‘low intensity democracy’ (Kreisky 2002 p. 60) will 
promote the further personalization of politics. Political communication will 
focus more on the people involved as the proximity between the electorates and 
governance structures increases. A further implication involves the increased 
importance of communication channels, such as conventional media and social 
media, in producing ‘positive’, image-building material relating to the policies 
and people behind policy-making. Problematic issues will most likely be solved 
not by looking at the root causes of the problems but through strategic PR activ-
ities. Because governments will be more inclined to keep a positive image, they 
will most likely want to control more of these communication channels, further 
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reinforcing transparency deficits. For example, the highlights of closed-door 
meetings and conferences will no longer be the exchanges of ideas and bargain-
ing interactions, but will tend to be the press conferences (Guehenno 1994).
8.5.4  Audience: Outcomes
Decisions and policies will be less likely the results of bargaining and persua-
sion involving all relevant stakeholders. Moreover, policies will not be developed 
through compromises and collaboration with societal groups but will rather be 
predominantly achieved through direct and indirect interactions between govern-
ment officials and representatives of the finance, business and industry sectors.
Moreover, the privatization of major state services will on the one hand lead 
to dispersed decision-making. On the other hand, outsourcing state services also 
means that governments will simultaneously rely heavily on consultants and 
experts (see Crouch 2008). Dispersed decision-making and factional politics will 
be complemented by a centralized concentration of power to the inner ellipsis of 
decision-makers, further reinforcing transparency deficits.
As the development and implementation of policies in the transformation 
process are exclusive, the outcomes of various bargaining, institutional and 
functional interactions will be mostly fragile in terms of input legitimacy. Never-
theless, as an implication of the assumption of market logic as an indicator of the 
efficiency of performance, the relevance of output legitimacy will surpass that of 
input legitimacy.
Outcomes will be confronted with social distrust. The tendency of govern-
ments to rely heavily on positive image-building (‘branding’) is counterproduc-
tive to promoting social trust. In addition, the political apathy of a significant part 
of the population will be reinforced by governments’ increased control of the 
media, with critical voices easily labelled as enemies of the state.
8.6  Interim Conclusion
The usage of the ideal types as theoretical models of policy-making can be useful 
in analyzing current irritations resulting from contradicting processes. While ideal 
types represent the “ideals” of selected policy regimes, the analysis of the rea-
sons behind deviations in real-life regimes can provide important inputs to allow 
a more grass-roots understanding of decision-making. A comparison between the 
ideal types and the real-life policy models can identify the ‘corridors’ in which 
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transformation can occur. The ideal types uncover the potentials of connecting 
policies with the assumptions made in the previous chapters. For example, it 
could be the case that policy-makers in democratic regimes are generally inclined 
to consult civil society groups. However, the same policy-makers may then pre-
fer to exclude civil society groups, for example, from foreign policies or from 
climate mitigation policies. The attention of the analysis can be directed towards 
understanding how this change of preference arises. For example, these poli-
cy-makers may have learned from their own personal experience that civil society 
groups may be highly competitive when it comes to climate mitigation projects.
In addition, because some experts argue that authoritative or semi-authoritar-
ian governments are also capable or even more capable of achieving success in 
climate protection projects (see Schreurs 2011), some policy-makers in demo-
cratic countries (referred to as “eco-authoritarians”) are currently more willing to 
“sacrifice” inclusion (as a democratic principle) and other democratic principles 
for the sake of efficiency, especially when accountancy is increasingly measured 
by the formal success of economic development plans and external security (see 
Hardin 1968; Heilbroner 1974; Porritt 1984). Nevertheless, other experts argue 
that some authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states can only ‘tolerate’ environ-
mental activism as long as its advocacy is not directed at governmental agencies.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, 
sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you 
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Crea-
tive Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to 
obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
177
Mexico and China—Sustainable,  
Low-Carbon Transformation Processes 
in Democratic and Authoritarian 
Regimes
Mexico and China are two dynamic countries that can ‘challenge’ existing nor-
mative views on regimes, governance, and institutions. On the one hand, Mex-
ico is a vibrant democratic country that has managed to become a member of the 
OECD and its economy has benefitted from open borders, direct foreign invest-
ment inflows and integration into global value chains (OECD 2017b), but yet it 
still reflects governance deficiencies, particularly in the formal and material rep-
resentation of relevant stakeholders, and especially in marginalized communi-
ties. On the other hand, although China is governed by an authoritarian regime, 
particularly when environmental issues are involved, societal groups’ interests 
seem to find effective ways to influence policy-making. In addition, as the Chi-
nese government has discovered the opportunities of integration into global value 
chains, moving into higher value-added production by improving the quality and 
relevance of innovation (OECD 2017a), it is able to achieve the approval of its 
domestic audience, which further consolidates the standing of the Communist 
regime.
Strategically, the Chinese regime was able to ‘link’ this ‘upskilling’ policy 
goal with climate protection and sustainable developmental goals, paving the 
way for the achievement of ‘moral power’, both domestically and internationally, 
and eventually assume global leadership. With certain European countries cur-
rently confronted with financial crisis, austerity measures, and legitimacy gaps, 
a vacuum has emerged, which may derail the climate negotiation process. Such a 
leadership in China will most likely require focusing on a partnership with urban 
clusters or networks of cities (chengshiqun), local societal groups, business and 
investment groups aiming to advance environmental integrity, sustainable devel-
opment and energy security. As it becomes apparent that global leadership is 
becoming a key aspect of Chinese foreign policy, China has increasingly moved 
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into either creating new platforms for global and regional partnerships of devel-
opment such as the Belt and Road as well as the Beijing-Hebei-Tianjin Corridor, 
or reconfiguring the rules of existing international institutions by assuming differ-
ent types of leadership. Nevertheless, as Thomas Hale (2017) highlights, China 
still needs to find new avenues for climate leadership that cater to non-traditional 
channels of diplomatic influence.
Mexico and China are very seldom compared. In this chapter, the Mexi-
co-China comparative case study suggests each are using the other as the ‘alterna-
tive setting.’ Particularly in the context of sustainable, low-carbon transformation, 
such a comparative approach can provide interesting insights, especially when 
‘normative traps’ become evident. For example, the short-comings of democratic 
regimes and the advantages of authoritarian regimes in policy implementation 
are often downplayed, because the success of policy implementation tends to be 
merely defined by input legitimacy. However, an important requirement for such a 
comparison is to initially put aside, at least for analytical purposes, the normative 
lens of democratic and authoritarian regimes. Here, context beats the purported 
logic of policy models. This should not, however, be taken as an argument sup-
porting authoritarian regimes. Understanding how authoritarian regimes are able 
to effectively address specific problem issues of low-carbon transformation can 
contribute useful knowledge to democratic regimes and vice-versa.
Hypotheses: Identifying New Variables and New Interdependencies
Any system transformation is highly contextual. Therefore, as argued in Chap-
ter 7, each case study will most likely lead to the identification of new variables 
and interdependencies or re-discovering old variables that assume new meanings 
or significance, which can be later conceptualized. This approach aims to insti-
gate further theory development.
The following hypotheses intend to highlight the overlaps and deviations 
between the ideal types (chapter 8) and the case studies on China and Mexico.
 Hypothesis 1: The successful implementation of sustainable, low-carbon 
policies is highly contingent on the capacity and autonomy of the state.
Relevant questions include: are democratic regimes more effective than author-
itarian regimes in achieving sustainable, low-carbon developmental pol-
icy goals (policy formulation, coordination, implementation, verification and 
1799.1 Context—Transformation Processes and Governance Models
 modification)? Are hybrid regimes the solution? If yes, which elements of both 
governance models should be selected when designing the regime?
 Hypothesis 2: Both democratic and authoritarian regimes can manage 
transformation processes.
Paradoxically, participative bargaining interactions do not exclusive occur, 
nor are they guaranteed in democratic countries. By understanding how insti-
tutional, functional and bargaining interactions can be planned and executed, 
both  democratic or authoritarian regimes can establish effective transformation 
 management.
 Hypothesis 3: The historicity of transformation processes implies that 
decisions or policies are to be designed and implemented case-by-case or 
point-by-point.
As such, analytical methods that allow the analysis of scales, episodes and sub-
systems are needed. Ideal type analysis suggests additional subjects and addi-
tional ways of analyzing historical, social processes for further research, allowing 
a more integrated approach to problems and solutions.
 Hypothesis 4: The effective management of transformation processes 
requires ‘negotiative’ mechanisms that allow continuous the revisiting of 
decisions made.
By focusing on various negotiation episodes, levels, or stages, the resilience of 
transformation processes can be ensured. Through this, distinct conditions of each 
episode, level or stage can be highlighted, allowing retrofitted solutions.
9.1  Context—Transformation Processes 
and Governance Models
The evaluation of the state of sustainable, low-carbon transformation in Mexico 
and China entails a participatory approach through which the different levels and 
scales of the ‘involvement’ of relevant stakeholders will be highlighted.
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9.1.1  The Paris Agreement and Responses from Mexico 
and China
9.1.1.1  Mexico
Ahead of the UNFCCC COP meeting in Paris in December 2015, Mexico had 
already ratified the agreement in March 2015. Mexico was also the first develop-
ing country to submit a climate pledge to the 2015 COP meeting. By doing so, 
the Mexican government had officially committed to meet its climate goals by 
upscaling its ‘Intended Nationally Determined Contribution’ (INDC) from mere 
intentions to formal policy goals (see Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 2017). 
Mexico understands itself as a major climate champion while its government 
aims to achieve the following:
• Unconditionally reducing GHG emissions by 22 percent and black carbon by 
51 percent of business-as-usual levels by 2030. With assistance, the govern-
ment aims to increase these reductions by 36 percent (GHG) and 70 percent 
(black carbon).
• Conditionally reducing GHG and black carbon emissions (35 percent and 70 
percent respectively), contingent on international support.
• Achieving peak net emissions from 2026 and reducing emissions per unit of 
GDP by around 40 percent from 2013 to 2030.
• Reducing emission intensity per unit of GDP by 40 percent between 2013 and 
2030.
• Committing to various adaptation measures to lessen the vulnerability of local 
communities to climate change and to ameliorate climate impacts on ecosys-
tems, infrastructure and productive systems. In addition, the Mexican govern-
ment commits to achieving zero percent deforestation by 2030.
To achieve these goals, Mexico introduced a major new policy on clean energy 
through the ‘Energy Transition Law’. With the energy sector responsible for 
70.8 percent of Mexico’s GHG emissions (Climate Links 2017), this new policy 
envisions generating at least 25 percent of its electricity through clean energy by 
2018, 30 percent by 2021, and 35 percent by 2024. Nevertheless, even though 
many of new reforms in Mexico call for sustainable development and climate 
protection, many policies still favor the fossil fuels sector. In 2015, petroleum 
and natural gas accounted for most of Mexico’s total fuel consumption for trans-
portation and electricity generation, at 45 percent and 40 percent respectively 
(EIA 2016a). This is because the energy sector (electricity and hydrocarbons) 
is generally open to private investment, which tend to favor the exploration and 
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 exploitation of shale gas as a key goal. Therefore, as the Special Program of Cli-
mate Change of the Mexican government (PECC) recognizes, energy reform 
and the exploitation of shale gas in Mexico could actually lead to an increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions, which means that the reform would actually go against 
the national climate commitment (Energy Transition 2014).
In addition, the Energy Transition Law still needs to be complemented by 
additional knowledge of the impacts of targets that are yet to be quantified. Fur-
thermore, because this law assumes a definition of clean energy that includes 
co-generation, which means natural gas—a CO2 emitting source of energy—will 
be playing a crucial role, doubts among the scientific community have emerged 
(Climate Action Tracker 2017b). The consumption of natural gas now accounts 
for 23.6% of fossil-fuel CO2 emissions (see Boden et al. 2017; CDIAC 2017). 
For example, this could mean that the emissions will be 6 percent higher in 2030 
and that the share of renewables in 2024 will be merely 29 percent. Therefore, 
Mexico will need to commit to additional policies in order to reach its NDC 
 target.
9.1.1.2  China
China ratified the Paris Agreement on September 3, 2016. The Chinese govern-
ment has identified and centered its policies on reaching its NDC goals. Some 
important elements of its NDC include:
• Peak CO2 emissions by 2030, or earlier if possible;
• The reduction of the carbon intensity of its GDP by 60 to 65 percent below 
2005 levels by 2030
• An increase of the share of non-fossil energy sources in the total primary 
energy supply to around 20 percent by 2030
• An Increase of the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters (40 
million hectares of forest coverage) by 2020 compared to 2005 levels
Nevertheless, while the policies and intended actions of the Chinese government 
could be adequate to enable China to overachieve its NDC as well as its national 
targets, the Chinese NDC is seen as not ambitious enough to be consistent with 
holding warming to below 2 °C as required under the Paris Agreement, and is 
instead consistent with warming between 3 °C and 4 °C (Climate Action Tracker 
2017a). However, while China is currently the biggest source of CO2 emissions 
with around 30 percent, followed by the United States with 15 percent (Boden 
et al. 2017), it cannot be blamed alone for this failure to achieve the global 2 °C 
target. China’s emissions are merely half of U.S. emissions on a per capita basis. 
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In addition, most of China’s emissions are attributed to manufactured goods 
exported to the United States and other European countries. Moreover, based on 
historical CO2 emissions, U.S. climate-damage responsibility is twice as much 
of that of China, even without normalizing for population. Most importantly, 
China’s emissions have been stabilized and have now been constant over the last 
three years (Carbon Tax Center 2017).
When the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China initiated 
the concept of ‘eco-civilization’ as a new model of the modernization of har-
monious human-nature development, it sets the new framework for present and 
future strategies on planning to conform to the world trend. China has already 
built the world’s biggest installed capacity of wind and solar power, and its cli-
mate policies are embedded in its current five-year economic plan. With China’s 
slowing economic growth, the Chinese government has identified the potentials 
of expanding its dominance in low-carbon technologies, which can serve as the 
engine of the next phase of its economic growth. In 2016, China invested USD 
102.9 billion in renewable energy and installed half of the world’s new wind 
power, as its coal consumption has peaked and has begun to decline.
9.1.2  Multiple Entry Points to Climate Mitigation 
in Mexico and China
Entry points can be understood as problem-issues related to other policy priori-
ties such as sustainable development and energy security, whose resolution can 
be coupled with climate mitigation, that is, with emission reduction through 
renewables or through energy efficiency technologies. By focusing on synergies 
and co-benefits, policy-makers might find it easier to push for more ambitious cli-
mate protection policies. Sustainable development goals can be coupled with cli-
mate protection goals particularly after trade-offs between these policy goals and 
policy implementation measures can be identified and managed.
The entry points that will be discussed below do not comprise a complete 
list of all entry points to climate mitigation in Mexico and China. This selection 
intends to highlight the most relevant as underscored by the theoretical models 
(ideal types).
9.1.2.1  Mexico
There are various entry points to climate mitigation for Mexico. A potential entry 
point to climate mitigation for the Mexican government is its political priority of 
addressing the social and economic impacts of migration to the country. As 
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extreme weather events cause economic damage, climate change increases the 
probability that Mexicans migrate to the United States and from rural to urban 
areas within Mexico (see Jessoe et al. 2016). The effects of climate change, such 
as water scarcity, diseases, food scarcity and rising sea levels, induce the increas-
ing rates of internal and external migration, which are becoming more of an eco-
nomic and political concern in terms of both the origins and the destinations (see 
Nawrotzki et al. 2015), climate mitigation needs to be a central element of any 
policy that aims to address migration. Nevertheless, as the effects of Mexico’s cli-
mate mitigation efforts cannot be easily converted to concrete outcomes in the 
affected areas (e.g., observable resolution of water scarcity), Mexico’s climate 
mitigation efforts need to be accompanied by short-term successes in terms 
of containing migration.
One example of such coupling of climate mitigation and addressing migration 
is to ensure local community development, particularly in areas where renew-
able energies such as wind, geothermal and solar are developed and expanded. 
Renewable energy projects in rural areas should be reliable sources of both high- 
and low-skilled jobs. The promotion of intelligent growth in rural Mexico, for 
example through geothermal energy, needs to be driven by innovation and 
by the expansion of value chains in the context of community development, 
gender equality, empowerment of indigenous communities, social innova-
tion, youth empowerment and innovative entrepreneurship. Furthermore, 
 renewable projects in rural areas need to be accompanied by the development of 
local infrastructure and expertise in order to build new capacities while reversing 
emigration. A huge challenge for various renewable projects (e.g., Mareñas Ren-
ovables in Oaxaca) is to address the situation that most workers in such areas are 
fishermen or farmers who will most likely be negatively affected by such projects 
(e.g., noise, water and air pollution leading to less catches or less agricultural 
yields). Therefore, the creation of knowledge-intensive sectors and services 
needs to be equally beneficial for other sectors (e.g., agriculture).
The sustainability of economic development processes based on the utilization 
of renewable energies in Mexico depends not only the Large and Multinational 
Companies (MNEs), but to a large extent on the incorporation of local traditional 
partners in this process—the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). Cli-
mate mitigation projects need to initiate not only national and regional, but also 
local value creation by fostering the role of renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency technologies in creating new market opportunities and the promotion of 
technology-based entrepreneurship with a focus on SMEs.
To avoid the traps of natural resource abundancy (the ‘resource curse’, or the 
‘paradox of plenty’), local economic development strategies need to utilize the 
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energy project as an entry point to support new knowledge-intensive businesses, 
thereby upgrading the local economy in terms of capabilities and knowledge. Its 
focus is on the development of Technology-Intensive Suppliers (TIS), character-
ized by skilled activities such as manufacturing specialized machinery & pro-
duction inputs and knowledge-intensive services. For instance, the utilization of 
geothermal energy in Mexico can open diverse new opportunities as well as chal-
lenges for SMEs, as specialized supplies and expertise in automation, precision, 
and scientific instruments, among others, are needed. Supporting the local supply 
of these goods and services avoids development in the form of enclaves, which 
export much of the production and import key inputs, capital goods and special-
ized services. In order to support this process, the project will actively promote, 
guide, and sustain the development of competitive new business models arising 
out of the energy project.
Another point of entry to climate mitigation in Mexico is the promotion of 
social cohesion by recognizing the importance of integrating societal groups into 
the value chain, preventing future conflicts that could delay mitigation projects. 
Social cohesion, or the lack thereof, has been a huge deficit in Mexico’s demo-
cratic system, where the political elite has often pursued a top-down approach in 
policy-making, resulting in civil society groups concentrating more on govern-
ance issues rather than other important issues such as environmental protection 
and sustainable development. The participation of civil society groups can not 
only ensure a high level of public acceptance of renewable energies and the elim-
ination of caveats against behavioral change, it can also promote evidence-based 
debates, which can further contribute to the maturity of technologies. Understand-
ing the social ramifications of renewable energy technologies can help improve 
these technologies.
In addition, promoting gender equality can be a significant entry point to 
climate mitigation. The studies and investigations on gender elaborate upon the 
perspective of gender in analyzing how organizations and society produce ine-
qualities through social positioning based on gender. Gender inequality is 
therefore an indicator of structures that produce various types of imbalances. 
Addressing and correcting gender inequality will most likely produce synergies 
and co-benefits that will resolve other types of imbalances. Masculinity and fem-
ininity are understood as cultural and social constructs through which society is 
organized and through which symbolical differences are defined. The category 
‘gender’ fulfils the function of manifesting mechanisms and dispositions which 
create and reproduce spaces for the subordination, discrimination and mar-
ginalization of women in societies (see Kreisky 1979; 2008). The rationale for 
addressing the issue of gender equality and gender mainstreaming in research 
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and innovation revolves around the principles of non-discrimination and equality, 
efficiency and competitiveness, preventing the waste the talent and potential con-
tributions of highly educated women, increasing innovation potential and ensur-
ing the conduct of socially responsible and accountable research and innovation 
through the integration of sex/gender analysis. Furthermore, integration of the 
gender dimension creates new ideas and opportunities for innovation. Thus, gen-
der diversity and the consideration of the gender dimension in research content 
has a direct effect on improving scientific quality, social responsibility, and the 
robustness of research and innovation.
9.1.2.2  China
China has numerous entry points to climate mitigation. A major entry point to 
climate mitigation refers to China’s efforts to sustain and enhance its global 
economic competitiveness, which legitimizes the current political regime. The 
Chinese government understood that from the examples of South Korea and 
Japan, its next phase of economic development involves a significant upgrade 
in its capacity to produce advanced and higher-value technologies, where China 
is able to own intellectual property rights. In addition, while there is still some 
resistance to its low-carbon energy transformation, traditional energy compa-
nies in China have fewer political resources to obstruct low-carbon policies. As 
such, these companies often pursue a pragmatic approach by cooperating with 
authorities and supporting policies that pose constraints to their own business 
interests. This is another entry point to climate mitigation in China, where the 
political system limits dissent and fosters a political culture where authorities 
are ‘trusted.’ Whether this trust is based on decades of propaganda through state 
controlled media, on collective narratives about the ‘incorruptible’ leaders (Hsu 
2001), or on the persecution of dissenting voices is at this point a subject of a 
separate debate.
After a political crisis in the 1980s where intellectuals were able to draw upon 
the traditionalist collective narrative of corruption to blame the communist leader-
ship for social problems, the Chinese government and the state-controlled media 
revised the narratives of corruption. In the 1990s, the role of the state was then 
no longer understood as a moral or ideological leader, but as that of an economic 
manager. As Hsu (2001) argues, Chinese leadership managed not only to control 
the corruption crisis, but it also found an effective channel for ensuring political 
legitimacy through the narrative “economic prosperity.” With the slowing eco-
nomic growth in China, the leadership has become more open to new policies 
that could sustain the very economic growth that legitimizes the current political 
order.
9.1 Context—Transformation Processes and Governance Models
186 9 Mexico and China—Sustainable, Low-Carbon…
Another major entry point for climate mitigation is the coupling of emis-
sion reduction with the recognition of the social, economic and health 
impacts of environmental degradation, especially of air pollution (see Cao 
2018; Trombetta 2019). Finally, shortly before and during the Beijing Olympic 
games, the Chinese leadership recognized the environmental effects of three dec-
ades of an economic growth that builds on high-carbon energy technologies. The 
social, economic and health impacts of air pollution in major cities, the loss of bio-
diversity, the water crisis, and soil contamination have created a sense of political 
urgency. These impacts of environmental degradation, as well as the impacts of cli-
mate change (extreme weather events and floods) are seen as threats to economic 
well-being. This urgency has opened another entry point for climate mitigation, 
paving way for the Xi Jinping administration (2013 to present) to adopt “ecologi-
cal civilization” as a political vision. This vision was translated into actions includ-
ing the restoration of decimated forests, efforts to stop the expansion of the Gobi 
Desert, the promotion of electric mobility, and eco-friendly urbanization. The most 
recent plan to realize this vision is the 4,500 km long ‘Green Wall of China’ or the 
‘Three-North-Shelterbelt Program’ which is a huge ring of newly planted forests. 
This program, which was conceptualized as early as 2001, is planned to be com-
pleted by 2050 and aims to stabilize the soil, retain moisture and act as a buffer 
against further desertification (see BBC News 2001; Petri 2017).
9.2  Case Study: The Agency of Transformation 
Process in Mexico—Gaps in the Discursive 
Function of Governance
Some of the main challenges and barriers to Mexico’s low-carbon transforma-
tion are defined by the dilemma of the self-fulfilling prophecy, whereas Mexico’s 
current efforts, which are already perceived by Mexico as highly ambitious, are 
assessed as not enough to allow the country to achieve its NDC. This dilemma 
can be categorized as a structural barrier, as it limits the set of possible future 
actions. Particularly because Mexico’s targets as concretized by its NDC are not 
consistent with limiting warming to below 2 °C, let alone with the Paris Agree-
ment’s stronger 1.5 °C limit, additional perspectives are needed. The Climate 
Action Tracker evaluates Mexico’s current pledges. While Mexico has pledged to 
reduce its GHG emissions by 22 percent below baseline in 2030, equivalent to 
an increase of emissions by 56 percent above 1990 levels, the long-term path-
way (red dashed lines) from 2030 to 2050 is simply, according to current knowl-
edge, not attainable. Therefore, there is a need to conceptualize strategies that can 
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be isolated from the anchors set by the knowledge that Mexico’s efforts are not 
enough to attain the 2 °C goal.
Another challenge for Mexico’s low-carbon transformation is to increase the 
clarity of strategies for reducing emissions in key sectors, particularly electricity 
and transportation. There is consensus in the policy, polity and politics sides that 
Mexico has the potential to move rapidly towards a low carbon future (ESMAP 
2016). Although Mexico is a significant oil producer, it seeks to develop its vast 
potentials on renewable energies including geothermal, bioenergy, solar, and 
wind, because of steadily decreasing oil production since 2005. Nevertheless, 
Mexico still has a long way to go before it can depart from its dependence on fos-
sil fuels, which constituted a total of 93 percent of the total energy consumption 
in 2015 (EIA 2016b).
With this background, low-carbon transformation in the country will require 
scenarios that provide fossil fuels with a bridging role to assure a bearable tran-
sition. New constitutional and policy reforms were already introduced by the 
government to promote transition, through diversification of the energy portfo-
lio including tax reform, the liberalization of electricity supply, and ending the 
monopoly of the state-owned Petroleós Mexicanos (PEMEX). However, the vola-
tility of world oil prices inhibits clear decisions, as the government might reverse 
some of its reforms when oil prices increase. Therefore, new arguments aside 
from low oil prices should be found as to why the development of renewable 
energies should be further expanded.
The current efforts of the government to achieve low-carbon economic devel-
opment are defined by the country’s national development policy as outlined in 
the “Estrategia Nacional de Cambio Climático—Visión 10-20-40” (National Cli-
mate Change Strategy) (SEMARNAT 2013). The national strategy is based on 
a study that encompasses various scenarios of emission reduction. The World 
Bank, in collaboration with the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program 
(ESMAP), conducted the study “Mexico-Estudio Sobre la Dismínución de Emi-
siones de Carbon” for the Mexican government. The study assesses the poten-
tial for GHG reduction in Mexico in the next few decades. The main objective of 
the national strategy is to allow the country to significantly reduce it GHG emis-
sions without hindering economic growth (ESMAP 2016). This principle mainly 
defines the tolerable window for Mexico’s low-carbon economic development. 
Present and future decisions are required to follow this principle.
Based on this national strategy of the government, five principal sectors have 
been identified, indirectly identifying the different actors that need to be part of 
the negotiations—electric power (e.g., electricity utilities, transmission line pro-
viders), oil and gas (e.g., oil importers and suppliers, refineries, distributors), 
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energy end-use (e.g. manufacturing and construction industries, residential, com-
mercial and public sectors), transport (e.g., road transportation companies), and 
agriculture and forestry (e.g., crop and timer producers, forest land managers 
and biomass energy producers). Aside from the evident actors, societal groups, 
including indigenous communities, the urban poor, farmers and fishers, will want 
to participate in all decision-making processes, as their livelihood, culture, and 
self-determination will be affected by any changes made in these five sectors. The 
concrete roles of these actors are, however, not explicitly discussed in government 
policy papers. In addition, there is no clear reference to formal procedures that 
would allow stakeholders to be fully integrated into the formal decision-making 
process.
Low-carbon transformation in Mexico requires ‘strong’ and strategic policies. 
However, it is argued by this book that Mexico needs to complement these ambi-
tious energy, climate protection, and sustainable policies with reforms of its gov-
ernance system, particularly how state institutions should function as a nexus of 
social integration. As it will be discussed in this section, democratic structures in 
Mexico further conflate various conflicts, with challenges to climate protection 
merging with governance issues, further increasing the complexity of low-carbon 
transformation. As many conflict cases involving renewable energy projects in 
Mexico suggest (e.g., wind power in Oaxaca), it will most likely make no dif-
ference whether Mexico will be successful in designing policies that will make 
it achieve its NDC or not, as in both cases these policies will lack legitimacy, 
as they often do not carry social acceptance, particularly in local communities. 
Without this social acceptance, the ambitious climate protection policies of 
the central government will be initially framed and defined as intrusion.
9.2.1  Analysis between the Ideal Type and the Empirical 
Case Study of Mexico—Causal Mechanisms 
through Congruence Methods and Process-Tracing
Chapter 8 has introduced the democratic policy pathway as an ideal type of trans-
formation. The following are the most relevant provisions of this ideal type in the 
context of transformation towards sustainability:
• The competitive advantage of political actors in democratic countries is 
defined by how it can manage to align their political interests with public opin-
ion or how these political actors can shape public opinion.
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• Universities and other academic institutions play a significant role in providing 
‘public space’ where various societal groups can meet and exchange perspec-
tives.
• Consensus-building mechanisms have the purpose of defining consensual 
knowledge.
• The government agenda on low-carbon transformation is significantly defined 
by the ideological preferences of the political party in power, which determine 
the feasibility of technology options and other viable alternatives in achieving 
the policy goals.
• Institutions are responsible for the monitoring, evaluation and verification of 
government actions.
• Politics is dynamic and is defined by power relations between actors
• Existing polities serve as formal and material frameworks that allows weaker 
parties to cope with asymmetrical relations
• Polities review how new policies are in accordance with the existing rules of 
the game while evaluating the resilience of the system.
• While the government may set the limits of what is politically acceptable 
through guard-rails that exclude intolerable impacts to both the issues involved 
and the instruments chosen to address these issues, the same government 
needs to adhere to these limits.
• The transition process and the transformed stage need to accommodate calls 
for re-negotiations through pre-defined measures.
The next step pertains to the enumeration and analysis of the deviations, where 
theoretical and empirical explanations to these deviations will be introduced. 
These explanations will focus on causal mechanisms.
 Democratic structures conflate various conflicts, delaying the sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation process.
One major deviation of the Mexican transformation process from the ideal type 
is that Mexico’s democratic structures actually conflate various conflicts. For 
example, with climate protection policies reduced to mere questions of ‘govern-
ance,’ the effective implementation of climate protection policies will be con-
tingent on how deficiencies of governance are effectively addressed. While the 
climate agenda can be defined by the ideological preferences of the political party 
or administration in power, with the conflation of various conflicts, the feasibility 
of technology options to achieve low-carbon transformation is no longer defined 
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by the ideological preferences of the ruling political actor vis-à-vis low-carbon 
transformation, but rather by its ideological preferences on governance. This 
delays the sustainable, low-carbon transformation process.
This deviation can be explained by how the state monopolizes the pub-
lic sphere. Compared to the provision of the ideal type, which suggests that the 
competitive advantage of political actors in democratic countries is defined by 
how they can manage to align their political interests with public opinion, or how 
these political actors can shape public opinion, the political elite in Mexico is able 
to profit from unequal, old practices and traditions based on dependence, such as 
clientelism, corporatism, and patrimonialism, which further reinforces legitimacy 
gaps, as political actors have a high degree of structural autonomy from the soci-
ety (see Olvera 1997). Furthermore, the concomitant absence of operative legal 
institutions as well as the limited public space for normative political discussions 
further contribute to the state’s monopoly of the public sphere, which motivates 
the ‘over-politicization’ of specific issues (including climate protection and sus-
tainable development) in order to maintain state control.
Mexico’s capacity to host representative public discourse is yet to be devel-
oped in a way that is inclusive and that moves away from the center-periphery 
structure of decision-making (see Aguilera Portales & Gonzáles Cruz 2010). The 
current lack of opportunity to participate and express interests in forums is seen 
to increase and further justify violence towards politicians, which further moti-
vates politicians to defer consultations. Mexican civil society faces various dif-
ficulties inhibiting their full participation in decision-making (Aguilera Portales 
2010; Aguilera Portales & Sánchez Garcia 2010). Alberto Olvera (1997) argues 
that the unstable character of a civil society composed of social movements with-
out, or with limited, operative civil, political, and social rights and capacities limit 
any type of transformation process. These difficulties are perceived to have roots 
in the colonial period, where a small but powerful elite was successful in politi-
cally, socially, and economically disenfranchising the majority of the population 
by completely insulating itself from societal influences. While local communities 
are usually able to influence local decisions, several decisions made in the capi-
tal city, especially those involving international partners including multinational 
companies, are often already finalized in closed-door meetings without prior con-
sultation at the local level. These decisions often face resistance, further politi-
cizing issues. This can be regarded as the result of Mexico’s complex, segregated 
and decentralized policy processes, whereas the coordination and fusion of pub-
lic and private resources are still controlled by the federal government, especially 
when these resources are provided by donors from abroad. Particularly when 
international projects follow a strict time schedule, the lengthy process of con-
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sultation at various levels will most likely motivate policy-makers to skip tedious 
consultations.
 Relevant stakeholders, particularly in the civil society, are unable to partic-
ipate in the consensus-building process, because they are unable to influ-
ence the definition of consensual knowledge.
The ideal type of democratic policy model denotes a highly educated and 
informed civil society that is capable of understanding and defining problems 
and their technical aspects, identifying relevant agendas, and assessing the effec-
tiveness of proposed solutions. As Mexico needs to come up with a clear plan 
to implement its transition from fossil fuels to renewable energies through robust 
policies and regulations, the government needs to mobilize local partners, which 
include social groups, to enable rapid deployment of policies. For the civil soci-
ety to be able to identify and assess the social and environmental impacts of the 
implementation of policies, it requires the opportunity to contribute to consensual 
knowledge.
In Mexico, a significant vacuum in the technical expertise of its civil soci-
ety representatives is seen as a major hindrance to including them in technical 
consultations (Aguilera Portales 2011). Without a proper understanding of the 
technical issues involved, their potential participation in any type of knowledge 
diplomacy (see chapter 5) is merely “rhetorical” and is therefore not expected to 
yield constructive discussions and solutions, which further motivates the political 
elite to exclude them. In addition, the ideal type entails that all decisions made 
by policy-makers are happen after consultation with societal groups in a self-evi-
dent manner. Deviation from the conditions of this ideal type can be explained in 
various ways. One possible explanation is that organizing consultation processes 
is dependent on existing networks. As a network, stakeholders have already been 
identified and cooperation is self-evident. Similar to many countries in Latin 
America, advocacy by non-governmental organizations in Mexico is usually con-
noted as opposition to state actions, which are often seen as lacking transparency 
and political accountability (Aguilera Portales & Gonzáles Cruz 2010). With this 
background, Mexican societal groups are distrustful of cooperation with per-
ceived authoritarian state agencies (Franco et al. 2010; Natal et al. 2010; Martín-
ez-Cárdenas et al. 2015). This manifests as the reality that social capital is yet 
to be strengthened in Mexico. High social capital means state agencies can be 
trusted to pursue the interests of society even when these interests contrast with 
their own personal interests.
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Mexican civic society initially mobilized the broader society in the 1980s 
to form urban social movements, and continued in 1990s to demand transpar-
ent political processes and political accountability following the electoral fraud 
in 1988 (see Fox & Hernandez 1992; Aguayo Quezada & Parra Rosales 1997). 
This mobilization was highly repressed by the federal and state governments, as 
it was seen as a threat to the political stability of the country. From that point 
to the present, the attention and resources of Mexican civil society has been 
primarily directed towards good governance (see Feinberg et al. 2006). Envi-
ronmental issues that affect various parts of society are more often addressed 
as merely a question of political governance, particularly regarding the politi-
cal inclusion of marginalized sectors of society. Here arise various missed 
opportunities, both for Mexican civil society and policy-makers. For example, 
the resistance of indigenous communities to the wind farm project of Mareña 
Renovables in Oaxaca is merely seen as a political conflict, with the indigenous 
opposition not allowing any talks, taking the attention of the debate away from 
the concrete environmental and livelihood problems arising from the project (see 
McGovern 2014).
Another deviation of Mexico from the ideal type pertains to the lack of 
self-evident relationships between policy-makers and epistemic communities, 
between policy-makers and advocacy groups, and between epistemic commu-
nities and advocacy groups. The National Strategy refers to the potential role 
of civil society groups and of the research community. However, it is not clear 
whether all relevant civil society groups were involved in any form of the con-
sultation process when drafting this national strategy or when writing the back-
ground paper through the World Bank. Low-carbon economy development in 
Mexico will affect all aspects of human life, from land use change to livelihood, 
from forms of housing to transportation. Therefore, the national strategy should 
also define consultation processes with both civil society groups and epistemic 
communities.
 The history of Mexico ‘disqualifies’ presumed hosts or facilitators of public 
discourse
As identified by the ideal type, universities and other academic institutions can 
play a significant role in providing a ‘public space’ where various societal groups 
can meet and exchange perspectives. Universities and other academic institu-
tions are often chosen as venues of public debate as they symbolize objectivity 
and neutrality. In several European countries, public discourse is often hosted by 
such institutions. In other countries like the Philippines and Thailand, the church 
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often provides ‘venues’ or actively facilitates dialogues between conflict groups. 
Historically, however, both universities and the church are not seen as suitable 
and credible facilitators in Mexico. The Revolution of 1910, where the Catholic 
Church in Mexico served as one of the hallmark supporters of the dictatorship of 
Porfirio Diaz, reminds social movements that the Catholic Church is a force of 
the right and that it only pursues its own interest (see Quirk 1973). In the same 
manner, universities have traditionally played the role of (left) opposition to the 
government (see Lorey 1993). With this background, looking back at the ideal 
type diagram, the public consensus approach still needs to be developed in Mex-
ico.
This case study on Mexico is not a comprehensive analysis of the transforma-
tion process of Mexico. Using the ideal type, relevant questions can be formu-
lated that could be subjects of further studies.
9.3  Case Study: The Agency of Transformation 
Process in China—State-Guided Transition 
Management
China’s sustainable, low-carbon transformation has profited from past decisions 
made by the Chinese leadership, whose primary interest of maintaining the polit-
ical legitimacy of its authoritarian regime has proven to have produced favorable 
conditions for China’s low-carbon transformation. China’s reforms and drive to 
open up have catalyzed a series of transformations in their society, economy and 
politics (Haifeng 2014). Unlike in democratic regimes, where governments often 
think that they can rely on the electoral process alone for legitimacy, authoritar-
ian regimes depend on other means of legitimacy. After decades of seeing climate 
protection as something that undermines its economic development, or that emis-
sions are merely a matter of international diplomacy rather than environmental 
sustainability (see Aden & Sinton 2006), China has begun to play a prominent 
role in reaching the Paris Agreement. With this shift in behavior, the Chinese 
leadership has finally acknowledged that by joining the global trend of low-car-
bon transition, it can further expand its political legitimacy (see Cao 2018).
Surprisingly, this change in China’s behavior is made possible by its earlier 
decisions, which serve as necessary components of policy changes. For example, 
by changing its national development strategy in 2002, prioritizing economic effi-
ciency between 1992–2002 by reforming its welfare policies, and by opting to 
prioritize economic efficiency while giving consideration to fairness (Li 2013), 
policies that aim to promote sustainable development and climate protection that 
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were often perceived as undermining economic growth are now getting the atten-
tion of reformers. China’s high economic growth was not translated into a ‘trickle 
down’ of wealth to a huge portion of the population, as income inequality has 
continuously increased, leading to popular unrest. The SARS crisis in 2003 fur-
ther motivated the government and the urban Chinese population to expand its 
welfare system as the negative externalities of unaffordable healthcare became 
visible (Li 2013).
Additional concerns have emerged as the pace of China’s economic growth, in 
terms of real growth of GDP, has slowed down since 2007 (from 14.2 percent in 
2007, to 9.4 percent in 2009, to 7.9 percent in 2012, to 6.7 percent in 2016) (NBS 
2017). In light of the 2007 financial crisis and the threat of economic recession in 
China, the Chinese leadership recognized the necessity of restructuring the econ-
omy to reduce dependency on exports and boost domestic demand. To achieve 
this, a whole range of policies have been designed and implemented that aim to 
support economic growth while at the same time producing benefits to social 
welfare (Li 2013). Massive investments were executed, including in the transport 
network and urban power supply. It can be argued that this massive investment 
in the transportation sector has subsequently promoted modes of transportation 
that are run by electricity. After almost ten years of investment and the upgrade 
of infrastructures, policies and decisions from that point on have tended to favor 
renewable energies, because renewables are, with the availability of appropriate 
infrastructures, more attractive than fossil fuels. The modernization of the urban 
power supply to major Chinese cities has defined a stable and promising domestic 
energy demand, which increasingly prefers renewable energies.
In addition, with the slowing of the GDP, the Chinese leadership has accepted 
the need of gradually defining economic growth with industrial quality and effi-
ciency promotion to accelerate the adjustment of economic structures leading to 
the shift from a factor- and investment-driven economy into an innovation-driven 
one (He 2016). With huge investment and upgrades already having been con-
ducted more than ten years ago, China is now determined to actively promote the 
transformation of its economic development pattern, its supply-side structural 
reform of the energy system, and its domestic consumption behavior to achieve 
a sustainable, low-carbon system while building and further expanding upon its 
core competitiveness. Moreover, the central government seeks to address the 
over-capacity practices of high-energy consuming industries (He 2016).
China is expected to overachieve the CO2 reduction goals in its NDC, as 
well as its own national targets. China’s CO2 emissions may have peaked more 
than ten years ahead of its Paris Agreement commitment of hitting its peak CO2 
emissions before 2030. Around 2020, the terminal energy consumption and CO2 
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emissions from the industrial sector are expected to peak. Nevertheless, as the 
following figure illustrates, its NDC is not ambitious enough to be consistent 
with holding warming to below 2 °C, let alone limiting it to 1.5 °C as required 
under the Paris Agreement, and is instead consistent with warming between 3 °C 
and 4 °C. Furthermore, the absence of comparable commitments regarding other, 
non-CO2 gases could mean that China’s total GHG emissions will continue to 
increase until at least 2030.
9.3.1  A comparison of the Ideal Type and an Empirical 
Case Study of China—Causal Mechanisms 
through Congruence Methods and Process-Tracing
China fits the primary condition of the ideal type of an authoritarian policy 
model. The Chinese regime is considered to be continually stable and robust. 
While democratic movements have gained significance in the country, these are 
generally limited to Hong Kong. The economic transition of China can be argued 
as evidence that a market-oriented economy can exist within the political param-
eters of an authoritarian regime by complementing market policies with social 
welfare reforms.
The following are the most relevant provisions of this ideal type in the con-
text of transformation, where significant deviations in the Chinese case can be 
observed:
• The recruitment of new members of the political elite is structured and eidetic.
• The interaction between policy-makers and scientific communities often 
involves scientific and technocratic elites with long-standing relationships with 
the state.
• Issues are securitized, paving way to the “suspension” of some current rules 
and the adoption of new rules, which gradually leads to a “new normal”, par-
ticularly in political agenda-setting.
• Because stable authoritarian regimes derive their (output) legitimacy primarily 
from their performance in achieving indicators of modernization, bureaucra-
cies of authoritarian regimes will most likely play a very significant role in the 
planning and management of processes.
• Although authoritarian countries tend to be governed center-to-periphery and 
top-down, there is a predictability of institutional interactions (implying stabil-
ity), as the character of historically dominant policies will define the policies 
taken in new areas.
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• Persuasion interaction between elites and other social actors in authoritarian 
policy pathways tend to occur through informal and non-public channels, 
which are effective in channeling resistance towards constructive and coopera-
tive relationships.
• Because authoritarian regimes will most likely influence all aspects of the 
transformation process, outcomes will require cooperation between different 
levels of state authority.
As in the case study of Mexico, the next step refers to the enumeration and analy-
sis of the deviations, where theoretical and empirical explanations of these devia-
tions will be introduced and explained.
9.3.1.1  The changing meaning of social connections 
in selecting the political elite in China
Authoritarian regimes are often defined by the exclusiveness of important polit-
ical positions. Eidetic recruitment of the political elite is a major characteristic 
of their bureaucracies (e.g., a military regime with military personnel holding 
positions). Selection to the elite is usually defined mainly by political loyalty. 
While this is, in principle, also the case in China, where only members of the 
Communist Party can hold government positions, recruitment to the political elite 
in China has developed further than this. The criteria of selection now instead 
cater to efficiency, while pursuing the inclusion of ethnic minorities into the polit-
ical elite. There are additional factors, which transcend party membership, that 
determine one’s recruitment. In the last three decades, the Chinese leadership has 
instilled rules and norms into its elite selection process, prioritizing qualifica-
tion and efficiency through nascent institutional mechanisms (see Cheng & Yiou 
2017). Such mechanisms include the formal institutionalization of the inclusion 
of ethnic minority cadres among party-state elites through the Law of Ethnic 
Minority Autonomous Areas of the People’s Republic of China. The Law stipu-
lates that the top post in the local government in all ethnic minority autonomous 
areas (from the township level to the provincial level) should be held by a leader 
from the same ethnic minority background as the majority of citizens in that area 
(Cheng Li & Yiou Zhang 2017).
The academic literature on the selection of China’s political elite identifies 
‘Guanxi,’ the network-based system of favor exchange, as the major principle 
that drives political, economic and social interactions (see Chen & Chao 2004). 
Nevertheless, in addition to formal rules, there are informal rules, particularly 
when selecting candidates for top positions that intend to circumvent Guanxi. 
For example, in the six CCP Central Committees that have formed since the 13th 
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Party Congress in 1987, ethnic minorities have been represented in the commit-
tee (between 10 to 11 percent of the membership). In addition, the seven-member 
Politburo, the most powerful body in the Chinese government, is itself responsi-
ble for selecting new members (Shirk 2012). Due to the informal rules adhered to 
by Politburo members, social connections and personal ties will instead reduce 
the likelihood of being selected to the Politburo. For example, officials will be 
required to recuse themselves from evaluating candidates from their own regions 
or those who have connections to them, like college ties (see Fisman et al. 2017).
Reforms in governance and other structural changes have further supported the 
creation of a new political elite. The concept of ‘elite dualism’ has defined the 
Chinese system of governance. The division of labor between the CCP and the 
government in governance has led to two distinctive career paths. While candi-
dates for elite positions in the CCP are screened for technical qualifications and 
political credentials, those candidates for government positions are screened more 
rigorously for their human capital. In addition, promotion in the government sys-
tem is more dependent on efficiency compared with promotions in the CCP hier-
archy (Xiaowei 2004). This elite dualism can be identified as conducive to any 
transformation process that requires technical expertise from its policy-makers.
The selection of the political elite in China can be seen as similar to best 
‘practices’ in democratic countries that aim to address corruption and red tape. 
While it can also be interpreted that these provisions in China are designed for 
propaganda purposes, they also promote efficiency, as social connections are 
increasingly limited by both formal and informal practices. In general, this devel-
opment is not only beneficial when ensuring the long-term political legitimacy 
of the regime, but this also supports the low-carbon transformation process, as 
new recruits coming from other networks can provide much needed out-of-the-
box thinking. China’s new political elite has now a more integrated and pragmatic 
understanding of politics, economics, social issues and technologies compared 
with its past leadership (see Khan 2013).
9.3.1.2  Institutional Interactions through Partnerships—
Urban Entrepreneurialism and Urban Clusters 
(Chengshiqun) in China
Authoritarian regimes dominate institutional, functional and bargaining interac-
tions simply through their ‘omnipresence’ within government agencies, playing 
a very significant role in the planning and implementation of policies at all levels 
of governance. Past reforms have moved China significantly further away from a 
strict center-to-periphery and top-down style of governance. Rather than being a 
monolithic system, China’s governance of science, innovation, and environmental 
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decision-making has been characterized by ‘fragmented authoritarianism,’ with 
protracted bargaining between bureaucracy units, including ministries, advisory 
bodies and top-level ‘National Leading Groups’ (see Heggelund 2004; Tyfield 
et al. 2015) as well as fragmentation between levels of government. Partnerships 
between multiple stakeholders are reinforced by local networks, for example, 
between state-owned and private companies. These networks have been mobi-
lized to implement the government’s climate protection goals. Such networks 
include the Alliance of Peaking Pioneer Cities that aim to hit the peak of their city 
emissions in advance of national targets (see Hale 2017).
Another example of structural changes that are now unfolding refers to how 
local governments have re-invented themselves and how they have sought part-
nerships with business companies to promote local development. However, this 
development in China can also be understood as a measure of ‘regaining’ com-
petencies that were increasingly outsourced by the state following the opening of 
markets to international business actors. Some scholars such as Jonas and Ward 
(Harrison & Hoyler 2014; see Jonas & Ward 2016) have claimed that the forma-
tion of city-region governance is a deliberate process of scale building, which 
involves both state and non-state actors. In addition, the re-emergence of city-re-
gion governance can be understood as a direct reaction to globalization, as Neil 
Brenner’s (1999, 2004) research on ‘state spatiality’ describes, where the rise of 
regional governance can be broadly understood as a process of ‘state reterrito-
rialization’, and the specific form of the city-region as ‘state spatial selectivity’, 
which means that a specific scale has been chosen or built by the state.
In many areas, such as Kunshan, a small city around 60 kilometers west of 
Shanghai, the formation and transformation of urban entrepreneurialism has 
facilitated economic devolution, paving the way for such areas to break out of 
the institutional constraints of state socialism and innovatively promote further 
devolution formally and informally from the state towards a development zone 
and town governance (Shiuh-Shen & Fulong 2011). Local and city governments 
started to transform themselves into market-friendly agents whose key goals are 
to form an alliance with more investors to promote local economic development. 
The functionality of city governments has changed from being mainly a social 
welfare deliverer to an economic development promoter. This change has further 
cemented the prioritization of economic efficiency at the grass-root levels.
Furthermore, as an indirect consequence of increased competition among 
cities, urban governance has become more cooperative, with other neighbor-
ing administrations under certain regional coordination by upper-level govern-
ments. The concept of urban clusters (chengshiqun) (Yao & Zhu 1992) has been 
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revived and included as part of the agenda of government policies, either to build 
stronger coalitions for regional competitiveness or to solve the over-concentration 
of growth in large central cities (Wu 2016). Particularly because of the limits of 
economies of scale, local governments have opted to share and combine resources 
to maximize benefits. Interestingly, the resurgence of urban clusters in China has 
been highlighted as an effective policy, as China has sought to solve environmen-
tal problems. For example, in an effort to find solutions to the problems of smog 
and population over-concentration, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposed, in 
2014, a regional approach to the future development of Beijing in the capital’s 
region (Jing-Jin-Ji), which led to further discussions about city-region govern-
ance (Wu 2016). In March 2015, the central government approved the outline of 
the Jing-Jin-Ji Collaborative Development Plan, which indicated that the notion 
of the urban cluster had become an official term in governance and had become 
popularized. In May 2016, the State Council approved the Yangtze River Delta 
Urban Cluster Development Plan (Wu 2016).
This newly evolved state-led coordinative and collaborative urban entrepre-
neurialism is regarded as one of the most important principles of China’s mar-
ket transition. While many villages still adhere to strong local corporatism, where 
family and kin members control local enterprises, this trend demonstrates an 
increase in the leasing of collectively-owned enterprises to private actors (see 
Heggelund 2009; Shiuh-Shen & Fulong 2011). In addition, in contrast to the 
market logic, Chinese state-owned companies, which account for 80 percent of 
the stock market, tend to be more receptive to ‘indigenous innovation’ (zizhu 
chuangxin) mainly because of this state control (see Haifeng 2014).
As the central, regional, and local governments release new policy goals, 
such as moving up the value chain, state owned companies will tend to ‘sacri-
fice’ profit-making in order to internalize such policy goals. Furthermore, with 
the reform of elite selection (elite dualism) in place, government units are now 
technically able to effectively design and implement local development. With this 
new self-identification as an ‘entrepreneurial state’ (Mazzucato 2013), the Chi-
nese central, regional, and local governments are not only driving research and 
development investment in strategic ‘green’ sectors, they are also constructing a 
market for innovation and building the skilled workforce required to serve emerg-
ing ideas of eco-innovation (see Tyfield et al. 2015) Furthermore, the asymmet-
rical transformation of the political and economic spheres in China involve the 
decentralization, in part, of economic decision-making, while the political system 
remains centralized and cadre promotion is based on the evaluation of the eco-
nomic performance of their jurisdictions (Shiuh-Shen & Fulong 2011).
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9.4  Chapter Conclusion—Theory Testing and the 
Implications of Case Findings for Theory 
and Practice
Of particular interest, in terms of the outcomes of the case studies, is how the 
gaps between theory and practice can be bridged. The case studies highlight how 
Mexico and China’s deviation from the theoretical models of democratic and 
authoritarian policy models have captured interesting causalities that can be fur-
ther conceptualized.
9.4.1  Lessons for Theory
The hypothesis that the successful implementation of sustainable, low-carbon 
policies is highly contingent on the capacity and autonomy of the State can be 
confirmed. However, as vindicated by the case studies, the terms ‘capacity’ and 
‘autonomy’ require further concretization. State capacity, in the context of sus-
tainable, low-carbon transformation, can be understood as how the State is able 
to accommodate different the perspectives of stakeholders affected by changes. 
As highlighted by Bruce Gilley (2012), China has the advantage of having rel-
atively strong institutions that could manage the participatory process so as to 
ensure complementarities of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms (see Fraser 
et al. 2006; Stringer et al. 2007). Thus, as Gilley (2012) concludes, China had a 
potential advantage over more democratic regimes with weak states such as the 
Philippines and Thailand, as well as over more authoritarian regimes with weak 
states such as Myanmar (see Myint 2007).
As the Chinese leadership has linked inclusiveness with efficiency, formal and 
informal rules have been introduced and institutionalized to ensure representation 
in various decision-making processes. In contrast to China, Mexico seems to have 
more difficulties in engaging various stakeholders. In addition, autonomy, in the 
context of sustainable, low-carbon transformation, can pertain to how specific 
issues can be initially securitized to attract political attention and later on de-po-
liticized to promote constructive collaboration. China is able to achieve a “new 
normal” in addressing emerging issues, because of structural reforms allowing the 
formal separation of political and non-political decision-making, where in some 
cases, non-political decision-making is outsourced to non-political actors for effi-
ciency reasons. In Mexico, sustainable development and environmental issues 
are trapped in the political sphere, because of how the decision-making has been 
structured.
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Moreover, a comparison of the case studies on Mexico and China confirms 
that a democratic policy model does not guarantee inclusiveness in decision-mak-
ing. Because of Mexico’s focus on the electoral process as the main legitimizing 
source of governance, there is a sense that this question of legitimacy has already 
been resolved. Thus, there seems to be less motivation to ensure the efficiency of 
policies, as legitimacy has already been covered by electoral victories. In addi-
tion, as the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2011) points out, failure in imple-
menting robust, democratic foundations has led and has reinforced structural 
imbalances that promote clientelism in Mexican politics. In the context of sus-
tainable, low-carbon transformation, Mexico’s focus on the electoral process has 
unintentionally framed sustainability and climate mitigation as mere problems of 
governance, instead of ones of social cohesion, long-term and inclusive economic 
development, and of environmental integrity. By tracing the process of legitimi-
zation, the equifinality of paths becomes evident, as different paths can produce 
both similar and different outcomes and as similar paths can also produce both 
similar and different outcomes.
Nevertheless, China’s focus on output legitimacy and the introduction of a 
“new normal” have both led to the kind of structural changes that are supposed 
to only be observed in democratic regimes. With economic efficiency combined 
with social welfare as the main principles, new formal and informal rules in pol-
icy-making in various spatial levels have been established. For example, family, 
hometown, and college ties & connections are increasingly negatively affect-
ing a person’s selection to the Chinese political and economic elite. Therefore, 
elite recruitment has become more inclusive and fluid in China. Elite dualism 
and urban entrepreneurialism can be assessed as positively affecting sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation, because of wider participation in decision-making 
processes. While China cannot represent all existing authoritarian regimes, this 
case study demonstrates the normative traps of some theories (e.g., democratic 
peace) and how a case-to-case perspective can provide knowledge on the limita-
tions of such theories.
In addition, while holistic approaches are needed as a basis for the compari-
son of cases which can be provided by “alternative settings” in order to generate 
useful knowledge, as the Ideal types suggest, additional subjects and additional 
ways of analyzing historical social processes for further research can allow a 
more integrated approach to problems and solutions. The introduced ideal type of 
transformation looks at the orchestration of various negotiation processes that are 
occurring at various levels within the system. The understanding of these differ-
ent interdependencies in the various levels supports strategic planning in order to 
reduce transition costs and increase the political legitimacy of the outcome of the 
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processes. Knowing that specific activities are aiming to come up with the agenda 
provides some time to prepare and manage conflicts that can be anticipated.
9.4.2  Lessons for Practice
The reasons why some climate protection measures are more successful in some 
countries than others cannot be fully explained, for example, by merely deter-
mining whether a country is democratic or authoritarian. It also depends on how 
“success” is defined. While China is often applauded because of its commitment 
to certain climate protection measures, it remains a question of whether it can still 
be considered as a success for climate protection when the motivations behind 
these decisions are not to protect the climate but, for instance, to combat air pol-
lution. What happens when such goals have already been met before achieving 
long-term climate protection goals? Nevertheless, this question is only relevant 
when authoritarianism is understood as monolithic. For example, civil society 
groups and other stakeholders have more leverage over decision-making around 
environmentalism, climate change and innovation policies than in previous eras in 
China (Tyfield et al. 2015).
While governance structures have obvious and latent implications for societal 
consensus-building processes, consensus-building is dependent on the formal 
and material capacities of the relevant stakeholders to actually participate in the 
process. Effective management of transformation processes needs to effectively 
establish ‘negotiative’ mechanisms that allow the continuous revisiting of deci-
sions that have been made in the past. The case study on Mexico’s transformation 
process is merely a glimpse into the factors that are often neglected in the stra-
tegic planning of transformation to a low-carbon economy. Consensus- building 
is not self-perpetuating, especially not on countries with a government crisis 
related to the lack of transparency and accountability. Issues such as creating 
public space and empowering societal groups to be able to participate in orches-
trated negotiation processes are often not adequately included or addressed in 
national strategies. As Raiza Pilatowsky Gruner (2016) argues, Mexico’s lack of 
 transparency and accountability at all levels of government will remain a major 
challenge and barrier to climate change national goals being enforced. This is 
reflected in a shortage of implementation and surveillance mechanisms and clear 
actions that will help to comply with the Paris Agreement pledges the country has 
made. With recent efforts of civil society groups to demand accountability and 
transparency from all levels of governance, climate policies can become ‘collat-
eral damage.’
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The emergence of a bottom-up, green public space is crucial to the sustain-
able, low-carbon transformation process. By developing the capacity of societal 
actors to express and pursue their interests, decisions that are made will most 
likely become more effective. Inclusivity is an investment, because the costs of 
transition will not only be shouldered by more actors, but the total costs will also 
be limited, as individual stakeholders will limit the negative externalities that they 
are producing for the others, because they will also be paying for them.
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The Philippines as a Case Study—
Populism and Institutional Activism 
in Transformation Processes Towards 
Sustainability
The current resurgence and reinforcement of populists in many countries has 
profited not only from various real or imagined crises (e.g., 2015-present refu-
gee crisis in Europe or the caravan of migrants in Latin America heading to the 
United States), but also from how established political parties and polities have 
addressed these crises, which have disenfranchised, in a de facto manner, a signif-
icant portion of the population (see White 2016). Former Greek finance minister 
and Professor of Economics at the University of Athens, Yanis Varoufakis, notes 
that President Trump’s election, Brexit, and the resurgence of right-wing political 
parties in Germany, Austria & other countries are not new in history, but merely 
“a post-modern variant of the 1930s, complete with deflation, xenophobia, and 
divide-and-rule politics” (Varoufakis 2016). Populist movements have found and 
instrumentalized compelling issues, such as emission reduction, to gain political 
importance. For example, in an attempt to re-gain political importance, they have 
taken emission reduction as an example of a policy instrument that undermines 
national interests because they negatively affect job opportunities in various 
coal-dependent regions.
Many experts (see Storck & Stehr 2010; Stehr 2015; White 2016) argue 
that ambitious climate protection measures are also questions of governance 
and  politics. As climate protection policies have become part of the “new nor-
mal” and of the mainstream socio-political and sociolinguistic narratives, they 
have also united and mobilized ‘climate change deniers,’ critics of the political 
‘establishment,’ nationalists, xenophobes, alt-right groups, and fossil fuel inter-
est groups to pose a coherent and effective political opposition. Because ‘cli-
mate change  policies’ and ‘climate science’ have been mainstreamed or in some 
cases narrated as ‘linked’ with liberal ideas in the past few years, questions rel-
evant to climate change have been unintentionally reduced to being only matters 
of political  decisions and actions. With the rise of counter-movements including 
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 anti-intellectualism and the emergence of the post-truth era, climate science, 
which has initiated political discussions on climate protection, is being delegit-
imized by actors in various directions, which is often not hard to do, due to the 
complexity and uncertainty of climate change as well as due to the conceptual 
and methodological limitations of scientific methods.
The Philippines and the United States (see Chapter 11) are two of the several 
countries wherein nationalists and right-wing populists have profited from such 
anti-intellectualist, anti-democratic, anti-establishment, anti-media, and post-truth 
movements as well as from the context of the political system. For example, with 
the absence of a run-off in the electoral system of the Philippines, as the official 
canvas of the Congress of the Philippines concluded, the populist President Rod-
rigo Duterte won the presidential election with the second-smallest mandate in 
Philippine history (Nery 2017), with just 39.01 percent of the counted electoral 
votes (16,601,997 votes). Rodrigo Duterte’s campaign was based on hostility 
towards the ‘West’, the corrupt political establishment, the independent press, and 
on dehumanizing (real and alleged) criminals, including drug addicts.
With several similarities and the parallel development of the Philippines and 
the United States following the election of a populist leader, this chapter and the 
following chapter will provide important insights into understanding how a sys-
tem can adapt to a regime hostile to many principles of sustainable development 
and climate protection. As a former colony of the United States, the Philippines 
has a political system that closely resembles that of the United States. A major 
focus is given to the role of social movements, including non-profits, advocacy 
groups, non-government organizations or NGOs, and other civil society groups, 
using an ideal type of the institutional activism-dominated policy model. In the 
case of the Philippines, populism and institutional activism have merged. Fur-
thermore, the Philippine context challenges the existing ‘right-left’ dichotomy of 
political ideology with the ‘textbook’ right-wing Duterte regime debarring polit-
ical opposition from the Left by ‘subcontracting’ certain policies to left-wing 
actors.
Finding compelling reasons for long-term climate protection under President 
Duterte is challenging, particularly because the Philippines is not a major emitter 
of greenhouse gases or GHG. In addition, the sociolinguistic narrative on climate 
protection in the Philippines is instead focused on climate adaptation. Because 
the country is one of the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, cli-
mate protection through emission reduction has not yet caught the attention of 
policy-makers and the Philippine society in general. The Paris Climate Agree-
ment is generally linked with more international support of adaptation projects 
in the country. Upon ratification, the Philippines will have access to the Green 
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Climate Fund, which will be funded with USD 100 million annually by devel-
oped countries to support vulnerable and low-emitting countries confronted with 
climate change. Therefore, unlike in the United States, populist groups in the 
Philippines cannot draw more popular support by rejecting the Paris agreement. 
Despite previous negative comments about the Paris Climate Agreement, Presi-
dent Duterte approved the agreement through his signature and his submission of 
the instrument of accession to the Philippine Senate for ratification of the Paris 
Agreement on February 28, 2017 (Salaverria 2017).
An analysis of politics in the Philippines remains interesting, as President 
Duterte contains political opposition by dividing social movements. After his 
inauguration, he appointed three left-wing activists to his cabinet, including an 
environmental activist as Secretary of the Department on Environment and Nat-
ural Resources and a social activist as Secretary of the Department of Social 
Welfare and Development. As part of the social movement, the appointed envi-
ronment Sec. Gina Lopez has typically used strategies common to advocacy 
groups in achieving goals.
Furthermore, another unique feature of the Philippine political system has led 
to the President’s control of various social and environmental movements through 
the party-list system, through which, as mandated by the 1987 constitution (Arti-
cle VI, Section 5 (i) and 2), 57 seats or 20 percent of the total seats in the House 
of Representatives are reserved for purportedly under-represented community 
sectors or groups, including labor, peasant, urban poor, senior citizens, indig-
enous, women, youth, and other such sectors (see Santos 1997). With elected 
social interest groups seeking collaboration with the newly elected president to 
increase the prospect of achieving their interests, social groups that are indifferent 
to specific issues are involved in ‘tit-for-tats’.
While tolerating the appointment and presence of civil-group representatives 
who were linked with the military, several leftist house representatives, who were 
elected into the Philippine Congress through the party-list system, have declared 
their support of President Duterte and informally agreed to a ‘truce’ with the mil-
itary. This co-option of various social movements through President Duterte can 
be interpreted as a strategy to stabilize his political control, as it prevents alli-
ances between major social and environmental groups and the political opposi-
tion. With potential challengers, such as opposition politicians, court justices, and 
human rights commissioners currently in the defensive mode as most of them 
were removed from positions in important committees in the Senate and House 
of Representatives, and while some are currently facing impeachment trials or 
crim inal charges or even imprisoned, no viable dissenters can mobilize popular 
 support to the political opposition.
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In addition, the current administration, like previous administrations, is profit-
ing from the incapacities of political and legal constraints provided by state insti-
tutions, such as courts and the commission on human rights. This incapacity is 
further exacerbated by the ‘weaponization’ of congress’ power to impeach (Nery 
2017) and of the ‘quo warranto’- power of the Solicitor General, as manifested 
by the recent removal of the Supreme Court Chief Justice on grounds that she 
failed to submit a requirement prior to her appointment as Chief Justice, mak-
ing her appointment by former President Benigno Aquino void (see Garcia 2018; 
Cabuenas 2018).
Further discrediting social movements, a legitimacy crisis within civil soci-
ety groups emerged following the “pork barrel scam scandal”, where politicians 
allegedly partnered with NGOs to divert and misuse their Priority Development 
Assistance Fund, popularly called “pork barrel,” for personal gains (see Doronila 
2013; Ubac 2013). In addition, many civil liberties and rights groups refuse to 
collaborate with current opposition politicians (or their families), whom they 
highly criticized when the latter were still in power. The current administration 
in the Philippines, after it has successfully co-opted major civil society groups 
represented in the House of Representatives, will most likely not expect a unified 
political opposition.
The goal of this chapter is to analyze and conceptualize the role of social 
movements, advocates, non-profits (and to a lesser degree profitable enterprises) 
and other civil society groups as agents of the transformation process towards 
sustainability in a political framework or a context that is partially or fully adver-
sarial or hostile towards political deliberation. By understanding the resources 
and strategies available to these social actors when promoting or encountering 
policies that are conducive to sustainable, low-carbon development, best practices 
can be derived. In addition, the comparison of this case study with a theoretical 
model (ideal type) will be conducted. The Philippine case study will be analyzed 
using the ideal type of an institutional activism policy model.
Hypothesis 1: Looking at the ‘negotiative’ requirement of transformation 
towards sustainability, the benefits and risks of institutional activism and social 
movements are highly contingent upon existing power relations and structures as 
well as on the level of capacity and autonomy of the State.
Existing power relations and structures, as well as the level of capacity and 
autonomy of the state, motivate and alter utility values for advocacy groups and 
social movements who were embedded into the policy stream. Will the (lib-
eral) normative concerns that often define social movements refrain them from 
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instrumentalizing power asymmetries when they are in power? Will they deploy 
resources in strategic ways and compete with other stakeholders, including other 
NGOs and other social movements?
Hypothesis 2: While institutional activism can facilitate rapid policy formu-
lation, it can also reinforce existing inequalities in countries with low social 
 capital.
While institutional activists often present their interests and strategies as pub-
lic interests, gaps between their interests and those of the general public can still 
exist. In addition, institutional activists may directly or indirectly reinforce exist-
ing structural imbalances and equalities when they find themselves in a more 
powerful position.
10.1  Context—Sustainable, Low-Carbon Development 
in the Philippines
10.1.1  The Paris Agreement and Responses From 
the Philippines
Climate change is evident in the Philippines. From 1951 to 2010, the Philippines’ 
annual mean temperature increased by 0.65 degrees Celsius with a mean rate 
of 0.01 degree Celsius per year. Furthermore, records from 1951 to 2008 show 
increasing intensity and frequency of rainfall in most parts of the country. In addi-
tion, based on climate projections, the Philippines’ annual mean temperature will 
increase by 0.9 to 1.1 degrees Celsius in the 2020s, and 1.8–2.2 degrees Celsius 
in the 2050s  (see OML Center 2014).
Addressing climate change in the Philippines is mainly focused on adap-
tation to the adverse effects of climate change. One viable reason for this is 
the rather low contribution of the country to global emissions. According to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, the Philippines was responsible only for 0.25 percent of 
global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion (79.5 Mt CO2 Eq.) in 2012, with its 
population comprising 1.38 percent of world total population in 2013 (98.39 mil-
lion). Nevertheless, the Philippine Climate Change Assessment Report warns that 
if the Philippine power sector continues to depend on coal (which covers 39 per-
cent of energy demand), emissions from the Philippines are likely to increase by 
around 400 percent by the year 2030, compared to 2007 levels (see OML Center 
2014). The Philippine government will therefore need to cancel all 29 coal plants 
currently in the pipeline to stabilize the emission level.
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The government’s intention to reduce its carbon emissions by 70 percent by 
2030 (DENR 2016) demonstrates a huge gap from the rise of emissions expected 
by the assessment report. In this regard, more ambitious mitigation measures will 
be needed. The government is not able to reconcile nor give any concrete means 
as to how it would mitigate the country’s carbon emissions. The Department of 
Energy defined a policy goal as an energy mix of 30 (coal)—30 (renewables)—30 
(natural gas)—10 (fuel oil), but without identifying concrete ways in which the 
government intends to achieve this goal. Moreover, as discussed earlier, as a weak 
state, the national government has low capacity and low autonomy to identify 
and implement projects to achieve this goal, especially in a country where power 
generation is not considered a public utility. The liberalization of the energy sec-
tor further limits the ability of the national government to achieve its mitigation 
policy goal, especially when the Philippines’ largest electricity distributor and 
the sole provider in the National Capital Region, the Manila Electric Company 
(MERALCO), has so far only invested in coal power plants (Olchondra 2015; 
Flores 2017). There are also no clear government strategies as to how it intends to 
support solar and wind energy and enable new players to enter an energy market 
where coal is the baseload.
The main mitigation instrument foreseen by the government is increasing car-
bon sinks by reforestation, which is, in the context of rapid urbanization and the 
need for more land for agriculture, expected to be not enough. Hence, the miti-
gation strategy of the Philippines needs to be revisited. For example, there is still 
no comprehensive and integrated national strategy as to how this intention can be 
realistically enacted, for example, by linking climate mitigation goals to enhanc-
ing renewable energies and energy efficiency. The investments in renewable ener-
gies in the Philippines will need to be matched, for example, by investment in 
infrastructure, such as grid systems in order to address the intermittency chal-
lenges of renewable energies. In addition, there is a need to improve the business 
prospects of mitigation technologies in the country. Finally, a major hurdle that 
needs to be cleared refers to deficiencies in governance.
As the Philippines is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, 
political priority is instead focused on early-warning and post-disaster manage-
ment. Furthermore, the country is still working on how to incorporate technol-
ogies and improving its disaster risk reduction and management capability. 
Information asymmetry is still apparent, particularly in cities and rural areas out-
side the capital region. While the country has significantly improved its disaster 
preparedness, it is still ranked by the 2016 Climate Change Vulnerability Index 
as the 13th most climate-vulnerable country (see Ranada 2015). This vulnerability 
is reflected in the issues pushed by the Philippines during climate negotiations. 
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For example, the Philippines led the Climate Vulnerability Forum of almost 50 
developing countries in successfully pushing for 1.5 °C to be recognized as the 
aspirational target of the UN Paris Agreement, which the Philippines signed last 
April 2016.
10.1.1.1  Sustainable Development Policies in the Philippines
As one of the 193 member-states that adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development in 2015, the Philippines is taking further steps in defining the coun-
try’s roadmap towards sustainable development in the next 15 years. Together 
with the Philippine Statistics Authority, the National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA) is the main government body that steers the government’s 
efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda.
President Duterte has signed Executive Order (EO) No. 5, which provided for 
the adoption of Ambisyon Natin 2040, as the Philippines 25-year, long-term 
vision and guide for development planning. It describes the kind of life that 
people want to live, and how the Philippines will be by 2040. Ambisyon Natin 
2040 is a product of a series of nationwide public consultations consisting of 
focus group discussions participated in by representatives from groups of youth, 
fishers, farmers, the urban poor, disaster survivors, indigenous peoples, people 
with disabilities, families of overseas workers, local migrants, and government 
workers, among others, and the administration of a survey led by NEDA, to deter-
mine the aspirations of the Filipino population. A number of technical studies 
were also commissioned in key thematic areas of development through the sup-
port of the Asian Development Bank to understand whether Ambisyon Natin 2040 
is achievable and to determine what it would take to achieve the vision. It aims 
to triple per capita income to 11,000 USD in 24 years by sustaining at least 6.5 
percent annual GDP growth alongside the implementation of policies that would 
make the Philippines a high-income country by 2040 with a “prosperous, pre-
dominantly middle-class society where no one is poor.”
Nevertheless, the vision does not clearly include the energy sector as among 
the identified priority sectors, even though the energy sector was involved in the 
series of nationwide public consultations. While the PDP consists of the govern-
ment’s plans and programs for the energy sector geared towards achieving Amb-
isyon Natin 2040, the absence of the participation of energy-related stakeholders 
as well as societal groups addressing energy issues will most likely lead to gaps 
and missed opportunities. As expected, because of the country’s focus on adap-
tation, it also fails to identify climate protection as an economic opportunity, for 
example, through energy efficiency technologies. The lack of political involve-
ment in mitigation leaves the country outside the discourse on energy efficiency 
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and renewable interests. This leads to the country not fully accessing all available 
opportunities to enhance energy security. The success of the vision’s priority pol-
icies is highly contingent on energy supply security as sustainable, low-carbon 
energy systems can provide the instruments to achieve these goals.
In addition, the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017–2022 foresees the 
reduction of poverty, especially in the provinces, and the reduction of unemploy-
ment from 5.5 percent at present to as low as 3 percent by 2022 through sus-
tained, robust economic growth in the next six years in line with the vision to 
make the country a high-income country by 2040. It also aims to sustain 7–8 
percent GDP growth in the medium-term, and slash poverty incidence to 14 per-
cent by 2022 from 21.6 percent in 2015. In rural areas, the higher poverty rate of 
30 percent in 2015 is expected to be cut to 20 percent in six years’ time. Other 
targets include higher trust in government and society, more resilient individuals 
and communities, and a greater drive for innovation.
10.1.1.2  Energy Security Policies in the Philippines
Similar to many Asian countries, the GDP growth of the Philippines (average 
rate of 6.1 percent from 2011 to 2015) is highly contingent on energy-intensive 
industries, mainly manufacturing and retail (see Euromonitor International 2017). 
Accounting for 73.5 percent, the energy supply in the country is highly dependent 
on fossil fuels (coal, gas, and oil). In 2013, coal covered approximately 42.62 per-
cent of electrical energy demand (75,266 GWh). While hydroelectric power 
accounts for 18 percent, geothermal covers 10 percent of total electricity produc-
tion. Solar, wind and biomass account for 2 percent of the country’s electricity 
production. Amid a significant increase in the global use of renewable energies, 
the Philippine government still intends to add 25 additional coal power plants 
to the current 32 coal-fired power generation facilities in the country (see Quis-
mundo 2016), proving that the country is a laggard in adopting renewable energy 
technologies.
Energy supply security is also a political priority in the Philippines. The 
energy crisis in the country is usually at its peak in summer periods, when 
demand for electricity is high in order to cool and air condition, while the lack 
of rain reduces electricity generation from hydropower. According to Steven 
Rood (2015), the major challenge to effectively addressing the energy crisis in the 
country is its weak governance. Approval for permits could take years, especially 
when a certain set of applicants are being favored. He notes that the Department 
of Energy estimates that it takes 165 signatures and a minimum of three years 
to secure the necessary permits. In addition, Rood suggests that low trust among 
investors when financing the costs of new power plants is a direct reaction to the 
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country’s contractual and pricing insecurity. New administrations often renego-
tiate the terms of contracts made during previous administrations. Government 
administrations often seek emergency powers to address the energy crisis, but the 
political opposition often mistrusts such steps. This dependence on emergency 
powers to implement energy policies vindicates the low autonomy of the State. 
In addition, the constant need for emergency powers to implement energy pol-
icies may reinforce abuse of power, because emergency powers tend to discard 
 guard-rails for accountability and transparency. As such, energy security tends to 
be a highly political issue in the country and is reduced to the subject of poor 
governance.
Immediately after his election, President Duterte promised a different and a 
more proactive approach to addressing the energy crisis in the country. DENR 
Secretary Lopez announced that she will prioritize the approval of permits for 
renewable energy projects over those of coal and other fossil fuels. Furthermore, 
as an environmentalist, she declared her opposition to the opening of the nuclear 
plant in Bataan, claiming that it will only contribute to less than 0.5 percent to the 
National Energy Grid with higher costs and risks (Cordero 2017). She suggested 
that waste-to-energy adoption can be tapped to address the energy crisis while 
solving waste problems in the country. Meanwhile, Energy Secretary Alfonso 
Cusi announced in July of 2016 that his team is about to review the coun-
try’s energy mix, but in the same briefing he also declared that the Philippines 
“can’t afford not to have coal” (Cordero 2017). The Climate Change Commis-
sion (CCC) of the Philippines has started its task of reviewing the government’s 
energy policy. In cooperation with various government agencies, a comprehensive 
review of the government’s energy policy involves a whole-nation approach to 
achieving a low-carbon development pathway, with national goals and targets for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and sustainable 
development (Climate Change Commission 2016).
The Philippine Energy Plan (PEP) as well as the various sectoral roadmaps 
2017–2040, which provide the framework for present and future energy poli-
cies, vindicate that the concept of energy security in the Philippines does not 
yet adequately address how the energy sector will contribute to the reduction of 
the country’s GHG emissions. This is an implication, instead, of the adaptation- 
oriented narratives on climate change in the Philippines. While the Upstream Oil 
and Gas Roadmap 2017–2040 as well as the Coal Roadmap 2017–2040 provide 
concrete numbers demonstrating the increased usage of oil, gas and coal, the 
renewable energy roadmap does not provide any concrete targets in numbers or 
timelines, implying that energy security will be mostly covered by emission-rich 
energy sources.
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10.1.2  Multiple Entry Points to Climate Mitigation 
and Sustainable Development in the Philippines
The entry points that will be discussed below do not comprise the complete list of 
all entry points to climate mitigation in the Philippines. This selection intends to 
highlight the most relevant ones in the context of system transformation as under-
scored by the theoretical models (ideal types).
10.1.2.1  Rural Development as an Entry Point to Sustainable, 
Low-Carbon Development
Because of the current narratives on climate change in the Philippines, additional 
efforts are needed to find entry points into climate mitigation. Coupling emission 
reduction with rural development and good governance will most likely find 
more political and public support than if it would have been presented as a 
stand-alone issue. For example, rural development will most likely involve the 
usage of agricultural waste products for bioenergy, as rural communities in the 
Philippines are highly agricultural. Nevertheless, the concept of waste-to-energy 
is highly contested in the country, because it is connoted merely with the burning 
of industrial and household waste. Environmental groups fear the release of tox-
ins from the burning of household and industrial waste. Hence, using agricultural 
waste for biomass energy will first require its delinking from the current notion of 
waste-to-energy and waste-to-fertilizer.
Aside from the country’s abundant supply of biomass resources (rice, maize, 
coconut, and sugarcane), agricultural crop residues, forest residues, animal wastes, 
agro-industrial waste, municipal waste (about 60 percent of which is biomass), and 
aquatic biomass among others remain unused. From the estimated total agricultural 
biomass waste in 2012 of 52,568.73 million metric tons, only 0.054 percent of it is 
being utilized (Cajes 2014). Merely 1.07 percent of the total biomass resources in 
the country is being used for energy production. Not only is this surplus waste agri-
cultural biomass, it is a missed opportunity to increase the percentage of biomass, 
which was at 1.09 percent of the installed capacity (or, as older data shows, at 12.4 
percent) of the country’s total primary energy supply mix in 2011 (39.4 million 
tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) (DOE 2017). The estimated biomass required to 
produce such power is 566,092.8 metric tons, assuming that the biomass-powered 
plants run at full capacity (efficiency is 24 percent for large-scale biomass plants 
ranging from 15 to 60 megawatts). The biofuel roadmap 2017–2040 of the Depart-
ment of Energy vindicates the peripheral role of bioenergy in the country.
With the highly underutilized resources and agricultural waste products for 
biomass, the Philippines’ can afford to set higher targets for renewable energy’s 
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contribution to the country’s installed generating capacity. Nevertheless, while the 
Philippines displayed a significant growth in power generation at 10 percent from 
82,413,213 MW in 2015 to 90,797,891 MW in 2016, of this total generation, only 
1 percent (or 725,906 MW) comes from biomass. Therefore, additional programs 
and strategies are needed to complement existing ones to realize higher pro-
duction targets, to establish market-based industry involving biomass resources 
including agricultural waste, and to maximize the usage of available international 
financing schemes such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Further-
more, partnerships with local sugar producers and farmers are needed, as sugar-
cane waste covers most of the agricultural waste.
Several programs and projects to promote agricultural biomass waste have 
been carried out in the Philippines since the 1970s (with an estimated worth of 
USD 100 million). Based on experiences from previous agricultural waste to 
energy programs and projects, such efforts can only be successful if they can be 
adequately coupled with rural development. A significant portion of the efforts 
have been rated as ‘less than successful’ by audit reports due to institutional prob-
lems, a lack of stakeholder mobilization and beneficiary participation, a lack of 
human capital in rural areas, as well as due to financial problems such as high ini-
tial and maintenance costs (Cajes 2014). These factors indicate the existing gaps 
between such projects and rural development. Therefore, the success of future 
programs and projects is highly contingent upon how these deficiencies are prop-
erly addressed. Establishing new or promoting old cooperatives and other forms 
of traditional cooperation methods (e.g., paluwagan) can be beneficial in strength-
ening ‘stakeholder and beneficiary’ ownership. New forms of local governance 
can be identified and tested as these programs and projects are implemented.
10.2  Case Study—Institutional Activism 
and Sustainable and Low-Carbon Policy Goals 
in the ‘Weak’ Philippine State
This section pertains to a comparison of the current transformation process in the 
Philippines as an empirical or historical case and the ideal type of institutional 
activism. While the sustainable, low-carbon transformation is still at its begin-
ning, it is significant to analyze the challenges of facilitating this transformation. 
While the low-carbon and sustainability policy goals have already been identi-
fied as political priorities, they are still predominantly perceived as isolated policy 
goals. The interlinkages and the resulting positive and negative synergies between 
them have yet to be recognized by the relevant policy-makers. The Philippines 
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as a case study allows a practical outlook on a transformation process of country 
that has a very strong civil society which is both a direct result of and an implica-
tion of weak governance. The limitations of the state in providing expected ser-
vices has prompted the state to “resign”, and “forge” franchise-like partnerships 
with civil society groups (see Hernandez 2014a).
10.2.1  Institutional Activism in the Philippines—The 
Historical Context and the Party List System
Activism in the Philippines is connoted with confrontation with state authorities. 
The historical context of activism in the country links activism to the radicaliza-
tion of mostly university students after certain violent actions or divisive policies 
of the government (see Weiss & Aspinall 2012). Patricio Abinales (1996) high-
lights the “enduring mark on Philippine society” on the “Philippine Left.” Philip-
pine activism is often linked with socialism or communism. The label of ‘enemy 
of the state’ during the Marcos military regime was used as political leverage 
to shame and justify the coercive actions of the state, as rural guerrillas, labor 
unions, community organizers, students and church activists were mobilized, and 
has become a major political force in the country (Abinales 1996), especially in 
rural areas. While the end of the military rule of Ferdinand Marcos has allowed 
activists to take positions in governments, other activists have opted to join the 
communist insurgency groups in the country.
Institutional activism is not a new phenomenon in the Philippines. As stated 
earlier, the Philippine political system allows representatives of marginalized 
groups to be elected to the Philippine Congress through the “party list system” in 
the House of Representatives of the Philippines. During the interim period from 
1987 to 1998, sectoral representatives were appointed by the President and con-
firmed by the Commission on Appointments.
During the May 1998 elections, the first sectoral groups were elected. Cur-
rently, party-list representatives are indirectly elected when their groups win at 
least two percent of the national vote, where at least one seat and at most three 
seats are given, depending on a formula based on the number of votes garnered 
by the sectoral group. In the last elections in May 2016, eleven party-list groups 
made the two percent threshold. Winning groups include groups representing 
women, senior citizens, farmers, teachers, disabled people, overseas Filipinos and 
the poor (see Uy 2016). The party-list system has allowed activists to mobilize, 
gain public exposure & political experience, and, in some cases, these activists 
were afterwards regularly elected outside the party-list system.
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However, with this “political space” provided to activists, institutional activ-
ism in the Philippines typically mainly addresses social capital, good governance 
and social policies. For example, the party-list system does not include any envi-
ronmental groups, proving that environmental activism is still traditionally at the 
periphery of policy-making, and implying that these groups still need to catch up 
in terms of mobilization. Because of several competing interests with other social 
groups, environmental groups still need to find their own space which would 
allow proximity between environmental integrity and social justice.
10.2.1.1  Institutional Activism in the Philippines—The 
Appointment of Secretary Regina Lopez
The appointment of the activist Regina Lopez as Secretary of the Department of 
Environment and National Resources was highly contested. Her appointment, 
and her subsequent failure to acquire confirmation of her appointment from the 
Commission of Appointments of the House of Representatives, can be seen as a 
demonstration of the different negotiation processes that need to be adequately 
prepared for. Several business and industry groups, as well as local government 
units (LGUs), called her appointment “highly divisive”, as she was said to ignore 
due process anytime it served her vested interests (see Simeon 2017). The Cham-
ber of Mining opposed the claim of Sec. Lopez that she should be able to prohibit 
mining even in non-proclaimed watersheds (see Quismundo 2017). The Depart-
ment of Finance, the Department of Labor, and Local Government Units claimed 
that they were not consulted by Sec. Lopez prior to the closure order (see Catoto 
2017).
Eventually, the Commission on Appointments bypassed or deferred the confir-
mation of her appointment more than once, as many members of the commission 
expressed opposition to her appointment (Diaz 2016, 2017; Geronimo 2017). The 
so-called ‘preference outliers’ or those legislators who were most interested in 
mining issues actively sought membership in the relevant commission assessing 
the appointment of the DENR Secretary. Nevertheless, Sec. Lopez was confident 
that she would be reappointed by President Duterte.
The closure order of more than half of the country’s mining companies 
through DENR and Sec. Lopez had mobilized popular support from various 
social justice and socio-environmental groups. More than 3,000 members of 
various anti-mining groups gathered to push for the confirmation of Sec. Lopez 
as Secretary of DENR (Alvarez 2017a). These groups reprimanded the mining 
industry by claiming that most Philippine mining operators do not view corporate 
social responsibility as a major concern. For example, it was argued that mine 
tailings as waste products without any financial value to the mining operators 
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were merely addressed as a financial footnote in the reports of Philippine mining 
operators. In addition, the environmental group Ibon Foundation claimed that the 
mining industry does not contribute to local economic development, as regions 
with the biggest mining activities are among the poorest in the country (Altez 
2017).
As expected, the mining industry as well as affected cities and municipalities 
opposed the cancellation of ‘legitimate, large-scale mining projects’ which were 
said to be backed by lawful contracts. The mining industry was also able to mobi-
lize various social groups, which mainly represented local communities affected 
by the order. On February 16, 2017, some 5,000 workers from different mining 
companies operating in Surigao del Sur organized a protest urging Sec. Lopez 
and President Duterte to reconsider closing the mining operations in Surigao 
del Sur, as this will would have led to massive job loss (Catoto 2017). Accord-
ing to Artemio Disini, head of the Chamber of Mines in the Philippines, more 
than 219,000 people are directly employed by the mining industry and 1.2 million 
people indirectly affected. Because 13 of the 28 potentially closed or suspended 
mines were in Mindanao, this closure order would have mainly affected already 
poverty-stricken areas of the country (see Altez 2017; Dela Cruz & Serapio, JR. 
2017). The orders to suspend or close down 28 mining operations would have 
cost local governments a total of more than PHP821.13 million (or ca. USD 
15.8 million) a year, according to Finance Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez III 
(Vera & Domingo 2017), affecting 17 cities and municipalities in 10 provinces, 
three of them poised to lose revenues equivalent to more than half of their current 
operating incomes
In addition, Dindo Manhit (2017) is critical that decisions were made out of 
“emotional and dramatic harangue(s)” and were made by an environmental activ-
ist who sees social justice and environmental issues as “eternally contradictory 
with prosperity and economics.” He adds that the activist politician, and those 
environmental activists supporting her decisions, were ignoring the USD 840 bil-
lion mineral revenues that can also be instrumental in financially achieving social 
justice and environmental integrity. He adds that while it is true that the mining 
industry represents only less than one percent of the economy, it should not be 
disregarded that there are only very few legitimate operating mines in the country, 
whose footprint reaches barely one percent of the landmass.
Sec. Lopez opted for a competitive negotiation strategy while underestimat-
ing the political resources available to the mining sector. Because Sec. Lopez 
removed the basic symmetry of the negotiatory situation with her mining policies, 
interest groups representing the mining sector and those local government units 
negatively affected shifted the bargaining to the hearings of the CA, where she 
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could not eliminate procedural equality. In addition, she had no effective leverage 
in the CA hearings aside from the procedural power of President Duterte, who 
could re-appoint her any time the CA rejected her confirmation, until the end of 
his term in 2022. Confronted by this situation, Sec. Lopez brought the “negotia-
tion” to the streets. This strategy is typically used by activists and social move-
ments in the Philippines, usually organizing street protests as instruments for 
enforcing their influence in policy-making without participating in formal chan-
nels. She and her supporters mobilized street protests supporting her anti-mining 
policies. However, due to the divisive nature of the issues involved, the civil soci-
ety was fragmented, and she failed to circumvent the polity structures (e.g., the 
Commission on Appointments) through street protests.
On May 9, 2017, after the rejection of her appointment, President Duterte 
decided not to reappoint her and instead appointed former military chief Roy 
Cimatu as the new Environment Secretary (Dizon et al. 2017). Secretary Cimatu 
eventually overturned the orders of former Sec. Lopez, such as her new policies 
on the issuance of environmental compliance certificates (ECC) (Gamil 2017). 
Furthermore, he expressed his intention to address misinformation and ‘reverse’ 
the negative publicity around the mining sector (Miraflor 2017).
10.2.2  An Ideal Type Analysis of Sustainable, Low-Carbon 
Development in the Philippines
The evaluation of the sustainable, low-carbon transformation in the Philippines 
will be conducted through ideal type analysis. The negotiation perspective allows 
an integrated outlook on the synergies and co-benefits, as well as risks intention-
ally or unintentionally created by institutional activism. As identified in the theo-
retical framework, a major assumption of institutional activism is that the results 
often legitimize the means. An additional assumption is that institutional activism 
may also seek procedures that are flexible, as defined by power relations, if these 
changes in procedures facilitate faster policy implementation.
While it is evident that institutional activism has been historically embedded 
in the political system of the Philippines, with the formalized political inclusion 
of marginalized sectors of the society into the legislation, there is still a need to 
understand how institutional activism defines decision-making in the context of 
weak governance. Similar to authoritarian states, countries with weak govern-
ance like the Philippines are often confronted by existing political structures that 
tend to sustain ‘hegemonic’ ideas or the dominance of one or several actors and 
exclude those who oppose the policies of these dominant actors. For example, the 
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electoral system in the Philippines employs a ‘winner-takes-all’ principle, where 
losing parties are not provided with any formal means of representation. This 
principle is also reflected in policy-making and policy implementation, where 
public deliberation is only tolerated or even encouraged when it supports govern-
ment policies. Opposing actors are put off and the reference to the rule of law is 
then highlighted. Furthermore, weak governance in the Philippines is expressed 
by ‘franchising’ various key government responsibilities to ‘elite groups’, includ-
ing oligarchs and corporations (see Hernandez 2014a). Similarly, the presence 
of political dynasties, where one family has its members both in the political 
and business fields to ensure that their interests are always protected, hampers 
changes. In this context, regaining these responsibilities will first require revi-
sions to the social contract.
The election of President Duterte has led to new and often paradoxical dynam-
ics in Philippine politics. On the one hand, while the administration has employed 
authoritarian principles in implementing its policies, such as the concentration of 
state authority on executive institutions as well as penalizing representatives in the 
Congress and senators who do not support government policies by stripping them 
of key posts (see ABS-CBN News 2017; Morallo 2017), such moves are regarded 
as facilitating a more rapid formulation and implementation of policies. On the 
other hand, the government (including the DENR) has often resorted to the mobi-
lization of citizen groups in order to support government policies which may not 
adhere to the rule of law and also to discredit political opposition. As the ideal 
type suggests, the relation between the policy-politics stream the and polity stream 
can be adversarial, especially when bureaucracy limits the pace of policy-mak-
ing and policy implementation. Ironically, the Philippine government is not only 
instrumentalizing this bureaucracy to exclude opposition, but it also seeks to cir-
cumvent this bureaucracy when it is not beneficial to the government’s interests.
Stream-alignment is defined by decisions reached more rapidly because of the 
exclusionary nature of agenda-setting. Although the confirmation of the appoint-
ment of DENR Secretary Regina Lopez was still pending, during her first months 
as secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources she was 
inclined to dominate agenda-setting, and other actors were not formally given the 
chance to express their perspectives (see Cordero 2017; Alvarez 2017b). Looking 
at the ideal type of institutional activism, then, Sec. Lopez pushed her adversaries 
out of the policy-making sphere, allowing them no formal channels with which 
to dissent. What followed was that these opposing actors sought other bargain-
ing avenues as they became aware that the “bargaining table” set by Sec. Lopez 
did not allow for bargaining at all, as former Sec. Lopez was not seen as being 
prepared to accept compromises. As Sec. Lopez had already employed a highly 
221
‘competitive’ negotiation style, other actors sought to shift the forum and estab-
lish another ‘bargaining table’ that would have either excluded her or limited her 
prerogatives. Industry actors had already foreclosed on the possibility of working 
together with Sec. Lopez (see Simeon 2017). This led to the situation where a 
specific issue (here, mining) completely defined the course of the process (instead 
of the process defining the scope of the issues and how those issues should have 
been addressed), which produced negative-sum results, not only in mining poli-
cies, but also in other issues.
Former Sec. Lopez’ actions confirmed that institutional activism focuses on 
issues and outcomes rather than on processes. In the context of key economic sec-
tors ‘franchised’ to corporations and business groups, focusing on the process, for 
instance, would have witnessed Sec. Lopez first seeking to alter the playing field 
in order to change the rules of the game that had hitherto favored business and 
industry actors. Instead, she used the concentration of state authority in executive 
institutions to push for her environmental policies. In light of huge opposition, 
she used instruments typical of activist groups such as mass mobilization and 
aggressive rhetoric defaming mining groups as ‘environmental rapists’ and oppos-
ing politicians as ‘killing mountains’ (see Quismundo 2017; Simeon 2017). From 
the negotiation perspective, labelling other actors as the problem limits the sets 
of possible outcomes that are acceptable to all. The Philippine Business for Envi-
ronmental Stewardship (PBEST), an environmental NGO advocating for the com-
pliance of the country’s businesses with al environmental rules and regulations, 
argued that ‘responsible mining exists in the Philippines’ (Business Mirror 2016). 
PBEST explained that instead of being branded as the enemy of the environment, 
the mining industry could be seen as the actor that could (and should) provide 
resources and a culture of innovation to solve environmental problems.
Furthermore, the role of science has been reduced to that of mere instrument. 
This gave groups opposing Sec. Lopez the possibility to claim that decisions 
made by her were merely based on ideologies rather than on scientific evidence 
(see Tria 2017; Alvarez 2017b). Carlos David argues that statements by Sec. 
Lopez may be understandable as claims from advocates, but it sends the wrong 
message when it comes from the head of the DENR (Business Mirror 2016), as it 
oriented the mining industry as part of the problem and not the solution. In addi-
tion, due to structural limitations, academic discourse in the Philippines tends to 
move outside the “typical channels” of scholarly debate such as peer-reviewed 
journals and conferences. As Filipino scholars are considered “periphery schol-
ars” (Belcher 2009) with limited access to journals, debates are often conducted 
through opinion columns and sections of the newspapers, where academics and 
experts are able to quickly engage in public debate.
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Looking at the case of institutional activism in the Philippines and how it com-
pared to the ideal type, the context of (weak) governance in the country suggests 
that in order to facilitate sustainable, low-carbon transformation, major changes 
in governance structures are needed. The institutional activism of former Sec-
retary Lopez elucidates that policy-making in the country focuses strongly on 
specific issues (rather than processes) that foreground negative-sum outcomes 
inhibiting possible synergies and trade-offs between issues. In addition, should 
Sec. Lopez have been successful in implementing her policies, it would have been 
a big question as to whether these policies would even have been institutional-
ized at all, especially after the administration of President Duterte when a new 
government administration comes into power in 2022. It is more likely that her 
policies would have been completely reverted, thus implying a return to default, 
further contributing to uncertainties and vacuums. In addition, as she was seeking 
to change the mandate of her government agency (from a regulatory to a develop-
ment agency), she was also changing the internal functions and the qualifications 
needed for those placed in the agency. Doing so would have required her to deal 
with how to make a productive government office with people who may not have 
been in the right type of work due to the abrupt changes she made.
10.3  Conclusion—Lessons for Theory and for Practice
10.3.1  Lessons for Theory
The theoretical framework of the case study on the Philippines has provided an 
understanding of how institutional activism can both inhibit and promote sus-
tainable, low-carbon transformation. Looking at the ‘negotiative’ requirement 
of sustainable, low-carbon transformation, the benefits and risks of institutional 
activism are highly contingent upon existing power relations and structures as 
well as on the level of capacity and autonomy of the state. While institutional 
activism can facilitate rapid policy formulation, it can also use bureaucratic lever-
age to reinforce existing inequalities in countries with low social capital. Because 
institutional activism uses the same structures that have created such inequalities 
in the first place, institutional activism may reinforce authoritarianism by exclud-
ing other interests and finding ways to legitimize such actions through means out-
side of the legal framework, such as social networks.
Institutional activism may also have negative implications for democracy and 
participation. It may, for example, further weaken social movements. Because 
satisfying all social groups is not possible, institutional activists may proactively 
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seek to exclude other social groups that seek interests that oppose government 
policies. Therefore, institutional activism may unintentionally create new ‘social 
elites’ who will further weaken social movements, as disfranchised social groups 
will distance themselves from these social elites. In the case of the Philippines, 
environmental groups, for example, which are seeking to enhance the use of 
renewable energy will be easily labelled as ‘ecological elites’, delegitimizing the 
goals of these groups in the eyes of other disfranchised social groups. This devel-
opment will most likely undermine the transformation process, especially because 
cooperation between these groups is inevitable. Furthermore, institutional activ-
ism may induce violence as adversaries are not given effective political channels, 
especially when decisions, such as the closure of mines, will be linked to the 
realm of the personal, such as livelihoods and incomes of households.
Furthermore, disfranchising (previously powerful) stakeholders such as 
 business and industry groups is counterproductive, as this will provide these 
groups with additional resources to act as “spoilers” who, when outside the 
 policy-making process, are not bounded by the norms and rules of negotiations 
or consensus-building. Labelling them as the problem is not helpful, as it will 
prevent them from contributing to solutions. Like authoritarian policy models, 
institutional activism may also cause poor policy formulation and poor policy 
implementation, as these policies will most likely be challenged or reversed after 
the administration changes. Furthermore, institutional activism may decrease 
the threshold for future political abuse, as it provides “undemocratic practices” 
in democratic political regimes with more resources to legitimize undemocratic 
actions through social networks and concentrated executive power. Especially in 
democratic countries with weak governance structures like the Philippines, insti-
tutional activism can motivate policy-makers addressing other issues to resort 
to similar authoritarian actions, especially when there is substantial opposition. 
Ignoring the principles of the “rule of the law” and due process as long as legiti-
mizing factors can be found to support such actions creates precedents for future 
authoritarian practices. Therefore, environmentalism should also be subjected to 
formal and material democratic principles.
10.3.2  Lessons for Practice
The strategy of  Sec. Lopez in eliminating the negotiatory or bargaining aspect 
of environmental policy-making was successful in eliminating reciprocity in this 
specific policy game. The absence of initial inequality in power motivated the 
mining and industry sector to shift the bargaining process to a forum where they 
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could have procedural inequality. This was possible because of the monolithic 
architecture of policy-making frameworks. As Sec. Lopez adopted the strategy of 
“demonizing” the mining and industry sector, the latter reciprocated and provided 
arguments that saw Sec. Lopez as the problem.  Sec. Lopez’s appointment and her 
subsequent failure to acquire confirmation of her appointment from the Commis-
sion of Appointments of the House of Representatives can be seen as a demonstra-
tion of the different negotiation processes that need to be adequately prepared for.
Policies and polities should be separated from politics or, if not, should be 
above politics. While policies should reflect consensual processes, polities guar-
antee the rules of the game. Politics brings the dynamics in process, as new agen-
das are identified, or existing norms revisited following the emergence of system 
pressures due to incremental changes. Nevertheless, this can only function when 
those in power ‘respect’ the boundaries between streams. If this is not the case, 
the pragmatic approach is to ‘go with the flow’ and for those actors in the polities 
and politics stream to find ways of embedding themselves in the policies stream.
The Philippine case study demonstrates the importance of social movements, 
activists, and non-profits as advocates. It also shows that these groups are not 
resistant to existing structural privileges, particularly when these privileges allow 
them to purportedly achieve their goals. However, as Bass et al. (2014) claims, 
advocacy is about relationships and about changing power dynamics. These 
groups should not forget their initial mandate and should look at how existing 
structures are responsible for the inequalities that mobilized them in the first 
place. When in power, like in the Philippines, they should seek to alter relation-
ships and change power dynamics.
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The United States of America—
Disruptive Governments, Social 
Movements and Technocrats 
in Transformation Processes Towards 
Sustainability
The election of the populist Donald Trump to the United States is argued to be 
a consequence of the fluke of the electoral college, the lackluster Democratic 
turnout, and the anti-establishment and populist sentiments in the population (see 
Atkins 2017). Through effective gerrymandering after the 2000 general elec-
tions, the Republican party and its presidential candidate Trump won the elec-
tions, even though he lost the popular vote by close to 3 million ballots. Another 
example of the flaw of the electoral system is shown by the 2018 midterm elec-
tions. Although the Democrats gained 56.9 percent of popular votes (or more 
than 12.5 million more votes than the Republicans), the Republicans still retained 
their control and even extended their majority in the Senate (Burns 2018). With 
the Republican Party controlling the executive, legislative (senate) and judicative 
branches, as Stephen Crowley (2016) notes, the checks and balances of the US 
political system will therefore need to come from social movements.
The goal of this chapter is to analyze and conceptualize the role of social 
movements, advocates, non-profits, profit-oriented/private sector enterprises, and 
other civil society groups in facilitating sustainable, low-carbon transformation in 
a political framework or context that is partially or fully adversarial or hostile to 
this transition. Best practices can be derived by understanding the resources and 
strategies available to these social actors in countering the actions of the state and 
government agencies which aim to reverse previous decisions that are conducive 
to low-carbon transformation. Can social movements provide genuine resistance 
dynamics to oppose new policies that aim to disrupt the transformation process 
towards sustainability? In addition, a comparison of these case studies to the theo-
retical models (ideal types) will be conducted. The United States will be analyzed 
using the technocratic/bureaucratic policy, as well as post-democratic model. Fur-
thermore, the analysis of the United States will highlight how certain civil society 
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groups are intentionally or unintentionally promoting technocracy as the policy 
model that can resolve highly escalated bipartisan politics in the country.
After the election of President Trump, several experts and the media were 
quick in predicting ‘system rupture.’ There are several silver linings to these 
events and insights into the idea that the election of President Trump could actu-
ally promote sustainable, low-carbon transformation in the long run. For example, 
David Atkins (2017) of the Washington Monthly notes that the 2020 elections are 
far more important than those of 2016, as the Democrats were unlikely to win 
both. He explains that elections in every zero-year coincide with the Census. In 
this regard, those who win the governorships and legislatures in the zero-year 
have control over the district lines redrawn after the Census. He notes that this 
is the most important reason why Democrats continue to lose the House despite 
winning more overall popular votes, as the Republican electoral victory in 2010 
allowed them to gerrymander Congressional and legislative district lines in the 
United States to the party’s advantage. With the Republicans winning the 2016 
elections, although losing more than 2.8 million of popular votes, the chance for 
the Democrats winning the 2020 elections becomes more likely and would allow 
Democrats to redraw those lines after an even more favorable census, potentially 
giving them a decade of dominance similar to that currently held by the Repub-
licans. Nevertheless, this argument does not resolve the structural imbalances 
and deficiencies of the US political system. But from the perspective of sus-
tainable, low-carbon development, this structural imbalance can help long-term 
 transformation.
In addition, columnist Sophie Roth-Douquet (2016) suggests that one factor 
that made the election of President Trump possible was the apathy of millennials 
towards politics, which resulted in low voter turnout among voters under the age 
of 30, a cohort which mostly favored Sec. Hillary Clinton. She further explains 
that this election could be a wake-up call for millennials, reminding them of the 
importance of civic engagement. Months after the 2016 elections in the United 
States, the new term ‘rage donations’ emerged, describing an increase in contribu-
tions to non-profit and civil society groups (Pfeiffer 2016), particularly civil rights 
and environmental groups. For example, contributions to the American Civil Lib-
erties Union of Massachusetts have increased by 500 percent. The Conservation 
Law Foundation in Boston witnessed a 222 percent increase in donations. The 
environmental group Sierra Club added 11,000 new monthly donors, while the 
Environmental Defense Fund raised USD 250,000 in the week after the election 
(Eckhouse 2016). Donations to EarthShare Washington and Forterra increased by 
40 percent and 57 percent respectively (Ryan 2017).
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Moreover, in terms of the improvement of the capacity of non-profits and civil 
society groups, the 2016 election of President Trump has led major corporations 
and business groups taking a clearer position on supporting climate protection 
and environmental integrity. On May 10, 2017, after the announcement of with-
drawal from the Paris Climate Agreement by President Trump, the CEOs of 30 
major companies, including Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft, bought full-
page ads in major US newspapers to argue that remaining in the Paris Agreement 
is in everyone’s best interests. Elon Musk, the founder of Tesla and SpaceX, and 
Robert A. Iger, the CEO of Disney, eventually left the economic advisory coun-
cil for President Trump (Victor 2017). Jeff Immelt, the CEO of General Electric, 
expressed his disappointment and called for the industry to lead and not depend 
on the government (Victor 2017). The academic community joined the protests, 
with eighty-two presidents and chancellors of universities expressing their sup-
port for the Paris Climate Agreement (Tabuchi & Fountain 2017). In addition, 
several U.S. cities and states have announced that they will adhere to the climate 
agreement by looking at ways to reduce emissions, including negotiating con-
tracts with local utilities to supply more renewable energy, building rapid transit 
programs, and other infrastructure projects like improved wastewater treatment. 
For example, the mayor of Salt Lake City, Jackie Biskupski, announced that her 
administration had brokered an agreement with a local utility to power the city by 
deploying 100 percent renewable energy by 2032 (Tabuchi & Fountain 2017).
The main hypothesis of this case study is the following:
Transformation processes have self-adaptive capacities through which disrup-
tive governments and other actors will have lower leverage to reverse the transfor-
mation process.
A technocratic policy pathway is perceived as a short-term solution when 
addressing the ideological divide in the United States. The current inability of 
bipartisanship to achieve substantial policy goals promotes the rise of a new gen-
eration of technocrats. The current contestation over a general lack of adequate 
political representation in the United States further undermines public trust. 
Where there are no imminent solutions to such a legitimacy (representation) cri-
sis, technocrats can provide other forms of legitimization. When technocratic 
stewardship can effectively encourage utilitarian outcomes that would ultimately 
generate the broadest benefits for the most number of Americans, a new social 
contract can be found.
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11.1  Context—Sustainable Low Carbon 
Transformation Under Protectionism 
and Isolationism
11.1.1  The Paris Agreement and Responses from the 
United States
The U.S. federal government under President Trump is pursuing protectionist pol-
icies that have direct and indirect ramifications on climate protection, sustainable 
development, and energy security. This section contextualizes climate and envi-
ronmental protection, sustainable development, and energy security as well as the 
interlinkages between these policy goals in the United States.
11.1.1.1  Climate Change Discourse in the United States 
Under President Trump and the U.S. Response to the 
Paris Climate Agreement
On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States 
from the Paris Agreement, which was followed by a formal communication to 
the United Nations of its intent to withdraw. This announcement aimed to ful-
fil an electoral promise of President Trump to eliminate ‘burdensome’ regula-
tions on the energy industry in the country and to revive the coal industry, which 
he concretized in his ‘America First Energy Plan.’ Originally, the United States 
would have had to implement both the Clean Power Plan and the Climate Action 
Plan, which was forged by the administration of President Obama, in order for 
the United States to meet its 2025 Paris Agreement commitment or NDC, which 
means a reduction of emissions by 26–28 percent below 2005 levels including 
Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). With pre-Trump climate 
policies still in place, including the Clean Power Plan, this would only reduce 
emissions to 10 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 (Climate Action Tracker 
2017c). With the suspension of the Clean Power Plan, emissions in 2025 are 
likely to be higher, at 7 percent below 2005 levels. Although, legally, the NDC 
remains in place as it is until at least 2019, the Trump administration has already 
stopped the implementation of the NDC at the federal level (Climate Action 
Tracker 2017c).
The ‘America first’ ideology of President Trump can also be translated as the 
withdrawal of the United States from its leadership role in global politics as it 
pursues national protectionism and isolationism (see Hardt & Mezzada 2016). 
This withdrawal can be used as leverage to demand more favorable terms, for 
example, in global trade. President Trump’s USD 10 billion reduction of  spending 
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on diplomacy, foreign assistance, and contributions to international organiza-
tions, including 50 percent of US contribution to the World Bank’s International 
Development Association, is seen as negatively affecting anti-poverty programs 
in (mostly) developing countries (see Simmons 2017; U.S. Department of State 
2017; Morello 2017).
11.1.1.2  Economic Development and Energy Security Policies 
in the United States—The Return of a Fossil-Based 
Energy and Economy System
Immediately after the election, the Trump administration started to review all 
environmental and energy policies made not only during the term of former Pres-
ident Obama, but also during earlier terms. Energy security through fossil fuel 
production expects to gain political momentum as energy production security has 
been ‘coupled’ with job security, which has been highlighted as a major prior-
ity of the government. The Administration’s ‘America First Energy Plan’ and the 
goal of U.S. ‘Energy Dominance’ are perceived as an encouragement of increased 
domestic production, reflected in the increased number of rig counts and drill-
ing permit applications in the first months of 2017 (Blackmon 2017). The ‘Amer-
ica First Energy Plan’ does not mention renewable energy at all, which confirms 
the government’s focus on fossil fuels. On several different occasions, President 
Trump complained about how expensive renewable energies are and about the 
subsidies renewable energy companies are receiving (Associated Press 2017). In 
a speech in the last week of June 2017, President Trump declared that this is the 
‘golden era’ of U.S. energy, through which dominance will be asserted through 
the country’s increased natural gas, coal, and petroleum exports, and identify-
ing Eastern Europe and Asia as important markets for U.S. liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) exports (DiChristopher 2017).
In order to implement these plans, the Trump administration is reviewing 
 linkages between energy production and environmental protection, where envi-
ronmental protection measures that ‘constrain’ these plans are lifted. For exam-
ple, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke ordered a review of a conservation plan forged 
by the Obama administration to protect the greater sage grouse. The review 
aimed to determine if the plan interfered with the Trump administration’s efforts 
to increase energy production on federal lands (Greshko et al. 2017). In addi-
tion, President Trump signed an executive order that ordered a review of bans on 
offshore oil and gas drillings in parts of the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, 
as well as a five-year oil leasing roadmap that excluded Alaska’s Beaufort and 
Chukcho Seas. Moreover, the executive order also halts the designation or 
expansion of National Marine Sanctuaries, unless the move includes an Interior 
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 Department estimate of the area’s ‘energy or mineral resource potential’ (Greshko 
et al. 2017).
Expedited by the signing of the presidential memoranda to revive both the 
Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines on January 24, 2017, the U.S. State 
Department, on March 24, 2017, granted Transcanada Corporation a permit for 
the construction of the 1,200-mile (1,931-kilometer) Keystone XL pipeline, 
which will connect oil sands from Alberta, Canada to refineries in Texas (Muf-
son & Eilperin 2017; Greshko et al. 2017). This project is the fourth phase of the 
Keystone Pipeline System that was rejected by then President Obama due to envi-
ronmental concerns and conflicts with Native American communities.
In addition to energy production based on an inclination towards coal, the 
Trump administration has announced the promotion of fossil fuels, particularly 
in the transport sector. President Trump appointed ExxonMobil CEO Rex Till-
erson as Secretary of State. Furthermore, on March 25, 2017, EPA administrator 
Scott Pruitt and U.S. Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao initiated the recon-
sideration of the emissions requirements for vehicles with model years between 
2022 and 2025 by pursuing the rollback of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) standards, which aim to improve cars’ fuel economy.
11.1.2  Multiple Entry Points to Climate Mitigation 
and Sustainable Development in the United States
As previous chapters suggest, entry points can be understood as problem-issues 
related to other policy priorities such as sustainable development and energy 
security, whose resolution can be coupled with climate mitigation in particular, 
that is, with emission reduction through renewables or through energy efficiency 
technologies. This section identifies two major entry points to climate mitigation 
and sustainable development in the United States that are driven by non-profits 
and social movements. Another entry point is driven by the business and financial 
sector as they seek to diversify and expand their global and domestic value chain.
11.1.2.1  Non-profits, Civil Rights & Liberties Groups, 
and Social Movements as Entry Points to Climate 
Mitigation
The resurgence of social movements in the United States can be a major entry 
point to climate mitigation and sustainable development goals. For decades, and 
especially after the 2016 US elections, coalitions and alliances between social 
movements have led to the process of knitting together horizontal relationships, 
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and to the expansion of political consciousness and interests between groups, not 
only between groups within the United States, but also between movements from 
other countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America with their U.S. coun-
terparts. For example, the ‘inextricable’ link between addressing climate change 
and defending indigenous rights have placed the current environmental policies 
of President Trump in conflict with indigenous communities (Hardt & Mezzada 
2016). Racial justice, as sought by the Black Lives Matter protests, is linked with 
gender, sexuality, and economic justice, which cover several elements of sustaina-
ble development. This ‘venue shopping,’ as borrowed from legal studies by Frank 
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1991), is an effective strategy of searching for a 
more receptive venue to achieve interests.
Meredith Rutland Bauer (2016) suggests that the current Trump protests could 
be the start of a new civil rights era. The election of President Trump has led to the 
enhanced capacities of social movements as donations and membership have risen 
by rates that were unimaginable before the 2016 elections (see above). Civil liber-
ties and rights movements have expanded their demands by integrating other related 
issues. For example, defending indigenous rights now coincides with demands 
to adequately address the effects of climate change and of the fossil fuel-driven 
industry projects in indigenous communities. Racial justice now includes compo-
nents of gender, sexuality, job security, and local community development, which 
are important pillars of sustainable development as summarized by the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The 2011 Occupy movement included racial justice as 
a central component of its issues, as it is related to social inequality. In addition, as 
many groups see climate change as one of the major causes of migration from Mex-
ico, empathy with illegal and undocumented Mexican migrants is easier to commu-
nicate (see Fox & Hernandez 1992; Rong 2010; Berrueta et al. 2015).
11.1.2.2  Urban Economic Development—The Emergence 
of Smart Cities and Smart Enclaves
With the expected reduction of federal funding for sustainability projects, the 
concept of ‘smart cities’, which has thrived in the past several years, will require 
a reconfiguration of local governance, because, particularly in the United States, 
the idea of ‘smart cities’ has been connoted with huge involvement from the fed-
eral government through funding (see Shelton & Clark 2016). Apart from the 
likely withdrawal of the Trump administration from promoting smart cities, revis-
iting the concept of smart cities calls for new questions on governance. Changes 
in federal policies will require new forms of partnerships, particularly between 
local governments and non-profits, to plan and deploy technologies linked to 
smart cities.
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Smart cities can promote climate mitigation as they aim to reduce energy con-
sumption through efficiency. However, as Shelton and Clark (2016) suggest, the 
idea of smart cities raises “questions about techno centrism in the reproduction of 
inequality and socio-spatial fragmentation.” Therefore, while social movements 
are generally beneficial in pursuing climate protection goals, and the election of 
President Trump may paradoxically ‘empower’ social movements, smart cities 
and urban development, the entry point to climate change mitigation need to be 
carefully facilitated, because the vindicated involvement of social movements 
may further reinforce technocratic policy models, which may in the long-term 
undermine the quality of democracy.
Subsequently, as Jeffrey Berry and Kent Portney (2014) have identified, most 
non-profits are local in nature, serving the interests of local communities or even 
mere neighborhoods. As such, non-profits are often more successful in influenc-
ing local policies than federal policies. Apart from the way in which non-profits 
are behaving after the election of President Trump, the roles of social movements 
in urban or communal political systems in the United States have already been 
changing in the past several years. One example of changes in urban politics 
is the increasing importance of the ‘politics of space’ (Berry & Portney 2014), 
which refers to how non-profits and other social movements are more able to 
interact with local policymakers.
A major reason for failure in or the limitation of the environmental agenda 
being able to reach the majority of the US population is attributed to the histori-
cal development of environmental movements, where environmental movements 
traditionally concentrate on what is most visible in national politics. After the 
election of President Trump, there has been a shift of centers of environmental 
activism, from the federal capital of Washington D.C. to cities and local com-
munities. As discussed above, compared with environmental groups, non-profits 
have focused on local issues. With this shift in environmental advocacy, the inter-
linking of interests between different non-profits can be more successful. Particu-
larly because some cities are now opting for a ‘stronger’ environmental profile, 
new partnerships between environmental groups and other non-profits are more 
likely to occur. As more ‘smart cities’ and ‘smart enclaves’ are emerging in the 
United States, climate mitigation in the context of a federal government under 
President Trump will most likely continue to evolve around the kind of urban 
economic development that is highly dependent on social movements, local busi-
nesses, and industry sectors. Cities in the United States have already assumed a 
leading role in designing and implementing innovative policies to achieve sustain-
ability (Portney 2013).
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One interesting factor that has further promoted the emergence of these smart 
cities is the change in the political ecology of most cities. As Berry and Portney 
(2014) have observed, major companies and corporations have migrated to the 
suburbs or moved their headquarters to major U.S. cities such as New York City 
to reflect a new global focus. The diminished role of corporations in local politics 
has benefited leaders and representatives of non-profits, including citywide civic 
organizations, social service agencies, environmental groups, and neighborhood 
associations, as local politicians are seeking more interactions not only to win 
elections, but also to address various issues through consultations.
11.1.2.3  Private Investment—The Invisible Hand 
of Corporations and Business Entities
Another important entry into climate mitigation in the absence of federal support 
in the private and business sector. Before the election of President Trump, US 
domestic climate policies focused on state policies and federal incentives such as 
subsidies for renewable energy. On the day President Trump withdrew from the 
Paris Climate Agreement, the governors of California, New York and Washington 
announced the formation of the United States Climate Alliance, which is a coali-
tion of states committed to meeting the objectives of the 2015 Paris Agreement 
on Climate Change. After many months, this coalition has now incorporated 14 
states and Puerto Rico, and it also includes several states with Republican gover-
nors (Rogers 2017).
While these federal states, which emit 21 percent of U.S. carbon emissions, 
cannot make a significant difference in terms of global emissions, this coalition 
can act as a bandwagon, where, as path dependence theory argues, it is more 
expensive for non-members not to join, especially for Republican states like Iowa 
and Texas, which have a large wind industry. If leaders of non-member states 
can ‘frame’ the issue as supporting renewable energy rather than mitigating cli-
mate change, the coalition can expect to gain more political support and bipar-
tisan endorsement at the state level. However, as past U.S. climate policies have 
depended heavily on federal subsidies, new agencies are needed to compensate 
for the absence of these federal incentives for renewable energy. Nevertheless, 
as many proponents of the ‘free market’ would argue, government subsidies can 
inhibit innovation as they may, for example, send wrong signals to the market 
(Wallsten 2000; see Brodwin 2013)
In a report published by Apex Clean Energy and the GreenBiz Group (see 
Abraham 2017), a survey of 153 major public and private U.S. corporations 
 concluded that 84 percent of these companies are still “actively pursuing or 
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 considering purchasing renewable energy over the next 5 to 10 years.” In addi-
tion, 43 percent of these companies intend to be more ambitious in their pur-
suit of renewable energy in the next two years. According to 87 percent of those 
actively pursuing renewable energy purchases, the election of President Trump 
had no impact on their decision, while 11 percent were more inclined to purchase 
renewable energy after the election. The major reason behind this preference is 
not political, but rather economical. Diversifying energy portfolios in terms of 
energy sources and geography through the inclusion of renewable energies is 
an important instrument against the rising and variable costs of fossil fuels. The 
surge of renewables is therefore something that will happen in a matter of time, 
because the tipping point that favors renewables may have already been passed.
With the investment behavior of corporations and business entities not sig-
nificantly altered or hampered by the election of President Trump, infrastructure 
development, which is profoundly necessary to complement the deployment of 
clean energy technologies and the upfront costs of renewables are expected to 
decline. As several corporations and investors continue to develop digital secu-
rity technologies (in terms of propriety technologies and digital information), 
the deployment of renewable energy becomes increasingly imminent, because, 
for example, digital technologies will further eliminate caveats for the deploy-
ment of renewables through smart technologies (e.g., smart grids, smart homes). 
With incremental learning already taking place, contributing to the maturity 
process of renewable energies, fossil fuel energies will most likely find it more 
difficult to compete in the future. The current U.S. administration will most 
likely further increase the dependence on the oil and coal sectors with federal 
government subsidies, making these sectors increasingly less attractive to new 
investors, particularly due to their volatility in upcoming years as new federal 
governments are elected, and upfront & maintenance costs for renewable ener-
gies are reduced due to new complementary technologies, innovation, and incre-
mental learning.
11.2  Case Study—Social Movements and Technocracy 
as Agencies of Deterrence Against Disruptive 
Politics in the United States
Particularly in the first months after the election of President Trump, social pro-
tests experienced a renaissance in the United States. As social capital, that is, 
the perception that state institutions can be trusted, deteriorated, especially 
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when President Trump has shown that he is implementing his electoral promises 
through executive orders and through ‘tricks’ (e.g., the fiscal budget) that were 
unimaginable, a ‘new era’ of social movements has emerged (see Rutland Bauer 
2016; Cobb 2017). In addition to an increased attention to social movements, a 
growing community of proponents of technocracy is becoming louder in propos-
ing that technocracy is the alternative governance system that can fix a ‘broken’ 
US political system (see Khanna 2017; Rohde 2017). Interestingly, as PayPal 
executive Peter Thiel argues, calling the United States a democracy is misleading, 
because a technocratic elite made up of career bureaucrats and appointed experts 
is already running the country, stealing governing authority away from citizens 
and their elected representatives (see Ferenstein 2015).
This section, however, argues that, after the election of Trump, the emergence 
of social movements, including non-profits and profit groups, may also further 
reinforce technocratic principles in a political system that is already technocratic 
in several of its core principles.
11.2.1  The Trump Administration and Social Movements—
The Re-emergence of Technocratic and Post-
democratic Governance Models in the United 
States
New and old forms of solidarity movements are being conceptualized and 
revived (e.g., total protest, civil disobedience). Interlinkages between issues have 
been rediscovered, paving the way for new alliances of non-profits,  advocacy 
groups, etc. As Jelani Cobb (2017) notes, the Trump era may be reinforcing 
the conviction of the 1960s, that “democracy is in the streets.” Nevertheless, 
social movements will need to evolve and reinvent themselves in order to pose 
 effective resistance to a disruptive political leadership. For Micah White (2016), 
the  difficult path of merging innovative protest, social movements and elec-
toral parties is the only viable strategy that addresses disruptive political leader-
ship. He highlights that fact that contemporary protest is ‘broken’ and that the 
 dominant tactic of mobilizing citizens to protest on the streets, rallying behind 
a single demand, and raising awareness about an injustice will not lead to the 
desired social change. Street demonstrations as manifestations of the will of the 
 collective will not shift sovereignty from the government to the protestors, unless 
such demonstrations create a movement-party. He concludes that the only viable 
way to transfer sovereignty back to the people is by winning elections. Social 
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 movements need to find ways to dominate elections. However, activism and advo-
cacies are still far removed from social movements.
Since the Clinton administration, a series of conservative social movements 
in the United States, including the rise of the Tea Party and ‘birther’ movements 
challenging the legitimacy of the country’s first Afro-American president, have 
emerged as a direct reaction to progressive and liberal policies. As Stephen Crow-
ley (2016) continues to argue, the social movements after the election of Presi-
dent Trump will need to have a strategic vision, which will also connect with the 
justifiable anger that drove many voters to President Trump. The United States 
has had powerful social movements in the past: the organized resistance to British 
colonial rule, the underground railroad and the abolition movement, the strikes 
and labor organizing of the 1930s spurring the New Deal, and the civil rights 
movement (Crowley 2016).
Social movements, especially environmental and scientific groups, have been 
mobilized to show their opposition to President Trump’s curbing of the enforce-
ment of environmental regulations and reversal of climate policies. For example, 
on April 22, 2017, thousands of scientists and supporters marched through Wash-
ington D.C. to the US Capitol, voicing support for science’s role in society. Other 
groups have dedicated themselves to fact checking in order to correct wrong 
information being circulated in the media and on social media. Other groups, 
such as the Environmental Integrity Project, published a report asserting that in 
the first six months of the Trump administration, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has filed fewer lawsuits against companies breaking pollution con-
trol laws in comparison with the first six months of the agency under Clinton, 
Bush Jr. and Obama (Greshko et al. 2017), resorting to ‘blaming and shaming’ 
tactics. With this, social groups, especially epistemic communities, have re-vis-
ited and renewed their social mandate. In addition, as a response to the listed 
actions of the current US administration, some federal state governments and US 
cities have formed an alliance that reaffirms their commitment to the implementa-
tion of the Paris Agreement. This so-called ‘green rebellion’ might initiate a shift 
in transformative policy-making from the federal government to the state govern-
ments.
In addition to the re-emergence of social movements, profit actors from the 
business and industrial sectors may also fill the vacuum created by the resigna-
tion of the state as an agency of transformation towards sustainability. As sev-
eral U.S. corporations stepped in to provide funding to renewable energy and 
energy efficiency technologies, they became ‘first movers,’ through which they 
were able to expand not only on their competitive advantages against other 
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 lagging corporations (e.g., by setting standards and introducing market barriers 
for non-conformists), they could also influence the agenda, methodologies, and 
interpretations of scientific studies in a way that was compatible with their inter-
ests. In the situation where profit actors are able to dominate more areas of social 
life, the United States could be heading towards post-democracy rather than 
technocracy.
11.2.2  A Comparative Analysis of the Ideal Type and the 
Empirical Case Study of the United States—Causal 
Mechanisms Through Congruence Methods 
and Process-Tracing
The comparison between the theoretical model (the ideal type) and the empiri-
cal case of the United States has proven to be highly insightful. In the context of 
low-carbon transformation in the United States, the disruptive leadership of Presi-
dent Trump has further complicated the process, where:
– This disruptive leadership has led to the mobilization of both profit-oriented 
and non-profit actors pursuing sustainable, low-carbon development.
– This disruptive leadership has motivated profit-oriented and non-profit groups 
to revisit and remodify their social mandate, put more attention on ‘low-hang-
ing fruits’, and evaluate loose ends.
– As several aspects of sustainable, low-carbon transformation are to be materi-
alized in local communities, non-profit groups have rediscovered their spatial 
advantages and recoupable resources.
– This disruptive behavior of the current federal government is not completely 
different from previous federal governments. For example, research funding 
through the federal government has been continually reduced, when compared 
with the 1960s and 70s.
– This disruptive leadership reinforces the existing technocratic and post-demo-
cratic qualities of the US political system.
11.2.2.1  An Ideal Type Analysis—Disruptive Political 
Leadership in the Context of Low-Carbon 
Transformation
Two scenarios will be analyzed when using the ideal types. The first scenario 
refers to the increased role of non-profit groups; as social movements overtake 
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various competencies of the federal state. In this scenario, non-profit groups build 
de facto institutions, or ‘shadow bureaucracies’, that run various aspects of 
social life in the United States. For example, with the emergence of smart cities, 
local, non-profit groups are able to exert more influence on local policy-making. 
Through their increased relevance to local policy-making and policy implementa-
tion due to their purported technical expertise, non-profits are able to function as 
expert committees. This scenario will be analyzed through the technocratic policy 
model.
The second scenario refers to the increased role of profit-oriented groups 
following the withdrawal of federal state funding, for example, in research and 
development. As the federal state reduces its role in providing services, profit 
groups are given space to provide services such as in education, health, and in 
compliance with environmental protection rules, especially when such ser-
vices can be linked with revenues. This scenario will be analyzed through the 
post-democratic policy model.
11.2.2.2  Low-Carbon Transformation in a Technocratic Policy 
Model
As discussed in Chapter 8 of this book, a (theoretical) technocratic policy model 
refers to a policy-making pathway where decision-making is initiated and exe-
cuted solely or predominantly by expert committees. The technocratic model of 
governance often looks at Singapore as an example, where expert, bureaucratic 
committees use electoral feedback, big data, and other kinds of analytical tools 
to determine policies that reflect, in the long-term, the utilitarian interests of the 
society (Khanna 2017). The decisive element of the technocratic policy model is 
an actor finding legitimacy for its governing authority through its technical exper-
tise.
As the following figure illustrates, in a technocratic policy model, the union 
of the policy and polity stream is the typical arrangement between policy-mak-
ers and the institutions managing or guiding the implementation of policies. 
The politics stream that reflects the low or limited participation of non-profits 
can contribute only indirectly to streams-alignment. Following streams align-
ment, further decisions are made in closed-door, expert committees, where 
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Comparing this theoretical model with the United States, non-profits can 
transform or at least ‘package’ themselves as the policy stream. The policy 
stream does not need to be represented solely by a government. When the 
government decides to abandon its leadership of the transformation process, 
others will emerge as viable alternatives. With the low-carbon transformation 
process already on its way, the process cannot be stopped, due to newly-estab-
lished critical junctures and lock-ins as well as potential pay-offs. Due to the 
convergence of norms and values as well as surpassing of the tipping point, 
not even a disruptive federal government can deter other ‘change agents’. 
The process is accompanied by a shift in policy-making towards the poli-
tics stream, and to a significant extent, to local policy-makers who are more 
likely to be pragmatic in their approaches. As the U.S. federal state increas-
ingly withdraws from its various competencies in environmental protection 
and sustainable urban development, more social groups (both profit-oriented 
and non-profit), come into the picture, which will most likely legitimize their 
involvement through their technical expertise, forming de facto ‘expert com-
mittees’ that define technocratic policy models. Non-profits can determine and 
institutionalize various norms and standards that can serve as benchmarks of 
the low-carbon transformation process.
In the United States, due to the withdrawal of federal state institutions and 
the expected disruptive behavior of federal government agencies, expert-social 
groups will depend on norms and standards to build de facto polities or bureau-
cracies that will guide the transformation process. As the theoretical model 
suggests, technocratic policy pathways will be highly dependent on institu-
tions, which implies a huge bureaucratic system. Nevertheless, with non-prof-
its able and more willing to influence local electoral processes, bureaucracies 
that matter in terms of the transformation process, although more likely to be 
fragmented and dispersed, will still manage to provide the functions required 
of polities, such as verification and compliance. With non-profits forming veri-
fication measures, particularly when due to lock-ins, noncompliance will bring 
more competitive disadvantages and costs, and social and economic actors will 
still commit.
The theoretical technocratic policy model assumes a high level of social capi-
tal in the short term as the public will tend to tolerate a lack of inclusiveness and 
transparency for the sake of technical efficiency. Nevertheless, in the case of the 
United States, the lack of inclusiveness and transparency are major reasons for 
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the emergence of the disruptive leadership. Therefore, non-profits need to consti-
tute more inclusive bargaining interactions, especially at the local level.
11.2.2.3  Low Carbon Transformation in a Post-Democratic 
Policy Model
A post-democratic policy model refers to a policy pathway that is democratic in 
nature but has some features that are typical of pre-democratic political systems. 
The theoretical model highlights the important role of the finance, business and 
industry sectors in policy-making, not only in regard to how they are able to 
lobby their interests, often at the cost of other social actors, but also how the 
space has become conducive to the lobbying of these sectors, as market-based 
principles & logic have been instilled in the narratives that legitimize political 
actions. When arguing that not going against the interests of the business and 
industry sectors will lead to the unacceptable loss of jobs or the loss of eco-
nomic competitiveness of a country, policy-makers are forced to accept their 
demands.
Comparing the post-democratic policy model to the United States, some 
elements of the US political system can confirm the post-democratic tenden-
cies of the country. The current withdrawal of the federal state in order to pur-
sue low-carbon, sustainable transformation reinvigorates the current devolution 
of state functions to private actors, particularly because privatization tends to be 
equated with rationalization and efficiency. With the various U.S. corporations 
still committing themselves to climate and environmental protection, monetary 
and economic values are increasingly defining the instruments of climate and 
environmental protection. As discussed earlier, one major entry point to climate 
mitigation has been identified through urban development (smart cities), which 
may further reproduce inequality among regions and cities as well as reinforce 
further socio-spatial fragmentation in the country.
As the following figure demonstrates, in a post-democratic policy model, busi-
ness and industry actors can access the policy stream, either through direct influ-
ences or through the norms and standards being followed by policy-makers. The 
polity and the politics streams can contribute to the streams alignment. Never-
theless, with the state ceasing to monopolize authority and welfare services, as it 
has privatized most of its functions, the state will be most likely concentrating its 
activities on bureaucracy (the polity stream). Here, the state becomes predomi-
nantly a security provider (Fig. 11.2).
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Due to the privatization of most of public services of the state, the state will 
most likely have low autonomy and low capacity. This means that the state will 
depend highly on other actors when implementing policies. Because it merely 
functions as a regulatory body, should the government initiate and pursue more 
ambitious targets it will need more assistance and collaboration from other actors. 
The success of government-led programs will be highly dependent on how the 
economic actors will think they will profit from these programs. In addition, the 
tolerable-window approach will be highly de-politicized and commercialized, 
which will most likely lead to the dominance of the financial over the social 
aspects of public life. Maximizing benefits with the lowest possible costs will 
frame political actions, leading to non-monetary values being unable to compete 
against monetary values in terms of political decision-making.
Moreover, bargaining interactions follow the market-driven and market-de-
fined framework for assessing the feasibility of policies. With the market logic 
defining the criteria for performance efficiency, the output orientation of legiti-
macy becomes the major driver of state actions. In a post-democratic policy 
model, as Hubertus Buchstein (in Crouch 2008) identifies, the re-definition of 
democracy through output-legitimacy opens the possibility of finding ‘functional 
equivalents’ to participatory legitimization, paving the way for dictatorial, aristo-
cratic and technocratic policy models to be classified as democratic.
The imminent loss of federal funding for various environmental protection 
projects could create a vacuum, which will most likely be filled by the private 
sector, including profit-oriented and non-profit groups. The withdrawal of federal 
funding will further increase the privatization of knowledge and expertise in the 
country. As scientific communities become increasingly independent from gov-
ernment agencies, scientific knowledge can be further privatized, which can be 
beneficial on the meta-level, as scientists can maintain independence from polit-
ical actors. Nevertheless, as is happening in the United States, the further pri-
vatization of this generation of scientific knowledge and technical expertise will 
be most likely accompanied by the federal government’s increased resignation 
from various areas of societal life, which has been taken significantly into private 
hands (e.g., Ivy League universities). As such, the state will lose more of its com-
petencies, which will be further assumed by profit-oriented and non-profit actors. 
This privatization of knowledge generation in the United States is not new, as the 
share of basic research funding provided by the federal government has been slip-
ping in recent years, from around 70 percent in the 1960s and 1970s to an esti-
mated 44 percent in 2015 (Science News 2017). In terms of non-profit groups that 
tend to pursue advocacy, some experts argue that government funding actually 
constrains advocacy (see O’Connell 1994; Reinelt 1994). For example,  Steven 
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Smith and Michael Lipsky (1993) argue that non-profits that are dependent on 
government funds are less likely to engage in advocacy for fear of alienating gov-
ernment funders, driving away possible sources of new funding, or reducing the 
flexibility of funding.
Dispersed decision-making and factional politics in post-democratic policy 
models is complemented by a centralized concentration of power in the inner 
ellipsis of decision-makers, further reinforcing transparency deficits. The pri-
vatization of several state functions and the market-orientation of the remain-
ing state policies will most likely lead to further shifts in power towards smaller 
membership of the elite, who are often referred to as the ‘millionaires from 
Martha’s Vineyard.’ As the US federal government increasingly withdraws from 
various services, combined with increasing political opposition from within the 
Republican Party, President Trump will most likely resort to executive orders. As 
observed by Chris Cillizza and Sam Petulla (2017), President Trump is set to sign 
more executive orders than any other president in the last 50 years. With 49 exec-
utive orders already signed between assuming office in January 2017 and October 
13, 2017, President Trump may resort to further executive orders after the possi-
ble loss of Republican control of the legislative branch, further limiting bargain-
ing interactions in the United States. With this, decisions and policies will be less 
likely the results of bargaining and persuasion involving all relevant stakeholders.
11.3  Conclusion—Prescription and Lessons
11.3.1  Lessons for Theory
The case study on the United States has provided the theoretical underpinnings 
of disruptions within transformation processes. Through theoretical models, 
this case study has attempted to provide an understanding of the ramifications 
of the emergence of a disruptive political leadership to the transformation pro-
cess. While the election of President Trump has mobilized and empowered social 
movements, both profit-oriented and non-profit, this empowerment can also fur-
ther reinforce the existing technocratic and post-democratic tendencies of the 
U.S. governance system, which can further expand legitimacy deficits in the 
country. The very same legitimacy deficits held responsible for the electoral vic-
tory of a populist leader can further erode public trust in institutions.
As suggested by several examples in Greece and Italy, technocratic and 
post-democratic policy models are often sold as effective solutions to dysfunc-
tional governance systems following various types of crises. However, as the U.S. 
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case study suggests, the transformation of profit-oriented and non-profit organiza-
tions into technocrats may further increase the gap between citizens and politics. 
The more the United States depends on the private sector, the more technocratic 
the country becomes, and the more exclusive policy-making becomes, the more 
inequality and socio-spatial fragmentation is reproduced.
11.3.2  Lessons for Practice
The implications of the election of President Trump for global climate protec-
tion can be analyzed through two perspectives—the implications 1) for the global 
order in general and 2) for global climate protection as a process. Without the 
intention of the current US federal government, it is paradoxically creating new 
opportunities for advancing global climate negotiations. Unlike with other global 
issues such as security and trade, the United States was, due to domestic pressure, 
not a leader in past climate negotiations. With the absence of U.S. leadership, 
there was a vacuum in climate negotiations, which European countries have tried 
to fill. Nevertheless, with the resignation of the country that, until recently, has 
emitted the most, European states are limited in their pursuit of an ambitious mit-
igation regime. They do not possess all the relevant resources to persuade or even 
coerce other states to support a mitigation regime that corresponds with the sort 
of climate integrity as proposed by epistemic communities. New major emitters 
such as China and India were reluctant to commit, because they calculated that 
the utility of committing was less than doing nothing (i.e. business-as-usual). This 
utility changed as the United States withdrew not only from climate negotiations, 
but also from other global regimes such as the UNESCO and TTIP.
The withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Deal is sympto-
matic, as it vindicates a bigger picture of a global hegemony in showing gradual 
resignation from this role. This resignation is, however, seen as an opportunity 
for other states with the ambition to replace the United States as the hegemon and 
profit from ‘hegemonic benefits’, such as forging global narratives and setting 
standards relevant for coordination and collaboration strategies. The US with-
drawal from the Paris Climate Deal as well as the reversal of almost all domestic 
climate policies forged not only by former President Obama, but also by earlier 
Republican and Democrat administrations, prevented the U.S. from any poten-
tial role in shaping future global climate regimes and institutions. Because of the 
linkages between climate protection and other issues, such as sustainable devel-
opment and energy security, this resignation from the climate regime will also 
mean less ‘Gestaltungsmacht’ (shaping power) in other global regimes.
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From the perspective of global climate protection as a process, there are new 
opportunities for advancing climate protection goals under the current US admin-
istration, which were not viable prior to the 2016 election of President Trump. 
As described above, the mobilization of social movements, the private sector, 
and state and local governments towards fulfilling the Paris Climate Deal is an 
unprecedented occurrence, and, if strategically used, can further advance cli-
mate protection as a process. However, embedding these actors into a global, 
climate-policy framework will need the resolution of several coordination and 
collaboration problems. It will, for example, require modifications of the norms 
and practices in global negotiations. Under which framework can the Federal 
Government of Germany, for example, negotiate with the City of Seattle with-
out involving the US Federal Government? In this case, which frameworks are 
available for the city of Düsseldorf to directly collaborate and coordinate with the 
City of Seattle? If local governments cannot be signatories of international trea-
ties, what alternative arrangements can be further supported? Should intra-city 
collaborations be the focal points of global climate negotiations? The answers to 
these questions will shed light on new agencies of global transformation towards 
sustainability.
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Jamaica—The Transformation Towards 
Sustainability of an Island Economy 
Under Austerity Measures
This chapter diverges from the previous case studies. In addition to a literature 
review and qualitative interviews of local stakeholders, this chapter also contextu-
alizes sustainable, low-carbon transformation by using an innovative experiment, 
where participants played the role of a decision-making government official com-
mitting to decisions under specific conditions (e.g., imposed austerity measures). 
When applied to Jamaica, the specific parameters of a scenario are assumed and 
through solution-oriented role playing, the process of decision-making is ana-
lyzed. The experiment employs a method, where a decision-making process is 
given a concrete space and time, which allows the identification of the main driv-
ers and dynamics. These dynamics may be significant when tracing the course of 
the process.
The aim of this chapter is, as with the previous case studies, to provide an 
empirical basis for new or revisited theoretical concepts. As in the previous case 
studies, this chapter commences with the contextualization of the transformation 
process in Jamaica through literature review and interviews. What are the unique 
factors that drive the behavior of various actors? What challenges and caveats 
inhibit the kind of policy-making that embraces sustainable, low-carbon transfor-
mation? Which entry points to climate mitigation can be useful in disentangling 
Jamaica from its multi-layered and complex carbon lock-ins?
The simulation game was designed and conducted by the author within the 
framework of a collaboration project between the University of  Technology 
(UTECH) in Kingston, the CARICOM, and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
 internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), where the author developed seven  modules 
of the newly established master’s Degree in Sustainable Energy and Climate 
Change, Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Participants of the simulation game 
were professionals from both the private and public sector, and who were enrolled 
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in the module on energy and environmental policies & economies. The profes-
sional background of the participants implies that they have significant (practical) 
knowledge of the issues involved. Most of the students are direct stakeholders 
in the low-carbon transformation process, which explains their enrolment in the 
master’s program and allowing the simulation game to touch upon institutional 
memories and professional culture.
12.1  Context—Stumbling Blocks and Barriers 
to Sustainable, Low-Carbon Transformation
As the theoretical model (ideal type) demonstrates, the contextualization of 
Jamaica’s transformation process will highlight the exogenous and endogenous 
factors that drive or hinder various processes relevant to the country’s sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation.
12.1.1  Carbon Lock-Ins
Sustainable, low-carbon transformation is an elusive project in Jamaica (see 
Makhijani et al. 2013; UNFCCC 2015; GRICCE 2017). Political, social, tech-
nological, geophysical, and economic conditions are inauspicious to sustaina-
ble, low-carbon system transformation. Suitable policies to achieve sustainable 
and low-carbon growth are effectively inhibited by (carbon) lock-ins (Charvis 
& Heron 2016). For example, the decision to construct the Freedom Highway 
from Kingston to the Northern part of the Islands inhibits the development of 
the railway system, as provisions were made to avoid direct competition with 
the toll-collecting highway (Williams 2016). The country’s high dependence on 
fossil fuels in terms of GDP/energy ratio and in almost all of its human activi-
ties is paradigmatic. Carbon lock-ins in Jamaica have limited the effectiveness 
of energy policies as stipulated by the National Energy Policy (2009–2030), the 
Addendum on Energy Conservation and Efficiency (2008–2022), the updated 
version of the National Energy Conservation and Efficiency Policy 2010–2030, 
and the Vision 2030 Jamaica (National Development Plan). These policies aim 
to promote energy conservation and efficiency. Such carbon lock-ins are com-
plemented by an inability in effectively addressing the shortcomings of renewa-
ble energies, such as the intermittency of wind energy (Reynolds 2016; Willie & 
Morgan 2016)
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Often labelled as a ‘hostage’ to oil, Jamaica’s oil imports exceeded the value 
of its total exported goods by 118 percent in 2010 (Ahmed 2017). Imported oil 
provides approximately 95 percent of the country’s primary energy services 
and accounts for over 90 percent of electricity production (MSET 2017), mak-
ing Jamaica highly vulnerable to oil price volatility. Serious implications for the 
balance of payments, inflation, business competitiveness, and household poverty 
can be connected to Jamaica’s energy insecurity. Exacerbating Jamaica’s energy 
insecurity further, is its high energy intensity and high inefficiency in the use of 
energy resources. Due to the central role of the bauxite and alumina industries, 
Jamaica consumes an average of 4,800 kWh per US$1,000 of GDP, which is very 
high compared to other Latin American and Caribbean countries (MSET 2017). 
Electricity losses on the grid are high, at 22.3 percent, of which 10 percent are 
technical and the rest are from theft and illegal connections (MSET 2017). In 
addition, as Al Binger (2011) highlights, Jamaica wastes more than half of the 
available energy from imported fuels.
The transport sector of Jamaica is the largest consumer of petroleum, account-
ing for 42 percent of total petroleum consumption in 2008 (Binger 2011). Still, 
with the relatively expensive toll fees of the highway to sustain its operations, 
the Jamaican government cannot reopen its passenger train service, which may 
undermine the operations of the national highway. As the officials of the Jamai-
can Railway Corporation highlighted during an interview (Hernandez 2016), 
railway services are unable to compete with other modes of transport, because 
of high maintenance costs and the lack of investment in infrastructure. In addi-
tion, ambitious and eventually radical efforts are needed to allow the shift to a 
carbon-neutral transportation sector. However, with the country’s electricity 
mainly being generated through oil-fired steam, combustion gas turbines, and 
combined cycle and diesel (Binder 2011), even the modernization of the railway 
system, which will be mainly powered through electricity, is expected to signifi-
cantly contribute to Jamaica’s de-carbonization. Therefore, the transport sector in 
Jamaica will remain a major source of carbon emissions in the long-term.
12.1.2  Social, Economic and Environmental Challenges 
to an Island Economy
As a small island state in the Caribbean, Jamaica is confronted by additional 
social, economic and environmental challenges typical to remote island econo-
mies (see Tisdell 2009). A major challenge is the interface between policies and 
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an economy with limited competition. Due to scale economies, governments of 
small island economies tend to resort more often to regulation to control prices 
as business companies and industries seek higher revenues in a non-competitive 
market (Tisdell 2009). However, the political connections of company owners and 
managers as well as the low bargaining leverage of governments against multina-
tional companies will more likely limit the effect of the ‘political will’ on regulat-
ing the market.
Small island states like Jamaica are highly vulnerable to imperfect market 
competition (see O’Sullivan 2003), particularly when trade commodities are 
involved. With imperfect competition, sellers are keen to influence the prices to 
earn more profits, particularly when limitations are unclear. The high prices of 
commodities are attributed not only to the limited number of sellers or traders, 
but also to de facto monopolistic competition, because sellers are selling highly 
differentiated products. Furthermore, Jamaica’s supply chain of commodities 
requires additional intermediaries, which further increase the costs of trade, as 
large traders are unable to connect to all dispersed small markets from various 
areas in urban and rural Jamaica.
The high prices of commodities are also attributed to Jamaica’s relatively high 
transportation costs, as the energy for transportation is provided almost solely by 
finite fossil fuels (Bedward & Simpson 2016). The limited number of inter-island 
transport options (McCalla 2016), as well as low frequency of transport connec-
tions in Jamaica, are responsible for the demand-supply imbalance following a 
situation where trade growth has outpaced the availability of transport services, 
leading to distorted signals about the demand for commodities (see Russell 
2017). The carbon lock-in of Jamaica’s economy sustains high transportation 
costs, as moving away from a carbon-intensive is inhibited by a complex set of 
other factors such as institutional barriers and high transition costs.
Like most small island countries, Jamaica has consistent trade deficits of 
around 20 percent of their GDP (Bank of Jamaica 2017). As of 2016, Jamaica had 
a negative trade balance of 3.55 billion USD in net imports (OEC 2017). Because 
trade accounts for around 50 percent of the GDP of Jamaica, lower demand of 
its bauxite used for aluminum production abroad will lead to significant losses 
in income. In addition, Jamaica is highly dependent on the United States as their 
main trading partner (52 percent of total trade), which undermines the resilience 
of the Jamaican economy. Related to these trade deficits, the negative capital flow 
in Jamaica is not only a sign of negative expectations with regards to economic 
growth, it also puts pressure on the economy. The −44.90 million USD capital 
flows in the second quarter of 2017 (−81.50 million USD in the first quarter of 
2017) (Bank of Jamaica 2017) demonstrate the relative weakness of the Jamaican 
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capital market and reflect the poor investment environment in the country, which 
further hamper economic development, as investors are reluctant to provide capi-
tal for operations and research & development.
Jamaica’s trade deficits and negative capital flow are directly linked to the 
country’s dependence on foreign aid and loans as well as on remittances from 
their citizens working abroad. Jamaica is one of the most indebted countries. It 
spends twice as much on debt repayment (1.2 billion USD) as it does on educa-
tion and health combined (600 million USD) (Dearden 2013). Although Jamaica 
has repaid a total of 19.8 billion USD for its 18.5 billion USD debt, it still owes 
7.8 billion USD as a result of high interest payments. In addition, Jamaica’s debt 
is inhibiting income growth in Jamaica, due to austerity measures imposed by 
international lenders. For example, in exchange for an IMF loan of 1 billion USD 
in 2013, four years of austerity are responsible for a 20 percent real-term cut in 
wages (Dearden 2013). Huge debt has been a constant burden for Jamaica for 
four decades, where the economy has effectively not grown since 1990. Natural 
disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012, have further increased indebtedness, 
as Jamaica seeks foreign aid and loans for its rebook.
To summarize, Jamaica seems to be trapped by carbon lock-ins and the result-
ing unfavorable economic conditions undermining the country’s attractiveness to 
foreign investors. While the tourism sector remains vibrant, partly due to austerity 
measures, Jamaica is lagging in improving infrastructure in non-tourist areas, fur-
ther inhibiting economic growth (Durrant 2016). Although its energy demand is 
almost solely covered by imported fossil fuels, the country’s efforts to expand the 
use of renewables are effectively hindered by the tendency of fossil fuel energy 
systems to be cheaper, better understood, and perceived as easier to employ.
A major factor that reinforces Jamaica’s carbon lock-in is the behavior of the 
society as a whole (see Binger 2011). Carbon lock-ins are deeply embedded in 
the consumption behavior of the majority of the Jamaican population. Jamaica 
is confronted with a high-consumption society, in which the consumption of 
commodities (e.g., household appliances and motor vehicles) is hardly driven 
by efficiency considerations. While the Jamaican government has already initi-
ated discussions aiming at giving energy efficiency and renewable energy more 
important roles in the country’s energy system (Wood 2016), it has been lagging, 
due to gaps in the kind of policy that aims to effectively raise awareness of the 
connections between lifestyle and energy use (Binger 2011). Moreover, because 
political attention tends to be given to renewables, the country fails to address 
the improvement of energy efficiency, because of the inherent belief that sav-
ings in energy costs will mainly come from the deployment of renewable energy 
options.
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12.1.3  Institutional Barriers
Functioning institutions are necessary for the successful deployment of sustaina-
ble energy, and ineffective institutions are a critical barrier to its growth (Knight 
2016). While small island countries tend to have a high need of regulation leading 
to a higher share of public sector employees in total employment, Jamaica’s pub-
lic sector is relatively small, hinting at capacity deficits in providing services to 
citizens. As of July 2017, the public sector accounts for 59,400 employees, which 
is 4.88 percent of the total 1,216,200 employed labor force in Jamaica (SIJ 2017). 
For comparative purposes, Nordic countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden have 
higher public-sector employment levels, reaching nearly or over 30 percent of 
total employment between 2009 and 2013. The United Kingdom and Barbados 
have, respectively, 23.5 percent and 22.03 percent of its total labor force work-
ing in the public sector (see OECD 2011). The public sectors of Caribbean coun-
tries the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic employ 33.7 percent (2009) and 
12.8 percent (2013) of the total labor force respectively.
Explanations as to the relatively small public sector in Jamaica are often 
linked to the country’s constant exposure to rigid austerity measures through its 
high debt. As the public sector is unable to compete with the private sector in the 
labor market for hiring employees with the needed technical expertise, the techni-
cal competence of Jamaican public sector’s employees is often questioned, inhib-
iting trust in state institutions. With the fast pace of technological advancement, 
regulatory bodies tend to struggle to catch up with regulatory provisions to ensure 
that other society priorities are not undermined. While the public sector is still 
perceived as a source of stable jobs, it is often the first affected by austerity meas-
ures imposed by creditors (e.g. hiring freeze).
In addition, some experts argue that a small public sector is partly responsible 
for the relatively low salary of private sector employees (see Malley & Moutous 
1996; Algan et al. 2002; Burdett 2012). Nobel laureate in economics, Christopher 
Pissarides (2000), argues that the public sector competes with the private sector in 
attracting the best workers through so-called ‘crowding out.’ A small public sector 
like that in Jamaica cannot compete with the private sector. In addition, a larger 
public sector that can offer higher wages will most likely provide workers in the 
private sector more leverage when bargaining around salaries and additional ben-
efits. Therefore, the public sector also influences the level of income in the private 
sector.
Sustainable low carbon transformation needs a public sector that is signifi-
cantly capable of dedicating resources, for example, to address complex energy 
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issues that are intertwined with other policy goals. Although government officials 
need to horizontally and vertically coordinate with colleagues from other govern-
ment agencies and ministries, they will more likely find it difficult to collaborate 
in the context of competition for limited public resources following impositions 
of austerity. For example, sustainable, low-carbon transformation requires the 
exchange of updated information necessary for sustainable energy planning. The 
entanglement of various aspects of energy sector governance will bear witness 
to the cross-cutting of competencies of a vast array of agencies and government 
structures, which may lead to a lack of clarity about final decisions in the energy 
sector or unnecessarily prolong or complicate permitting processes. Such a long 
and complicated permit process may further hinder the entry of renewable energy 
technologies. Due to their wide-ranging and often cross-sectoral responsibilities, 
many government officials lack the detailed knowledge of sustainable energy 
technologies, their economic and financial requirements, and alternative mecha-
nisms for their effective support.
With this contextualization of the various stumbling blocks to sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation, it is important that carbon lock-ins be identified, con-
ceptualized and addressed through an integrated approach to make policy-makers 
understand and concretize missed opportunities. The next section aims to provide 
an integrated understanding of the requisites of Jamaica’s sustainable, low-car-
bon transformation. What changes are needed to be implemented to effectively 
address lock-ins and related caveats?
12.2  The Agency and Audience of Sustainable, Low-
Carbon Transformation in Jamaica
12.2.1  Jamaica’s Response to the Paris Climate Agreement
Like many developing countries, Jamaica connotes climate change with vulnera-
bility. As a small island developing state, Jamaica is particularly vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change. Jamaica’s economic development is at risk, because 
its major economic sectors such as tourism, agriculture, forestry and water are 
climate-sensitive (UNFCCC 2015). As such, like in the Philippines, political dis-
course and narratives on climate change in Jamaica evolve mainly around adapta-
tion and seldom around mitigation. Nevertheless, Jamaica has announced that it 
intends to play its part in reducing GHG emissions through ‘no regrets’ emission 
measures (UNFCCC 2015). Emission reduction is also mainly framed from the 
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perspective of energy security, as Jamaica seeks to resolve risks and threats to its 
energy supply system.
Jamaica became the 143rd country to ratify the Paris Climate Agreement on 
April 11, 2017 when the Minister without Portfolio of the Ministry of Economic 
Growth and Job Creation officially presented the instrument of ratification at 
the National Climate Change Conversation organized by the Ministry’s Climate 
Change division (UNDP 2017). With Jamaica’s ratification of the Paris Agree-
ment, the INDCs have been adopted as NDCs, Jamaica will revise and update its 
NDCs by 2020 and will continue to update every 5 years thereafter.
The ratification was expected, because the agreement is aligned with Jamaica’s 
existing domestic policies. Climate change has been ‘mainstreamed’ in Jamai-
ca’s policy-making, which will integrate mitigation and adaptation in present and 
future policies. Jamaica’s National Development Plan, Vision 2030, which is the 
country’s long-term, sustainable development program recognizes the need for a 
healthy, natural environment. Other key policies that support the ratification and 
implementation are the Second National Communication (2011), the Climate 
Change Policy Framework (2013) and the National Energy Policy 2009–2030 
(2009). A major element of Jamaica’s climate policy is, as mentioned, climate 
change adaptation. Jamaica has developed a Strategic Program for Climate Resil-
ience (SPCR), as part of the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), to 
decrease Jamaica’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change.
In terms of mitigation, Jamaica’s intended nationally-determined contribu-
tion (INDC) will mitigate the equivalent of 1.1 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide per year by 2030 or a reduction of 7.8 percent of emissions compared 
to the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario of growth without policy intervention, 
which uses 2005 as a base year (UNFCCC 2015). However, under this BAU 
scenario, GHG emissions from Jamaica would increase by 37 percent by 2030, 
which implies a massive gap between expected emission increase and INDC 
under the BAU scenario. In addition, Jamaica will conditionally increase its aim 
to a reduction of GHG emissions of 10 percent below the BAU scenario, sub-
ject to the provision of international support. The Jamaican government aims to 
significantly reduce emissions growth and achieve its NDCs through a program 
of modernization of energy infrastructure and diversification of energy sources 
towards cleaner and renewable fuels (20 percent by 2030), pursuing opportuni-
ties for energy conservation and incentivizing efficiency. The Climate Change 
Division of the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change will 
coordinate the actions of various ministries, departments and agencies in imple-
menting Jamaica’s INDCs.
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12.2.2  Entry Points to Climate Mitigation, Energy Security 
and Sustainable Development
Entry points to climate mitigation, energy security and sustainable development 
in Jamaica can be identified through the contextualization of policy and market 
instruments.
12.2.2.1  Embedding the Informal Economy into Sustainable, 
Low-Carbon Transformation
The informal segment of the Jamaican economy is a significant issue when 
assessing sustainable, low-carbon transformation, because its size is estimated to 
be between 40 and 60 percent of the country’s official GDP (Torero et al. 2006) 
(compared with 16.1 percent of GDP in OECD countries or 8.4 percent in the 
United States, see Schneider 2005). With the established connections between the 
informal economy and emission growth (see Abid 2015; Bento et al. 2017), sus-
tainable, low-carbon transformation needs to include efforts not only to ‘formal-
ize’ this segment of the economy, but also recognize the potential ‘entrepreneurial 
spirit’ of informal sectors (see Soto 1986) that could be conducive to sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation.
The informal economy a broad range of activities conducted in the informal 
sector can be condensed to identify several common characteristics that includes 
all employment that is not bound by contract or other legal regulations, small-
scale operations, unregistered businesses, and all activities which generate rev-
enue that is not reported to tax authorities (Graham 2016). While the informal 
economy in Jamaica is usually attributed to a loss of tax revenues, which is esti-
mated to be around about 800 billion JMD in nominal terms per year, as well 
as to the evasion of environmental regulations and the vulnerability of workers 
due to a lack of government protection (70 percent of workers do not have legal 
contracts, see Torero et al. 2006), its impact on Jamaica’s sustainable, low-car-
bon transformation remains a huge knowledge gap. If the informal economy is 
largely unaccounted for in sustainable, low-carbon modelling, policy approaches 
and scientific & policy analysis, the effectiveness of policy instruments can be 
a major source of uncertainty (see Benson et al. 2014). Nevertheless, including 
the informal economy in sustainable, low-carbon policy-making will be needed to 
fairly address the reasons why there is an informal economy in the country in the 
first place.
For example, one possible reason for the existence of the informal economy 
is the lack of political will to address this, because formalization will most likely 
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further burden the poor. The informal economy is often seen as a major source 
of employment for those who do not have access to human capital. In addition, 
the informal economy is composed of various activities that are often reactions 
to fluctuations in the formal economy and provide ‘cushions’ in times of eco-
nomic crises, as unemployed people are able to secure income through the infor-
mal economy (Benson et al. 2014). In addition, because the informal economy 
is largely unaccounted for, it is difficult to come up with categories or types of 
informal economic entities, especially as these entities cover different sectors 
such as energy, agri-food, trade, mining, housing and waste management. While 
some of these are not major emitters, such as street vendors, or are even are help-
ful to the environment, such as informal waste-picking (see Benson et al. 2014), 
others such as artisan mining, informal housing, and car repair shops, are con-
tributing significantly to environmental degradation through uncontrolled and 
unmonitored pollution (see Abid 2015, Blackman and Bannister 1998; Lahi-
ri-Dutt 2004).
Various studies and reports have identified microenterprises in wholesale/
retail trade and agriculture as the main entities of Jamaica’s informal economy by 
employing almost 60 percent of the workers in the informal economy, followed 
by manufacturing as a distant third (see Torero et al. 2006). These microenter-
prises contribute to the income generation of women in particular (57 percent of 
the total number of workers in the informal economy, see Torero et al. 2006) and 
supply various commodities particularly needed in the rural areas of the country. 
Nevertheless, while some of these entities are financially incapable of installing 
technologically advanced pollution control equipment, others refuse to install 
such pollution control, particularly when the government is most likely unable to 
monitor and control these entities (see Blackmann 2000).
Calculating the amount of emissions from the Jamaican informal econ-
omy can only depend on ‘honest estimates.’ Therefore, the potential benefits of 
engaging the informal economy for sustainable, low-carbon transformation will 
need to look beyond mitigation to innovation at the grassroots level. As possibly 
implied by the significant number of microenterprises in the informal economy of 
Jamaica run by tertiary graduates (around 33 percent), the informal sector in the 
country can be tapped as an important driver of sustainable, low-carbon transfor-
mation. However, engaging Jamaica’s informal economy to commit to sustaina-
ble, low-carbon transformation will require the inclusion of non-state actors. The 
actors of the informal economy will most likely prefer the non-intervention of 
state actors, whose forms of formalization such as licenses, fees, and permits are 
linked to additional costs and limitations.
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12.2.2.2  Sustainable Tourism—Efficient Hotel Buildings
As tourism is a huge source of revenue and employment in Jamaica, mitigation 
efforts that will affect the tourism sector will require careful implementation. The 
direct contribution of travel and tourism to Jamaica’s GDP was 1.4 billion USD 
or 9.3 percent of total GDP in 2016 and is forecast to rise by 4.6 percent in 2016, 
and to rise by 5 percent per year from 2017 to 2027 to 13.4 percent of total GDP 
by 2027 (WTTC 2017). In addition, travel and tourism directly supported 97,000 
jobs (8.4 percent of total employment), which is expected to rise by 4.1 percent in 
2017 and by 4.4 percent per year to 155,000 jobs or 12.2 percent of total employ-
ment by 2027 (WTTC 2017). When jobs indirectly supported by the sector are 
included in the calculation, the total contribution of the travel and tourism sector 
in 2016 was 27.5 percent of total employment (318,500 jobs). It is furthermore 
expected that total employment will rise by 4.3 percent in 2017 and by 4.4 per-
cent in 2027 to a total of 40 percent (WTTC 2017).
With the expected growth of the travel and tourism sector, without additional 
climate policies, the sector will be a major source of emissions. Nevertheless, the 
sector can benefit from mitigation policies by contextualizing (co-benefits and 
synergies) new investment and decision frameworks (including narratives). While 
government mitigation policies can, for example, focus on reducing electricity 
costs, particularly those needed for the cooling of hotels, through the gradual 
replacement of imported fossil fuels and the deployment of renewable energies 
for a long-term perspective, the sector can actively highlight investments in 
enhancing energy efficiency. Particularly with the expected warming in Jamaica, 
hotels burdened with the crippling effects of higher electricity costs can be sup-
ported through new policies on demand and supply. The tourism sector can be 
further motivated to address these challenges through policy and market instru-
ments to promote efficient buildings that will significantly reduce energy con-
sumption. Nevertheless, the tourism sector will need additional support to achieve 
energy efficiency while it addresses the effects of climate change such as sea-
level rise, extreme weather events and erosion.
12.3  A Simulation Game—The Jamaican Energy Policy 
Under Austerity Measures
The energy policy game focuses on putting forward austerity measures which 
will create 250,000 jobs while reducing its debts to 117 percent of GDP, mod-
ernize the public sector by strengthening government capacity and effectiveness, 
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enhance energy security and energy efficiency to reduce its dependence on oil, 
and generate additional income to stabilize government spending (25 percent of 
the 2016/2017 government budget) of J$ 147.5 billion. Emphasis is also placed 
on evaluating the risks and barriers of the chosen measures (risks, unhappiness 
and ecological damage).
12.3.1  The Background of the Game
The newly elected Prime Minister Andrew Holness of the Jamaican Labour Party 
(JLP) has promised to reverse the hard austerity measures dictated by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). In 2010, Jamaica needed the US$1.27 billion IMF 
loan to support its plan to recover from mounting government debt, weak eco-
nomic growth, and the effects of the global financial crisis. While the government 
was able to restore economic stability, these measures are often regarded as unsus-
tainable, because the reduction of budget deficits was primarily attributed to the 
effect of low oil prices which allowed the government to reduce its spending on oil 
imports. The current low oil price gives the government a reprieve, but if Jamaica 
wants to have sustainable economic growth, it cannot speculate solely on global oil 
prices, especially because of the political crisis in Venezuela which might lead to 
the cancellation of the agreement providing Jamaica with cheap oil. It needs to take 
on the program to break the cycle of high debt (currently about 140% of GDP) and 
low growth, trapping Jamaica in a cycle of debt service and borrowing for decades.
The new government cannot reverse the reforms stipulated by the IMF loan. 
The government understands that the obstacles to Jamaica’s growth and job cre-
ation are numerous and severe. As identified by the IMF, the key problems for 
Jamaica are: crime, the cost and availability of credit, tax compliance costs, unre-
liable and expensive electricity, and a large informal economy. The IMF has also 
identified the need to address the large size of the public sector that has also sti-
fled private sector dynamism and places too much emphasis on government as the 
engine of growth and employment.
12.3.2  The Game—Goals and Instruction
The new government has tasked an expert panel with making recommendations 
to improve the fiscal standing of Jamaica. The expert panel has produced a list 
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of possible measures. The cabinet of the government conducts a meeting to eval-
uate the austerity measures suggested by the panel. Furthermore, the govern-
ment has tasked this panel with recommending measures to meet the following 
goals while meeting the austerity goals set by the International Monetary 
Fund:
– Create more than 250,000 jobs while reducing its debt to 117% (debt to GDP 
ratio) in 2017.
– Modernize the public sector by strengthening government capacity and effec-
tiveness
– Create an enabling environment for the private sector by fostering investments 
in high-potential sectors,
– Build social and climate resilience by strengthening social safety nets and by 
supporting the development of a comprehensive framework for disaster and 
climate risk management
– Enhance energy security and energy efficiency to reduce dependence on oil 
imports.
As members of the government cabinet, participants need to evaluate the meas-
ures presented and choose which measures are to be implemented to meet these 
political goals. This should be done while considering the social, economic, and 
environmental sustainability of these specific measures. Furthermore, participants 
should identify possible conflict cleavages, conflict parties, issues and other neg-
ative externalities and provide “compensatory measures” (including the costs of 
these measures).
The participants should follow the following steps:
The first step is to generate additional sources of income to allow much-
needed investment and to finance the increase of the income tax rate threshold 
(from J$592,800 to J$1,000.272). The assumed amount of needed additional 
income to stabilize government spending is 25 percent of the 2016/2017 govern-
ment budget or J$ 147.5 billion.
The second step after generating additional sources of income is to choose and 
evaluate measures that would implement the goals mentioned above. The expert 
panel have identified additional sources of funding available to developing coun-
tries under the framework of various development funds such as the climate fund 
or the clean development mechanism. The participants need to check Jamaica’s 
eligibility for this additional funding.
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The third step is to evaluate the risks and barriers of the chosen measures. For 
this game, each option shows the expected costs and expected revenues. Costs are 
shown as: Risk Points (RPs), Unhappiness Points (UPs) and Ecological Damage 
Points (EDPs)
Some measures are linked with risks (the probability that the measure will 
not work as well as externalities, trade-offs and co-benefits), public discontent or 
public resistance (leading to street protests and more social unrest), and ecolog-
ical damage points (leading to environmental damages). Aside from the goal of 
generating or saving J$ 147.5 billion, no set of austerity measures is allowed to 
have more than 10 RPs, 10 UPs and 2 EDPs.
Participants may decide to alter a specific value. For example, in suggesting 
measure no. 4, a tax may be introduced with a 20 percent increase (instead of 
10 percent as the expert committee suggested). This will lead to an additional 
75 percent of the initial value to reflect the marginal benefits of values. In turn, 
the RPs and UPs will be doubled, and EDP tripled. Some measures cannot be 
altered or doubled (marked with *).
12.3.3  Results and Interpretation
The three groups have produced a set of decisions as summarized by the follow-
ing three figures:
Group 1 (PHMEL) was able to come up with actual budget cuts totaling 
127.043 billion JMD. Adjusting this number to consider the marginal benefits, 
the group achieved a budget cut of a total of 106.84 billion JMD. Marginal ben-
efit adjustment refers to some measures that were doubled (or tripled) compared 
to the figures given by the expert panel. Group 1 decided to double the figures 
of the selected austerity measures (2a, 2b, 2c, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 20). Neverthe-
less, a doubling the provision on increasing income tax will not lead to a dou-
bling of the savings, because of the expected marginal benefit of factor 0.75. Both 
numbers are short of the required 147.5 billion JMD. In comparison, Group 2 
(HVSP) achieved budget cuts of a total of 125.804 billion JMD. Interestingly, 
the group decided to bridge the remaining amount through additional foreign 
loans and grants. Group 3 (AGBPB) on the other hand achieved cuts of a total 
of 150.854 billion JMD, which surpasses the required 147.5 billion JMD goal. 
When asked how the group was able to negotiate savings with such relative ease, 
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the group claimed they focused on the direct and indirect benefits of each 
austerity measure. When it became apparent that ‘harsh’ austerity measures 
would later yield to additional benefits, negotiations became less contested.
In terms of limitations to the Risk Points (RPs) (10), Unhappiness Points 
(UPs) (10) and Ecological Damage Points (EDPs) (2), group 1 met the limitations 
on UPs and EDPs with −9 and −27 points respectively. However, with 14 RPs, 
group 1 surpassed the allowed RPs. Group 2 managed to meet all the limitations 
on points. With 10 RPs, 0.5 UPs and −14 EDPs, it is expected that the budget 
cuts will not face fierce political and social resistance. Group 3 produced a set of 
austerity measures with the most favorable points. With 10 RPs, −2.5 UPs and 
−24.5 EDPs, group 3 vindicated the pattern of the usefulness of linking environ-
mental protection with other policy priorities. When environmental benefits of 
economic and political measures are ‘concretized,’ the linkages become clear and 
are easier to embed in their decisions. Furthermore, with the surprisingly ‘good 
EDPs’ of all groups, discussions were made whether a ‘points trade’ should be 
made possible following a similar principle of carbon trading, with RPs to be 
substituted by UPs and EDPs. This ‘trade’ can be further pursued in real life 
to facilitate decision-making.
Due to time constraints, groups 1 and 2 were not able to discuss the other 
aspects of the game, such as the identification of relevant stakeholders as well 
as the expected co-benefits and synergies, which could have provided them with 
additional resources to legitimize the austerity measures or to even bargain for 
further budget cuts. It was difficult for them to connect austerity measures with 
the creation of more than 250,000 jobs while reducing its debt to 117 percent 
(debt to GDP ratio). A possible explanation for this difficulty is that they did not 
completely understand the rationale behind the ‘points.’
On the other hand, Group 3 was able to initiate the assessment of budget sav-
ings using the imposed conditions, because the group tried to understand why 
a specific austerity measure was too risky to implement. For example, when a 
measure was expected to lead to job cuts, this measure was combined with dis-
cussions about contingencies such as additional policy instruments for job cre-
ation. This linkage made contextualization possible. In addition, by identifying 
the ministries and other related government agencies, group 3 was able to have an 
overview of the required government capacity that is needed to ensure the effec-
tiveness of the implementation of the austerity measures, while maximizing their 
co-benefits and minimizing the risks (Table 12.1).
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Table 12.1  Example: The Results of Group 1 (PHMEL) (own representation)
263
12.3.4  Observations from the Behavioral and Negotiation 
Point of View
The author of this book/game designer added and highlighted some game param-
eters that would test the negotiation behavior of the participants. As noticed by 
the participants (and written in the questionnaire), the need to negotiate with 
other stakeholders (other ministries) made decision-making very complex.
The following is a selection of observations made by the game master during 
the game:
Group 1
– Group 1, which consisted of all male participants, spent a significant amount 
of time (around 60% of time) discussing the procedures that were to be fol-
lowed. However, after the group was able to find consensus about the proce-
dures, the bargaining interactions became easier to conduct.
– There was a general impression that the participants were ‘territorial,’ because 
the discussions were often about the limitations of what they could accept 
as representative of a specific ministry. Because of this, it was difficult for a 
participant to assume the role of a facilitator in the negotiations. Often, a par-
ticipant who was indifferent to a specific issue intuitively mediated between 
participants who were obviously unable to move forward because of differ-
ences.
– Interestingly, on various occasions, humor (use of jokes) was used to ‘deflate’ 
some tensions between parties.
– Group 1 used all possible technical tools to make the visualization of values 
easier, such as the projection of an excel table showing all the measures that 
they have already reached. This visualization gave the group additional moti-
vation to work together as they become solution-oriented.
Group 2
– Group 2, which consisted of all female participants, focused on the fairness 
aspects of the provisions. The deliberations were often framed by concepts 
of fairness and equity. Interestingly, the participants apparently had a similar 
definition of fairness and equity, as one session of the module was dedicated to 
understanding the concept of fairness and justice. This gives the idea that it is 
important for participants of any negotiation to have a basic understanding of 
such concepts, as this will effectively facilitate negotiations.
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– Group 2 consisted of four participants who applied different negotiation styles 
(competitive, collaborative, cooperative, avoiding). One participant was highly 
competitive, two were rather collaborative and the remaining one was an 
avoider.
– The two collaborative participants were able to ‘contain’ the competitive par-
ticipant by highlighting benchmarks and objective standards. Because of this, 
the deliberations became highly analytical.
Group 3
– Group 3 consisted of both male and female participants. There were no clear 
gender-based implications of this composition.
– Interestingly, one participant connected to the group through Skype. Never-
theless, as expected, the internet connection was difficult, and he was discon-
nected most of the time. During the times he was briefly connected, he tried 
to unilaterally dictate the course of the negotiation until the connection failed 
again. This can be explained by his motivation to compensate for his absence. 
Nevertheless, the connection difficulty significantly delayed the negotiations, 
because the discussion was constantly repeated for the sake of the missing par-
ticipant. This experience implies the importance of ‘institutional memory’ and 
‘personal connections’ during deliberations. A participant that is new to the 
group will need additional time to catch up with the obvious and latent infor-
mation and the related signals needed to agree on decisions.
– All (except for the skype participant) were collaborative during the negotia-
tions.
12.4  The Ideal Type of Democratic Policy-Making 
Under Low Capacity and Low Autonomy—The 
Role of Austerity Measures and Carbon Lock-Ins 
in Jamaica
Jamaica has developed into one of the most stable democracies in the Caribbean 
region. While some election periods, such as the 1980 general elections, which 
was marked by over 800 casualties, have witnessed sporadic violence, Jamaica has 
never experienced a successful coup attempt since its independence in 1962, and 
although elections were often delayed by the incumbent government, elections have 
been regularly conducted and the opposition party is regularly able to win elections.
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12.4.1  The Material Value of Democracy in Jamaica
As identified in chapter 8, the manner in which political actors are able to align 
their political interests with public opinion or how they can shape public opin-
ion is an important subject of analysis of policy-making in democratic countries. 
Jamaica’s “dumb” democracy is currently challenged by legitimacy deficits as 
implied by the downward trend of voter turnouts since 1944 (The Gleaner 2016). 
The perception of disconnect between politics and societal interests fuels politi-
cal apathy, especially among the youth, which weakens civil society engagement. 
In turn, political apathy further reinforces legitimacy gaps. For example, approx-
imately 28 percent of the votes from the eligible electorate was enough to give 
a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives to the People’s National 
Party (PNP) in the 2011 elections. This was slightly improved in the following 
elections. In 2016, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) won the General Elections 
held on 25 February 2016 with 50 percent of votes (or 32 out of 63 seats) with 
only 47.7 percent voter turnout, which was the lowest since 1983, the year when 
the PNP boycotted the election.
Because many democratic countries tend to rely solely on elections as source 
of political mandate, input legitimacy is often taken as ‘default,’ evident and 
given. As such, some governments and state institutions do not see the need to 
build up their capacities to effectively engage and facilitate persuasive interac-
tions. As long as their decisions are within the boundaries set by the constitution, 
no additional efforts are identified and implemented to build the capacities of 
other stakeholders to actually and effectively participate in persuasion and bar-
gaining regimes. In Jamaica, while there is a stable democratic regime, state insti-
tutions are often overwhelmed by several lock-ins and structural impediments. 
For example, Jamaica’s dependence on fossil fuels and bargaining interactions 
that are allowed to define how the country will achieve sustainable, low-carbon 
transformation is not creating enough new impulses for the necessary changes.
As the ideal type of the democratic policy model suggests, the transformation 
process is not only dependent on the interactions between the three streams, but 
also on the drivers and brakes. In Jamaica’s case, carbon lock-ins have impeded 
stream alignments. In addition, local conditions, such as ‘brain drain’, have inhib-
ited consensus-building, as important stakeholders have limited technical capacity 
to actually contribute to consensus-building.
Carbon lock-ins limit the perceived available and feasible sets of decisions 
(and policies) in many ways, which constrain efforts to promote sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation. State institutions are confronted by its low  autonomy 
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and low capacity in facilitating functional, institutional, and bargaining interac-
tions among relevant stakeholders. The low autonomy of Jamaican institutions 
pertains to the multiple dependencies of these institutions on designing, imple-
menting and monitoring policies. Jamaica’s high dependence on foreign loans 
and remittances, as well as the related imposed austerity measures limit the abil-
ity of Jamaican policy-makers to make independent decisions without under-
mining its access to future loans. Low autonomy (translated to the ‘tolerable 
window’) is, for example, not being determined through streams alignment, but 
by foreign lenders and carbon lock-ins. Therefore, existing guard-rails tend to 
favor non-sustainable and high-carbon policies.
Jamaica’s low capacity can be significantly attributed to its relatively small 
size (around 4 percent of the total labor force). This and the paradoxical public 
perception that the Jamaican public sector is ‘too big,’ implying legitimacy defi-
cits, limiting its institutional capacity to address complex and intertwined issues 
in order to pursue sustainable, low-carbon transformation. Jamaica’s low capacity 
is further reinforced by ‘brain drain’, as the country lacks policy entrepreneurs 
with both technical expertise and knowledge of the local context. Knowledge 
diplomacy is therefore a huge challenge as technical and academic studies rele-
vant to Jamaica’s sustainable, low-carbon transformation is not able to catch up 
with emerging necessities. As such, Jamaican policy-makers, for example, often 
resort to studies and reports published by international bodies with limited (local) 
contextual value.
In addition, the rather weak social movement or civil society working on sus-
tainable development and environmental/climate protection in Jamaica pave way 
for certain (business) actors that represent the fossil fuel sector to over-propor-
tionately influence policy entrepreneurship (also called lobbying). Nevertheless, 
there are several environmental NGOs such as the Nature Conservancy which 
helped to create the Blue and John Crow Mountain National Park for which it 
brokered a Debt for Nature Swap (see GRICCE 2017) that are actively engaged 
with international donors to support environmental and climate protection in 
Jamaica. However, there are significant missed opportunities that can be ade-
quately addressed with a more empowered Jamaican civil society. The general 
civic discontent and political apathy of a significant part of the population are 
symptoms both of the low autonomy and low capacity of state institutions, which 
further induce limitations to any transformation process in Jamaica, as potential 
partners for transformation are effectively alienated and disenfranchised (see 
Campbell 2016).
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12.5  Conclusion—Capacity-Building as Key 
to Jamaica’s Sustainable, Low-Carbon 
Transformation
12.5.1  Lessons for Theory
The ideal type analysis of Jamaica’s policy model has led to some theoretical 
challenges. The simulation game highlighted the co-benefits of various austerity 
measures. The identification of these co-benefits and other synergies was made 
possible through the contextualization of each measure. As the positive and nega-
tive externalities of each measure were identified, it became evident that negative 
externalities, when properly addressed by compensatory measures, may create 
new values, for example for climate protection or job creation. A lesson for the-
ory is that ‘empathy’ can be the key to any transformation process, as addressing 
multiple perspectives can actually expand the value of a specific measure. Never-
theless, expanding the value might require additional investment, which requires 
a long-term outlook.
12.5.2  Lessons for Practice
Jamaica lacks local scholars who have the methodological and scientific exper-
tise to produce studies that meet high academic validity standards. Because epis-
temic communities play a huge role in understanding the complexities of climate 
change and of how climate protection, energy security, and sustainable develop-
ment interplay, Jamaica’s sustainable, low-carbon transformation will necessitate 
an unprecedented upgrade of its pool of experts. In addition, Jamaica’s pool of 
technical experts should not only come from government agencies, but also from 
independent research institutes that are able to pursue both basic and applied 
research without depending on either the government or the business/industry 
sectors.
Moreover, the capacity-building of scientific communities in Jamaica will 
need to find a balance between propriety and access to public goods. Through 
various interviews of local experts and scientists, it became apparent that Jamai-
can universities tend not to share information and data with other scholars (both 
within the same organizations and between organizations) for propriety reasons. 
This outlook can be attributed to the dependence of research on private  funding. 
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There is a need to address the ‘angst’ of researchers and research institutes, 
because a sustainable, low-carbon transformation will require more inter- and 
intra-disciplinary collaboration to effectively address complex issues that super-
sede disciplinary boundaries. As one institute produces a set of data, other insti-
tutes may be in a better position to assess the meaning and implication of these 
data. Another policy-oriented institute may be better at transforming the data 
and its assessment into policy recommendations as other contextual factors are 
embedded into the analysis. The Jamaican government needs to ensure access to 
relevant knowledge to support the maturation process and the adaption of knowl-
edge to Jamaican specificities.
In the same manner, Jamaica needs to upgrade the capacity of its civil soci-
ety to participate in consensus-building processes. Linked to this is the need to 
effectively address the latent disconnect between policy-making and the societal 
mandate. This can be done, for example, by initiating ambitious consultations 
on structural reforms. Effective consultations are, however, contingent on social 
actors that are able to formulate and advocate for various societal priorities such 
as environmental protection, civil rights and liberties, equity, and social innova-
tion. Jamaica needs to improve its social capital if it wants to achieve sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation.
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Lessons for Theory: A Conceptual 
Framework of Transformative Pathways
A major objective of this book is to provide theoretical and practical knowledge 
on how sustainable, low-carbon transformation can be facilitated. As a creative 
and a rational process, transformation can be managed. However, the manage-
ment of transformation necessitates an integrative and process-oriented outlook 
to grasp the various issues, dynamics, causalities, associative relations, lock-ins, 
critical junctures, tipping points, interactions, behavior, and analytical levels that 
drive any transformation process. Chapters 2 to 6 have contributed to the theo-
retical framework or scope of the book, followed by chapters 7 and 8, which 
presented the knowledge and decision tools as methodologies (the ideal types as 
theoretical models, case studies and simulations). These tools guided the analysis 
of the case studies in chapters 8 to 12. These case studies offered the empirical 
foundation by providing the context, agency, and audience relevant to the trans-
formation process of selected countries. This chapter delivers the next step, which 
introduces a conceptual framework to better understand and explain ‘stratified’ 
transformative pathways from the ‘negotiative’ perspective.
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The Conceptual Framework of Transformative Pathways (CFTP) attempts to 
provide an important understanding necessary to grasp the complexity of shift-
ing from the initially chosen or assumed pathway (‘business-as-usual’) to other 
pathways, which in this book are referred to as sustainable, low-carbon (trans-
formative) pathways. As a framework, the CFTP will provide an explanation of 
causality (referred to here as ‘congruence’). This explanation will be substanti-
ated using previous works in relevant fields including well-established theories, 
as well as the case studies (including the simulation game) presented in this book. 
Afterwards, the assessment of the congruence (or explanation)’s ability to pre-
dict will be assessed, testing its possible reoccurrence in future events as well as 
its applicability to other contexts. Another possibility of testing the ability to pre-
dict is to provide insights into which conditions this congruence can occur. The 
testing will be ended by discussing its limitations and analyzing to what extent 
this congruence can be falsifiable. An important disclaimer of this chapter is 
that this conceptual framework is still being developed and will eventually reach 
maturity as time passes.
13.1  The Parameters of the Conceptual Framework 
of Transformative Pathways—The Negotiation 
Outlook
The following figure mirrors the integrated stream of transformation. Before 
introducing the various phases of transformative pathways, there is a need to dis-
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The non-linear process projects decision-making at both the global and 
domestic levels, where there are evident deviations, particularly because of the 
varying types of exogenous interventions, the varying implications of public 
goods in terms of exclusion, as well as the diversity in the range of capacities. It 
cannot be automatically assumed that the global/domestic is merely a question of 
scaling or abstraction, because while these two rationales are interrelated, they 
can also influence each other. For example, the global can limit the ability of the 
domestic to shift its energy system. Nevertheless, the ‘vertical’ hierarchy between 
the ‘global’ and the ‘domestic’ needs to be assumed as an explanatory variable of 
distinct dynamics. For example, Anthony Bogues (2011) argues that the national 
is the self and the global is the other, which posits a hierarchical process that dis-
tances the self from the other. In this sense, the domestic is the self and the global 
is ‘everyone else on the international stage.’ There is a need to highlight the fact 
that the boundary between the global and the domestic is diffuse, as conflicts, 
vulnerabilities, value systems, institutions, and technologies are conflated. As the 
politics of Jawaharlal Nehru represented, there cannot be an internationalist who 
is not a nationalist (Chacko 2011).
Moreover, while the ‘domestic’ indicates the concept of citizenry following 
the norms bestowed by state sovereignty, the ‘global’ is itself still in the process 
of exploring the possibility of a world citizenship (see Roscrance 1998; Dunne 
2008). A huge barrier to this is the somewhat exclusive nature of public spheres, 
in which a public sphere is connoted to exist only through the mobilization of an 
identity. If the European Union is to be taken as the best example of the possi-
bility of a ‘post-national constellation’ (see Calhoun 2002; Zürn 2002, 2009), the 
limitations of extending ‘European Union citizenry’ have become evident. Jürgen 
Habermas’ (2006) suggests that the new, European public sphere, while previ-
ously offering hope of a true world citizenship, has becomes bleaker, as social 
movements in many European countries have emerged, demanding the rever-
sal of this outward extension of European citizenry. To address the gap between 
the global and the domestic, this proposed conceptual framework assumes that 
the ‘global’ professes to be a certain degree of citizenry that can be decoupled 
from the principles of state sovereignty, a citizenry based on human solidarity 
(Arendt 1958; see Bogues 2011). This concept of citizenry based on solidarity 
can be compared with the idea of an ‘internationalist nationalism’ initially intro-
duced by Priya Chacko (2011 p. 181).
The stages of interaction serve as spaces for the three types of interactions: 
functional, institutional, and bargaining interactions. As described in the previous 
chapters, because spheres and interests often overlap, interactions are necessary 
to address common vulnerabilities. Functional interactions highlight the overlap 
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of mandates or visions. Institutional interactions refer to interactions between 
polities, where each represents ‘embodied’ distinct norms, principles, and prac-
tices, which are often self-enforcing. Bargaining interactions refer to interactions 
between actors that have the main goal of building alliances and partners through 
changes in the others’ preferences and dispositions. They also refer to interactions 
between stakeholders, with the main purpose of exchanging values with or with-
out changing the preferences of their counterparts.
The analysis of the different outcomes of functional, institutional, and bar-
gaining interactions allows the integrative understanding of (domestic) collective 
actions that will be reflected by the behavior of this collectivity (or state) at the 
international and domestic level. At the international level, similar interactions 
occur, leading to another set of collective actions; however, the ‘global’ collec-
tivity can deviate significantly from the ‘domestic’ collectivity (and vice versa), 
primarily because of the possibility of several types of interventions that are often 
defined in terms of sanctions and rewards. The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ game has a 
different meaning, for example, for global relations when confronted by Realpoli-
tik in global relations or by low social capital than it does for intra-state relations.
In addition, because interactions are influenced by drivers and brakes (e.g., 
culture, co-benefits, and externalities), the transformation process can only be 
conceptualized through its contextual relevance and is therefore historical. Going 
back to the global/domestic juxtaposition, the contextualization of the global and 
the domestic can be transferred using two directions. The global context can be 
translated to the national context and the national context to the global context, 
where gaps can be evident, as some elements get ‘lost in translation.’ The global 
context is not the aggregation of all national contexts, because it is also an out-
come of various unique interactions (that cannot be repeated), where some actors 
or issues can dominate the various processes under present conditions, leading 
them to dictate the parameters of the global context (of that time). In the same 
manner, some elements of the global context can be instilled back into the domes-
tic level, where additional elements emerge as counter-reactions, particularly 
when conflicts of values, ideologies, and relationships become evident.
Decision-making requires some basis or points of reference for orientation. 
This highlights the cognitive, hence, human character of the transformation pro-
cesses. As the illustration above suggests, the process is divided into four cog-
nitive frames: social contract, power game, discourses, and outcomes. These 
cognitive frames are stable constructs that provide a lens that allows individuals 
to see and understand the situation and to create a context for complex behavio-
ral responses (Walsh 1995; see Smith & Tushman 2005). These frames promote 
the development of mind-sets useful to processing information and to engaging 
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learning. For example, in the ‘social contract’ frame, actors are most likely keen 
on maximizing their influence when drafting the provisions (e.g., standards) of 
the social contract, as this social contract will later determine rewards and sanc-
tions. Actors may therefore employ distinct competitive strategies, creating a 
coordination problem. Furthermore, actors require useful information to allow 
them to anticipate the consequences of each provision. In most cases, an inabil-
ity to assess the provisions inhibits participation and increases the probability of 
defection in those cases where the social contract is implemented. As the process 
unfolds, the same actors will change and adapt their strategies, depending on the 
frames.
Corresponding with the cognitive frames are the stages of (cooperative) 
interaction: collaboration, coordination, deliberation, and application. These are 
derived from the four categories of cooperation problems (Stein 1983; Martin 
2010; see Snidal 2010), which are here taken as stages or phases that are use-
ful in conceptualizing the various related problems of collective actions: collab-
oration problems, coordination problems, deliberation problems, and application 
problems. While the cognitive frames pertain to the constitution of collective 
action, the stages of interaction concur in the relationships among actors, between 
issues, and between structures & actors. For example, when actors assume and 
experience asymmetrical interests, they are confronted with an equilibrium out-
come that leaves at least one actor dissatisfied. As institutions facilitate coop-
eration, coordination problems can be resolved, promoting the integration of 
interests in the deliberation and application stages.
13.2  A Conceptual Framework of Transformative 
Pathways—The Congruence and Theorization 
of Causalities and Associations
As described earlier, this section will introduce and discuss relevant ‘congru-
ence’, which pertains to the explanations of causalities as identified in the previ-
ous chapters.
A congruence can be expressed through one of the following formulations:
1) If X … then Y
 In this case, X is the explanatory variable for Y.
2) X is associated with Y, Z …
 In some cases, X can only be partly or indirectly explained through the occur-
rence of Y and Z, or only in conjunction with certain factors.
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In addition, a congruence will be theorized by the following steps:
1) Validation through substantiation: This involves an analysis using existing 
theories and empirical evidence collected from both the case studies & simu-
lation games, and from empirical data, models, & expert judgment. The chal-
lenge is to find the explanatory value without losing substantive meaning as 
the value is generalized.
2) An analysis of the ability to predict: This pertains to the analysis of the pos-
sibility of reoccurrence in the future as well as its applicability to other con-
texts (or under which conditions it can occur in other contexts)
– The ability to predict also refers to the level of confidence based on expert 
judgment, data, and theory. This project uses the IPCC’s likelihood scale 
in describing this level of confidence (see Moss & Schneider 2000; IPCC 
2005), as summarized in the following Tab. 13.1:
3) Falsifiability: an analysis of the limitations and scope of the explanations and 
under which conditions the explanation will not be viable
– Variable y will very likely not occur if z.
Congruence 1: At the domestic level, if the levels of capacity and autonomy 
of the state facilitating the transformation process are low, then defection 
from the state-sponsored transformative pathway will be very likely.
Most literature on statehood refers to state capacity and state autonomy as indica-
tors of state power (see Krasner 1984; Kreuzer & Weiberg 2005; Chernillo 2007; 
Back & Hadenius 2008). A state with high capacity and high autonomy is one 
that can provide basic tasks (including welfare services and security) and that is 
Table 13.1  Likelihood 
Scale (see Moss & 
Schneider 2000; IPCC 
2005)
Term Likelihood of the Outcome
Virtually certain 99–100% probability
Very likely 90–100% probability
Likely 66–100% probability
About as likely as not 33 to 66% probability
Unlikely 0–33% probability
Very unlikely 0–10% probability
Exceptionally unlikely 0–1% probability
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able to do so with a minimum of intervention from the public. A state with low 
capacity and low autonomy is one that lacks the ability to fulfil basic tasks and 
is subject to direct public control and interference. It is also one where power is 
highly decentralized among state and non-state actors. It needs to be highlighted 
that both democratic and authoritarian states can have high capacity and high 
autonomy, whereas having high autonomy tends to undermine democracy, as par-
ticipation is limited. In the context of sustainable, low-carbon transformation, a 
state with high capacity and high autonomy will very likely find it easier to design 
sustainable, low-carbon transformation policies. Nevertheless, it needs to be 
asked how this high capacity and high autonomy has been achieved. Is it because 
of high social capital, where the public opts not to intervene, because it sees no 
reason to do so as the state can be generally trusted to seek policies that benefit 
all? Or is it because the public is completely excluded from decision-making?
The case study on China suggests that even an authoritarian country can find 
ways to balance efficiency and legitimacy. In lieu of the normative bias favor-
ing democratic regimes, explanations are often sought as to how an authoritarian 
regime such as that in China can still manage to ‘survive.’ A likely explanation as 
to how China found a way to legitimate its institutions without requiring the ‘con-
cordant’ process of deliberative decision-making can be offered by the possibility 
of strategically facilitating (or even manipulating) the approval process in front of 
the designated audience. Understanding this approval process is key to the suc-
cess of the Chinese regime in achieving its audience’s approval. In his book “The 
English Constitution,” Walter Bagehot (1867) contended that the principles of the 
division of power (between legislature, executive, and judiciary) and of checks 
and balances (between the different elements of the constitution) are ‘erroneous.’ 
He identified the two elements of state institutions in the United Kingdom as the 
“dignified” and the “efficient.” These two elements can explain how this approval 
process can be facilitated. The “dignified” parts played the essential role of win-
ning and sustaining the loyalty of the public (input legitimacy) and the “efficient” 
parts were responsible for the technical aspects to ensure that goals were reached 
(output legitimacy). Using the general logic of these two elements, China’s insti-
tutions have evolved to reflect a dualism of governance in terms of its institutions. 
China has developed state institutions that not only allow but are also dependent 
on the coexistence of the ‘efficient’ and the ‘dignified.’ The ‘dignified’ pertains to 
the parts that represent the political elite, whose members are recruited from the 
communist party cadre. The ‘efficient’ pertains to the technical elite whose mem-
bers are recruited based on their technical expertise. With the integration of these 
two parts, China can fulfil both the political as well as the technical requirements 
of the transformation process.
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Meanwhile, as the Mexican and Philippine case studies confirm, democracy, 
when confronted by deficiencies, cannot guarantee to promote transformation 
process towards sustainability. The dominance of institutional activists and social 
movements in the country indicates a Philippine State with low capacity and low 
autonomy. The low capacity and low autonomy of the Philippine State are both a 
cause and an effect. In the case of Mexico, the lack of venues or channels for the 
effective participation of societal groups can be held responsible for the states low 
capacity. These societal groups could have contributed important inputs to the 
effective implementation of relevant energy projects. On the one hand, this situ-
ation reinforces the ability of dominant actors to disconnect various bargain-
ing games from policy games. For example, as institutional activists willingly or 
unwillingly opt to reinforce existing structural imbalances and use privileges pre-
viously reserved for the dominant actors, the transformation process is very likely 
inhibited, because this disconnect will very likely mobilize ‘preference outliers’ 
leading to the proliferation of fractal systems. The disconnection of various bar-
gaining games will very likely, on the other hand, lead to further limitations in the 
Philippine State’s autonomy. Because sustainable, low-carbon transformation will 
virtually certainly touch on various interconnected issues, the State will virtually 
certainly need insurmountable resources to integrate the dispersed fractal systems 
of decision-making.
In addition, as the case study and simulation on Jamaica suggest, the level of 
capacity and autonomy of the state can also be associated with existing lock-ins. 
Jamaica’s carbon lock-ins limit the set of possible decisions aiming at implement-
ing sustainable, low-carbon transformation, implying both the low capacity and 
low autonomy of the Jamaican state. Such lock-ins create, among other things, 
institutional barriers, which further limit the synergies emerging from functional, 
institutional, and bargaining interactions. For example, Jamaica’s dependence 
on international loans is associated with the country’s rather small public sec-
tor, preventing the state from effectively facilitating and participating in various 
functional, institutional, and bargaining interactions, which would have intro-
duced much needed impulses to resolve such lock-ins. Due to the wide-ranging 
and often cross-sectoral responsibilities of many government officials in Jamaica, 
they likely lack the detailed and integrated knowledge of sustainable energy tech-
nologies, their economic and financial requirements, and alternative mechanisms 
for their effective support.
Nevertheless, the level of capacity and autonomy of the state is highly con-
tingent on how the state can ‘depoliticize’ and ‘securitize’ certain issues. The 
securitization of certain issues will likely initiate “emergency powers”, allowing 
change agents to tap “exemptions” to the “normal” set of rules and regulations, 
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in order to better address the existing constraints caused by lock-ins. The case 
study on China exemplifies how China was able to do a complete turn-around 
on its environmental and climate protection policies. Through the effective secu-
ritization of environmental and climate protection, China was able to revise its 
socio-linguistic narratives and justify the establishment of a “new normal.” These 
narratives that, for example, link the need to address climate change with China’s 
economic competitiveness, provided the regime with important capital to establish 
the “new normal” within limited constraints from many types of carbon lock-ins.
Congruence 2: The increasing relevance of fractal decision-making systems 
in the context of sustainable, low-carbon transformation at both the global 
and domestic level is virtually certainly associated with the frequent occur-
rence of disconnections between various bargaining and policy games. Frac-
tal decision-making likely imposes a polycentric order, both at the global and 
domestic level.
As more bargaining games are disconnected from policy games, decision-mak-
ing becomes virtually certainly polycentric. Furthermore, as each issue is sep-
arated from other issues, where the state encourages public participation in one 
issue but limits or excludes another issue, governance will likely become polycen-
tric (see Ostrom 2010). The autonomy of the state decreases as more fractal deci-
sion-making systems (with each of these fractal systems seeking its own specific 
equilibrium) emerge, due to the increased polycentrism of governance. This 
means that the state becomes less capable of constituting and implementing pol-
icies by itself. The state will need to address multiple competitions within each 
of these fractal systems, which strain the state’s capacity. The state will likely 
prioritize certain issues and delay or even resign in others, leading to individual 
vacuums in certain issues. These vacuums will likely further reinforce fractal 
systems. In such a situation, in facilitating and managing sustainable low carbon 
transformation, the State will virtually certainly be dependent on multiple fractal 
decision-making frameworks, which will virtually certainly exacerbate both the 
collaboration problem (e.g., the emergence of more equilibria) and the coordina-
tion problem (e.g., an increase in problems related to communication).
In the case study of the United States, the emergence of ‘smart’ cities and 
‘smart’ enclaves as well as the re-emergence of social movements following the 
state’s increased outsourcing of welfare services to the private sector will likely 
further undermine the autonomy of the state through the reinforcement of tech-
nocratic and post-democratic governance principles in the country. As the pri-
vate sector and social movements continue to set the standards, benchmarks, and 
norms in various sectors and establish de facto ‘expert committees’ that  compete 
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with state institutions in terms of authority and expertise, the state will very 
likely be more dependent on the private sector and other non-state actors when 
implementing a wider range of policies, which will virtually certainly further 
exacerbate legitimacy deficits. These de facto ‘expert committees’ are informal 
conglomerates of technical experts that compete with experts within state poli-
ties. In addition, the dependence on de facto ‘expert committees’ will likely aggra-
vate polycentric decision-making, because these de facto ‘expert committees’ will 
likely be sectoral in nature. Cross-cutting expertise is likely limited due to the cor-
porate nature of accountability. For example, members of de facto ‘expert com-
mittees’ on financial issues will very likely come from the finance sector and have 
limited exposure to related social issues. In addition, because they are account-
able to the stakeholders of the finance sector, there will very likely have limited 
motivation to encompass, for example, human rights concerns.
Therefore, the success of the transformation process depends virtually cer-
tainly on how the objectives of the transformation process can be aligned with the 
objectives of these de facto ‘expert committees.’ In addition, the increased impor-
tance of these de facto expert committees will virtually certainly lead to further 
legitimacy gaps in the transformation process. Hence, new forms of accountabil-
ity and transparency are needed to address new types of structural imbalances.
Congruence 3: The diffusion of norms, principles, and standards within a 
system is very likely associated with the identity-based concept of citizenry, 
both at the global and national level, because citizenry underpins the flow of 
social practices among actors.
As implied earlier, the convergence of norms and values that resolve coordina-
tion and collaboration problems professes a certain degree of identity-based citi-
zenry. Nevertheless, there is a need to consider an understanding of citizenry that 
is decoupled from the principle of state sovereignty, because this is often used 
as a pretext for exclusion. Several authors have called for similar concepts (see 
Arendt 1958; Bogues 2011). For example, Priya Chacko (2011 p. 181) introduced 
the idea of an “internationalist nationalism.” When analyzing any transformation 
process, there is a need to identify the various categories that can unify actors, 
including both the change and status quo agents. For convergence to be initiated, 
respective norms, values, and principles need to be diffused to the value systems 
of the others, without causing ruptures in these systems. However, this diffusion 
presumes one or more entry points. Another idea about diffusion is contributed by 
David Strang and John Meyer (2010 p. 150), who argue that diffusion is shaped 
and accelerated by culturally-analyzed similarities among actors, and by the-
orized accounts of actors and practices. They continue by suggesting that when 
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social entities belong to a common social category, diffusion should be rapid. 
As convergence moves one step forward, the next step will require less than the 
resources needed to make the previous step.
In the context of sustainable, low-carbon development, the diffusion of new 
norms, principles and standards that reinforce sustainability rationales in col-
lective actions is very likely to occur in a homogenous system rather than in a 
fragmented one. However, there is a need to analyze what makes the system 
homogenous, particularly when actors will virtually certainly be diversified. 
Even in classical ‘nation’ states such as France and Germany where the popula-
tion is generally perceived as homogenous, there are differences, depending on 
which category (language, religion, level of income) is considered. The difference 
between homogeneity and heterogeneity depends significantly on the socio-tech-
nical and socio-linguistic narratives used. These contend which similarities and 
differences are deemed relevant and which elements of these similarities or differ-
ences (us against them) will likely mobilize identity-building. Therefore, there is 
a need to find a set of categories that highlight similarities without linking differ-
ences with threats—a citizenry based on human solidarity.
Congruence 4: At the domestic and global level, power asymmetries need to 
define the asymmetries of privileges. As power shifts during the transforma-
tion process, if structural arrangements and institutions (including norms 
and practices) are preventing corresponding changes in the distribution 
of privileges, and status quo agents are successful in maintaining or even 
expanding old privileges, then individual incentives to defect from the trans-
formation process will likely outweigh the incentives of continued coopera-
tion/collaboration.
Shifts in the underlying structure of power are reflected, sometimes gradually 
rather than abruptly, by changes in social institutions like regimes at the global 
level (see Young 2010 p. 175) and in state institutions at the domestic level. While 
actors accept that power asymmetries are a given, they take the distribution of 
privileges seriously and contest it, should they find themselves in an unfavorable 
position. Nevertheless, they will very likely accept the distribution of privileges 
according to power asymmetries, particularly when this power status is achieved 
and maintained by costs shouldered by the powerful. However, as soon as power 
configurations shift, the distribution of privileges is virtually certainly expected 
to shift as well. If not, the distribution mechanism will be contested and if status 
quo agents are able to instrumentalize their old privileges to inhibit change in the 
distribution of privileges, then defection is virtually certain to occur.
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Asymmetries in power are knowledge-intensive. Therefore, the system is very 
likely to witness an intensive exchange of information. Further, additional ‘con-
vening’ power can be generated through capacities to introduce indicators and 
benchmarks that are needed to assess power relations. Therefore, another chal-
lenge lies in the empirical and conceptual problems of measuring power, assess-
ing when and how power is shifting, and differentiating paradigmatic shifts from 
mere one-time, coincidental deviations. In addition, as Oran Young (2010 p. 176) 
contends, while it is easy to recognize major shifts in power, it is difficult to pin 
down the preliminary stages of significant shifts, or to monitor them closely as 
they unfold. The ability of early identification is important, as it allows more time 
and resources to counter emerging shifts or to adapt to their implications as first 
movers.
Another challenge is linked with the self-reinforcing characteristic of power, 
often sustained by privileges, with or without active intervention from the actors. 
In addition, some privileges are latent, which requires addition effort to be prop-
erly conceptualized and resolved. Other privileges are symptomatic. These 
privileges can be caused by variables that are systems-related, which cannot be 
resolved without causing additional paradoxes. For example, the underrepresenta-
tion of scholars from developing countries in the generation of academic knowl-
edge is not always a result of the intended marginalization of these scholars but 
can also be attributed to differences in orientation or mandate (e.g., the teaching 
mandate of professors). This underrepresentation is rather a symptom of ‘biased’ 
indicators of the ‘performance quality’ of scholars, which tend to focus heavily on 
publications in peer-reviewed journals.
Looking at the international system, emerging powers such as China and Mex-
ico will virtually certainly seek access to privileges enjoyed by contemporary 
powers, and when confronted by an inability to do so due to existing structural 
constraints, these emerging powers will very likely evaluate whether defection 
(and the establishment of competing systems) will bring more benefits. In some 
cases, emerging powers will establish competing regimes or institutions that will 
very likely be open only to selected actors. This behavior will likely be interpreted 
by established powers as rule-breaking and therefore as a threat to international 
stability and order. In addition, emerging powers will very likely ‘shop for forum,’ 
which means that in addressing one issue they will very likely prefer to participate 
in a specific global institution, but in another issue, they will participate in a com-
peting global or regional institution. This behavior will likely be seen negatively 
by established parties, because this undermines the predictability and consistency 
of foreign policies. Therefore, power shifts in transformation processes will very 
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likely lead to an international order that is likely more fragmented and therefore 
polycentric.
Congruence 5: At the global level, if the states are experiencing increased 
convergence, then the motivation to defect virtually certainly decreases. In 
other words, the convergence of norms, principles, and practices is both a 
requirement and an outcome of cooperation.
Convergence refers to the similarities in experiences between actors in terms of 
lock-ins, standards, and norms. The increased rapprochement of the policies and 
actions of countries will very likely promote cooperation or collaboration. As con-
vergence increases, the immediate pay-offs of defection likely decreases, because 
convergence resolves the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ in collaboration games (see Layer 
1980; Snidal 2010). The rapprochement of multiple equilibria in the context of 
convergence implies that the suboptimal equilibrium’s pay-offs will very likely 
become minimal. Furthermore, it needs to be highlighted that convergence does 
not automatically mean the elimination of asymmetries between actors. Asym-
metries in power or privileges can even promote cooperation. As Duncan Snidal 
(2010 p. 11) contends, asymmetries increase the likelihood of some cooperation. 
However, the distribution of benefits from cooperation will very likely reflect this 
asymmetry, and the discrepancy between the asymmetry and the benefits will vir-
tually certainly lead to contestation. As the distribution of costs and benefits can 
also favor weaker parties, weaker states will likely perceive that this probability of 
benefits outweighs complete exclusion.
The negotiation outlook on collective decision-making suggests that coop-
eration in the context of an unequal distribution of privileges is likely tolerated 
when the actors are confronted with similarities in terms of lock-ins, standards, 
and norms, implying that the degree of convergence among actors offsets the 
legitimacy gaps that resulted from asymmetries in power and privileges. Because 
convergence implies the ability to reciprocate the behavior of the others, actors 
expect that they can also profit from the privileges of powerful actors without 
shouldering the costs of achieving and maintaining power. Therefore, because 
convergence constitutes the anticipation of spill-over effects, asymmetries 
become tolerable. In this sense, it can also be argued that the incentives to defect 
from a transformation process in the context of asymmetries are very likely con-
cretized through convergence.
In addition, it can be argued that actors will very likely allot more time to 
negotiations with those actors with similar lock-ins compared to those which are 
perceived as being significantly different. This means, for example, that while 
countries with the same type of policy pathways (democratic, authoritarian, etc.) 
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are expected to prefer negotiations among each other, the caveat to negotiating 
will likely disappear when the policy pathway taken by the counterparts does not 
reflect the various lock-ins one is confronted with. In addition, further conver-
gence is achieved as actors explore additional potentials of cooperation, cement-
ing shared values and establishing new capacities, which eventually pave the way 
for more exclusive membership. Therefore, while convergence promotes further 
cooperation, it can also limit the scale of cooperation, as actors outside the fractal 
system (convergent system) will very likely be excluded.
A possible limitation of this congruence is when a specific public good rele-
vant to the transformation process debars the exclusion of non-members, or that 
the multiple memberships of one actor to more than one ‘convergent club’ is pos-
sible. In addition, countries that are attempting to combine various transforma-
tive pathways with contradictory norms and values will very likely be difficult to 
address. For example, when a country pursues multiple policies that are in their 
essence contradictory with each other, like aiming to reduce emissions but grant-
ing new concessions to coal mining companies, other countries that still intend 
to engage in cooperation will need to look beyond convergence as orientation. 
Another limitation to this congruence refers to a situation where information on 
the other’s behavior is limited or can be easily manipulated, because relevant 
issues are highly politicized or securitized, which compel exceptions to existing 
rules and practices.
Congruence 6: If critical junctures (and lock-ins), in the context of sustain-
able, low-carbon transformation, create conflicts in social mandates, then 
there is very likely a need to find a concept of ‘conversion’ for the relevant 
values through a ‘common currency.’
Several collaboration and coordination problem-issues were resolved in the last 
few years as confirmed by the Paris Climate Agreement. The first signs of pay-
offs from mitigation policies made in the past have already occurred. Examples of 
these signs include the gradual decrease of upfront costs and the market price of 
renewables. In addition, the slowing growth in the global CO2 emission level was 
recorded despite continued economic growth, hinting at stabilization and a slower 
global growth in fossil fuel consumption (see Jackson et al. 2015; IEA 2016a; 
Löfken & Martin 2017). While it is still premature to claim that the critical junc-
ture that favors sustainable, low-carbon seems to have already arrived, signs indi-
cate that this critical juncture is only a matter of time.
This critical juncture is expected to be further reinforced, eventually estab-
lishing self-driving lock-ins, as the effects of investments in renewables are real-
ized in the next few years. Since 2015, there have been more energy power plants 
13.2 A Conceptual Framework of Transformative Pathways …
284 13 Lessons for Theory: A Conceptual Framework …
using wind, water, and solar power than those using energy from fossil fuels and 
nuclear power (IEA 2016a). In addition, 70% of new investments made (or 288 
billion USD) in the electricity sector are attributed to renewables (IEA 2016a) 
and a significant chunk of these investments were made in China, which is the 
primary source of emission growth. When this critical juncture is established, dis-
tortions, such as the election of President Trump, as the case study on the United 
States shows, are unlikely to cause major reversals of the transformation process 
or even a system rupture. On the contrary, there are important silver-linings to 
such distortions that will very likely further reinforce the transformation process. 
The relevant climate and sustainability initiatives coming from the private sec-
tor and civil society under President Trump, which were not available during pre-
vious administrations, are likely promising signs that after the term of President 
Trump, the sustainable, low-carbon transformation of the United States or even 
of many developing countries will very likely accelerate. New climate leaders 
such as China have emerged. Because the Chinese regime has recognized that the 
decrease of coal use in China was largely responsible for CO2 stabilization, China 
has garnered the ‘moral legitimacy’ needed for its leadership.
The road towards this critical juncture is long. Additional efforts and time 
are needed to promote the required convergence of norms, standards, and val-
ues, also due to marginal benefits. This road will virtually certainly demand the 
further relinquishing of personal rights, liberties, and freedoms at the domestic 
level and sovereignty at the global level. As new lock-ins emerge, more rights 
and freedoms may be undermined, which may alter preferences, particularly 
when benefits remain ‘theoretical’ and ‘collective’ while the costs are ‘practical’ 
and ‘personal’. Because sustainable, low-carbon transformation involves cut-
ting across issues, jurisdictions, and mandates, conflicts of rights and liberties 
will virtually certainly be inevitable. The failure to adequately address emerging 
conflicts will very likely further motivate the creation of additional fractals in an 
already fragmented system.
As hinted at earlier in this book, conversion is inevitable, because identifying 
benchmarks as well as the contingents of transformation require the comparabil-
ity of values and, later, of the ‘inventories’ of a policy that need to be replaced 
without undermining the overall effectiveness of this policy. The resolution of 
both coordination and collaboration problems are virtually certainly dependent on 
benchmarks and contingencies, which will likely cross-cut several issues, rights, 
and mandates. Therefore, social contracts will very likely need to include mecha-
nisms of conversion to diminish the self-enforcement of existing structural biases. 
Using the conflict between the German wind energy sector and environmental 
groups, under current conditions, the offshore wind energy sector will very likely 
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produce more compelling arguments to persuade policy-makers and public opin-
ion. The reason behind this is that this sector can easily ‘convert’ its current and 
future values into more tangible ‘currencies’ that are welcomed by policy-makers 
and the public. For example, the number of jobs that are created and will be cre-
ated by the sector are compelling. For the environmental groups, it will be diffi-
cult to convert ‘environmental integrity’ into currencies that can equally compel 
political and public acceptance as much as the arguments of the offshore wind 
energy sector. How many jobs can one unit of environmental integrity create? 
Answering this question is not only difficult from the methodological perspec-
tive, but it is also difficult because the answer will very likely imply that the oth-
ers should relinquish rights and liberties and undermine the social mandates of 
other actors. For example, hypothetically speaking, if one can answer with cer-
tainty that one unit of environmental integrity will create 100 jobs, this will very 
likely mean that the reduction of 100 jobs in the energy sector will be tolerated 
or demanded, then additional compelling values can be presented by the energy 
sector such as the economic competitiveness of the city or country. For environ-
mental groups, converting environmental integrity into economic competitiveness 
may be more difficult to achieve.
The simulation game on the Jamaican austerity measures hinted at the possi-
bility of ‘trading’ values: risk, unhappiness, and ecological damage points (see 
the case study on Jamaica). This idea came into the discussion as the participants 
quantified the risks, unhappiness levels and ecological damage. As the partici-
pants focused on the co-benefits and synergies of selected austerity measures, 
some provisions produced positive externalities for the environment. What if this 
‘conversion’ could be produced in reverse? This would, however, require further 
theoretical underpinnings.
Congruence 7: If the deliberation over the factors relevant to legitimacy, effi-
ciency, and capacity focus mainly on ‘big bang’ situations, then it will very 
likely lose count on the importance of ‘low’ politics for systemic and social 
integration.
An upcoming debate about transformative pathways will raise the question of 
whether a certain transformative pathway can be best achieved through voluntary 
or binding commitments. An intuitive answer to that is that this pathway needs to 
be binding to all or to none. Binding commitments can be designed in such a way 
that non-participation brings less pay-offs or even unacceptable disadvantages. 
However, as argued earlier, a sustainable, low-carbon transformative pathway will 
very likely demand limitations and constraints on liberties and freedoms, which 
also includes the freedom to decide ‘unwisely’. Relinquishing certain individual 
13.2 A Conceptual Framework of Transformative Pathways …
286 13 Lessons for Theory: A Conceptual Framework …
rights and liberties to achieve collective sustainable, low-carbon goals will very 
likely necessitate tedious deliberation, as individual actors will assess the values 
behind their preferences in terms of incentives. Further inhibiting deliberation 
is the uncertainty of the future outcomes of present decisions, which motivates 
actors to agree on commitments that allow exit-strategies.
At the global level, attaining a single, global-wide, sustainable, low-carbon 
transformation is, under current conditions, perceived to be merely theoretical 
or academic. A specific unknown threshold needs to be identified, conceptual-
ized and achieved first, through which it would eventually become unbearable 
to be in an unsustainable, high-carbon system. What can be currently observed, 
is that one or a small group of states have chosen a ‘contextualized’, sustaina-
ble and low-carbon transformative pathway that addresses local conditions while 
accommodating global visions. As such, their pathways are contingent upon dif-
ferent ‘flexibility’ measures, as well as requiring varying bridging technologies 
that enable transition without less unacceptable sacrifices and steep cuts in their 
utility values. Nevertheless, the contextualization of pathways virtually certainly 
demonstrates the diversity of individual ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics, which refer 
to the level of securitization of issues. Securitization implies the willingness to 
employ coercive measures. Nevertheless, differences in political priorities and 
indifferences can be tapped to expand values.
The simulation game on Jamaica demonstrated how some participants, who 
were representing various stakeholders, were able to gain additional pay-offs 
through issues they were initially indifferent to. Because the issues they were 
indifferent to were considered to be ‘high’ politics by the others, they had noth-
ing to lose when they supported the interests of these others. As they were in a 
bargaining game, their indifferences became integral to the achievement of their 
‘high’ politics. Indifference can therefore provide additional leverage. In the same 
manner, participants, whose ‘high’ politics became obvious to the others through 
their behavior and rhetoric, experienced increased resistance and bargaining 
intensity, as the others perceived that they could gain more from the participants 
with clear, ‘high’ politics. Therefore, if given the chance to repeat the process, 
these participants will very likely hide their ‘high’ politics the next time around, 
increasing the need for ambiguities and further increasing the complexity of inter-
actions.
In addition, appropriate attention needs to be given to the anti-functionalist 
effect of ‘high’ politics. Functional interactions imply the systemic and social 
integration of various utilities, which can be distorted if these interactions involve 
‘high’ politics. In the case study on the Philippines, it was a game-changing event 
when the appointed Environment Secretary elevated the mining issue as ‘high’ 
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politics, which in turn transformed her confirmation into ‘high’ politics, in which 
she had no jurisdiction or bargaining leverage. While the confirmation was ini-
tially a formality of appointment, its importance as leverage for her opponents 
became evident. This demonstrates that policy-makers need to consider how turn-
ing an issue into high politics will be very likely translated into other issues, and 
that one should assess his or her own bargaining leverage in those other issues, 
including those issues one is indifferent to. Therefore, ‘low’ politics and ‘high’ 
politics should receive equal attention from both policy-makers and academes, as 
they both offer opportunities and weaknesses when engaging in functional and 
bargaining interactions. Focusing mainly on ‘high’ politics will likely imply an 
underestimation of ‘low’ politics, which can be easily turned into ‘high’ politics 
as the negotiation process unfolds.
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Lessons for Practice: Reflexivity 
and Stakeholder Engagement 
for Transformations Towards 
Sustainability
This chapter intends to present a practical approach to strategically facilitating 
sustainable, low-carbon transformation. The recommendations that can be made 
are presented while using a Weberian understanding (Verstehen) of various var-
iables and dynamics that has been crystalized through this book’s theoretical 
foundation (chapters 2 to 6), methodological tools (chapters 7 and 8), case stud-
ies (chapters 9 to 12), simulation game (part of chapter 12), and the theoretical 
claims through the conceptual framework (chapter 13). A major contribution 
of this book is a set of recommendations that aim to support an inquiry-based, 
reflective, collaborative, and integrative facilitation of the transformation process. 
Reflexivity is itself a form of intervention that allows systems to adapt while pre-
venting ruptures. An analysis of reflexivity can help better structure institutional, 
functional, and bargaining interactions from the negotiative perspective on con-
text, agencies, and audiences of transformation towards sustainability. Reflexivity 
analysis is a matrix or collection of concrete questions that resonate at the 
(meta-level) theoretical/conceptual, methodological, and practical challenges 
relevant for each analytical level (actors, issues, structures, processes, and out-
comes).
Serving as a roadmap, the stakeholder engagement plan is furthermore intro-
duced in this chapter. As a practical example of application the engagement plan, 
this chapter looks at the transformation of the transport sector towards sustaina-
bility in Germany. The matrix is a decision tool that equates the typical ‘hypothet-
ical’ analysis in legal studies. Hypothetical analysis pertains to the use of fictional 
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but still  realistic and feasible accounts when analyzing the potential actions of 
protagonists. The matrix demonstrates, for example, how narratives are tailored 
to make points without being burdened by doubts about the incompleteness of 
information. Hypothetical accounts can answer some questions that are unan-
swered by real-life case studies, because these accounts, including motivations 
and interactions, are described in an imaginary fashion (Green 2000 p. 991). Fic-
tional vignettes may be useful to help identify situations where particular rules 
may apply and explore the ambiguity of rules (Green 2000 p. 995). Finally, unlike 
real-life case studies, hypothetical accounts can recognize the sensitivity of deci-
sion-making towards moral nuances and complexity.
14.1  Reflexivity Analysis—Developing Perspectives 
for Stakeholders’ Engagement
The reflexivity analysis of the multi-level and polycentric sustainable, low-carbon 
transformation towards sustainability can be conducted using the five different 
analytical levels (actors, issues, structures, processes, and outcomes). The use of 
these levels highlights the systems analytical approach. For this purpose, concrete 
questions and elaborating questions are formulated to help identify the concep-
tual (theoretical), methodological, and practical issues that need to be addressed 
when facilitating the transformation process. The questions summarize the 
insights and impulses gained from the previous chapters. The theoretical assump-
tions, knowledge tools such as theoretical models (ideal types), case studies, 
simulation, as well as the conceptual framework have not only contributed to the 
meta-level conceptual understanding of sustainable, low-carbon transformation 
and to explaining complex issues and dynamics, they have also identified meth-
odological and practical issues that should be concretized and elaborated when 
facilitating sustainable, low-carbon transformation. These questions constitute the 
strategic approach that needs to be pursued by each stakeholder when preparing 
their strategies and when participating in various functional, institutional, and 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31514.2 The Stakeholder Matrix and Engagement Plan
14.2  The Stakeholder Matrix and Engagement Plan
The insights and lessons gained from the theoretical, methodological, and empir-
ical chapters of this book are used to come up with a stakeholder matrix and 
engagement plan that can help decision-makers structure their strategies and 
adapt to the various dilemmas and self-driving dynamics when making impor-
tant decisions. The previous section empowers stakeholders to understand the 
questions that need to be asked to “master” the transformation process towards 
sustainability. The identification of meta-level theoretical, methodological, and 
practical issues allows integrated and systems analytical thinking that promotes 
the expansion of values. This expansion of values promotes collective deci-
sion-making by highlighting the ‘positive sum’ character of the transformation 
process.
The following figure illustrates an empty template of a matrix that summarizes 
and applies the outputs of all the chapters of this book. The stakeholders are first 
categorized according to their role in the policy-making process. Tier 1 are the 
direct agents that directly come up with policy instruments that could promote or 
inhibit transformation towards sustainability. Tier 2 refers to context-related pol-
icy entrepreneurs that include both enablers and spoilers which are not directly 
involved in policy-making but can enable or hinder (delay or obstruct) deci-
sion-making. Tier 3 (audience) pertains to entities that bestow different types of 
legitimacy on the transformation process through their direct or indirect approval 
or disapproval not only of the whole transformation process, but also of different 
(sub)processes (Table 14.2).
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The different aspects of the matrix include the system and process-related role 
of these stakeholders, conflict analysis (how these stakeholders define conflict 
and how they see this conflict being resolved), and the type of engagement that 
can be utilized to produce specific outputs from this engagement. In addition, the 
matrix highlights the entry points to transformation towards sustainability, the 
caveats to support this transformation process, as well as the possible positions 
of stakeholders for further actions (which type of actions are most likely to be 
pursued).
To demonstrate the use of the matrix, a preliminary draft of the stakeholder 
analysis and engagement plan for the transformation process towards sustaina-
bility of the German transport sector (Verkehrswende) will be introduced. Some 
impulses were taken from current discussions among relevant stakeholders par-
ticipating in various public discourses on sustainable transport in Germany. 
The draft suggests, for instance, how asking appropriate reflexive questions can 
explain why some stakeholders are ambivalent to sustainable transport. This high-
lights why one stakeholder or even a policy-making agent produces a series of 
actions that are contradictory. This is not necessarily an argument for the unpre-
dictability or irrationality of this actor, but rather suggests existing entry points 
and caveats or barriers.
The Tier 1 agents refer to the different relevant government bodies as stipu-
lated by the federal system, as well as Germany’s membership in the European 
Union. While the federal ministries tend to be the major agenda-setting actors in 
the negotiation process, the state governments (Bundesländer) employ other ven-
ues of participation. The city governments and local councils (Gemeinde) are also 
involved through various means and are considered the policy-makers nearest 
to the citizens. The Tier 2 agents are the policy entrepreneurs who have varying 
degrees of influence over Tier 1 agents. They also contribute different types of 
inputs that allow Tier 1 agents to efficiently address certain issues while maintain-
ing legitimacy. They include the different “advisory councils” (Beiräte) such as 
the Deutsches Ethikrat (German Ethic Council), the Rat für nachhaltige Entwick-
lung (Advisory Council for Sustainable Development), the Sachverständigenrat 
zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Advisory Council 
of Evaluators for the Evaluation of Total Economic Development) and the Wis-
senschaftlicher Beirat für globale Umweltveränderung (the Scientific Advisory 
Council for Global Environmental Change). These councils have become impor-
tant pillars of policy-making in Germany. Other Tier 2 agents include research 
institutions, businesses and industry agents (either individually or as proponents 
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of Verbände (associations)), the public transportation sector (represented by 
either individual entities or by associations) and labor unions. Foundations are 
considered Tier 2 agents, because they influence power relations between Tier 2 
agents through their capacity-building activities. The media is considered here 
as a policy entrepreneur, because it often pursues its own interests, such as the 
accountability of policy-makers and the capacity-building of other policy entre-
preneurs, and even of the audience by providing information. Political parties 
have been categorized as Tier 2 agents. Although they set the pace and direction 
of government policies and are often even political parties building the govern-
ment or its coalition, as the German political party culture demonstrates, they can 
pursue other interests. In addition, government ministries can pursue policies that 
are the results of compromises with coalition partners, which can be unacceptable 
to the political base of the party. Furthermore, groups within a political party that 
control different levels (federal, state and local) may pursue contradictory views. 
Moreover, referring back to the “the efficient” and “the dignified”-dichotomy pre-
sented in the previous chapters, in this context, Tier 1 represents the “efficient” 
while Tier 2 the “dignified.” Finally, Tier 3 refers to the different audiences that 
assess the interplay between the efficient and the dignified. It includes the Ger-
man audience, the EU audience, the global audience, as well as the distinct con-
stituents of Tier 2 agents.
The matrix also demonstrates the system and process roles of Tier 1 and Tier 
2 agents in the transformation process towards sustainable transport. While some 
agents can either push for change (change agents), others are more interested in 
ensuring stability by minimizing change (status quo agents). For example, the 
transportation ministry can be regarded as a change agent. Responding to struc-
tural changes in the transport sector, which may include new technological inno-
vation that favors the sustainable development of the sector, it sets the agenda for 
different negotiations with other Tier 1 agents. Other Tier 1 agents, such as the 
Finance Ministry, may be keen on ensuring that the propositions of the change 
agents will not undermine the fiscal health of the country, thus initially acting as 
a brake to changes, at least until uncertainties about the future costs of transfor-
mation can be calculated and managed. In addition, some agents can be both a 
change and a status quo agent due to the complexity of the issues involved, where 
in some issues they seek change and in some they resist. For example, the Min-
istry of Economy and Energy can both push and pull the process depending on 
the issues involved. This might be initially seen as contradictory or even irrational 
behavior on behalf of the agent. In this situation, this ministry is dependent on 
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how issues can be decoupled. For example, the Ministry of Economy and Energy 
on the one hand limit the pace of fuel switch from diesel to electric cars to protect 
the German car industry (pull), but on the other hand implement policy instru-
ments to unlock carbon lock-ins in the car industry (push).
Moreover, the process roles of the agents refer to how each agent from every 
tier can contribute or inhibit the transformation process. For example, scien-
tific communities as Tier 2 agents can provide inputs for evidence-based deci-
sion-making that ensure the effectiveness of transport policies and thus the 
legitimacy of relevant procedures. Other agents, such as the car industry, can be 
learners in the process, which, once persuaded through interactions with other 
agents, will be important game changers in the process. Scientific communities 
and think tanks can accelerate this learning process through partnerships and net-
works. Agents such as foundations and think tanks are relevant to the process, as 
providers of resources and proponents of capacity-building. They can, for exam-
ple, increase funding to universities and research institutions that focus on public 
acceptance of public transportation systems.
The power base identifies the different sources of leverage for each agent. 
Some agents, through their access to expert knowledge, depend on procedural 
power to pursue their interests when interacting with the others. For example, the 
credibility of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development vis-à-vis 
foreign partners is defined by the know-how it can provide to other countries. 
Few agents can employ leverage through negative power, which can successful 
increase the costs and efforts needed to implement certain policies. For example, 
individual federal states (Bundesländer) can decide to block bills proposed by the 
federal government irrespective of their political party affiliations. Citizen groups 
that believe that building new train stations in their communities could attract 
criminals, drug addicts, and “cheap” tourism have different ways of blocking 
decisions or increasing the costs of implementing projects.
The negotiation analysis refers to the interests and anticipated negotiation 
style of agents when engaging in various levels of bargaining. The interests reflect 
the social mandate of these agents. Understanding these interests promotes flex-
ibility and creativity in forging agreements. For example, in understanding that 
consumer protection will most likely be in the interests of the Ministry on Jus-
tice and Consumer Protection when it comes to sustainable transport, other agents 
wishing to achieve its support will need to include proposed stipulations ensur-
ing consumer protection. Other interests of this ministry may include ensuring 
security and safety in transit infrastructures. Moreover, agents are anticipated to 
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employ specific negotiation styles, which often depends on the agents’ role in the 
transformation process. For example, the European Commission might be highly 
competitive in the process to compensate for its position of merely responding 
or reacting to decisions made in Berlin (or Bonn). Other agents, such as federal 
state governments and local governments that employ negative power, will very 
likely be competitive in negotiating with the federal government, because veto 
power has the initial logic of preventing something. Agents such as the Minis-
try of Economy and Energy may tend to employ an avoidant negotiation style, 
because of its ambivalence to sustainable transport. With uncertainty, these actors 
will very likely be trapped in an indecisiveness dilemma. Thus, they will very 
likely avoid agreeing to much-needed, immediate commitments.
The conflict analysis pertains to the definition of conflict cleavages or the 
threshold where confrontation becomes more acceptable or desirable than inhi-
bition. The conflict can refer to issues, processes, and procedures. In addition, 
conflict analysis summarizes each agent’s understanding of viable methods to 
achieve resolution of conflicts. For example, labor groups may see the conflict 
as resulting from inequitable procedures due to hierarchical relationships in the 
context of mutual dependence. For these labor groups, resolving procedural ineq-
uities will very likely employ context-sensitive approaches and will specifically 
target compensatory mechanisms for specific imbalances. The Federal Ministry 
of Employment and Social Affairs may see the conflict arising because of unclear 
jurisdictions, which can be resolved through deductive approaches through which 
acceptable principles are initially achieved, and then applying these principles to 
concrete issues. For example, this Ministry will very likely focus first on reconcil-
ing workers’ rights for employees of both the public transport sector and the car 
industry to the principles of sustainable transport.
‘Engagement’ refers to the ways in which agents can be mobilized in a pro-
cess from the perspective of Tier 1 agents. Engagement is highly differentiated, 
depending on their role and their potential inputs into the transformation process. 
Tier 1 agents can empower, collaborate, consult, involve, or inform Tier 2 agents. 
For example, Tier 1 agents may choose to collaborate with selected Tier 2 agents 
such as scientific communities and think tanks. These selected agents can provide 
policy briefs and policy recommendations during consultations, or even appoint 
Tier 2 representatives to various expert committees. Others Tier 2 agents can be 
empowered through capacity-building measures (e.g., funding, access to informa-
tion), because the fulfilment of their interests is to the benefit of Tier 1 agents. 
This empowerment can vindicate the social mandate of Tier 2 agents and help 
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reinforce their identities as policy entrepreneurs are eventually able to recipro-
cate, which further legitimizes the process.
Tier 1 agents might also decide to limit or prevent the participation of cer-
tain Tier 2 agents due to a number of political and logistical reasons. These Tier 
2 agents are merely informed. Nevertheless, those policy entrepreneurs who 
are merely informed will very likely still seek other means of influencing Tier 
1 agents, depending on the capacity and autonomy of state institutions—from 
producing position papers to mobilizing street protests and boycotts through 
the media. Some will seek to influence public opinion and deliver sociolinguis-
tic narratives to the audience which might be successful in gaining the attention 
of Tier 1 agents. For example, the Stuttgart 21 movement in Germany targeted 
the German railway corporation (Deutsche Bahn), leading not only to a loss for 
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-led conservative state government in 
Baden-Württemberg, but also to the massive increase in the costs of re-build-
ing the central station in the city of Stuttgart. The costs increased from 4 billion 
euros to 9 billion euros due to delays and additional provisions stipulated by later 
court orders that were successfully demanded by citizen groups. The Stuttgart 21 
case proves that public acceptance can be a huge barrier in pursuing the Verkehr-
swende.
Entry points to transformation towards sustainable transport reflect the oppor-
tunities for each agent during and after the transformation process. These entry 
points may result from positive externalities, co-benefits and synergies. Some 
entry points are purposive, and others are emergent. Purposive entry points refer 
to benefits for each agent from additional measures to support sustainable trans-
port that are in anyway planned to achieve other developmental goals. For exam-
ple, the German Environmental Ministry (BMU) seeks to mitigate climate change 
through emission reduction. Because Verkehrswende seeks to decouple transport 
emissions from GDP growth, the BMU will most likely be motivated to support 
the Verkehrswende. Another example is the Ministry of Finance (BMF), which 
will most likely support the introduction of new taxes, such as fuel taxation and 
carbon pricing, needed to implement the Verkehrswende, because these new taxes 
could help the BMF maintain the fiscal health of the government. Emergent entry 
points are the direct, positive effects of sustainable transport that could motivate 
the support of agents. For example, the expectation that the Verkehrswende will 
very likely lead to the reduction of massive public investment in road infrastruc-
ture construction and maintenance will persuade the BMF to support the Verkehr-
swende.
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Caveats to support transformation are the reasons behind the agent’s reluc-
tance or opposition to sustainable transport. Most caveats refer to perceived 
future disadvantages as direct results of redistribution, double contingencies, 
political risks or even redundancy. For example, because of the redistribution for 
the EU Community (as an audience), the German Verkehrswende might further 
constrain EU wide electricity transmission lines, as well as put vehicles from 
other EU countries transiting in Germany in a disadvantageous position should 
fees for road use be introduced on German highways to motivate the use of pub-
lic transportation (redistribution). As an example of double contingencies, the 
Media as a Tier 2 agent might be confronted with additional uncertainties and 
credibility problems due to its lack of technical expertise in issues relevant to 
Verkehrswende. Political parties might estimate the political risks of the Verkehr-
swende and refrain from pursuing unpopular measures such as the introduction 
of road use fees or the increase of a car tax and of a speed limit on all parts of 
the German Autobahn. In addition, private households might be indifferent to the 
sentiments of other private households in other areas directly affected by the con-
struction of necessary infrastructure, the limitation of parking spaces, or the clo-
sure of city centers to car use. They are, in this case, essentially redundant and 
will most likely be supportive when they have direct benefits or be adversarial 
when personally confronted by negative effects (the ‘not-in-my-backyard, but yes 
if in the backyard of the others’ mentality).
Positions for further actions are demanded of agents to materialize their 
purpose as the transformation process unfolds. These positions have direct 
implications for the various levels of functional, institutional, and bargain-
ing interactions. Some positions will call for more generic outcomes, which 
might enable different understandings of guiding principles and formulas. 
For example, some agents will look at the impact of the Verkehrswende on the 
egalitarian public space. Will the Verkehrswende promote interactions between 
citizens from different backgrounds or will it further reinforce segregation? Pol-
icy-makers will need to revisit and, if necessary, modify the compatibility of the 
principles of the Verkehrswende to those existing local narratives that frame prin-
ciples. Will the construction of new rail networks be compatible with local iden-
tities (and traditions), particularly when gentrification through suburbanization 
arises? Will the increased property value and accessibility of real estate eventu-
ally drive out vulnerable, poor households?
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Other positions may call for more time and flexibility to find technical 
solutions within the problem frame. For example, creating more opportuni-
ties for interdisciplinarity and systems thinking might allow the improvement of 
the intermittency problems of renewable energies that are significant for electric 
and hybrid cars. In addition, improving access to modern forms of transportation 
depends on income levels and income distribution. However, levels of income are 
also dependent on access to affordable and reliable transportation technologies. 
This ‘vicious cycle’ reiterates the limitations of technical solutions. Therefore, 
technology-driven policies need to work in concert with other development poli-
cies such as employment, income, institutional structures, social objectives, envi-
ronmental integrity, and regional or local development.
Some positions might demand the targeting of the development of relations 
and communication channels, while others may focus on policy and bar-
gaining games. Dialogue processes have wide applicability in Verkehrswende. 
Not only can they support the maturity of relevant technologies through pro-
vider-user support systems, they can also enhance input and output legitimacy. 
Through mechanisms for feedback and flexibility in programs and projects, dia-
logue becomes an investment and not a cost. The establishment of networks and 
cooperation bodies can help create and maintain various centers of excellence as 
spaces for knowledge-sharing on different issues that cut across policy priorities.
As a disclaimer, the example of the matrix and stakeholder engagement plan 
for the German Verkehrswende is, to date, merely conceptual, but still useful in 
many ways. While assumptions of the profiles of the stakeholders were made 
based on interpretations of the existing literature and on anecdotal analysis, there 
are still open issues that require further research. Nevertheless, it demonstrates 
how emerging coordination and collaboration problems, as well as planning 
issues can be anticipated. In addition, it identifies the areas of the German Ver-
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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, 
sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you 
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Crea-
tive Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain 
permission directly from the copyright holder.
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Conclusion—Creating Momentum 
for Transformation Through Purpose
Many experts and pundits from the popular media often depict sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation as a revolution (see Sawin & Moomaw 2009; Pan 
2016a, 2016b). For example, Tom Delay (2009) of The Guardian sees “a new rev-
olution that fast tracks the deployment of a new set of technologies.” He continues 
that the new low carbon economy is “poised to be the mother of all markets and 
will be as transformative in its impact as the first industrial revolution.” Delay 
sees this revolution as an opportunity for countries to re-establish themselves 
as major global competitors. For Janet Sawin and William Moomaw (2009) the 
‘renewable revolution’ of the entire global energy system is a matter of preventing 
catastrophic climate change. In addition, for Claus Leggewie and Dirk Messner 
(2012), the ‘Great Transformation towards a global low-carbon economy,’ which 
can be compared to the Neolithic Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, is not 
self-perpetuating (Selbstläufer). They argue that while the main technological, 
economic, and social elements that will permit the transformation are already in 
motion, additional changes (behavioral change, social mandates, paradigm shifts, 
and structural changes) are still necessary to allow the transformation to unfold. 
The momentum of transformation needs constant ‘spurring.’
Throughout this book, I have cautioned against labelling sustainable, low-car-
bon transformation as a revolution, because a revolution connotes a system that 
has collapsed, that has drastically realigned relationships, and that has created 
new winners and losers. As sustainable, low-carbon transformation is a process, 
linking it to a revolution is misleading if not useless, because transformation 
needs to build not only through leapfrogging but also incrementally, with 
learning curves and consensus-building, while effectively absorbing new 
game-changing impulses that modify the equilibrium of policies/decisions. A 
revolution produces anxieties through vacuums and ‘surprises’ that often justify 
15
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drastic and Draconian measures, including the suspension of hard-fought princi-
ples such as fairness, human rights and social equality. Because of the uncertainty 
of revolutions, potential losers attempt and are often successful at ‘re-mobiliz-
ing’ support from various societal groups and organizing counter-movements, 
which further creates instability. In some cases, counter-revolutions as historical 
examples, such as the counter-reformation or even the current state of post-truth 
politics, might employ coercion that often surpasses the boundaries of what is 
acceptable, particularly when these movements assume the emotional narrative 
of struggle. This remobilization initiates self-enforcing dynamics that further 
increase complexity. Some of these dynamics may be successful in shattering 
negotiation processes and increasing the threshold for renegotiations. Finally, 
because sustainable, low-carbon transformation is a non-linear process, it can be 
strategically facilitated. In this case, the management of procedures needs both 
conceptual and empirical underpinnings to understand and adapt to challenges. 
Strategic planning means persistence and creativity. In addition, the reflexivity of 
the transformation can be useful in determining ad hoc strategies to resolve chal-
lenges at various levels of joint decision-making through the possibility of differ-
entiating impacts and purposes. Reflexivity helps to achieve measurable, specific 
and credible results. It identifies what it takes to help focus emotions and energy 
by knowing which questions need to be asked and by thinking about the answers 
of questions around power, purpose, and success, which can mobilize individual 
and collective actions. What specific actions are needed to achieve a transforma-
tion towards sustainability?
The ultimate goal of this book is to provide a comprehensive and integrated 
understanding of sustainable, low-carbon transformation that is both global 
and domestic in its scope and that broadens the theoretical and methodological 
capacity of scholarly disciplines to analyze underlying concepts, ideas, princi-
ples, and notions relevant to explaining why and how distinct collective actions 
are reached as well as how functional, institutional, and bargaining interactions 
influence collective actions. I have integrated the ‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’ 
approaches to ‘grasp’ complex processes and dynamics that are often observed by 
stakeholders. ‘Understanding’ identifies the purpose and ‘explanation’ determines 
the necessary action.
Studying transformation processes is challenging. Possibly the most impor-
tant question when analyzing transformation is to estimate how much change 
or intervention (assuming that transformation is initiated by revisions of 
the status quo) can be tolerated by the system without causing system rup-
tures, without initiating fragmentation, without reproducing inequalities that 
made the transformation necessary in the first place, and without creating 
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 fractures as negative externalities to other systems. Interestingly, the most 
prominent reason why certain actors can (successfully) resist change is the claim 
that changes that are ‘sold’ as solutions may de facto lead, directly or indirectly, 
to more problems that could easily escalate into system ruptures. Particularly 
when changes are understood as threats to system stability, coercion (including 
physical violence) can be easily justified. I have argued that what is missing in the 
current discourse on the transformation towards sustainability is that there is the 
need for the transformation to stop, reflect upon, and modify processes.
As sustainable, low-carbon transformation deals with multiple processes, the 
analysis needs to grasp the connection between the departure point of the pro-
cess and the point at which process goals are achieved. Studying transformation 
also implies the need to look at both the past and the future, as well as what the 
past means for the future and what the future means for the present. Although, in 
general, the past can be captured using historical analysis, assessing the meaning 
of a past event for the future is constrained by the fact that not all significant data 
and information can be found or is accessible when connecting, with absolute 
certainty, causes to effects in order to justify corrective interventions (including 
positive and negative externalities caused by actors to other actors, and causes by 
one modular sub-system to another sub-system). In addition, because studies in 
transformation also look at trajectories and development pathways, they need to 
address the specificities of making sense of the future. Is it possible to acquire 
the ability to predict future events or to predict how behavior will change when 
certain parameters have been or can be altered? Hence, uncertainty becomes an 
inevitable condition of transformation and major attention should be given to 
early warning and quick response mechanisms when implementing transforma-
tive goals. Decision-makers will also need to find ways to ‘manage’ uncertainty, 
not only to justify their decisions, but also to ensure that the most efficient deci-
sion can be made, even with incomplete information. Moreover, as a non-linear 
process, sustainable, low-carbon transformation will very likely witness self-driv-
ing dynamics and self-enforcing processes that have gained independence from 
agents due to the emergence of lock-ins.
A comprehensive and integrated understanding of sustainable, low-car-
bon transformation is established by the research approaches used in this book. 
After resolving the ontological and epistemological baggage of various concepts, 
ideas and notions relevant to sustainable low-carbon, gaps and trade-offs have 
been identified to analyze the proximity between the analytical value of sustain-
able, low-carbon transformation and its actual practical value for decision-mak-
ers. For example, by understanding the implications of the conflictive nature of 
transformation, strategies can be forged for stakeholders to allow them to benefit 
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from several functional, institutional, and bargaining persuasive, and bargaining 
interactions. With this understanding, measures can be better explained to stake-
holders, resolving credibility gaps resulting from the complexity of the issues 
involved and the diffuseness of the jurisdictions. By understanding that power 
refers to creating dependence on the monolithic architecture of the world system, 
collaboration and coordination problems can be resolved. The calculative mean-
ing of connecting basic bargaining and policy games provides a new explanation 
for how weaker parties can effectively interact with stronger parties.
In this project, I have defined transformation as shifting from the initially 
chosen (or taken) pathway to another pathway, as goals have been revised 
for the system to adapt to changes. Pathways are sets of critical junctures and 
lock-ins that frame decisions and actions. With this definition, sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation is then depicted as shifting from one pathway 
to another by shouldering transition costs, that is, the costs of detaching a 
system from existing unsustainable and carbon lock-ins. The methodologies 
employed in this book follow a storyline to resonate the complexity of transfor-
mation processes. After identifying the theoretical parameters for the theoretical 
models (ideal types) presented in chapters 2 to 6 and chapter 8, an assessment of 
the case studies was conducted in chapters 9 through 12 to give context to sus-
tainable, low-carbon transformation. The theoretical models (ideal types) used 
the negotiation perspective in understanding and explaining how interactions are 
managed in different policy models (authoritarian, democratic, etc.) as well as in 
different variations of policy models (institutional activity, post-democracy, and 
technocratic). In addition, chapters 9 to 12 ‘unmasked’ sustainable, low-carbon 
transformation and demanded clear proximity to normativity. Functional, insti-
tutional, and bargaining interactions were highlighted, through which collective 
actions were made. In addition, data assessment through process-tracing and con-
gruence methods has led to theory development (theoretical claims) (chapter 13) 
and a reflexivity analysis & engagement plan (chapter 14). A check-list of questions 
was presented to assist stakeholders when strategically preparing their engagement.
15.1  Theoretical Claims: A Theory of Transformative 
Pathways (TTP)
As the theoretical models were contextualized to test their empirical value, 
chapter 13 introduced a Conceptual Framework of Transformative Pathways 
(CFTP). This CFTP attempted to provide additional theoretical inputs to better 
grasp the complexity of shifting from the initially chosen or assumed pathway 
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 (‘business-as-usual’) to other pathways. As a framework, the CFTP provided 
an explanation of causality, which was substantiated using existing theories and 
empirical data. This explanation was supported by the case studies presented. 
Afterwards, an assessment of their ability to predict congruence was further eval-
uated, exploring its possible re-occurrence in future events as well as its applica-
bility to other contexts.
The theory problematized how studies of transformation processes need 
to deal with normative and narrative bias when analyzing interactions within 
transformation systems, which are mainly attributed to the cognitive challenges 
brought by emotions, empathy (or the lack thereof), and biases. Because sustain-
able, low-carbon transformation requires justifications and legitimacy, imply-
ing that an additional analysis is needed to understand how social mandates and 
(input/output) legitimacies are achieved, normativity is inevitably a fundamental 
pillar of transformation. Furthermore, the theory addresses various methodolog-
ical challenges brought about by the complexity of transformation, such as the 
difficulties of scaling up, identifying benchmarks, assessing tipping points, exter-
nalities & synergies, and evaluating boundaries.
Moreover, the CFTP argues that decision-making requires a basis or some 
points of reference for orientation. It introduces the four cognitive frames: the 
social contract, the power game, discourses and outcomes. These cognitive 
frames are stable constructs that provide a lens to see and understand the situation 
and to create a context for complex behavioral responses. Corresponding with the 
cognitive frames are stages of interaction: collaboration, coordination, deliber-
ation, and application, which address the various related problems of collective 
actions: collaboration problems, coordination problems, deliberation problems, 
and application problems. While the cognitive frames pertain to the constitution 
of collective action, the stages of interaction concur within relationships among 
actors, between issues, and between structure & actors.
15.1.1  To Summarize, the Theory has made the Following 
Concrete Arguments:
– At the domestic level, if the levels of capacity and autonomy of the state facil-
itating the transformation process are low, then defection from the state-spon-
sored transformative pathway will be very likely.
– The increasing relevance of fractal decision-making systems in the context of 
sustainable, low-carbon transformation at both the global and domestic level 
is associated with the frequent occurrence of disconnections between various 
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bargaining and policy games. Fractal decision-making is likely to impose a 
polycentric order, both at the global and the domestic level.
– The diffusion of norms, principles, and standards within a system is associated 
with the concept of citizenry both at the global and national level, because citi-
zenry underpins the flow of social practices among actors.
– At the domestic and global level, power asymmetries define the asymmetries 
of privileges. As the transformation process unfolds, if structural arrangements 
and institutions (including norms and practices) are preventing changes in the 
distribution of privileges and are actively seeking the reproduction of old priv-
ileges in previously powerful actors, then individual incentives to defect from 
the transformation process are likely to outweigh the incentives of continued 
cooperation/collaboration.
– At the global level, if the states are experiencing increased convergence, then 
the motivation to defect decreases. In other words, a convergence of norms, 
principles, and practices is necessary for cooperation.
– If critical junctures (and lock-ins) in the context of sustainable, low-carbon 
transformation create conflicts in social mandates, then there is a need to find a 
concept for the ‘conversion’ of relevant values through a ‘common currency.’
– If the deliberation over the factors relevant to legitimacy, efficiency, and 
capacity focuses mainly on ‘big bang’ situations, then it will lose count of the 
importance of ‘low’ politics for systemic and social integration.
15.2  Further Recommendations for Facilitating 
the Transformation Towards Sustainability
Facilitating sustainable, low-carbon transformation to become the ‘Great Trans-
formation towards a global low carbon economy’ (Messner 2015), and one that is 
comparable to the Neolithic and Industrial Revolutions, is not only necessary to 
concretize and make use of the lessons of past transformations to prevent or limit 
the occurrence and effects of vacuums and externalities, but also to ensure that 
human systems are able to develop adaptive mechanisms to ensure that aggre-
gated changes will not lead to system ruptures.
15.2.1  Actors
The targets and ambitions of both state and non-state stakeholders should be 
aligned with the principles of sustainable, low-carbon transformation. This book 
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has highlighted the elusiveness of motives and the fact that decisions are no 
longer merely about the facts. The elusiveness of motives remains a huge chal-
lenge for policy-making in the context of sustainable low-carbon, because devi-
ancy is not always rational and predictable, making efforts to understand it highly 
complicated. Nevertheless, while these motives are a riddle, they can still be con-
trolled. The convergence of the utility preferences of individuals and collective 
groups can be achieved and controlled through cooperation, where reciprocity is 
enhanced by learning curves and incremental values.
For the alignment of targets and ambitions to occur, appropriate data and 
information are needed for actors to adequately reflect upon their interests, and 
for them to recognize that fulfilling the interests of others is necessary to achiev-
ing one’s own interests. Appropriate data and information do not mean com-
pleteness, as this is impossible. What is possible, however, is for actors to have 
genuine access to available information and for them to find ways of handling 
incomplete information, even when they need to make immediate decisions. In 
addition, as interactions are hosted by a system that is monolithic in its archi-
tecture, cooperation is the only viable way to address linkages of interests. As 
‘power’ is understood by this book as the capacity to deter dependence, actors can 
develop strategies to make them indispensable to the others, giving them some 
level of leverage even though the others have evident financial and institutional 
advantages.
15.2.1.1  The Identification of the Appropriate Capacity 
of Stakeholders
In addition, there is a need to assess which size of the polities or of the public 
sector is preferable when facilitating the long-term integration of these sustain-
ability projects. The case studies presented in this book have provided insights 
into the effects of the low capacity and low autonomy of the state. For example, 
as demonstrated by the case study of Jamaica, the success of sustainable, low-car-
bon transformation is also contingent upon the human resources capacity of the 
state to monitor and evaluate the transformation process. Is the state able to pro-
vide the technical expertise on various issues related to the transformation pro-
cess? Is this ‘lagging behind’ of the state responsible for inefficient legislation 
and other policy instruments? When a state such as Jamaica is subjected to aus-
terity measures as imposed by international donors, can the state really develop 
a ‘healthy’ capacity? Therefore, the facilitation of sustainable, low-carbon trans-
formation will also need to assess the effects of international donors and creditors 
in terms of capacity-building. The dilemma of a state that is subjected to auster-
ity measures is that the ‘butterfly effect’ of small provisions is inhibited, such as 
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investments that are deemed to have small effects on the present but could lead to 
bigger effects in the medium- and long-term.
Nevertheless, the size of state apparatus is also determined by existing lock-
ins, which, as shown by the case study on Jamaica, are causes that are maintained 
by a dependence on specific stakeholders. Carbon lock-ins will very likely lead 
to goals and actions from government agencies and state resources that will res-
onate these lock-ins, in terms of government subsidies and market incentives for 
example, which will most likely put further non-carbon technologies in a disad-
vantageous position. Therefore, there is a need to find an ideal size for the public 
sector, based on needs and not on lock-ins.
15.2.2  Issues
Sustainable, low-carbon transformation will involve a multitude of issues. Each 
issue will call for a different set of actors, structures, knowledge, and temporal 
& spatial contexts, as well as ontological and epistemological conceptions. Each 
issue will very likely produce externalities and feedbacks, which further com-
plicate the planning of collective actions. In addition, issues will be prioritized 
differently by actors depending on how these issues are perceived as relevant 
problems. Further, addressing specific issues can create a demand for decisions 
that require efforts that cut across different modular sub-systems, each of which 
will very likely have distinct mandates, jurisdictions, senses of equality & ‘fair-
ness tolerable’ windows, and sense of urgency.
With this complexity of issues, the facilitation of sustainable, low-carbon 
transformation will need to be able to ‘detach’ issues from all types of baggage to 
allow new ideas and concepts as well as paradigm shifts, and to eventually iden-
tify additional entry points for sustainable, low-carbon transformation. Such entry 
points can serve as departure points for collective actions. In addition, these entry 
points can be used to define various basic bargaining and policy games as multi-
ple processes (e.g., consensus-building, state-building, economic transition, and 
de-colonization) unfold.
15.2.2.1  Revisit Public Discourses and Debate
Developing countries need to assess the relevance of the roots and origins of 
sustainable, low-carbon discourse, particularly, regarding sustainability. Many 
scholars suggest that the environmental roots of sustainability discourse in most 
European countries have created a basic asymmetry between the environment and 
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the social (see Kapoor 2001; Agyeman & Evans 2004; Davidson 2009; Boström 
2014). Davison (2009) and Kapoor (2001) argue that, as the concept of sustain-
ability resulted from discourses on environmental forums, it carries a particular 
‘ontological and epistemological baggage’, which creates a conservative bias 
towards how sustainability issues are defined and addressed. This bias causes, for 
example, the prioritization of environmental integrity over social justice.
Magnus Boström (2014) contends that while conservation of the environment 
is desirable, it is usually less important than the conservation of certain social sus-
tainability aspects. He explains that environmental aspects generally take prec-
edence over social aspects, because of the diffuse and multitudinous nature of 
social sustainability, which may refer to social welfare, quality of life, social jus-
tice, social cohesion, cultural diversity, democratic rights, gender issues, workers’ 
rights, broad citizen participation, and the development of social capital & indi-
vidual capabilities, among others (Boström 2012). This bias was demonstrated 
by the policies introduced and implemented by former Philippine Environmental 
secretary Gina Lopez during her brief tenure, when she prioritized environmen-
tal conservation over the livelihood of the thousands of individuals who lost their 
jobs. As a result, participatory opportunities were deliberately restricted by not 
inviting numerous stakeholders, as Gina Lopez did not see their relevance due 
to her narrow framing. As a result, these excluded actors (business groups, local 
government units, and community development groups) sought other forums to 
address their concerns. Although she attempted to reframe public discourse by 
equating social justice with environmental integrity, it became apparent that the 
‘ontological and epistemological baggage’ of her environmental advocacy con-
flicted with the livelihood concerns of those affected by the closure of the mines.
The ontological and epistemological pretext of sustainable, low-carbon 
discourse is inevitably derived from the contemporary political priorities of 
the national government, as well as from tangible problem-issues. As most 
developing countries with medium-income levels demonstrate, their development 
trajectory is mainly driven by the process of consolidating power as these coun-
tries undergo state-building. The consolidation of power will likely define func-
tional, institutional, and bargaining interactions, as stakeholders seek to maximize 
their individual utility before lock-ins are established. With various insurgencies 
controlling parts of several developing countries as well as boundary conflicts 
with neighboring countries, issues relevant to state-building will be virtually cer-
tainly inherent to the discourse on sustainability.
Without the historical environmental discourse that occurred in developed 
countries, the connotation of sustainability in these countries will very likely 
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deviate from the connotation prevalent in the political and academic discourse. As 
highlighted by Mikael Klintman (2012), the dichotomy between local and global 
is often simplistically framed as a duality of social versus environmental con-
cerns. Therefore, for many developing countries, the distance between the global 
and the local can be explained by this difference in discourse. What if the caveats 
for developing countries against embracing similar commitments to sustainable, 
low carbon exist because of the conditions wherein environmental sustainability 
is exogenous to them, as this concept was instilled in them by developed coun-
tries? If the Eurocentric discourse on sustainability is expected to be of value in 
developing countries from the ‘South,’ will this exacerbate the already existing 
gaps between the ‘global’ and the ‘local,’ where the global is driven by envi-
ronmental sustainability and the local by social sustainability? Furthermore, 
assuming that the Eurocentric discourse on sustainability is inevitable, because 
of existing power asymmetries, how can climate policies in developing countries 
still achieve legitimacy, where gaps between the intangible global climate goals 
and the tangible social realities are evident?
The conflicts between developed and developing countries in terms of climate 
mitigation can be partly explained by the ontological and epistemological differ-
ences in the concepts of climate mitigation among countries. As climate policies 
were initiated by environmental scientists and advocacy groups, binding emission 
reductions are not inherent to the public discourse on sustainability in developing 
countries, preconceived as issues around state-building. In this regard, sustaina-
ble, low-carbon transformation in many developing countries will be framed by a 
concept of sustainability that is different to the concept framing the behavior and 
actions of most developed countries, where the dominance of environmental sus-
tainability has defined concrete objectives, measurable indicators, and universal 
applications, and has elevated an approach based on the ‘technocratic, top-down 
expert culture in environmental management’ (Kapoor 2001) regarding delibera-
tions on social and economic sustainability.
With the clarification and understanding of the ontological and epistemologi-
cal differences of concepts related to sustainable, low-carbon transformation, how 
can ‘frame-bridging’ efforts be made to support sustainable, low-carbon transfor-
mation? How can frame-bridging lead to mutual learning experiences between 
actors as they engage in functional, institutional, and bargaining interactions? Can 
this frame-bridging also facilitate a different notion of politics and the political 
(see Davidson 2009)? Asymmetries resulting from ontological and epistemolog-
ical differences between concepts of sustainable, low-carbon transformation can 
be effectively addressed by promoting the capacities of stakeholders.
357
15.2.3  Structures
The facilitation of sustainable, low-carbon transformation is also defined by 
the integration of multiple structures, which may both promote and inhibit the 
pace of transformation. While these structures are mutually complementing, oth-
ers are mutually contradicting. Transformation is not unitary and encompasses 
transformation within multiple modular sub-systems, which may be converging 
or diverging. Structures are entities that have been intentionally and uninten-
tionally established to manage various processes and can both drive and inhibit 
decisions and actions. The comparative analysis of structures across different 
modular sub-systems can provide insights into why a specific structure, for 
example, promotes transformation in one sector but inhibits another. How are 
these structures interconnected, and what happens when they are disconnected? 
Can actors effectively use this connectedness as a strategy to pursue their inter-
ests, as was demonstrated in the case study on the Philippines, where mining 
groups were successful in disconnecting from basic bargaining and policy 
games?
In addition, the effective integration of structures will also depend on the insti-
tutional designs and arrangements of each sub-system as well as of the whole sys-
tem. Institutions require the careful planning of organizational design, checks & 
balances, legitimacy, and social mandates. Of equal importance to facilitation is 
the understanding of how structures can be self-reinforcing. As institutions and 
mechanisms become separated from the behavior of humans, additional resources 
are needed to ensure that these institutions and mechanisms comply with the prin-
ciples of sustainable, low-carbon transformation.
15.2.3.1  Promoting Mobility and Global Networking
As Magnus Boström (2014) contends, some actors are entangled in a local con-
text, whereas other actors move more freely between different levels (from local 
to global and vice versa) and can mobilize and combine various resources from 
their global networks. The precedence of environmental sustainability in public 
discourses on sustainable, low-carbon transformation is reinforced by the mobil-
ity of environmental groups as compared to that of social groups, which tend to 
be entangled at the local level, because of the local nature of social issues, as well 
as because of the structural limitations on global networks when addressing social 
sustainability, such as civil rights and gender equality.
The strategic use of new technologies to advance and promote innovative 
organizational structures and communication channels is inevitable. It can  further 
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improve the capacities of local stakeholders to forge useful partnerships and 
attract global attention to local concerns. The careful deployment of technologies 
needs to be complemented by improvements in the ability to monitor and inter-
vene in institutional, functional, and bargaining interactions occurring at various 
levels to enable the identification of gaps and learning from best practices. Tech-
nologies should not be the only drivers of transformation, because by allowing 
this, other societal goals will very likely become secondary.
Moreover, additional resources are needed to help stakeholders to refrain from 
perceiving, framing, and representing a ‘global view’ or a universal interest that 
is too distant from local conditions (see Boström & Tamm Hallström 2010). As 
Eurocentric claims of universality are formalized, standardized, and institution-
alized, improving the capacity of local stakeholders to interconnect and link local 
problems to global matters will very likely reduce the ‘context blindness’ and 
‘local uselessness’ of these universal principles and standards. When theoretical 
knowledge (global), which tends to be abstracted and detached from the local 
context (see Cheyns 2011), ceases to subordinate practical knowledge (local) 
through improved interconnectedness, asymmetries resulting from ontological 
and epistemological differences in concepts of sustainable, low-carbon transfor-
mation will be less likely to define interactions between stakeholders.
As demonstrated by the case study on Mexico, the emergence of a bottom-up, 
public sphere is crucial to the sustainable, low-carbon transformation process. By 
developing the capacity of actors and their ownership of the process to highlight 
social sustainability, decisions that are made will most likely be more effective. 
As discussed, inclusivity is an investment that is often underestimated, because 
the costs of transition will not only be shouldered by more actors, but the total 
costs will also be limited, as individual stakeholders will limit the negative exter-
nalities that they are producing for the others, because they will also be paying 
for them.
15.2.4  Processes
Sustainable, low-carbon transformation is driven by the accumulation and orches-
tration of multiple processes, which can be both self-driving and managed. The 
growing numbers of actors relevant for the required paradigm shifts and behav-
ioral changes as well as the types (including hybrids) of policy regimes imply 
the co-existence of multiple processes that are co-evolving. Transformative path-
ways involve processes that converge as lock-ins are established. Therefore, any 
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 facilitation of sustainable, low-carbon transformation will need to grasp the driv-
ers of each of these relevant processes, including how and where these processes 
are inter-connected and how they are affecting each other. The pace of transfor-
mation of each sub-system also affects the pace of transformation of the others. 
When the transformation of a sub-system is ‘too fast’ or ‘too slow,’ it may send 
wrong or distorted signals to others. Rebound effects can also emerge in certain 
sub-systems, off-setting the gains made by the others.
Furthermore, any facilitation needs to effectively link these processes to con-
texts and collective actions to address mutual feedbacks. As an analysis of a pro-
cess is often done by looking at its application to a specific context, it is a huge 
challenge to completely grasp the different cause-and-effect relationships that 
drive processes. As such, it is recommended that this analysis of processes be 
complemented by innovative methods of scientific inquiry that allow the detach-
ing of processes from contexts to better understand causalities.
15.2.4.1  Highlighting the Long-Term Aspects of Interactions
Effectively abrogating carbon lock-ins will require a long-term outlook on inter-
actions. As changes in the utility preferences of stakeholders will very likely 
require time, facilitating sustainable, low-carbon transformation will require 
additional resources to establish and maintain long-term platforms and incen-
tive systems. As suggested by Nicolas Faysse (2006), establishing long-term 
multi-stakeholder platforms means better opportunities for capacity building. As 
entry points for sustainable low carbon transformation are identified, stakehold-
ers can focus on synergies and co-benefits that will alter their utility preferences. 
Synergies and co-benefits require the linking of issues, where the realization of 
benefits will occur after a given set of time. As these synergies and co-benefits 
materialize, these long-term platforms and incentive systems will need to be doc-
umented and assessed, constituting a ‘memory’ that will ensure that these benefits 
are properly documented and therefore useful.
Nevertheless, because many sustainability projects have a limited time-frame, 
they use a ‘project mind-set’ (Casula Viffel & Thedvall 2012 p. 26). As such, 
there are missed learning opportunities resulting from the failure to connect these 
sustainability projects, assess impacts and feasibility, and modify future projects. 
As argued by Magnus Bostöm (2014), the integration of the social, economic, 
and environmental aspects addressed by these sustainability projects necessitates 
a learning period characterized by multiple communications and interactions. 
Therefore, the success of sustainable, low-carbon transformation is dependent on 
incrementalism.
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15.2.5  Outcomes
Each modular sub-system has its own set of interactions, which include the res-
olution of problem-issues. Many types of agreements are produced, which can 
be both binding or non-binding. Most cooperation frameworks aim at producing 
binding agreements, as social trust is still elusive. However, reality shows that it 
is often better to achieve non-binding agreements than having no agreement at 
all. Furthermore, non-binding agreements often produce additional impulses for 
future agreements as learning unfolds. In addition, from the negotiation perspec-
tive, these outcomes can be relevant for agenda-setting, but not for the clarifica-
tion of interests or the concretization of solutions. The outcome of interactions 
in one sub-system can either complement or compete with the outcomes of the 
others. Outcomes can be limited in their temporal validity or can be perpetual in 
their consequences. In addition, outcomes can be the means to an end or can be 
an end in themselves. Furthermore, the success of outcomes in achieving prede-
termined goals will depend highly on established compliance systems that can be 
dependent upon other outcomes. Ambiguities and flexibilities can be both useful 
and detrimental elements of outcomes.
15.2.6  Gaps in Knowledge and Future Research
While conducting this book, several gaps in the knowledge have been identified 
and collected. While some gaps were addressed, others were not, because they 
needed further theoretical and empirical analyses that could not be accommo-
dated by this project. Some of them are presented in this section as suggestions 
for further future research.
This book attempted to introduce a conceptual foundation to the study of sus-
tainable, low-carbon transformation. Major gaps in the knowledge refer to the 
methodological shortcomings of future studies, as the enormous variety of pro-
cesses and technologies adds to the complexity of assessment (see Tanaka 2008; 
Siitonen et al. 2010). New systematic approaches and underlying methodologies 
are further needed to avoid double-counting, for example, due to the many differ-
ent ways of attributing emissions (see Fischedick et al. 2014) or externalities.
The collection and assessment of data and information is confronted with a 
lack of globally standardized and homogenized data. An analysis of sustainable, 
low-carbon transformation involves multiple sectors, such as the private and pub-
lic sectors as well as the sectors representing industry, energy, agriculture, etc. 
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There is a diversity in practices within and among sectors, leading to uncertainty, 
a lack of comparability, incompleteness, and doubts about the quality of available 
data. While some sectors are keen to produce data, others, such as the informal 
sector, refuse to cooperate. Sector data tend to be collected by the private sec-
tor, which is highly aggregated and gives little information about individual pro-
cesses.
The availability and quality of data in the public domain is often subjected to 
political the calculations of authorities. In many cases, an improved understand-
ing of the mitigation potentials, interplay, and costs, as well as environmental 
and socio-economic consequences of policies are desirable, but there are some 
situations where this improvement is linked with a fear of being compelled to 
decide in a specific direction, which may be contrary to the ideological stance 
of the policy-makers. Furthermore, an improvement in knowledge does not auto-
matically mean a change in behavior, because this knowledge may not be aligned 
with one’s identity or may not be useful, as the assessment of mitigation poten-
tials on a global and national scale may fail to address the boundaries of global 
and national jurisdictions. Particularly when addressing trade-offs between many 
sustainable, low-carbon policy goals requires cross-cutting actions from compet-
ing and cooperating institutions, government agencies, and societal groups, the 
boundaries between them may be ‘too high’ to overcome. Addressing trade-offs 
will not only require an understanding of the net impacts of different types of pol-
icies, it also requires concretizing the linkages between them. As these linkages 
are very likely process-driven, mutual feedback can change over time, making it 
difficult to attribute effects to causes. In addition, the quantification and moneti-
zation of both positive and negative externalities are difficult to achieve, and, if 
done at all, are often not well-integrated into the decision-making processes.
Further gaps in knowledge refer to governance issues on sustainable, low-car-
bon transformation. There are questions around how partnerships of sectors, gov-
ernment bodies, civil society, and private governance for climate governance can 
overcome caveats brought about by existing ontological and epistemological bag-
gage.
15.2.7  Final Message
A significant factor that hinders sustainable, low-carbon transformation is the 
establishment and use of ‘false dichotomies’ in understanding and explaining 
collective decisions and actions that are driven by elusive motives. These false 
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dichotomies abuse gaps between rationality and preferences. Gideon Lasco 
(2018) problematizes the wide use of false dichotomies in political discourses 
where narratives such as “stupid people with good intentions… (are better)… 
than smart people with bad intentions” are offered and compel people pick 
between two options as if these were the only choices. As such, the analysis of 
sustainable, low-carbon becomes a matter of choice between rejection and sup-
port, where criticisms are easily branded as rejection of the entire transformation. 
Sustainable, low-carbon transformation involves issues that are complex, making 
it impossible to be either ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ sustainable, low-carbon transformation. 
For example, criticizing the wind energy projects of Danish companies in Mexico 
because they are causing irreversible social problems does not mean that one is 
anti-sustainability. In the same manner, when someone is ‘eco’ friendly, it does 
not mean that this person needs to stop using planes and cars as a means of trans-
portation or stop printing out journal articles to read manually. As each one of us 
experiences sustainable, low-carbon transformation in different ways, we need to 
be open and empathic. We should not be chained to political correctness.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, 
sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you 
give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Crea-
tive Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain 
permission directly from the copyright holder.
363© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021 
A. M. Hernandez, Taming the Big Green Elephant, Globale Gesellschaft und 
internationale Beziehungen, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-31821-5
References
Abell, P. (2004) Narrative explanation: an alternative to variance-centered explanation? 
Annual Review of Sociology 30, 287–310.
Abers, R. N. & Tatagiba, L. (2014) Institutional Activism: Mobilizing for Women’s 
Health from Inside The Brazilian Bureaucracy: GT14 – Entre as Ruas e os Gabinetes: 
institucionalização e contestação nos movimentos sociais latino-americanos. 38º Encon-
tro Anual da Anpocs.
Abid, M. (2015) The close relationship between informal economic growth and carbon 
emissions in Tunisia since 1980: The (ir)relevance of structural breaks. Sustainable Cit-
ies and Society 15, 11–21.
Abinales, P. (ed.) (1996) The Revolution Falters. The Left in Philippine Politics After 1986. 
Southeast Asia Program Publication, Ithaca, NY.
Abraham, J. (2017) Despite Trump, American companies are still investing in renewable 
energy. The Guardian, October 11. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-
consensus-97-per-cent/2017/oct/11/despite-trump-american-companies-are-still-invest-
ing-in-renewable-energy. Accessed 10/18/2017.
ABS-CBN News (2017) LP senators removed from key posts in Senate reorg. ABS-CBN 
News, February 27. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/27/17/lp-senators-removed-
from-key-posts-in-senate-reorg.
Aden, N. T. & Sinton, J. E. (2006) Environmental implications of energy policy in China. 
Environmental Politics 15 (2), 248–270.
Adger, W. N., Barnett, J., Chapin III, F. & Ellemor, H. (2011) This Must be the Place: 
Underrepresentation of Identity and Meaning in Climate Change Decision-Making. 
Global Environmental Politics 11 (2), 1–25.
Adler, E. & Haas, P. (1992) Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and 
the Creation of a Reflective Research Program. International Organization 46 (1), 
367–390.
Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. & Sandof, N. (1950) The Authoritarian 
Personality. Haprer and Brothers, New York.
Aguayo Quezada, S. & Parra Rosales, L. P. (1997) Las Organizaciones No Gubernamen-
tales en Derechos Humanos: Entre la Democracia Participativa y la Electoral: Serie 
ONG de los Sesenta.
364 References
Aguilera Portales, R. E. (2010) La relación de una triada compleja: entre el derecho, la 
moral y la política. Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho 28, 455–491.
Aguilera Portales, R. E. (2011) Educación Ciudadana para una Cultura de la Legalidad: 
Ejemplar dedicado a: Homenaje al Profesor Dr. Ferrando Montovani. Letras jurídicas: 
revista electrónica de derecho 12.
Aguilera Portales, R. E. & Gonzáles Cruz, J. (2010) Estado democrático, sistemas de 
legalidad y corrupción en América Latina. Revista telemática de filosofía del derecho 
(RTFD) 13.
Aguilera Portales, R. E. & Sánchez Garcia, F. R. (2010) Cultura política, sociedad civil y 
gobernabilidad democrática. Letras jurídicas: revista electrónica de derecho 10.
Agyeman, J. & Evans, B. (2004) Just sustainability: the emerging discourse of environmen-
tal justice in Britain? Geographical Journal 170 (2), 155–164.
Ahmed, A. (2017) Jamaica’s Electricity Mix in 2030: The Role of Renewables and Natural 
Gas.
Algan, Y., Cahuc, P. & Zylberberg, A. (2002) Public employment and labor market perfor-
mances. Economic Policy 17 (34), 7–66.
Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis, 2nd Edition. Longman, New York, Reading, Menlo Park, Harlow, Don Mills, Syd-
ney, Mexico City, Madrid, Amsterdam.
Altemeyer, B. (2006) The Authoritarians. University of Manitoba, Winnipeg.
Altez, J. A. L. (2017) Making mining work. Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 07. https://
opinion.inquirer.net/102230/making-mining-work. Accessed 3/7/2017.
Alvarez, K. C. (2017a) Anti-mining groups clamor for Gina Lopez confirmation as DENR 
chief. GMA News Online, March 01. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/601484/
news/nation/anti-mining-groups-clamor-for-gina-lopez-confirmation-as-denr-chief. 
Accessed 3/2/2017.
Alvarez, K. C. (2017b) DOF chief: Gina Lopez failed to observe due process in shut-
down of mines. GMA News Online, March 14. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/
story/603124/money/companies/dof-chief-gina-lopez-failed-to-observe-due-process-in-
shutdown-of-mines. Accessed 3/17/2017.
Anderman, M. (2007) Status and Prospect of Battery Technologies for Hybrid Electric 
Vehicles, including Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles.
André, C. (2008) Développement personnel: À la recherche du bonheur. Sciences 
Humaines 7, 72–73.
Andresen, S. & Gulbrandsen, L. (2003) The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate 
Compliance, Oslo.
Anstey, M., Avenhaus, R. & Faure, G. O. et al. (2009) Science in International Policymak-
ing. PINPoints 33, 1; 31.
Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Arias-Maldonado, M. (2007) An imaginary solution? The green defence of deliberative 
democracy. Environmental Values 16 (2), 233–252.
Armitage, D. (2005) Adaptive Capacity and Community-Based Natural Resource Manage-
ment. Environmental Management 35, 703–715.
Arnstein, S. R. (1969) A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Planning 
Association 35 (4), 216–224.
365References
Aron, W. (2001) Science and the IWC. In: Friedheim, R. (ed.) Toward a Sustainable Whal-
ing Regime. University of Washington Press and Canadian Circumpolar Institute, Seat-
tle, London and Edmonton, pp. 105–123.
Arthur, B. (1988) Self-enforcing Mechanisms in Economics. In: Anderson, W. P. & Arrow, 
K. (eds.) The Economy as an Evolving Complex System. Addison Wesley, Redwood 
City, CA, pp. 9–31.
Arthur, B. (1994) Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arber.
Aspinall, E. (2002) Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights: History 
and the International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism. Indonesia 73, 1–24.
Associated Press (2017) U.S. utilities seek solar power as Trump sides with coal, fossil 
fuels. Los Angeles Times, February 04. https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-solar-
power-20170204-story.html. Accessed 10/18/2017.
Atkins, D. (2017) The Silver Lining of Trump’s Win: 2020 is More Important than 2016. 
Washington Monthly, January 14. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/01/14/the-sil-
ver-lining-of-trumps-win-2020-is-more-important-than-2016/. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Avritzer, L. (1995) Transition to Democracy and Political Culture: An Analysis of the Con-
flict between Civil and Political Society in Post-Authoritarian Brazil. Constellations 2 
(2), 242–267.
Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York.
Baber, W. F. & Bartlett, R. V. (2005) Deliberative environmental politics: democracy and 
ecological rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Back, H. & Hadenius, A. (2008) Democracy and state capacity: Exploring a J-shaped rela-
tionship. Governance 21 (1), 1–24.
Bagehot, W. (1867) The English Constitution. Chapman and Hall, London.
Baldwin, R. E. (2016) The great convergence: Information technology and the new globali-
zation. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Bank of Jamaica (2017) Jamaica Balance of Trade. https://tradingeconomics.com/jamaica/
balance-of-trade. Accessed 11/17/2017
Barbier, E. (2009) A Global Green New Deal: Report prepared for the Green Economy 
Initiative of UNEP.
Bardhan, P. (2010) Awakening Giants. Feet of Clay. Assessing the Economic Rise of China. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Barett, B. & Chambers, W. B. (1998) Primer on Scientific Knowledge and Politics in 
the Evolving Global Climate Change Regime: COP3 and the Kyoto Protocol. United 
Nations University, Tokyo.
Baron, J. (1994) Thinking and deciding.
Barr, N. (2012) The relevance of efficiency to different theories of society: Economics of the 
Welfare State. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Barrett, S. (2003) Environment and Statecraft. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bass, G., Abramson, A. & Dewey, E. (2014) Effective advocacy. Lessons for nonprofit 
leaders from research and practice. In: Pekkanen, R., Smith, S. R. & Tsujinaka, Y. 
(eds.) Nonprofits and Advocacy: Engaging Community and Government in an Era of 
Retrenchment. Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 254–293.
366 References
Baumgartner, F. & Jones, B. (1991) Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems. Journal of 
Politics and Law 53 (4), 1044–1077.
Bazerman, M. H., Magliozzi, T. & Neale, M.A. (1985) Integrative bargaining in a competi-
tive market. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35 (3), 294–313.
Bazerman, M. & Shonk, K. (2005) The Decision Perspective to Negotiation. In: Moffitt, 
M. & Bordone, R. (eds.) The Handbook of Dispute Resolution. Jossey-Bass, San Fran-
cisco, CA, pp. 52–65.
BBC News (2001) China’s Great Green Wall. BBC News, March 03. https://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1199218.stm. Accessed 9/27/2017.
BBC News (2016) Australia senator Malcolm Roberts calls climate change a UN con-
spiracy. BBC News, August 05. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-36972449. 
Accessed 11/30/2016.
Bedward, T. & Simpson, V. (2016) Sustainable transport in Jamaica, Ministry of Transport 
and Mining, Kingston, Jamaica.
Beeson, M. (2010) The coming of environmental authoritarianism. Environmental Politics 
19 (2), 2726–294.
Belcher, W. L. (2009) Writing your journal articles in 12 weeks. SAGE Publications, Los 
Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC.
Benson, E., Best, S. & del Pozo-Vergnes, E. et al. (2014) Informal and Green? The forgot-
ten voice in the transition to a green economy, Discussion Paper March, London, UK.
Bento, A., Jacobsen, M. & Lui, A. (2017) Environmental Policy in the Presence of an Infor-
mal Sector. UC Center for Energy and Environmental Economics.
Berrueta, V. M., Serrano-Medrano, M., García-Bustamante, C., Astier, M. & Masera, 
O. R. (2015) Promoting sustainable local development of rural communities and 
 mitigating climate change: The case of Mexico’s Patsari improved cookstove project. 
Climatic Change 140 (1), 63–77.
Berry, J. & Portney, K. (2014) The Group Basis of City Politics. In: Pekkanen, R., Smith, 
S. R. & Tsujinaka, Y. (eds.) Nonprofits and Advocacy: Engaging Community and Gov-
ernment in an Era of Retrenchment. Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 21–46.
Bessette, J. (1980) Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Govern-
ment: in How Democratic is the Constitution? AEI Press, Washington, D.C.
Beyerlin, U. (2006) Bridging the North-South Divide in International Environmental Law. 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 66, 259–296.
Bibby, W. (2012) Technologies of the Clean Development Mechanism: Neoliberal Barriers 
to Carbon Offsetting. Human Welfare 1, 105–116.
Biersteker, T. & Weber, C. (eds.) (1996) State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Bijker, W. (1995) Of Bicycles, Bakelites and Bulbs. Toward a Theory pf Sociotechnical 
Change. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bijker, W. (2010) How is technology made? That is the question! Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 34 (1), 36–76.
Bijker, W., Bal, R. & Hendriks, R. (2009) The paradox of scientific authority: the role of 
scientific advice in democracies. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bijker, W., Hughes, T. & Pinch, T. (1987) The social construction of technological systems: 
new directions in the sociology and history of technology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
367References
Binger, A. (2011) Energy efficiency potential in Jamaica: challenges, opportunities and 
strategies for implementation, United Nations, Santiago de Chile.
Birkeland, T. A. (2005) An introduction to the policy process: theories, concepts, and mod-
els of public policy making, 3rd. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY.
Birnie, P. & Boyle, A. (1992) International Law and the Environment. Oxford University 
Press, New York.
Blackmann, A. (2000) Informal sector pollution control: What policy option do we have? 
World Development 28, 2067–2082.
Blackmon, D. (2017) The Trump Energy Policy Revolution Creates Its Own Set Of Chal-
lenges. Forbes, July 10. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2017/07/10/
the-trump-energy-policy-revolution-creates-its-own-set-of-challenges/#515de01d4123. 
Accessed 10/18/2017.
Blair, T. (2011) Who, What, Why: What can technocrats achieve that politicians can’t? 
BBC News, November 14. https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-15720438. Accessed 
8/17/2017.
BMZ (2015) Klimaschutz ist nachhaltige Entwicklungspolitik. https://www.bmz.de/de/
presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2015/november/20151118_Klimaschutz-ist-nachhaltige-En-
twicklungspolitik/index.html. Accessed 1/20/2017.
Boavida, N. F. F. G. (2017) The role of indicators in decisions of technology innovation. 
KIT Scientific Publishing, Karlsruhe.
Bodansky, D. (2010) The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem. The 
American Journal of International Law 104 (2), 230–240.
Boden, T., Andres, R. & Marland, G. (2017) Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel 
CO2 Emissions. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United 
States).
Bogues, A. (2011) Radical anti-colonial thought, anti-colonial internationalism and 
the politics of human solidarities. In: Shilliam, R. (ed.) International relations and 
non-Western thought: Imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity. 
Routledge, London, pp. 197–214.
Bolton, R., Lagendijk, V. & Silvast, A. (2018) Grand visions and pragmatic integration: 
Exploring the evolution of Europe’s electricity regime. Environmental Innovation and 
Societal Transitions.
Bonaiuti, M. (2014) The Great Transition. Routledge, London and New York.
Booth, W. C., Colomb, G. G. & Williams, Joseph, M. (1995) The Craft of Research. Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Boström, M. (2012) A missing pillar? Challenges in theorizing and practicing social sus-
tainability. Sustainability: Science, Practice, and Policy 8 (1), 3–14.
Boström, M. (2014) Sustainable development by the multi-stakeholder model? In: Fitz-
patrick, T. (ed.) International handbook of social policy and the environment. Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 349–375.
Boström, M. & Tamm Hallström, K. (2010) NGO power in global social and environmen-
tal standard setting. Global Environmental Politics 10 (4), 36–59.
Boyle, A. (1999) Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law. Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 48, 901–913.
Bradford, G. (1989) How Deep is Deep Ecology? Times Change, Ojai, CA.
368 References
Brand, F. (2009) Critical Natural Capital Revisted: Ecological Resilience and Sustainable 
Development. Ecological Economics 68, 605–612.
Braudel, F. (1958) Histoire, science sociales. La longue durée. Annales Economies Societés 
Civilisations XIII (4), 723–753.
Brembs, B., Button, K. & Munafò, M. (2013) Deep impact: unintended consequences of 
journal rank. Frontiers in human neuroscience 7, 291.
Bremmer, I. (2018) Us vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism. Portfolio/Penguin, New York.
Brenner, N. (1999) Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of Urban Govern-
ance in the European Union. Urban Studies 36 (3).
Brenner, N. (2004) Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in western 
Europe, 1960–2000. Review of International Political Economy 11 (3), 447–488.
Brewer, G. & Stern, P. (2005) Decision Making for the Environment: Social and Behavio-
ral Science Research Priorities. National Research Council of the National Academies, 
Washington, D.C.
Brodwin, D. (2013) The Double-Edged Subsidy Sword. US News, September 05. https://
www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/09/05/how-government-
subsidies-both-help-and-hurt-taxpayers. Accessed 11/1/2017.
Brooks, T. (2006) Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought. International Jour-
nal of Philosophical Studies 14 (1), 51–77.
Bruckner, T., Petschel-Held, G. & Toth, F. (eds.) (1998) The Tolerable Window Approach 
to Global Warming. World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Ven-
ice, Italy
Bruckner T., I. A. Bashmakov, Y. Mulugetta, H. Chum, A. de la Vega Navarro, J. Edmonds, 
A. Faaij, B. Fungtammasan, A. Garg, E. Hertwich, D. Honnery, D. Infield, M. Kainuma, 
S. Khennas, S. Kim, H. B. Nimir, K. Riahi, N. Strachan, R. Wiser, and X. Zhang (2014) 
Energy Systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Bunker, B. & Rubin, J. (eds.) (1995) Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice. Jossey-Bass Pub-
lishers, San Francisco.
Burdett, K. (2012) Towards a theory of the labor market with a public sector. Elsevier. 
Labor Economics 19 (2), 68–75.
Burns, A. (2018) A Week after the Election, Democratic Gains Grows Stronger. New York 
Times, 13 November. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/us/politics/midterm-re-
sults-democratic-gains.html. Accessed 10/21/2020.
Business Mirror (2016) Environmental NGO: Responsible mining exists in the Philippines. 
Business Mirror, July 02. https://www.businessmirror.com.ph/environmental-ngo-re-
sponsible-mining-exists-in-the-philippines/. Accessed 3/19/2017.
Buzan, B. & Lawson (2015) The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Mak-
ing of International Relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Byrne, J. & Glover, L. (2002) A Common Future or Towards a Future Commons: Globali-
zation and Sustainable Development Since UNCED. International Review of Environ-
mental Strategies 3, 5–25.
Cabacungan, G. C. (2013) Superior berates ‘crying’ climate exec Saño. Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, November 19. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/91553/superior-berates-cry-
ing-climate-exec-sano. Accessed 5/26/2019.
Cabuenas, J. V. (2018) Quo warranto can also be used against President, VP–Supreme 




Cadman, T. (2013) Climate change and global policy regimes: Towards institutional legiti-
macy. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Cajes, A. (2014) Philippine waste agricultural biomass: Prospects and opportunities: 
Sub-Regional Dissemination Workshop on Waste Agricultural Biomass to Energy in 
South East Asia.
Calhoun, C. (2002) Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and 
the Public Sphere. Public Culture 14 (1), 147–171.
Campbell, W. (2016) Jamaica’s jostle with democracy. Jamaica Observer, February 22. 
https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Jamaica---s-jostle-with-democracy_52123. 
Accessed 11/21/2017.
Candeal-Haro, J. C. & Induráin-Eraso, E. (1995) A note on linear utility. Economic Theory 
6 (3), 519–522.
Cao, J. (2018) Recalibrating China-U.S. Climate Cooperation Under the Trump Adminis-
tration. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 4 (1), 77–93.
Carbon Tax Center (2017) What about China? https://www.carbontax.org/what-about-
china/ Accessed 9/28/2017.
Carraro, C., Eyckmans, J. & Finus, M. (2006) Optimal Transfers and Participation Deci-
sions in International Environmental Agreements. Review of International Organiza-
tions 1, 379–396.
Carraro, C. & Sgobbi, A. (2008) Modelling negotiated decision-making in environmental 
and natural resource management: A multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bar-
gaining model with uncertainty. Automatica 44 (6), 1488–1503.
Carraro, C. & Siniscalco, D. (1994) Technical Innovation and Environmental Protection. 
Environmental Policy Reconsidered: The Role of Technological Innovation. European 
Economic Review 38 (3–4), 545–554.
Casula Viffel, A. & Thedvall, R. (2012) Organizing for social sustainability: governance 
through bureaucratization in meta-organizations. Sustainability: Science, Practice, and 
Policy 8, 50–58.
Catoto, R. (2017) 5,000 mine workers protest closure of mining firms. Minda News, Feb-
ruary 16. https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2017/02/5000-mine-workers-protest-
closure-of-mining-firms/. Accessed 3/2/2017.
CCICED (2015) Final Report–National Governance Capacity for Green Transformation, 
Beijing.
CDIAC (2017) Mexico Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions.
Cede, F. (2009) The Settlement of International Disputes by Legal Means—Arbitration 
and Judicial Settlement. In: Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V. & Zartman, I. W. (eds.) The 
SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. SAGE Publications, Los Angeles & London, 
pp. 358–375.
Cede, F. (2012) Evolving International Law of Intervention and Prevention. In: Anstey, M. 
& Zartman, I. W. (eds.) To Block the Slippery Slope: Reducing Identity Conflicts and 
Preventing Genocide. Oxford University Press, New York.
Chacko, P. (2011) The internationalist nationalist: pursuing an ethical modernity with 
Jawaharlal Nehru. In: Shilliam, R. (ed.) International relations and non-Western 
370 References
thought: Imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity. Routledge, 
London, pp. 178–196.
Charvis, M. & Heron, H. (2016) Energy System of Jamaica, Office of the Utilities Regula-
tions, Kingston, Jamaica.
Chasek, P. (2001) Earth Negotiations: Analyzing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy. 
UNU Press, Tokyo.
Chasek, P. (ed.) (2006) Global Environmental Politics. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Chen X. & Chao, C. (2004) On the intricacies of the chinese guanxi: A process Model of 
guanxi development. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 21 (3), 305–324.
Cheng Li & Yiou Zhang (2017) Assessing institutional rules in China’s elite selection: The 
case of ethnic minority leaders. Brookings, April 19. https://www.brookings.edu/opin-
ions/assessing-institutional-rules-in-chinas-elite-selection-the-case-of-ethnic-minori-
ty-leaders/. Accessed 10/5/2017.
Chernillo, D. (2007) A Social Theory of the Nation-State. The Political Forms of Modernity 
beyong Methodological Nationalism. Routledge, London & New York.
Chesterman, S. & Mahbubani, K. (2010) The Asian Way of Handling the World. The 
Guardian, March 04. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/04/global-
problem-solving-asian-way. Accessed 5/22/2018.
Cheyns, E. (2011) Multi-stakeholder initiatives for sustainable agriculture: limits of the 
inclusiveness paradigm. In: Ponte, S., Gibbon, P. & Vestergaard, J. (eds.) Governing 
through Standards, Origins, Drivers and Limitations. Palgrave, Basingstoke, pp. 210–
235.
Chrisholm, M. (1982) Modern World Development: A Geographical Perspective. Hutchin-
son, London, Melbourne.
Christensen, C., Bauman, J., Ruggles, R. & Sadtler, T. (2006) Disruptive innovation for 
social change. Harvard Business Review, December, 94–101.
Christie, I. & Warburton, D. (2001) From Here to Sustainability. Earthscan, London.
Churchman, D. (1995) Negotiation. Process, Tactics, Theory. University Press of America, 
Lanham, MD.
Cillizza, C. & Petulla, S. (2017) Trump is on pace to sign more executive orders than any 
president in the last 50 years. CNN, October 13. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/13/
politics/donald-trump-executive-orders/index.html. Accessed 11/2/2017.
Ciuta, F. & Klinke, I. (2010) Lost in Conceptualization: Reading the New Cold War with 
Critical Geopolitics. Political Geography 29 (6), 323–332.
Clarke, L., Jiang, K. & Akimoto, K. et al. (2014) Assessing Transformation Pathways: 
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group 
III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK.
Climate Action Tracker (2017a) China – Rating, 18 September 2017, https://climateaction-
tracker.org/countries/china.html. Accessed 09/22/2017.
Climate Action Tracker (2017b) Mexico – Rating. https://climateactiontracker.org/coun-
tries/mexico.html. Accessed 09/22/2017.
Climate Action Tracker (2017c) USA. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa.html. 
Accessed 09/17/2017.
371References
Climate Change Commission (2016) PHL begins comprehensive energy policy review, Cli-
mate Change Commission, Office of the President of the Philippines, Manila. https://
climate.gov.ph/15-press-release/121-phl-begins-comprehensive-energy-policy-review. 
Accessed 03/17/2017.
Climate Links (2017) Greenhouse Gas Emissions Factsheet: Mexico. May 2017, https://
www.climatelinks.org/resources/greenhouse-gas-emissions-factsheet-mexico. Accessed 
09/28/2017.
Cobb, J. (2017) The Return of Civil Disobedience. The New Yorker, January 09. https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/09/the-return-of-civil-disobedience. Accessed 
11/1/2017.
Cobham, A. (2014) Uncounted: Power, inequalities and the post-2015 data revolution. 
Development 57, 320–332.
Cogley, G. J., Kargel J.A., Kaser, G. & van der Veen, C. J. (2010) Tracking the source of 
glacier misinformation. Science (327), 522.
Cohen, J. & Arato, A. (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA.
Collier, D. & Collier, R. (1991) Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, NJ.
Colman, A. (2003) Oxford Dictionary of Psychology. Oxford University Press, New York.
Corbett, J., Grube, D. C., Lovell, H. & Scott, R. (2018) Singular memory or institutional 
memories? Toward a dynamic approach. Governance 31(3), 555–573.
Cordero, T. (2017) DENR chief Gina Lopez orders cancellation of 75 mining contracts. 
GMA News Online, February 14. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/599487/
money/companies/denr-chief-gina-lopez-orders-cancellation-of-75-mining-contracts. 
Accessed 2/18/2017.
Correa d’Almeida, A. & Poon, J. (2015) Making Chinese Cities Smarter: Leapfrogging 
Intra-city Transport Development with ‘Big Data’. The World Post, October 01. https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/andre-correa-dalmeida/chinese-smartercities-lea_b_8223530.
html. Accessed 8/11/2016.
Costa, L., Rybski, D. & Kropp, J. P. (2011) A Human Development Framework for CO2 
Reductions. PloS ONE 6 (12), e29262.
Council of Councils (2018) 2018 Report Card on International Cooperation. https://www.
cfr.org/interactive/councilofcouncils/reportcard2018/#!/. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2011) Democracy in Mexico: The Past, Present and 
Future. https://www.coha.org/democracy-in-mexico-the-past-present-and-future/. 
Accessed 05/28/2019.
Cozzens, S. E. & Kaplinsky, R. (2009) Innovation, poverty and inequality: Cause coinci-
dence or co-evolution? In: Lundvall, B.-A., Josepj K.J., Chaminade, C. and Vang, J. 
(ed.) Handbook of innovation systems and developing countries: Building domestic 
capabilities in a global setting. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Crone, P. (2005) Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh University Press, Edin-
burgh.
Cross, J. (1996) Negotiation as Adaptive Learning. International Negotiation 1, 153–178.
Crouch, C. (2008) Postdemokratie, 1. Auflage der deutschen Übersetzung. Suhrkamp Ver-
lag, Frankfurt am Main.
372 References
Crowley, S. (2016) If our protests against Donald Trump aren’t strategic, they will fail. The 
Guardian, December 16. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/16/
trump-protest-strategy-march-washington. Accessed 10/12/2017.
Crump, L. & Zartman, I. W. (2003) Multilateral negotiation and the management of com-
plexity. International Negotiation 8 (1), 1–5.
Cullet, P. (1998) Equity and Flexibility Mechanisms in the Climate Change Regime: 
Conceptual and Practical Issues, Geneva. https://www.ielrc.org/content/w9801.pdf. 
Accessed 05/28/2019.
Dahl, R. (1957) The Concept of Power. Behaviorial Science 2 (2), 201–215.
Dai, X. (2007) International institutions and national policies, 1st ed. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
Darby, M. (2014) Korolec: Poland is a climate policy success story. Climate Change News, 
August 18. https://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/08/18/korolec-poland-is-a-cli-
mate-policy-success-story/. Accessed 12/12/2016.
Davenport, T. H. & Prusak, L. (2000) Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage 
What They Know. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
David, P. (1988) Path-dependence: Putting the Past into the Future of Economics. Stanford 
Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford, CA.
Davidson, M. (2009) Social sustainability: a potential for politics? Local Environment 14 
(7), 607–619.
Dearden, N. (2013) Jamaica’s decades of debt are damaging its future. The Guardian, April 
16. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/apr/16/
jamaica-decades-debt-damaging-future. Accessed 11/13/2017.
Dedeurwaerdere, T. (2014) Sustainability Science for Strong Sustainability. Edward Elgar, 
Northampton, MA.
Dela Cruz, E. & Serapio, M., JR. (2017) Embattled Philippine minister may win reappoint-
ment if Congress defers decision. Reuters, March 09. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-philippines-mining-idUSKBN16G0EB?il=0. Accessed 3/14/2017.
Delay, T. (2009) Low carbon economy will transform world like the first industrial revolu-
tion. The Guardian, July 02. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/cif-green/2009/
jul/02/low-carbon-economy. Accessed 1/10/2018.
DeMint, J. (2016) Obama Sidesteps Senate Approval of Paris Agreement. https://www.her-
itage.org/environment/commentary/obama-sidesteps-senate-approval-paris-agreement. 
Accessed 05/28/2019.
DENR (2016) PH determined to cut emissions of carbon, other greenhouse gases. Depart-
ment of Environment and Natural Resources, Philippines, 2016. https://www.denr.gov.
ph/news-and-features/latest-news/2529-ph-determined-to-cut-emissions-of-carbon-oth-
er-greenhouse-gases.html. Accessed 3/11/2017.
Depledge, J. (2005) The organization of global negotiations: Constructing the climate 
change regime. Earthscan, London & Sterling, VA.
Diaz, J. (2016) CA bypasses 15 Duterte appointees. Philstar Global, October 27. https://
www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/10/27/1637793/ca-bypasses-15-duterte-appointees. 
Accessed 3/17/2017.




DiChristopher, T. (2017) Trump wants America to be ‘energy dominant.’ Here’s what that 
means. CNBC, June 28. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/28/trump-america-energy-dom-
inant-policy.html. Accessed 10/18/2017.
Dicken, P. (2015) Global shift: Mapping the changing contours of the world economy, Sev-
enth edition. Sage, Los Angeles, California.
Die Bundesregierung (2016) Was bringt, was kostet die Energiewende, Berlin.
Diehl, P. F. & Gltsch, N. (eds.) (2001) Environmental Conflict. Westview Press, Boulder, 
CO.
Dizon, N., Canivel, R. S., Gamil, J., Aurelio, J. & Avendano, C. (2017) Cimatu appointed 
DENR secretary. Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 09. https://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/895312/cimatu-appointed-denr-secretary. Accessed 10/17/2017.
DOE (2017) 2016 Philippine Power Situation Report. Department of Energy, Republic of 
the Philippines. https://www.doe.gov.ph/electric-power/2016-philippine-power-situa-
tion-report. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Dong Wei (2010) NGOs Play a ’Constructive Role’ In Climate Change. China Daily. 
October 8. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-10/08/content_11386672.htm. 
Accessed 05/28/2019.
Doronila, A. (2013) Money Trail of Fugitive Napoles. Philippine Daily Inquirer. August 
19. https://opinion.inquirer.net/59151/money-trail-of-fugitive-napoles. Accessed 
05/28/2019.
Doyle, T. & Simpson A. (2006) Traversing more than speed bumps: green politics under 
authoritarian regimes in Burma and Iran. Environmental Politics 15 (5), 750–767.
Drori, G., Meyer, J. & Hwang, H. (eds.) (2006) Globalization and Organization: World 
Society and Organizational Change. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Drösser, C. (1994) Fiktive Versuche. Zeit Online, February 11. https://www.zeit.
de/1994/07/fiktive-versuche. Accessed 12/25/2017.
Druckman, D. (ed.) (1977) Complexity in International Negotiations. Sage, Beverly Hills.
Dryzek, J. (2010) Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford.
Dubreuil, B. (2010) Human Evolution and the Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Dupont, A. (1996) Is there an ‘ Asian way’? Survival. Global Politics and Strategy 38 (2), 
13–34.
Dupont, C. (1994) Coalition Theory: Using Power to Build Cooperation. In: Zartman, I. 
W. (ed.) International Multilateral Negotiations. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 
pp. 148–177.
Dupont, C. & Faure, G. O. (2002) The Negotiation Process. In: Kremenyuk, V. (ed.) Inter-
national Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Second Edition. Jossey-Bass, San 
Francisco, pp. 39–63.
Durrant, R. (2016) Sustainable development in Jamaica, Jamaica Promotions Corporation 
(JAMPRO), Kingston, Jamaica.
Easterly, W. (2007) Was Development Assistance a Mistake? American Economic Review 
97, 328–332.
Easton, D. (1975) A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support. British Journal of 
Political Science 5, 435–457.
374 References
Eckhouse, B. (2016) Money Pours into Sierra Club at Frantic Pace After Trump Victory. 
Bloomberg, November 16. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-16/envi-
ronmental-donors-pledge-cash-at-frantic-pace-after-trump-win. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Ehnert, F., Kern, F., Borgström, S., Gorissen, L., Maschmeyer, S. & Egermann, M. (2018) 
Urban sustainability transitions in a context of multi-level governance: A comparison of 
four European states. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 26, 101–116.
EIA (2016a) Mexico: International Energy Data and Analysis. 06 October. https://www.
eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=MEX. Accessed 05/28/2019.
EIA (2016b) Mexico Energy Profile: Among Largest Source Of US Oil Imports – Analysis. 
December. https://www.eurasiareview.com/10122016-mexico-energy-profile-among-
largest-source-of-us-oil-imports-analysis/. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Eichengreen, B. (2011) Global Shifts. In: Bank of Finland (ed.) Anniversary Symposium, 
Helsinki.
Eichengreen, B., Wyplosz, C. & Park, Y. C. (eds.) (2008) China, Asia, and the New World 
Economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Elder, G., Johnson, M. K. & Crosnoe, R. (2003) The Emergence and Development of Life 
Course Theory. In: Mortimer, Jeylan, T. & Shanahan, Michael, J. (eds.) Handbook of 
the Life Course. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 3–19.
Elkington, J. (1994) Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win Business Strate-
gies for Sustainable Development. California Management Review 36, 90–100.
Elkington, J. (1997) Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Busi-
ness. Capstone, Oxford, UK.
Elliott, J. (2013) An Introduction to Sustainable Development. Routledge, New York.
Energy Transition (2014) The role of Latin America in global emissions. https://energytran-
sition.org/2014/12/the-role-of-latin-america-in-global-emissions. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Epstein, C. (2005) Knowledge and Power in Global Environmental Activism. International 
Journal of Peace Studies 10 (1), 47–67.
ESMAP (2016) Low-Carbon Development for Mexico, Energy Sector Management Assis-
tance Program, the World Bank, Washington, D.C. https://www.esmap.org/sites/esmap.
org/files/P108304_MX_Low-Carbon%20Development%20for%20Mexico_Brief-
ing%20Note003-10.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Etcheverry, J. (2011) New Climate Protection, Energy Security, and Employment Crea-
tion Strategies for Latin and North America based on Renewable Energy Collaboration. 
Latin American Policy 2, 43–57.
Euromonitor International (2017) Economy, Finance and Trade. https://www.euromonitor.
com/economy-finance-and-trade. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Eyerman, R. & Jameson, A. (1989) Environmental Knowledge as an Organizational 
Weapon: The Case of Greenpeace. Social Science Information 28 (1), 99–119.
Farzin, Y. H. (1996) Optimal Pricing of Environmental and Natural Resource Use with 
Stock Externalities. Journal of Public Economics 62, 31–57.
Fawcett, W., Hughes, M., Krieg, H., Albrecht, S. & Vennström, A. (2012) Flexible strate-
gies for long-term sustainability under uncertainty. Building Research & Information 40 
(5), 545–557.
Faysse, N. (2006) Troubles on the way: an analysis of the challenges faced by multi-stake-
holder platforms. Natural Resources Forum 30, 219–229.
375References
Feinberg, R., Waisman, C. & Zamosc, L. (eds.) (2006) Civil Society and Democracy 
in Latin America. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Feinstein, C. (1998) Pessism Perpetuated: Real Wages and the Standard of Living in 
 Britain during and after the Industrial Revolution. Journal of Economic History 58 (3), 
625–658.
Feng Wang & Haitao Yin, S. L. (2010) China’s renewable energy policy: Commitments and 
challenges. Energy Policy 38, 1872–1878.
Ferenstein, G. (2015) Peter Thiel Says America Is A Technocracy, Not A Democracy. 
Here’s 1 Graph That (Sort Of) Proves His Point. The Ferenstein Wire, April 02. https://
medium.com/the-ferenstein-wire/peter-thiel-says-america-is-a-technocracy-not-a-de-
mocracy-here-s-1-graph-that-sort-of-proves-2d7ef06aff8a. Accessed 11/2/2017.
Fischedick M., J. Roy & Abdel-Aziz, A. et al. (2014) Industry: In: Climate Change 2014: 
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, UK.
Fisher, D. R. & Green, J. F. (2004) Understanding Disenfranchisement: Civil Society and 
Developing Countries’ Influence and Participation in Global Governance for Sustaina-
ble Development. Global Environmental Politics 4 (3), 65–84.
Fisman, R., Jing Shi, Yongxiang Wan & Weixing Wu (2017) Connections and the Selection 
of China’s Political Elite. STICERD.
Fitzpatrick, T. (ed.) (2014) International handbook of social policy and the environment. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Flores, A. M. (2017) Meralco building modern coal plant. Manila Standard, March 03. 
https://thestandard.com.ph/business/power-technology/230830/meralco-building-mod-
ern-coal-plant.html. Accessed 4/21/2017.
Fogel, C. (2002) Greening the Earth with Trees: Science, Storylines and the Construction 
of International Climate Change Institutions. University of California, Santa Cruz.
Fox, J. & Hernandez, L. (1992) Mexico’s Difficult Democracy: Grassroots Movements, 
NGOs and Local Government. Alternatives 17 (2).
France, N. (2013) Editorial: Challenges of the transition to a low carbon, more electric 
future: From here to 2050. Energy Policy (52), 1–9.
Franco, R. C., Wang, L. & O’Rourke, P. et al. (2010) Civil Society and Social Capital in 
Mexico and Central America. In: Anheier, H. K., Toepler, S. & List, R. (eds.) Interna-
tional encyclopedia of civil society. Springer, New York, pp. 262–268.
Franklin, R. L. (1968) Freewill and determinism: a study of rival conceptions of man. Rou-
tledge and K. Paul.
Fraser, E.D.G., Dougill, A. J., Mabee, W. E., Reed, M. & McAlpine, P. (2006) Bottom up 
and top down: analysis of participatory processes for sustainability indicator identifica-
tion as a pathway to community empowerment and sustainable environmental manage-
ment. Journal of Environmental Management 78 (2), 114–127.
Fredericks, S. E. (2012) Justice in sustainability indicators and indexes. International Jour-
nal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 19 (6), 490–499.
Freistein, K. (2016) Effects of indicator use: a comparison of poverty measuring instru-
ments at the World Bank. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Prac-
tice 18 (4), 366–381.
French, H., Renner, M. & Gardner, G. (2009) Toward a Transatlantic Green New Deal, 
Berlin.
376 References
Friedman, T. (2007) The Power of Green. The New York Times, April 15. https://www.
nytimes.com/2007/04/15/opinion/15iht-web-0415edgreen-full.5291830.html?pagewant-
ed=all. Accessed 5/23/2018.
Friedrich, C. (1963) Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics. McGraw 
Hill, New York.
Fücks, R. (2011) The Great (Green) Transformation. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Berlin. 
https://ecosummit.net/uploads/eco11_fuecks_boell_slides.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Gale, D. (1976) The linear exchange model. Journal of Mathematical Economics 3 (2), 
205–209.
Galtung, J. (1990) Cultural Violence. Journal of Peace Research 27 (3), 291–305.
Gamil, J. (2017) Cimatu overturns Gina Lopez’s order on ECC issuance. Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, July 10. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/912696/cimatu-overturns-gina-lopezs-or-
der-on-ecc-issuance. Accessed 10/17/2017.
Ganzach, Y. & Karsahi, N. (1995) Message framing and buying: A field experiment. Jour-
nal of Business Research 32, 11–17.
Garcia, P. (2018) Experts discuss possible outcomes of quo warranto case vs. Chief Jus-
tice Sereno. CNN Philippines, May 11. https://cnnphilippines.com/opinion/2018/05/11/
quo-warranto-petition-maria-lourdes-sereno-votes.html. Accessed 7/2/2018.
Gauthier, D. (1969) The Logic of Leviathan. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
GEA (ed.) (2012) Global Energy Assessment—Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
Geels, F. (2005) The Dynamics of Transitions in Socio-technical Systems: A Multi-level 
Analysis of the Transition Pathway from Horse-drawn Carriages to Automobiles (1860–
1930). Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 17 (4), 445–476.
Geels, F. & Schot, J. (2009) The dynamics of socio-technical transitions: A socio-technical 
perspective. In: Grin, J., Rotmans, J. & Schot, J. (eds.) Transitions to sustainable devel-
opment—New directions in the study of long term transformative change. Routledge, 
London, pp. 11–104.
Geels, F. W. (2011) The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: Responses to 
seven criticism. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 1, 24–40.
Geels, F.W. & Schot, J.W. (2007a) Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. 
Research Policy 36, 399–417.
Geels, F.W. & Schot, J.W. (2007b) Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. 
Research Policy 36, 399–417.
Genus, A. & Coles, A.-M. (2008) Rethinking the multi-level perspective of technological 
transitions. Research Policy 37, 1436–1445.
George, A. L. & Bennett, A. (2007) Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Geronimo, Jee, Y. (2016) What drives Gina Lopez? Rappler, August 01. https://www.
rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/141535-environment-gina-lopez-profile. Accessed 
2/18/2017.
Geronimo, Jee, Y. (2017) CA to bypass Gina Lopez as environment chief—Pacquiao. Rap-
pler Philippines, March 14. https://www.rappler.com/nation/163562-commission-ap-
pointments-gina-lopez-confirmation. Accessed 3/17/2017.
377References
Gibbons, D. E. (2007) Communicable Crises: Prevention, Response, and Recovery in the 
Global Arena. IAP.
Gibson, R. (2005) Sustainability Assessment. Earthscan, London.
Gilbert, N. & Troitzsch, K. (2005) Simulation for the social scientist, 2nd ed. Open Univer-
sity Press, New York.
Gilley, B. (2012) Authoritarian Environmentalism and China’s Response to Climate 
Change. Environmental Politics 21 (2), 287–307.
Giupponi, C. & Sgobbi, A. (2013) Decision Support Systems for Water Resources Man-
agement in Developing Countries: Learning from Experiences in Africa. Water 5 (2), 
798–818.
Godet, M. (2000) The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning: Tools and Pitfalls. Techno-
logical Forecasting and Social Change 65, 3–22.
Goldberg, M. L. (2013) Samantha Power’s First Week: When Activists are Diplomats, 
and Diplomats are Activists. United Nations News and Commentary Global News—
Forum. UN Dispatch, August 12. https://www.undispatch.com/samantha-pow-
ers-first-speech-when-activists-are-diplomats-and-diplomats-activists/. Accessed 
3/2/2017.
Goldemberg, J. (1998) Leapfrogging Energy Technologies. Energy Policy 2, 729–741.
Goldin, I. & Winters, L. (eds.) (1995) The Economics of Sustainable Development. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Graham, L. (1993) The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of Soviet 
Union. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Graham, N. (2016) From the womb to the tomb via Jamaica’s $800 million informal 
enonomy. The Jamaican Gleaner, November 01. https://jamaica-gleaner.com/arti-
cle/news/20161101/womb-tomb-jamaicas-800-million-informal-enonomy. Accessed 
11/21/2017.
Grant, R. & Keohane, R. (2005) Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. 
American Political Science Review 99, 29–44.
Green, B. (2000) There but for Fortune: Real-Life vs. Fictional Case Studies in Legal Eth-
ics. Fordham Law Review 69 (3).
Green, M. J. & Self, B. L. (1996) Japan’s changing China policy: From commercial liberal-
ism to reluctant realism. Survival. Global Politics and Strategy 38 (2), 35–58.
Green New Deal Group (2008) A Green New Deal, London.
Greshko, M., Parker, L. & Howard, B. C. (2017) A running list of how Trump is chang-
ing the environment. National Geographic, August 23. https://news.nationalgeographic.
com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment.html. Accessed 10/17/2017.
GRICCE (2017) Jamaica—Approach to Climate Change. Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment. https://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/coun-
try-profiles/jamaica/. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Grießhammer, R., Brohmann, B. & Bauknecht, D. et al. (2015) Wie Transformationen und 
gesellschaftliche Innovationen gelingen können. Transformationsstrategien und Mod-
els of Change für nachhaltigen gesellschaftlichen Wande, 1. Auflage. Nomos Verlags-
gesellschaft, Baden-Baden.
Grin, J., Rotmans, J. & Schot, J. (2010) Transitions to Sustainable Development. New 
Directions in the Study of Long Term Transformative Change. Routledge, London.
378 References
Grin, J., Rotmans, J. & Schot, J. (2011) On patterns and agency in transition dynamics: 
Some key insights from the KSI programme. Environmental Innovation and Societal 
Transitions 1 (1), 76–81.
Grubler, A., Bai, X. & Buettner, T. et al. (2012) Chapter 18—Urban Energy Systems. In: 
Global Energy Assessment—Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, pp. 1307–1400.
Grundle, S. & Parker, S. (eds.) (2012) The new Italian Republic: from the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall to Berlusconi. Routledge, London.
Guehenno, J. M. (1994) Das Ende der Demokratie. Aus dem Französischen von Rainer von 
Savigny. Artemis & Winkler, München.
Gumport, P. (2000) Academic restructuring: Organizational change and institutional imper-
atives. Higher Education 39, 67–91.
Guo, C., Bond, Craig, A. & Narayanan, A. (2015) The Adoption of New Smart-Grid Tech-
nologies, Incentives, Outcomes, and Opportunities, Santa Monica, CA.
Gutmann, A. & Thompson, D. (2002) Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton University 
Press, Princeton.
GWEC (2010) Global Wind Power 2009 Report, Global Wind Energy Council, Brussels, 
Belgium. https://www.tureb.com.tr/files/bilgi_bankasi/dunya_res_durumu/8.gwec_
global_wind_2009_report.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Haas, P. (1992) Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordina-
tion. International Organization 46 (1), 1–35.
Haas, P. (2010) Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordi-
nation. In: Goldstein, J. & Steinberg, R. H. (eds.) International Institutions. Sage, Los 
Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC, pp. 185–220.
Habeeb, W. M. (1988) Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations 
Bargain with Strong Nations. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
Habermas, J. (2013) Im Sog der Technokratie. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
Häfele, W., Anderer, J., McDonald, A. & Nakicenovic, N. (1981) Energy in a Finite World: 
Paths to a Sustainable Future (Volume 1). Ballinger, Cambridge, MA.
Haifeng, H. (2014) The road to green transition in China. PHBS Working Papers, Peking 
University HSBC Business School (No. 2014001).
Haley, B. (2017) Designing the public sector to promote sustainability transitions: Institu-
tional principles and a case study of ARPA-E. Environmental Innovation and Societal 
Transitions 25, 107–121.
Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162, 1243–1248.
Hardt, M. & Mezzada, S. (2016) The power of the movements facing Trump. Resilience, 
November 22. https://www.resilience.org/stories/2016-11-22/the-power-of-the-move-
ments-facing-trump/. Accessed 10/12/2017.
Harrison, J. & Hoyler, M. (2014) Governing the new metropolis. Urban Studies 51 (11), 
2249 – 2266.
Hartwick, J. (1977) Intergenerational Equity and the Investing of Rents from Exhaustible 
Resources. The American Economic Review 67 (5), 972–974.
Haukkala, T. (2017) A struggle for change—The formation of a green-transition advocacy 
coalition in Finland. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions.
379References
He, J.-K. (2016) Global low-carbon transition and China’s response strategies. Advances in 
Climate Change Research 7 (4), 204–212.
Healy, M. E. (1947) Le Play#s Contribution to Sociology: His Method. The Ameri-
can Catholic Sociological Review 8 (2), 97–110.
Heggelund, G. (2004) Environment and Resettlement Politics in China: The Three Gorges 
Project. Aldershot, Ashgate.
Heggelund, G. (2009) China’s climate change policy: domestic and international develop-
ments. Asian Perspective 31 (2), 155–191.
Heilbroner, R. (1974) An Inquiry into the human prospect. Norton, New York.
Hekkert, M. P., Suurs, R. A.A., Negro, S. O., Kuhlmann, S. & Smits, R.E.H.M. (2007) 
Functions of innovation systems: A new approach for analysing technological change. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74 (4), 413–432.
Hennicke, P. & Welfens, P. J. J. (2012) Energiewende nach Fukushima: Deutscher Sonder-
weg oder weltweites Vorbild? Oekom Verlag, München.
Hernandez, A. (2014a) Nation-building and Identity Conflicts. Facilitating the Mediation 
Process in Southern Philippines. Springer VS, Wiesbaden.
Hernandez, A. M. (2014b) Strategic Facilitation of Complex Decision-Making. How Pro-
cess and Context Matter in Global Climate Change Negotiations. Springer Interna-
tional, Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht & London.
Hernandez, A.M. (2016) Interview od 12 Representatives from the Jamaica Railway Ser-
vices, 12 September, Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica.
Heyward, M. (2007) Equity and International Climate Change Negotiations: A Matter of 
Perspective. Climate Policy 7, 518–534.
Hirschmann, A. (1974) Abwanderung und Widerspruch: Reaktionen auf Leistungsabfall 
bei Unternehmungen, Organisationen und Staaten. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 
Tübingen.
Hobsbawm, E. (1965) The Industrial Revolution: From 1750 to Present Day. Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London.
Hoefer, C. (2008) Causal Determinism. In: Zalta, E. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Winter 2008 edition. Stanford University Press.
Holden, B. (2002) Democracy and global warming. Continuum, London.
Hopmann, P. T. (1996) The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Con-
flicts. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC.
Hopmann, P. T. (2002) Negotiating data: Reflections on the Qualitative and Quantitative 
Analysis of Negotiation Processes. International Journal of Environment and Sustaina-
ble Development 7 (1), 67–85.
Hopwood, B., Mellor, M. & O´Brien, G. (2005a) Sustainable Development: Mapping Dif-
ferent Approaches. Sustainable Development 13, 38–52.
Hopwood, B., Mellor, M. & O’Brien, G. (2005b) Sustainable development: Mapping dif-
ferent approaches. Sustainable Development 13 (1), 38–52.
Hsu, C. L. (2001) Political Narratives and the Production of Legitimacy: The Case of Cor-
ruption in Post-Mao China. Qualitative Sociology 24 (1), 25–54.
Hughes, N. (2009) A Historical Overview of Strategic Scenario Planning, and Lessons 
for Undertaking Low Carbon Energy Policy: A Joint working paper of the EON/





Humphrey, M. (2007) Ecological politics and democratic theory: the challenge to the 
deliberative ideal. Routledge, London.
ICLEI (2018) Local Governments for Sustainability—Who we are. https://www.iclei.org/
iclei-global/who-is-iclei.html. Accessed 05/28/2019.
IEA (2011) World Energy Outlook 2011, OECD, Paris. https://www.iea.org/newsroom/
news/2011/november/world-energy-outlook-2011.html. Accessed 05/28/2019.
IEA (2015) World Energy Outlook 2013, OECD, Paris. https://www.iea.org/newsroom/
news/2013/november/world-energy-outlook-2013.html. Accessed 05/28/2019.
IEA (2016a) World Energy Outlook 2016, OECD, Paris. https://www.iea.org/newsroom/
news/2016/november/world-energy-outlook-2016.html. Accessed 05/28/2019.
IEA (2016b) Decoupling of global emissions and economic growth confirmed. https://
www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/march/decoupling-of-global-emissions-and-eco-
nomic-growth-confirmed.html. Accessed 05/28/2019.
IPCC (1990) Emissions scenarios from the response strategies working group of the inter-
governmental panel on climate change: Appendix 1. In Climate Change: The IPCC Sci-
entific Assessment. Prepared for IPCC by Working Group I., Cambridge, UK.
IPCC (2005) Guidance Notes for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report on 
Addressing Uncertainties, Geneva. https://wg1.ipcc.ch/publications/.../uncertainty-guid-
ance-note.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
IPCC (2007) Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change: Contribution of Work-
ing Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
IPCC (2017) Activities. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva. https://www.
ipcc.ch/activities/activities.shtml. Accessed 09/14/2017.
IRENA (2013) Smart Grids and Renewables, Abu Dhabi.
Jabareen, Y. (2006) A New Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Development. Environ-
ment, Development and Sustainability 10, 179–192.
Jackson, R., Canadell, J. G. & Le Quéré, C. et al. (2015) Reaching Peak Emissions. Nature 
Climate Change 6, 7–10.
Jackson, T. (2008) The Challenge of Sustainable Lifestyles. In: Worldwatch Institute (ed.) 
State of the World 2008: Ideas and Opportunities for Sustainable Economies. Earths-
can, London, pp. 45–60.
Jakob, M., Luderer, G., Steckel, J., Tavoni, M. & Monjon, S. (2012) Time to Act 
Now? Assessing the Costs of Delaying Climate Measures and Benefits for Early Action. 
Climate Change 114 (1).
Jakob, M., Steckel, J. & Klasen, S. et al. (2014) Feasible Mitigation Actions in Developing 
Countries. Nature Climate Change 2.
Jakob, M. & Steckel, J. C. (2013) Why mitigation could harm developing countries. WIREs 
Climate Change.
Jellinek, G. (1900) Allgemeine Staatslehre. Ö. Haring, Berlin.
Jessoe, K., Mannin, D. & Taylor, J. E. (2016) Climate Change and Labour Allocation in 
Rural Mexico: Evidence from Annual Fluctuations in Weather.
381References
Jonas, A. E. G. & Ward, K. (2016) A World of Regionalisms? Towards a US–UK Urban 
and Regional Policy Framework Comparison. Journal of Urban Affairs 24 (4), 
377–401.
Jonas, H. (1984) The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Techno-
logical Age. University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. & Thaler, R. H. (1991) Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, 
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. American 
Economic Association. 5 (1), 193–206.
Kailitz, S. (2007) Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, In: Kailitz, S. (ed.) 
Schlüsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft, 1. Aufl. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften / 
GWV Fachverlage, Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 241–245.
Kalhauge, A. C., Sjöstedt, G. & Correll, E. (eds.) (2005) Global Challenges: Furthering 
the Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development. Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield.
Kanitkar, T., Jayaraman, T., D'Souza, M., Sanwal, M., Purkayastha, P. & Talwar, R. (2010) 
Meeting Equity in a Finite Carbon World: Global Carbon Budgets and Burden Shar-
ing in Mitigation Actions in Global Carbon Budgets and Equity in Climate Change, 
Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. https://re.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/
TISS-BackgroundPaper31May2010.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Kapoor, I. (2001) Towards participatory environmental management? Journal of Environ-
mental Management 63, 269–279.
Kappel, R. (2011) Der Abstieg Europas und der Vereinigten Staaten – Verschiebungen 
in der Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik. GIGA Focus 1. https://www.giga-hamburg.
de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_global_1101.pdf. Accessed 
05/13/2017.
Kappel, R. (2014) Global Power Shifts and Germany’s New Foreign Policy Agenda. Strate-
gic Analysis 38 (3), 341–352.
Karabell, Z. (2014) (Mis)leading Indicators: Why Our Economic Numbers Distort Reality. 
Foreign Affairs March/April Issue.
Kemp, R., Schot, J. & Hoogma, R. (1998) Regime Shifts to Sustainability through Pro-
cesses of Niche Formation: The Approach of Strategic Niche Management. Technology 
Analysis and Strategic Management 10 (2), 175–195.
Kempel, W. (1993) Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes. In: Sjöstedt, G. (ed.) 
International Environmental Negotiation. Sage, Newbury Park, pp. 48–62.
Khan, S. A. (2013) China’s new political elite. The Express Tribune, March 19. https://trib-
une.com.pk/story/522700/chinas-new-political-elite/. Accessed 10/5/2017.
Khanna, P. (2017) Technocracy in America: Rise of the info-state, First edition. Cre-
ateSpace, Kentucky.
Kindleberger, C. (1973) The World in Depression: 1929–1939. University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA.
Kjellén, B. (2007) A New Diplomacy for Sustainable Development. Routledge, Chapman 
Hill.
Klintman, M. (2012) Handling issues of scale in global accreditation of sustainable tourism 
schemes towards harmonised re-embeddedness? Sustainability: Science, Practice, and 
Policy 8, 59–69.
Knight, P. (2016) Environmental Sustainability and Planning in Jamaica, National Environ-
ment and Planning Agency, Kingston, Jamaica.
382 References
Knorr-Cetina, K. & Mulkay, M. (eds.) (1983) Science Observed: Perspectives on the 
Social Study of Science. Sage, London.
Kondratieff, N. (1926) Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft 
und Sozialpolitik 56, 573–609.
Kornek, U., Steckel, J., Lessmann, K. & Edenhofer, O. (2013) The Climate Rent 
Curse: New Challenges for Burden Sharing. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research, Potsdam, Germany. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10784-017-
9352-2. Accessed 06/12/2018.
Kramer, R. & Messick, D. (eds.) (1995) Negotiation as a Social Process: New Trends in 
Theory and Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Krasner, S. (1983) Third World Vulnerabilities and Global Negotiations. Review of Interna-
tional Studies 9, 235–249.
Krasner, S. (1984) Approaches to the State. Comparative Politics 16, 223–246.
Krasner, S. (1991) Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Fron-
tier. World Politics 43 (April), 336–366.
Kreisky, E. (1979) Alternative Strategien der Organisation staatlichen Handelns. Institute 
for Advanced Studies, Vienna.
Kreisky, E. (2002) In Schlechter Verfassung? Perspektiven einer österreichischen Verfas-
sungsdebatte. In: Graf, D. & Muther, E. (eds.) Streiten um Demokratie. Beiträge zur 
Verfassungsdiskussion. Czernin Verlag, Wien, 59–90.
Kreisky, E. (2008) Geschwächte Staaten, schwächelnde Männlichkeit und neue Kriege. In: 
Sützl, W. & Wallnöfer, D. (eds.) Gewalt und Präzision. Krieg und Sicherheit in Zeiten 
des War on Terror. Verlag Turia & Kant, Vienna, 137–163.
Kremenyuk, V. (ed.) (2002) International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Sec-
ond Edition. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
Kreuzer, P. & Weiberg, M. (2005) Framing Violence: Nation- and State-building. An Asian 
Perspective. PRIF Reports No. 71, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. https://www.
hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk.../prif72.pdf.
Kristof, K. (2017) Change Agents in gesellschaftlichen Veränderungsprozesse. In: Reiner-
mann, J.-L. & Behr, F. (eds.) Die Experimentalstadt. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, 
165–179.
Kusno, A. (2000) Behind the Postcolonial. Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cul-
tures in Indonesia. Routledge, London.
La Viña, A. (1997) Climate Change and Developing Countries: Negotiating a Global 
Regime, Quezon City, Philippines.
Laibson, D. (1997) Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 112 (2), 443–477.
Landes, D. (1969) The Unbound Prometheus. Press Syndicate of the University of Cam-
bridge, Cambridge.
Larson, M. J. (2003) Low-Power Contributions in Multilateral Negotiations: A Framework 
Analysis. Negotiation Journal 19 (2), 133–149.
Lasco, G. (2018) The tyranny of false dichotomies. Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11. 
https://opinion.inquirer.net/110182/tyranny-false-dichotomies. Accessed 1/11/2018.
Lax, D. & Sebenius, J. (1986) The Manager as Negotiator. The Free Press, New York.
Layer, M. (1980) Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem. Political Studies 28 
(June), 115–140.
383References
Leggewie, C. & Messner, D. (2012) The low-carbon transformation—A social science per-
spective. Journal of Renewable and Sustainable Energy (4), 041404 https://aip.scita-
tion.org/doi/10.1063/1.4730138. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Lei X. (2009) Environmental activism in China. Routledge, London.
Lewicki, R., Minton, J. & Saunders, D. (1999) Zone of Potential Agreement in Negotiation. 
Irwin McGraw Hill, Burr Ridge, IL.
Li, B. (2013) Welfare state changes in China since 1949. In: Greve, B. (ed.) The Routledge 
handbook of the welfare state, 1. ed. Routledge, New York, pp. 222–231.
Linz, J. J. & Krämer, R. (2009) Totalitäre und autoritäre Regime, 3. überarb. und erg. Aufl. 
WeltTrends, Potsdam.
Litfin, K. (1994) Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooper-
ation. Columbia University Press, New York.
Lloyd, G.E.R. (1992) Methods and Problems in the History of Ancient Science: The 
Greek Case. The University of Chicago Press Journals 83 (4), 564–577.
Löfken, J. O. & Martin, R. (2017) Ökowende: Es wirkt. Technology Review, June 19. 
https://www.heise.de/tr/artikel/Oekowende-Es-wirkt-3746232.html. Accessed 
12/19/2017.
Loorbach, D. (2010) Transition Management for Sustainable Development. A Prescriptive, 
Complexity-Based Governance Framework. Governance 23 (1), 161–183.
Lorey, D. (ed.) (1993) The University System and Economic Development in Mexico Since 
1929. Stanford University Press, Bloomington, IN.
Lotfalipour, M. R., Falahi, M. A. & Ashena, M. (2010) Economic growth, CO2 emissions, 
and fossil fuels consumption in Iran. Energy 35 (12), 5115–5120.
Lucas, Robert, Jr. (2002) Lectures on Economic Growth. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Luce, R. D. & Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions. Wiley, New York.
Lundvall, B.-A., Joseph, K. J., Chaminade, C. & Vang J. (eds.) (2011) Handbook of 
Innovation Systems and Developing Countries: Building Domestic Capabilities in a 
Global Setting. Elgar Publishing.
Lynas, M. (2008) A Green New Deal. New Statesman, July 17. https://www.newstatesman.
com/environment/2008/07/lynas-towards-economy-climate. Accessed 5/23/2018.
Lyytimäki, J., Tapio, P., Varho, V. & Söderman, T. (2013) The use, non-use and misuse of 
indicators in sustainability assessment and communication. International Journal of 
Sustainable Development & World Ecology 20 (5), 385–393.
Maiden, I. F. A. N. (2004) Scenarios, Stories, Use Cases: Through the Systems Develop-
ment Life-cycle. Wiley.
Makhijani, S., Ochs, A., Weber, M., Konold, M., Lucky, M., Ahmed, A., & Mastny, L. 
(2013) Jamaica Sustainable Energy Roadmap: Pathways to an Affordable, Reliable, 
Low-Emission Electricity System. Worldwatch Institute. www.worldwatch.org/system/
files/Jamaica-Sustainable-Energy-Roadmap-112013.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Malley, J. & Moutous, T. (1996) Does government employment “crowd-out” private 
employment? Evidence from Sweden. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 98 (2), 
289–302.
Malnes, R. (1995) Leader and Entrepreneur in International Negotiations: A Conceptual 
Analysis. European Journal of International Relations 1 (1), 87–112.
384 References
Manhit, D. (2017) Dangerous perspectives. Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 07. https://
opinion.inquirer.net/102224/dangerous-perspectives. Accessed 3/7/2017.
Markard, J. & Truffer, B. (2008a) Technological innovation systems and the multi-level 
perspective. Research Policy 37, 596–615.
Markard, J. & Truffer, B. (2008b) Technological innovation systems and the multi-level 
perspective. Research Policy 37, 596–615.
Marsden, G. & Snell, C. (2009) The Role of Indicators, Targets and Monitoring in Deci-
sion-Support for Transport. European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
9 (3), 219–236.
Martin, L. (2010) Interests, Power and Multilateralism. In: Goldstein, J. & Steinberg, R. 
H. (eds.) International Institutions. Sage, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, 
Washington DC, 273–300.
Martin, L. & Simmons, B. A. (2010) Theories and Empirical Studies of International Insti-
tutions. In: Goldstein, J. & Steinberg, R. H. (eds.) International Institutions. Sage, Los 
Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC, 33–64.
Martínez-Cárdenas, R., Ayala-Gaytán, E. A. & Aguayo-Téllez, E. (2015) Confianza y capi-
tal social: evidencia para México. Economía, Sociedad y Territorio 15 (47).
Maslow, A. (1943) A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review 50, 370–396.
Mathews, J. & Hao, T. (2013) The transformation of the electric power sector in China. 
Energy Policy (52), 170–180.
Mauch, C. & Patel, K. K. (eds.) (2010) The United States and Germany during the Twen-
tieth Centure. Competition and Convergence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Mawhinney, M. (2002) Sustainable Development: Understanding the Green Debates. 
Blackwell Science, Oxford.
Mayer, K. (2009) New Directions in Life Course Research. Annual Review of Sociology 35, 
423–424.
Mayntz, R. (2009) Über Governance, Institutionen und Prozesse politischer Regelung. 
Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. Campus, Frankfurt 
am Main.
Mazzucato, M. (2013) The Entrepreneurial State. Anthem Press, London.
Mazzucato, M. (2015) Toward a Green New Deal. Project Syndicate, December 14. https://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/clean-energy-billionaires-public-invest-
ment-by-mariana-mazzucato-2015-12?barrier=accesspaylog. Accessed 5/23/2918.
McCalla, L. (2016) Transportation in Jamaica, Jamaican Urban Transit Corporation, King-
ston, Jamaica.
McDonnell, D. & Valbruzzi, M. (2014) Defining and classifying technocrat-led and techno-
cratic governments. European Journal of Political Research 53 (4), 654–671.
McGovern, M. (2014) Analysis: Macquarie’s Marena Project on the Brink. Wind Power 
Monthly, January 16. https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1227498/analy-
sis-macquaries-marena-project-brink. Accessed 12/10/2016.
McKeown, T. (1999) Case Studies and the Statistical World View. International Organiza-
tion 53 (1), 161–190.
McKinsey (2009) Pathways to a Global Low Carbon Economy. McKinsey, London.
Meadowcroft, J. (2005) Environmental political economy, technological transitions and the 
state. New Political Economy 10 (4), 479–498.
385References
Meadows, D., Meadows, D., Randers, J. & and Behrens III, W. (1972) The Limits to 
Growth. Universe Books, New York.
Menon, S. (2017) The Unprecedented Promises—and Threats—of the Belt and Road Initi-
ative. The Wire, April 24. https://thewire.in/127579/the-unprecedented-promises-and-thr
eats-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative/. Accessed 12/23/2017.
Mensch, G. (1971) Zur Dynamik des technischen Fortschritts. Zeitschrift für 
Betriebswirtschaft 41, 295–314.
Mensch, G. (1972) Basisinnovationen und Verbesserungsinnovationen. Zeitschrift für 
Betriebswirtschaft 42, 291–297.
Mensch, G. (1975) Das technologische Patt: Innovationen überwinden die Depression. 
Umschau, Frankfurt am Main.
Merkel, W. (1999) Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der 
Transformationsforschung. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Opladen.
Mertha, A. (2009) “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization in the Chi-
nese Policy Process. The China Quarterly 200, 995.
Messner, D. (2015) A social contract for low carbon and sustainable development: Reflec-
tions on non-linear dynamics of social realignments and technological innovations in 
transformation processes. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 98, 260–270.
Messner, D., Guarín, A. & Haun, D. (2013) The Behavioural Dimensions of Interna-
tional Cooperation, Käte Hamburger Kolleg/Centre for Global Cooperation Research, 
Duisburg. https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/Messner-Guarin-Haun_Behaviour-
al-dimensions_GCRP-1-WEB.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Miraflor, M. (2017) New DENR chief wants to address misinformation on mining. Manila 
Bulletin, May 13. https://business.mb.com.ph/2017/05/13/new-denr-chief-wants-to-ad-
dress-misinformation-on-mining/. Accessed 10/17/2017.
Mission Innovation (2015) Joint Launch Statement—Accelerating the Clean Energy Revo-
lution. https://www.mission-innovation.net/joint-statement/. Accessed 5/27/2016.
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R. & Wood, D. J. (1997) Toward a theory of stakeholder identifi-
cation and salience: defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of 
Management Review 22 (4), 853–886.
Montalvan, A., III (2010) The Man with the Sugbu-Anon Accent. Philippine Daily 
Inquirer.
Moomaw, W., Susskind, L. & Kurczak, K. (eds.) (2003) Negotiating a sustainable future: 
Innovations in international environmental negotiations. PON Books, Cambridge, MA.
Moore, C. (1996) The Mediation Process. Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, Sec-
ond Edition. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.
Morallo, A. (2017) House majority strips anti-death penalty members of key posts. Phil-
star, March 15. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/03/15/1681371/house-majori-
ty-strips-anti-death-penalty-members-key-posts. Accessed 3/19/2017.




Moss, R. & Schneider, S. (2000) Uncertainties. In: Guidance Papers on the Cross Cutting 




Moustafa, K. (2015) The disaster of the impact factor. Science and Engineering Ethics 21 
(1), 139–142.
MSET (2017) An Overview of Jamaica’s Electricity Sector. Ministry of Science, Energy & 
Technology, Kingston, Jamaica. https://mset.gov.jm/overview-jamaicas-electricity-sec-
tor. Accessed 11/13/2017.
Mufson, S. & Eilperin, J. (2017) Trump seeks to revive Dakota Access, Keystone XL oil 
pipelines. The Washington Post, January 24. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2017/01/24/trump-gives-green-light-to-dakota-access-key-
stone-xl-oil-pipelines/. Accessed 10/18/2017.
Müller, J. A. (1998) Simulation ökonomischer Prozesse. MANZ Verlag Schulbuch GmbH, 
Wien.
Murphy, G. (2010) Shadowing the White Manas Burden: U.S. Imperialism and the Problem 
of the Color Line. New York University Press, New York.
Myint, T. (2007) Environmental governance in the SPDC’s Myanmar. In: Skidmore, 
M. & Wilson, T. (eds.) Mynmar: the state, community and the environment. Asia Pacific 
Press, Canberra, pp. 189–217.
Mytelka, L., Aguayo, F. & Boyle, G. et al. (2012) Chapter 25—Policies for Capacity 
Development. In: Global Energy Assessment—Toward a Sustainable Future, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, pp. 1745–1802.
Naess, A. (1989) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Najam, A. (2005) Why Environmental Politics Looks Different from the South. In: 
Dauvergne, P. (ed.) Handbook of Environmental Politics. Edward Elgar Publishing Lim-
ited, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 111–126.
Najam, A. (2010) The View from the South: Developing Countries in Global Environmen-
tal Politics. In: Axelrod, R. S., Downie, D. L. & Vig, N.J. (eds.) The Global Environ-
ment: Institutions, Law, and Policy. CQ Press, Washington, D.C.
Najam, A., Huq, S. & Sokona, Y. (2003) Climate Negotiations Beyond Kyoto: Developing 
Countries Concerns and Interests. Climate Policy 3 (3), 221–231.
Natal, A., Cadena-Roa, J. & Rappoport, S. G. (2010) Civil Society and Social Capital in 
Mexico and Central America. In: Anheier, H. K., Toepler, S. & List, R. (eds.) Interna-
tional encyclopedia of civil society. Springer, New York, pp. 262–268.
National Science Foundation (2000) Towards a comprehensive geographical perspec-
tive on urban sustainability. Rutgers—The State University of New Jersey: Center 
for Urban Policy Research, New-Brunswick, NJ. https://cupr.rutgers.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2014/08/sustain.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Nawrotzki, R. J., Riosmena, F., Hunter, L. M. & Runfola, D. M. (2015) Amplification or 
suppression: Social networks and the climate change-migration association in rural 
Mexico. Global environmental change human and policy dimensions 35, 463–474.
NBS (2017) National Accounts—Gross Domestic Product. National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/. Accessed 10/04/2017.
387References
Neale, M. A. & Northcraft, G. B. (1986) Experts, amateurs, and refrigerators: Comparing 
expert and amateur negotiators in a novel task. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 38 (3), 305–317.
Nery, J. (2017) Duterte’s secret. Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 05. https://opinion.
inquirer.net/109241/dutertes-secret. Accessed 12/5/2017.
Newig, J. & Fritsch, O. (2009) Environmental governance: participatory, multi-level and 
effective? Environmental Policy and Governance 19, 197–214.
Nietzsche, F. (1883) Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen. Verlag von 
Ernst Schmeitzner, Chemnitz.
Njalsson, G. (2005) From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, 
intentional and systematic analysi sof interests and elites in public technology policy. 
Theoria: a journal of political theory 108, 56–81.
Nobel Media AB (2014) The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and Albert Arnold (Al) Gore Jr., 2014. https://www.nobelprize.
org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/press.html. Accessed 6/28/2018.
Northcraft, G. B., Brodt, S. E. & Neale, M. A. (1995) Negotiating with Nonlinear Sub-
jective Utilities: Why Some Concessions Are More Equal Than Others. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 63 (3), 298–310.
Northcraft, G. B., Preston, J., Neale, Margaret, A., Kim, P. & Thomas-Hunt, Melissa, 
 C. (1998) Non-linear Preference Functions and Negotiated Outcomes. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73 (1), 54–75.
Nye, J. (2010a) Smart Power for Global Climate Negotiations. Climate Science & Policy. 
https://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/06/smart-power-for-global-climate-nego-
tiations/. Accessed 08/02/2016.
Nye, J. (2010b) The Future of American Power. Foreign Affairs 89 (6), 2–12.
Ochs, A., Konold, M., Auth, K., Musolino, E. & Killeen, P. (2015) Caribbean Sustainabil-
ity Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C-SERMS). Baseline Report and Assessment, Wash-
ington, D.C.
O’Connell, B. (1994) People Power: Service, Advocacy, Empowerment. Foundation Center, 
Washington, D.C.
OEC (2017) Jamaica. Observatory of Economic Complexity. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/
en/profile/country/jam/. Accessed 11/13/2017.
OECD (2011) Public Servants as Partners for Growth: Toward a Stronger, Leaner and 
More Equitable Workforce. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, Paris. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/public-servants-as-partners-for-
growth_9789264166707-en. Accessed 05/28/2019.
OECD (2017a) China—Economic Forecast Summary (June 2017), Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, Paris. https://www.oecd.org/china/china-eco-
nomic-forecast-summary.htm. Accessed 25 September 2017.
OECD (2017b) Mexico—Economic Forecast Summary (June 2017), Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, Paris. https://www.oecd.org/mexico/mexico-eco-
nomic-forecast-summary.htm Accessed 25 September 2017.
Olchondra, R. (2015) Meralco unit earmarks $1.2B for equity in 3 coal power plants. Phil-
ippine Daily Inquirer, July 29. https://business.inquirer.net/196109/meralco-unit-ear-
marks-1-2b-for-equity-in-3-coal-power-plants. Accessed 4/21/2017.
388 References
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA.
Olvera, A. J. (1997) Civil Society and Political Transition in Mexico. Constellations 4 (1), 
105–123.
OML Center (2014) 2014 Philippine Climate Change Assessment Report, Manila, Philip-
pines.
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Ostrom, E. (2010) Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Eco-
nomic Systems. American Economic Review 100, 641–672.
O’Sullivan, A. (2003) Economics: Principles in Action. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Sad-
dle River, NJ.
Ott, H., Winkler, H. & Brouns, B. et al. (2004) South-North Dialogue on Equity in the 
Greenhouse: A Proposal for an Adequate and Equitable Global Climate Agreement, 
Bonn & Wuppertal.
Oye, K. A. (2011) Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. 
World Politics 38, 1–24.
Ozturk, I. & Acaravci, A. (2010) CO2 emissions, energy consumption and economic 
growth in Turkey. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 14 (9), 3220–3225.
Pan, J. (ed.) (2016a) China’s Environmental Governing and Ecological Civilization. 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Pan, J. (2016b) Low-Carbon Energy Transformation. In: Pan, J. (ed.) China’s Environmen-
tal Governing and Ecological Civilization. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg., pp. 129–146.
Parsons, T. (1951) The Social System. Routledge, London.
Patwardhan, A., Azevedo, I. & Foran, T. et al. (2012) Chapter 16—Transitions in Energy 
Systems. In: Global Energy Assessment—Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, pp. 1173–1202.
Paul, R. & Eder, L. (2002) Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Professional 
and Personal Life, Third Edition. Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ.
Pearce, F. (2016) Is it possible to reduce CO2 emissions and grow the global economy? 
The Guardian, April 14. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/14/is-it-
possible-to-reduce-co2-emissions-and-grow-the-global-economy. Accessed 10/26/2016.
Peck, S. L. (2004) Simulation as experiment: a philosophical reassessment for biological 
modeling. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 19 (10), 530–534.
Penetrante, A. M. (2010) Politics of Equity and Justice in Climate Change Negotiations in 
North–South Relations. In: Brauch, H. G., Spring, U. & Mesjasz, C. et al. (eds.) Coping 
with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security – Threats, Challenges, Vul-
nerabilities and Risks. Hexagon Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg & New York, pp. 
1355–1366.
Penetrante, A. M. (2011) The Entanglement of Climate Change in North–South Relations: 
Stumbling Blocks and Opportunities for Negotiation. In: Richardson, K., Will, S. & 
Livermann, D. (eds.) Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions. Cam-
bridge Univeristy Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 356–359.
Penetrante, A. M. (2012) Simulating climate change negotiations: Lessons from modeled 
experience. Negotiation Journal 27 (3), 279–314.
389References
Penetrante, A. M. (2013) Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. The North-South 
Divide in the Climate Change Negotiations. In: Sjöstedt, G. & Penetrante, A. M. (eds.) 
Climate Change Negotiations. A Guide to Resolving Disputes and Facilitating Multilat-
eral Cooperation. Routledge, London, pp. 249–276.
Penetrante, A. M. (2014) The Case of Arcania: Perspectives in Point-of-Entry Negotiations. 
In: Melamud, M., Meerts, P. & Zartman, I. W. (eds.) Banning the Bang or the Bomb? 
Negotiating the Nuclear Test Ban Regime. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, pp. 277–296.
Pentico, D. (2008) The Assortment Problem: A Survey. European Journal of Operational 
Research 190, 295–309.
Petri, A. (2017) China’s ‘Great Green Wall’ Fights Expanding Desert. National Geographic, 
April 21. https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/04/china-great-green-wall-gobi-teng-
ger-desertification/. Accessed 9/27/2017.
Petschel-Held, G., Schellnhuber, H.-J., Bruckner, T., Tóth, F. L. & Hasselmann, K. (1999) 
The Tolerable Window Approach: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations. Cli-
matic Change 41 (3/4), 303–331.
Pfahl-Traughber, A. (2004) Staatsformen im 20. Jahrhundert I: Diktatorische Systeme. 
In: Gallus, A. & Eckhard, J. (eds.) Modelle politischer Ordnung. Eine Geschichte der 
Staatsformen von Altertum bis zur Gegenwart. Böhlau Verlag, Köln/Weimar, pp. 223–
280.
Pfeiffer, S. (2016) ‘Rage donations’ become an anti-Trump movement. Boston Globe, 
November 21. https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/11/21/rage-donate-becomes- 
anti-trump-balm/7t4pJvnlbfAW3A3NeItmyL/story.html. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Philipps, T. (2017) The $900bn question: What is the Belt and Road initiative? The Guard-
ian, May 17. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/12/the-900bn-question-
what-is-the-belt-and-road-initiative. Accessed 12/23/2017.
Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the twenty-first century. The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Pilatowsky Gruner, R. (2016) Mexico Emission Reduction Challenges, 30 August. https://
climatescorecard.org/2016/08/30/mexico-emission-reduction-challenges/. Accessed 30 
August 2016.
Pinkse, J. & Kolk, A. (2012) Addressing the climate change-sustainable development 
nexus: the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships. Business and Society 51, 176–210.
Pissarides, C. (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Pitkin, H. (1967) The Concept of Representation. University of California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA.
Plous, S. (1993) The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. McGraw-Hill, New 
york.
Plummer, J. & Taylor, J. G. (2004) The characteristics of community participation in 
China. In: Plummer, J. & Taylor, J. G. (eds.) Community participation in China: issues 
and processes for capacity building. Earthscan, London, pp. 36–54.
Polanyi, K. (2015) The great transformation: Politische und ökonomische Ursprünge von 
Gesellschaften und Wirtschaftssystemen, 12. Aufl. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt (Main).
Popper, K. (1959) The logic of scientific discovery. Basic Books, New York.
390 References
Pora, G. (2017) Of mining and mountains: The audacity of Gina Lopez. Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, March 07. https://opinion.inquirer.net/102202/thinq-audacity-environment-sec-
retary-gina-lopez-mining. Accessed 3/7/2017.
Porritt, J. (1984) Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 
and New York.
Portney, K. (2013) Taking sustainable cities seriously. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Posner, R. A. (2004) Catastrophe: Risk and Response. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Prakash, A. & Gugerty, M. K. (2010) Advocacy organizations and collective action. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, New York.
Pratt, M. L. (2002) Modernity and Periphery: Towards a Global and Relational Analysis. 
In: Mudimbe-Boyi, E. (ed.) Beyond Dichotomies. SUNY Press, Albany, pp. 21–48.
Princen, T. & Finger, M. (1994) Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local 
and the Global. Routledge, London.
Pronin, E. & Kugler, M. B. (2007) Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection 
illusion as a source of the bias blind spot. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
43 (4), 565–578.
Pruitt, D. & Rubin, J. (1986) Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. Ran-
dom House, New York.
Purdy, J. (2010) The politics of nature: climate change, environmental law, and democracy. 
Yale Law Journal 119, 101–188.
Quirk, R. (1973) The Mexican Revolution and the Catholic Church, 1910–1929. Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, IN.
Quismundo, T. (2016) Why is PH building 25 more coal-powered plants? Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, March 15. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/773681/why-is-ph-building-25-more-
coal-powered-plants. Accessed 3/18/2017.
Quismundo, T. (2017) Oppositors cite Lopez’s ‘incompetence’ as DENR chief. Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, March 09. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/879090/oppositors-cite-lopezs-
incompetence-as-denr-chief. Accessed 3/17/2017.
Raiffa, H. (1968) Decision Analysis. Random House, New York.
Raiffa, H. (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Raiffa, H. (2002) Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision 
Making. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Ranada, P. (2015) PH drops in 2016 list of countries vulnerable to climate change. Rapper Phil-
ippines, November 17. https://www.rappler.com/science-nature/environment/113064-phil-
ippines-2016-climate-change-vulnerability-index. Accessed 3/17/2017.
Ravindran, T. (2015) Beyond the Pure and the Authentic: Indigenous modernity in Andean 
Bolivia. AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples 11 (4), 321–333.
Reinelt, C. (1994) Fostering empowerment, building community: The challenge for state-
funded feminist organizations. Human Relations 47 (6), 685–704.
Reisman, G. (1998) Capitalism: A Complete Understanding of the Nature and Value of 
Human Economic Life. Jameson Books, Ottawa, IL.
Reynolds, O. (2016) Electricity in Jamaica, Jamaica Energy Partners (JEP), Kingston, 
Jamaica.
Riello, G. & O’Brien, P. (2009) The Future is Another Country: Offshore Views of the Brit-
ish Industrial Revolution. Journal of Historical Sociology 22 (1), 1–29.
391References
Rip A. & Kemp, R. (1998) Technological Change. In: Rayner, S. & Malone, E. L. (eds.) 
Human Choice and Climate Change. Battele Press, Columbus, OH, 327–399
Robbins, A. (2006) Inner Strength: Harnessing the Power of Your Six Primal Needs, Simon 
& Schuster Audio.
Robertson, A. (2016) Donald Trump lied about his climate change conspiracy theory, but his 
tweet is still up. The Verge, September 26. https://www.theverge.com/2016/9/26/13067918/
donald-trump-presidential-debate-2016-climate-change-hoax. Accessed 11/30/2016.
Rogers, P. (2017) Rebellion against Trump climate change policies. The Mercury News, Sep-
tember 27. https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/27/states-rebellion-against-trump-cli-
mate-change-policies-gaining-momentum/. Accessed 11/1/2017.
Rohde, J. (2017) Richard G. Olson. Scientism and Technocracy in the Twentieth Century: 
The Legacy of Scientific Management xx + 207 pp., bibl., index. Lanham, Md.: Lexing-
ton Books, 2016. $85 (cloth). Isis 108 (1), 217–218.
Rong, F. (2010) Understanding Developing Country Stances on Post-2012 Climate Change 
Negotiations: Comparative Analysis of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. 
Energy Policy 38, 4582–4591.
Rood, S. (2015) Energy Crisis in the Philippines: An Electricity or Presidential Power Short-
age? The Asia Foundation, Manila. https://asiafoundation.org/2015/03/18/energy-cri-
sis-in-the-philippines-an-electricity-or-presidential-power-shortage/. Accessed 03/18/2017.
Rossi, F. & Bülow, M. von (eds.) (2015) Social Movement Dynamics. Ashgate, Farnham.
Roth-Douquet, S. (2016) Post Trump Win: A Silver Lining for Millennials. 17 March 2017, 
November 11. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/sophie-rothdouquet/post-trump-win-a-
silver-l_b_12890446.html. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Roudometof, V. (2015) The Glocal and Global Studies. Globalizations 12 (5), 774–787.
Roy, J., Dowd, A.-M., Muller, A., Pal, S. & Prata, N. (2012) Chapter 21—Lifestyles, 
Well-Being and Energy. In: Global Energy Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, pp. 1527–1548.
Ruiz-Mercado, I., Masera, O., Zamore, H. & Smith, K. (2011) Adoption and sustained use 
of improved cookstoves. Energy Policy 39, 7557–7566.
Runde, D. (2015) Urbanization Will Change The (Developing) World. Forbes, February 24. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/02/24/urbanization-development-oppor-
tunity/#228f4c226277. Accessed 10/26/2016.
Russell, D. (2017) The real impact of high transportation costs. Supply Chain Quarterly, 
30–36.
Rutland Bauer, M. (2016) Trump Protests Could Be the Start of a New Civil Rights Era. 
Yes Magazine, November 14. https://www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/trump-pro-
tests-could-be-the-start-of-a-new-civil-rights-era-20161114. Accessed 10/12/2017.
Ryan, A., Tilbury, D., Blaze Corcoran, P., Abe, O. & Nomura, K. (2010) Sustainability in 
higher education in the Asia‐Pacific: Developments, challenges, and prospects. Interna-
tional Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education 11 (2), 106–119.
Ryan, J. (2017) Green groups see silver lining to Trump win: money and members. Kuow, 
January 19. https://kuow.org/post/green-groups-see-silver-lining-trump-win-money-
and-members. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Sadowski, W. (1959) A few remarks on the assortment problem. Management Science 6 
(1), 13–24.
392 References
Sakamoto, Y. (1994) Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System. United 
Nations University Press.
Salaverria, L. (2017) Duterte finally signs Paris Agreement on climate change. Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, March 02. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/153030/duterte-finallly-
signs-paris-agrement-climate-change.
Sánchez, M. E. (2010) Globalisation and loss of identity. International Forum of Psychoa-
nalysis 19 (2), 71–77.
Sandler, T. (2004) Global Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Sanna, L. J., Schwarz, N. & Stocker, S. L. (2002) When debiasing backfires: Accessible 
content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 28 (3), 497–502.
Santos, Soliman, Jr. (1997) The Philippines Tries the Party-List System (A Progressive Per-
spective). Kasarinlan Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 13 (2), 5–18.
Savitz, A. (2006) The Triple Bottom Line. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.
Sawin, J. & Moomaw, W. (2009) Renewable Revolution: Low-Carbon Energy by 2030. 
World Watch Institute, Washington, D.C. https://www.worldwatch.org/bookstore/publi-
cation/renewable-revolution-low-carbon-energy-2030. Accessed 01/10/2018.
Scerri, A. & James, P. (2010) Accounting for sustainability: Combining qualitative and 
quantitative research in developing ‘indicators’ of sustainability. International Journal 
of Social Research Methodology 13 (1), 41–53.
Schäfer, A. (2008) Krisentheorien der Demokratie: Unregierbarkeit, Spätkapitalismus und 
Postdemokratie. MPIfGDiscussion Paper 08/10, 2008.
Schäpke, N. & Rauschmayer, F. (2011) Foundations for a common approach. WP 2—Sys-
tematic Reflection and Theory Building.: THEME FP7—ENV. 2010.4.2.3-1: Foresight 
to enhance behavioural and societal changes enabling the transition towards sustaina-
ble paths in Europe.
Schelling, T. (1995) Intergenerational Discounting. Energy Policy 23 (4/5), 395–401.
Schofer, E. (1997) Science association in the international sphere 1875.1990: The ration-
alization of science and the scientization of society. In: Boli, J. & Thomas, G. (eds.) 
Constructing World Culture. International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp. 249–266.
Schreurs, M. (2011) Climate Change Politics in an Authoritarian State: The Ambivalent 
Case of China. In: Dryzek, J., Norgaard, R. & Schlosberg, D. (eds.) The Oxford Hand-
book of Climate Change and Society. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Schulte von Drach, M. & Schätzl, A. (2010) Vornehm geht die Welt zugrunde. Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, May 19. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/kein-klimawandel-bei-der-au-
toindustrie-vornehm-geht-die-welt-zugrunde-1.910994. Accessed 1/19/2017.
Schulte-Uebbing, L., Hansen, G., Hernandez, A. M. & Winter, M. (2015) Chapter scientists 
in the IPCC AR5—experience and lessons learned. Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability 14, 250–256.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934) Fundamentals of Economic Development. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Schumpeter, Joseph, A. (1935) The analysis of economic change. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics. The MIT Press 17 (2), 2–10.
Schumpeter, Joseph, A. (1954) History of Economic Analysis. Allen & Unwin, London.
393References
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H. & Simons, A. 
(1991) “Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic”. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (2), 195–202.
Science News (2017) What’s in Trump’s 2018 budget request for science? Science News, May 
23. https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/what-s-trump-s-2018-budget-request-sci-
ence. Accessed 11/2/2017.
Scott, J. & Baltzly, A. (1958) Readings in European History since 1814. Appleton-Centu-
ry-Crofts, New York.
SDSN (2018) SDSN Germany. https://www.die-gdi.de/sdsngermany/. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Sebenius, J. (1992a) Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: 
Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities. International Organiza-
tion 46 (1), 323–365.
Sebenius, J. (1992b) Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review. Management 
Science 38 (1), 18–38.
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (2017) Mexico Reaffirms Its Support for and Commit-




Seligman, M. E. P. (2014) Florecer: La nueva psicología positiva y la búsqueda del biene-
star, 1ª ed. Océano, México, D.F.
Sell, Friedrich, L. & Sauer, B. (2011) Geld-, Kapitalmärkte und Wohlfahrt: Eine Wirkung-
sanalyse der Target2-Salden. Die europäische Zahlungsbilanzkrise. Ifo Schnelldienst 64, 
34–35.
SEMARNAT (2013) Estrategía Nacional de Cambio Climático. Visión 10-20-40, México 
D.F.
Seriño, M. N. V. (2014) Do Philippine Households Lead a Carbon Intensive Lifestyle? 
Econstor. Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth—Discussion Papers 
158. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/100100. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Shadi, H. (2003) An Islamic Alternative? Equality, Redistributive Justice, and the Welfare 
State in the Caliphate of Umar. Renaissance: Monthly Islamic Journal 13 (8).
Shambaugh, D. (2013) China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
Shearman, D.J.C. & Smith, J. W. (2007) The climate change challenge and the failure of 
democracy.
Shelton, T. & Clark, J. (2016) Technocratic values and uneven development in the “smart 
city”.
Shirk, S. (2012) China’s next leaders: a guide to what’s at stake. New York Times, 2012. 
https://cn.nytimes.com/article/china/2012/11/15/c15shirk/en. Accessed 10/5/2017.
Shiuh-Shen Chien & Fulong Wu (2011) Transformation of China’s Urban Entrepreneurial-
ism: The Case Study of the City of Kunshan. Cross-Currents: East Asian History and 
Culture Review 1.
Siitonen, S., Tuomaala, M. & Ahtila, P. (2010) Variables affecting energy efficiency and 
CO2 emissions in the steel industry. Energy Policy 38, 2477–2485.
SIJ (2017) Main Labour Force Indicators. Statistical Institute of Jamaica, Kingston.https://
statinja.gov.jm/LabourForce/NewLFS.aspx. Accessed 11/13/2017.
394 References
Simeon, L. M. (2017) Chamber of Mines confident of Lopez rejection as DENR chief. 
Philstar, March 10. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/03/10/1679787/chamber-
mines-confident-lopez-rejection-denr-chief. Accessed 3/17/2017.
Simmel, G. (1908) Exkurs über das Problem: Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich?: in: Ders., 
Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. pp. 21–30, Berlin.
Simmons, A. (2017) U.S. foreign aid: A waste of money or a boost to world stability? Here 
are the facts. Los Angeles Times, May 10. https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-global-
aid-true-false-20170501-htmlstory.html. Accessed 12/27/2017.
Simon, H. (1955) A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
69, 99–118.
Simpson, Stephen, D. (2011) 5 of the Most Adaptive Companies. Investopia, March 22. 
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0311/5-of-the-most-adaptive-companies.
aspx. Accessed 5/30/2016.
Sinn, H. W. (2007) Pareto Optimality in the Extraction of Fossil Fuels and the Greenhouse 
Effect a Note. NBER Working Paper No. 13453. The National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. https://www.nber.org/papers/w13453. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Sjöstedt, G. (ed.) (1993) International Environmental Negotiation. Sage, Newbury Park.
Sjöstedt, G. (ed.) (2003) Professional Cultures in International Negotiation: Bridge or 
Rift? Lexington Books, Lanham, MD.
Sjöstedt, G. (2009) Knowledge Diplomacy: The Things We Need to Know to Understand it 
Better. PINPoints 33, 4–7.
Sjöstedt, G. & Penetrante, A. M. (eds.) (2013) Climate Change Negotiations. A Guide to 
Resolving Disputes and Facilitating Multilateral Cooperation. Routledge, London.
Skodvin, T. (2000) Structure and agent in the scientific diplomacy of climate change. Klu-
wer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Skorepa, M. (2011) Decision-making. A Behavioral Economic Approach. Palgrave Macmil-
lan, Basingstoke, UK.
Slaper, Timothy, F. & Hall, Tanja, J. (2011) The Triple Bottom Line: What is It and How 
Does It Work? Indiana Business Review 86 (1).
Slater, R. O., Schutz, B. M. & Dorr, S. R. (1993) Global transformation and the Third 
World. Lynne Rienner Publishers; Adamantine Press, Boulder, CO, London.
Sliggers, J. & Kakebeeke, W. (eds.) (2004) Clearing the Air. 25 years of the Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, New York & Geneva.
Smith, A. (2005) The alternative technology movement: An analysis of its framing and 
negotiation of technology development. Special issue on nature, science and social 
movements. Human Ecology Review 12 (2), 106–119.
Smith, K. R., Balakrishnan, K. & Butler, C. et al. (2012) Chapter 4 - Energy and Health. In: 
Global Energy Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, pp. 255–324.
Smith, S. R. & Lipsky, M. (1993) Nonprofits for hire: The welfare state in the age of con-
tracting, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Smith, W. K. & Tushman, M. L. (2005) Managing strategic contradictions: A top manage-
ment model for managing innovation streams. Organization Science 16, 522–536.
395References
Smyrgała, D. (2017) Fukushima and Energiewende: Impact on structure of power genera-
tion. Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy 12 (4), 332–337.
Snidal, D. (2010) Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for Interna-
tional Cooperation and Regimes. In: Goldstein, J. & Steinberg, R. H. (eds.) Interna-
tional Institutions. Sage, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC, 
pp. 1–32.
Solow, R. (1974) The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics. The Ameri-
can Economic Review 64 (2), 1–14.
Solow, R. (1986) On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 88 (1), 141–149.
Soto, H. de (1986) El Otro Sendero. El Barranco, Lima.
Sowers, J. (2007) Nature reserves and authoritarian rule in Egypt: embedded autonomy 
revisited. Journal of Environmental Development 16 (4), 375–397.
Spranca, M., Minsk, E. & Baron, J. (1991) Omission and commission in judgment and 
choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 27, 76–105.
Staw, B. M. (1976) Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to 
a Chosen Course of Action. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 
(16(1)), 27–44.
Stearns, P. (1993) The Industrial Revolution in World History. Westview Press, Boulder.
Steckel, J., Brecha, R., Jakob, M., Strefler, J. & Luderer, G. (2013) Development Without 
Energy? Assessing Future Scenarios of Energy Consumption in Developing Countries. 
Ecological Economics 90, 53–67.
Stedman, S. J. (1997) Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security 22 (2), 
5–53.
Stehr, N. (2015) Prima Klima ohne Demokratie. Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 01. 
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/forscher-glauben-autokratien-koen-
nen-klimawandel-abwenden-13941004.html. Accessed 11/30/2015.
Stein, A. (1983) Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. In: Kras-
ner, S. (ed.) International Regimes. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp. 115–140.
Steinberger, J. & Roberts, J. T. (2010) From Constraint to Sufficiency: The Decoupling 
of Energy and Carbon from Human Needs 1975–2005. Ecological Economics 70, 
425–433.
Stirling, A. (2008) Science, precaution, and the politics of technological risk. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 11 (28), 95–110.
Stone, R. W. (2009) Risk in international politics. Global Environmental Politics 9 (3), 
40–60.
Storck, H. von & Stehr, N. (2010) Knowledge Claims in A Post-Normal Stage: Thoughts 
on Climate Science and Policy. https://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2010/07/
knowledge-claims-in-a-post-normal-stage-thoughts-on-climate-science-and-policy/. 
Accessed 8/11/2011.
Stringer, L. C., Reed, M. S., Dougill, A. J., Seely, M. K. & Rokitzki, M. (2007) Implement-
ing the UNCCD: participatory challenges. Natural Resources Forum 31 (3), 198–211.
Sugiyama, T. & Deshun, L. (2004) Must developing countries commit quantified targets? 
Time flexibility and equity in climate change mitigation. Energy Policy 32 (5), 697–704.
Sutton, P. (2000) Explaining Environmentalism. In Search of a New Social Movement. Ash-
gate, Aldershot, UK and Burlinton, USA.
396 References
Sydow, J., Schreyögg, G. & Koch, J. (2009) Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the 
Black Box. Academy of Management Review 34, 689–709.
Tabuchi, H. & Fountain, H. (2017) Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and Companies 
Commit to Paris Accord. New York Times, June 01. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/
climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Tan, O. F. (2017) Duterte’s UP degree and anti-intellectualism. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
April 24. https://opinion.inquirer.net/103422/dutertes-degree-anti-intellectualism. Accessed 
4/24/2017.
Tanaka, K. (2008) Assessment of energy efficiency performance measures in industry and 
their application for policy. Energy Policy 36, 2887–2902.
Tandon, Y. (2008) Ending Aid Dependence. Fahamu, Cape Town, Dakar, Nairobi and 
Oxford.
Tarrow, S. (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 
1st Edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Teng, F. & Gu, A. (2007) Climate Change: National and Local Policy Opportunities in 
China. Environmental Sciences 4, 183–194.
The Economist (2011) Minds like machines. The Economist, November 19. https://www.
economist.com/node/21538698. Accessed 8/18/2017.
The Gleaner (2016) Dumb ‘democracy’—Political system hurting Jamaica. The Gleaner 
- Jamaica WI, February 07. https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20160207/
dumb-democracy-political-system-hurting-jamaica. Accessed 11/21/2017.
Tilly, C. (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Tilly, C. (1985) War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: Evans, P. B., 
Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. (eds.) Bridging the State Back In. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, pp. 169–191.
Tilly, C. (1987) Formalization and quantification in historical analysis. In: Schröder, W. H. 
& Jarausch, K. (eds.) Quantitative history of society and economy: some international 
studies. Scripta Mercaturae, St. Katharinen, pp. 19–29.
Tisdell, C. (2009) Economic Challenges Faced by Small Island Economies: An Overview. 
Economic Theory, Applications and Issues, University of Queensland Working Paper 
No. 58 (ISSN: 1444–8890).
Tocqueville, A. de (1856) The Old Regime and the Revolution: trans. John Bonner. Harper 
& Brothers, New York.
Tokimatsu, K., Ii, R. & Yamaguchi, R. et al. (2013) Measuring future paths of alternative 
sustainability indicators: An assessment of IPCC SRES scenarios. International Journal 
of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 20 (4), 273–286.
Torero, M., Robles, M., Hernández, M., La Roca, J. de, Webber, M. & Thomas, D. (2006) 
The Informal Sector in Jamaica. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C. 
https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/4326. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Toth, F., Mwandosya, M. & Carraro, C. et al. (2001) Decision-making Frameworks: Third 
Assessment Report (TAR) of the Third Working Group. Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, Geneva. https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/. Accessed 11/10/2019.
Tria, J. (2017) Coming to terms with mining, Sec. Gina Lopez, dialogue and science. 
Manila Bulletin, February 06. https://news.mb.com.ph/2017/02/06/coming-to-terms-
with-mining-sec-gina-lopez-dialogue-and-science/. Accessed 3/19/2017.
397References
Trianni, A., Cagno, E. & Farné, S. (2016) Barriers, drivers and decision-making process 
for industrial energy efficiency: A broad study among manufacturing small and medi-
um-sized enterprises. Applied Energy 162, 1537–1551.
Trombetta, M. J. (2019) Securitization of Climate Change in China: Implications for Global 
Climate Governance. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 5 (1), 97–116.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974) Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. 
Science 185, 1124–1131.
Tversky, A. & Kahnemann, D. (1986) Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. The 
Journal of Business 59 (4), S251–S278.
Tyfield, D., Ely, A. & Geall, S. (2015) Low carbon innovation in China: from overlooked 
opportunities and challenges to transitions in power relations and practices. Sustainable 
Development 23, 206–216.
U.S. Department of State (2017) FY 2018 Congressional Budget Justification—Department 
of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Washington, D.C.
Ubac, M. L. (2013) Palace: ‘Three Furies’ will prosecute people in non-Napoles NGO 
scandal. Inquirer News. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/481885/palace-three-furies-will-
prosecute-people-in-non-napoles-ngo-scandal. Accessed 05/28/2019.
UK GOS (2011) Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees, London.
Ullbrich, J. & Lipponer, A. (2011) Salden im Zahlungsverkehrssystem Target2 – ein Prob-
lem? Die europäische Zahlungsbilanzkrise. Ifo Schnelldienst 64, 34–35.
Underdahl, A. (2002) The Outcomes of Negotiation. In: Kremenyuk, V. (ed.) International 
Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Second Edition. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 
pp. 100–117.
UNDP (2017) Jamaica Ratifies Paris Agreement. United Nations Development Program. 
https://www.jm.undp.org/content/jamaica/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2017/04/11/
jamaica-ratifies-paris-agreement.html. Accessed 11/21/2017.
UNFCCC (1992) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. Accessed 05/28/2019.
UNFCCC (2015) Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of Jamaica. https://www4.
unfccc.int/sites/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx. Accessed 
11/05/2017.
UNFCCC (2016) Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, Paris, 
30 November to 13 December 2016.
UNFCCC (2017) Conference of the Parties, Twenty-third session, Bonn, 6–17 November 
2017, Bonn, Germany.
Urpelainen, J. (2011) The enforcement—exploitation trade-off in international cooperation 
between weak and powerful states. European Journal of International Relations 17 (4).
Uy, J. (2016) New groups make it to party-list’s Top 10. Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 11. 
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/784979/new-groups-make-it-to-party-lists-top-10. Accessed 
3/14/2017.
van Asselt, H. & Gupta, J. (2009) Stretching Too Far: Developing Countries and the Role 
of Flexibility Mechanisms of Kyoto. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28, 311–380.
van der Ploeg, F. (2011) Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? Journal of Economic Liter-
ature 49 (2), 366–420.
van Jones (2008) The Green Collar Economy: How One Solution Can Fix Our two Biggest 
Problems. Harper Collins, New York City.
398 References
van Mossel, A., van Rijnsoever, F. & Hekkert, M. (2018) Navigators through the Storm: A 
Review of Organization Theories and the Behavior of Incument Firms during Transi-
tions. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 26, 44–63.
van Vuuren, D., Edmonds, J. & Kainuma, M. et al. (2011) The representative concentration 
pathways: an overview. Climatic Change 109 (5), 5–31.
Varoufakis, Y. (2016) Trump victory comes with a silver lining for the world’s progressives. 
The Conversation, November 11. https://theconversation.com/trump-victory-comes-
with-a-silver-lining-for-the-worlds-progressives-68523. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Vera, B. de & Domingo, R. (2017) LGUs seen losing P821M from mine closures. Philip-
pine Daily Inquirer, February 21. https://business.inquirer.net/224952/lgus-seen-losing-
p821m-mine-closures. Accessed 2/22/2017.
Victor, D. (2017) ‘Climate Change Is Real’: Many U.S. Companies Lament Paris Accord Exit. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/business/climate-change-tesla-corporations-par-
is-accord.html, June 01. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/business/climate-change-te-
sla-corporations-paris-accord.html. Accessed 10/9/2017.
Volz, U. (ed.) (2015) Financing the green transformation: How to make green finance work 
in Indonesia. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke Hampshire, N.Y., NY.
Walker, H., Rogers, L. & Zelditch, M. (1988) Legitimacy and Collective Action: A 
Research Note. Social Forces 67 (1), 216–228.
Wallsten, S. (2000) The effects of government-industry R&D programs on private 
R&D: The case of the small business innovation research program. The RAND Journal 
of Economics 31 (1), 82–100.
Walsh, J. P. (1995) Managerial and organizational cognition: Notes from a trip down mem-
ory lane. Organization Science 6 (3), 280–321.
Wapner, P. (1996) Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics. State University of 
New York Press, Albany.
Warren, M. & Castiglione, D. (2004) The Transformation of Democratic Representation. 
Democracy and Society 2 (1), 20–22.
Watkins, M. & Passow, S. (1996) Analyzing Linked Systems of Negotiations. Negotiating 
Journal 12 (3), 325–339.
WBGU (2009) Solving the Climate Dilemma - the Budget Approach, German Advisory 
Council on Global Change, Berlin.
WBGU (2011) World in Transition. A Social Contract for Sustainability, German Advisory 
Council on Global Change, Berlin.
Weber, m. (1987) Decision making with incomplete information. European Journal of 
Operational Research 28, 44–57.
Weber, M. (1976) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Fünfte, revidierte Auflage. J.C.B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck) Verlag, Tübingen.
Weber, M. (1985) Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkennt-
nis: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftlehre/ Max Weber. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 
146–214.
Weber, M. (2005) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 3rd 
edn. Zweitausendeins, Leipzig.
Weiss, M. L. & Aspinall, E. (2012) Student activism in Asia: Between protest and power-
lessness. Univ. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minn.
399References
Weizsäcker, E. U. v., Hargroves, K., Smith, M., Desha Cheryl & Stasinopoulos, P. (2009) 
Factor Five: Transforming the Global Economy through 80% Increase in Resource Pro-
ductivity. Earthscan, London and Droemer.
Wells, P. (2007) The green junta: or, is democracy sustainable? International Journal of 
Environment and Sustainable Development 6 (2), 208–220.
White, J. & Klein, D. (eds.) (2007) Family Theories. Sage, London.
White, M. (2016) Protests won’t stop Trump. We need a movement that transforms into a 
party. The Guardian, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/14/
protests-donald-trump-democracy-party. Accessed 10/12/2017.
Wigley, T., Richels, R. & Edmonds, J. (1996) Economic and environmental choices in the 
stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Nature 379, 240–243.
Willard, B. (2002) The Sustainability Advantage: Seven Business Case Benefits of a Triple 
Bottom Line. New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, B.C.
Wille, J. (2017) „Das Trauma von Fukushima überwinden“. Frankfurter Rundschau, Sep-
tember 09. https://www.fr.de/wirtschaft/energie/energiewende-das-trauma-von-fukushi-
ma-ueberwinden-a-1403395. Accessed 6/8/2018.
William, I. W. & Rubin, J. (eds.) (2002) Power and Negotiations. University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor.
Williams, F. (2016) Transportation Sector in Jamaica, Jamaica Railway Corporation. Inter-
view by Ariel Hernandez, 14 September 2016.
Willie, S. & Morgan, P. (2016) Electricity in Jamaica, JPSCo, Kingston, Jamaica.
Wilson, M. C. & Wu, J. (2016) The problems of weak sustainability and associated indica-
tors. International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 24 (1), 44–51.
Winham, G. & DeBoer-Ashworth, E. (2000) Asymmetry in Negotiating the Canada-US 
Free Trade Agreement, 1985–1987. In: Zartman, I. W. & Rubin, J. (eds.) Power and 
Negotiation. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, pp. 35–52.
Winham, G. R. (1977) Complexity in International Negotiations. In: Druckman, D. (ed.) 
Complexity in International Negotiations. Sage, Beverly Hills, pp. 347–366.
Winkler, H., Vorster, S. & Marquard, A. (2009a) Who Picks Up the Remainder? Mitigation 
in Developed and Developing Countries. Climate Policy 9, 634–651.
Winkler, H., Vorster, S. & Marquard, A. (2009b) Who Picks Up the Remainder? Mitigation 
in Developed and Developing Countries. Climate Policy 9, 634–651.
Winslow, M. (2005) Is democracy food for the environment? Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 48 (5), 771–783.
Wiser, R., Z. Yang & M. Hand et al. (2011) Wind Energy: In IPCC Special Report on 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation, Cambridge, UK.
Wood, G. (2016) Sustainable buildings in Jamaica, Jamaica Institute of Architects, King-
ston, Jamaica.
Woolgar, S. (1988) Science: The Very Idea. Tavistock Publications, London.
World Databank (2011) World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance 
(GDF). https://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do.
WRI (2009) Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), Washington, D.C.
WTTC (2017) Travel & Tourism—Economic Impact 2017 Jamaica, World Travel & Tour-
ism Council, London. https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-re-
search/countries-2017/jamaica2017.pdf. Accessed 11/21/2017.
400 References
Wu, F. (2016) China’s Emergent City-Region Governance: A New Form of State Spatial 
Selectivity through State-orchestrated Rescaling. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 40 (6), 1134–1151.
Xiaowei, Z. (2004) Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China. Routledge, New 
York.
Yao, S. Chan, R. & Zhu, Y. (1992) Zhongguo de chengshiqun [China’s urban clusters]. 
Chinese Science and Technology University Press, Hefei.
Young, H. P. (1991) Negotiation Analysis. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Young, I. M. (1986) Deferring Group Representation. In: Kymlicka, W. & Saphiro, I. (eds.) 
Nomos: Group Rights. New York University Press, New York, pp. 349–376.
Young, O. (2009) Governance for Sustainable Development in a World of Rising Interde-
pendencies. In: Delmas, M. & Young, O. (eds.) Governance for the Environment. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 12–40.
Zartman, I. W. (1978) The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications. SAGE Publica-
tions, Beverly Hills, CA.
Zartman, I. W. (1988) Common Elements in the Analysis of the Negotiation Process. Nego-
tiation Journal 4 (1), 31–43.
Zartman, I. W. (ed.) (1994a) International Multilateral Negotiations. Jossey-Bass Publish-
ers, San Francisco.
Zartman, I. W. (1994b) Two’s company and more’s a crowd: The complexities of multi-
lateral negotiation. In: Zartman, I. W. (ed.) International multilateral negotiation: 
Approaches to the management of complexity. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 
pp. 1–10.
Zartman, I. W. & Rubin, J. (eds.) (2000) Power and Negotiation. University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Zelli, F. (2011) The Fragmentation of the Global Climate Governance Architecture. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 2, 255–270.
Zerriffi, H. & Wilson, E. (2010) Leapfrogging over development? Promoting rural renewa-
bles for climate change mitigation. Energy Policy 28 (4), 1689–1700.
Zhang, X.-P. & Cheng, X.-M. (2009) Energy consumption, carbon emissions, and eco-
nomic growth in China. Ecological Economics 68 (10), 2706–2712.
Zhang, Y., Lewis, M., Pellon, M. & Coleman, P. (2007) A Preliminary Research on Mod-
eling Cognitive Agents for Social Environments in Multi-Agent Systems, AAAI Fall 
Symposium: Emergent Agents and Socialities, 116123. https://www.semanticscholar.
org/paper/A-Preliminary-Research-on-Modeling-Cognitive-Agents-Zhang-Lewis/
ae51a4a099dca38614fc82fcf8a42a02b682a66e. Accessed 05/28/2019.
Zürn, M. (2002) Zu den Merkmalen postnationaler Politik. In: Jachtenfuchs, M. & Knodt, 
M. (eds.) Regieren in internationalen Institutions: Festschrift für Beate Kohler-Koch. 
Leske und Budrich, Opladen, pp. 215–234.
Zürn, M. (ed.) (2009) Law and Governance in Post-national Europe. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
